We, civil society organisations, including farmers, workers, women's, faith-based and students' groups and organisations, call on our people to redouble their efforts to stop the self-serving free trade agreements, misleading designated as 'Economic Partnership Agreements' that Europe seeks to impose on African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, and which will destroy the economies of these countries.

At our meeting in Cape Town, South Africa, from 20-23 February 2008, under the umbrella of the Africa Trade Network, to review the latest developments in the EPA negotiations, we reaffirm our unequivocal opposition these agreements

When the EPA negotiations were launched, civil society organisations from all over Africa, the Caribbean, the Pacific and Europe warned that the EPAs were profoundly anti-developmental. We pointed out that the EPAs posed a threat not only specifically to government revenue, local producers and industries, food sovereignty, essential public services, and the regional integration of African countries; but also to the right and capacity in general of African countries to develop their economies according to the needs of their people and their own national, regional and continental priorities.

The latest developments in these negotiations have exposed even more sharply the fundamental outrage represented by the EPAs.

At the end of 2007, Europe deployed manipulative and heavy-handed tactics in an attempt to force African governments into so-called 'interim' agreements. When it became clear that no African regional bloc would agree to its demands, the European Commission, with the active support of its member states, resorted to blatant divide-and-rule tactics. Europe capitalised on the fact that, for historical reasons, a few export sectors in Africa are largely dependent on the European market. By threatening to close access to these markets and throw export sectors into chaos, Europe rode roughshod over the regional negotiating processes and instigated bilateral deals with individual countries.

The more vulnerable African governments were forced to concede to Europe's demand for 'interim' trade deals, and in the process, completely undermined regional negotiating positions.

These Interim Economic Partnership Agreements reveal Europe's true face. The deals are classical free trade agreements that clearly serve Europe's commercial and geo-economic interests. All the claims about supporting Africa's development and regional integration have been exposed as false.

Merely to secure a level of market access that is remarkably similar to previous levels, ACP countries involved in the interim agreements have had to concede to opening up their economies to historically unprecedented levels even beyond the commitments required at the multilateral level.

In addition, Europe took advantage of the circumstances to insert clauses in the interim agreements that were not even part of earlier negotiations. These include the 'most favoured nation' clause, a standstill clause that forbids countries from ever raising tariffs on imports from Europe, and restrictions and even outright prohibitions on export taxes. These provisions only serve to lock in further these countries into Europe's agenda, and prevent them from exploring other options and relations within the changing global order. This will take away their space for autonomous policy to create jobs, secure livelihoods and pursue equitable economic development and regional integration.

Throughout the negotiating process, aid has been used as a bait to lure African governments into long and protracted debates, which have diverted attention from the fundamental economic issues at stake and misled them into taking on onerous commitments. As the 'Interim' deals make abundantly clear, promises of additional financing are illusory.

The negotiating agenda for 2008 aims to deepen the above processes. Europe intends to lock in the 'interim' agreements with all their outrageous provisions as quickly as possible. This is a clear breach of the understanding on which they were provisionally initialled - namely that the deals were merely a means to avoid possible retaliation at the WTO and that any contentious elements would be renegotiated.

In addition, Europe is exerting high levels of pressure on African governments to expand the negotiations to open up the services sector and to include binding rules on investment, competition policy, and government procurement. Such rules will take away the right of African governments to manage investment and investors in ways that serve Africa's own development. The inclusion of such issues is not necessary at the multilateral level and against the expressed wishes and declarations of Africa's governments and peoples.

Today it is clear more than ever, that the EPAs are Europe's means of locking-in the fundamentally unequal relationships between Africa and Europe. Viewed from Africa, this is nothing less than re-colonisation.

It is more urgent now, than ever, that Africa's people and their allies unite in action to defeat this agenda.

To this end,We demand that:

- The 'interim' agreements that have been entered into are nullified; and, to avoid threats of trade disruption, options such as enhanced GSP Plus and Everything But Arms are utilised;
- There must be no negotiations on services, investment, intellectual property, competition, government procurement and any other new issues in order to ensure that all sovereignty on these issues is retained at the national and regional levels;
- There must be a return to our own development agendas based on national priorities within consolidated regional communities in Africa;
- Any relationship between Africa and Europe must be based on our development agenda and recognise the principles of non-reciprocity, the right to protect our domestic and regional markets, and our economic sovereignty.

We salute the majority of African Governments that have so far-resisted any form of agreement with Europe. We call on these governments to work with the more vulnerable countries in order to reverse the 'interim' arrangements. We further call on the governments that have initialled agreements not to sign and for parliaments to refuse to ratify them in case they are signed.

We commit ourselves to work with our governments in the quest to achieve more equitable relationships with Europe that protect our sovereignty and autonomous developmental options.

We call on civil society organisations and other citizens groups in Europe and other parts of the world who are also resisting European free trade agreements to strengthen their active solidarity with our campaign to Stop the EPAs.

Stop EPAs!

Stop the re-colonisation of Africa!

The present void as exists in Kenya, says Annar Cassam, is very dangerous for it renders both the elections and the observer missions irrelevant and robs the voters of their democratic rights twice.

Nearly two months after Kenya's rigged elections and Kibaki's "victory" claim set the country on fire, there is one question that has been on everybody's lips and it has still to be answered.

How can it be that this "model" African country,this island of stability, democracy, good governance, economic excellence and humanitarian solidarity in an otherwise chaotic, conflict-ridden and backward part of the continent, can so quickly collapse into tragedy? And this as a result of rigged elections which take place all the time and all over the world, but seldom with such horrendous consequences?

This perception of Kenya being the exception, the model, is widespread, among Kenyans especially and in the outside world but is it really justified, is it not more fiction than fact?

It is difficult to square this image with one simple truth universally acknowledged, that, Kenya is one of Africa's most corrupt countries. Its history of state corruption is not a secret, nor is it complicated to understand, thanks to the country's vibrant and vigilant press and to well-documented investigation reports of major financial scandals, such as the Goldenberg scam (under Moi) and the recent AngloLeasing scam (under Kibaki).

For those who wish to know more about Kenya's endemic culture of corruption at the highest level,a seminar with John Githongo would be useful. Githongo is the former head of the country's anti-corruption unit, now living in exile in London, having fled Kenya in fear for his life in 2005. The myth about Kenya's economic status has long been promoted by representatives of the World Bank and IMF who imagine that Kenya, by virtue of its hosting the "most powerful economy" in East Africa and the UN Office in Nairobi, exists in some other parallel universe, far away from African realities.

However, the people of Kenya are now poorer than ever. According to the Financial Times, in 1990, 48% of the population lived below the poverty line. "Today, four decades after independence, 55% of Kenyans subsist on a couple od dollars a day"(FT.1/1/2008).

Since independence in 1963, the international donor community, led by the UK, has contributed some $16bn in aid. It is also under their watch that Kibera, so-called "the largest slum in Africa" has expanded and festered in the capital city where about 1.2mn people live without clean water and sanitation amenities, many of them without employment or adequate medical care. Vast amounts of Kenya's arable land are owned by the three ruling families,namely, Kenyatta,Moi and Kibaki. Half of the nation's wealth is in the hands of 10% of the population.

Kenyan MPs earn allowances amounting to tax-free salaries of more than $10,000 per month. This is a democratic model very few African countries can afford to emulate. The international community, so massively present in Kenya, has been complicit in fabricating the "model" country myth, to the detriment of the suffering of the Kenyans.The parallel universe complex referred to earlier afflicts the UN Office in Nairobi, the only UN HQ to be based in a developng country, the others being in New York, Geneva and Vienna.UNON is also the seat of two Specialised Agencies, UNEP (environmental programme) and HABITAT (human settlement) and to an ever-expanding network of international organisations, NGOs and commercial enterprises providing financial, policy and logistic support for the many conflict ad disaster-prone populations in the region.

But the plight of the ordinary citizens seems not to be in the mandate of the leadership of this privileged group of international experts who live in daily contact with Kenyans who look after their children, drive their cars, provide security for their property, etc. In the last 10 years, Kenya has become a major exporter of fresh vegetables and flowers to European markets. In the Lake Naivasha area, acres of land lie covered under green-houses where a water-intensive, high-tech industry produces millions of fresh roses to be flown to Holland (for very low prices). The environmental damage caused to local water resources and the hardship this means for the local rural population's ability to grow food crops is a case study for our experts.

Myths can take on a life of their own, unaffected by concrete realities which in Kenya are only too visible. The so-called economic success story should be seen in context. For, however impressive may be the gains on the Nairobi Stock Exchange, the tonnes of agricultural exports, the thousand of tourists, the millions of dollars in aid funds and the 6% growth rate since 2006, this cannot hide the misery and the humiliation of over half the population which used to live on $2 a day before the current breakdown.

It is time to re-consider the continued presence of the UN Office in a country whose government holds such a record of mismanagement and corruption ... and now of election fraud. Kenya's Central Bank, the main beneficiary of the money the UN and allied networks spend in the country will feel the loss,(the "UN business" is said to provide 20% of Kenya's annual forex earnings) but the UN's leadership must surely demand some basic standards of ethical behaviour from the host government, both for its own integrity and credibility and for the sake of the millions of Kenyans now in obvious distress and disarray.

As for the spread of democracy, the Kenyan debacle provides an opportunity for a fresh look at the role of observer missions which arrive in developing countries as watchdogs for the godess of free and fair elections. Is it really enough to fly in, observe, declare this or that and then vanish? Some serious attention needs to be paid to a code of ethics and follow-up mechanisms which can apply in situations where a mission's verdict on rigged elections is ignored and power is grabbed by the faudulent party.

The present void as exists in Kenya is very dangerous for it renders both the elections and the observer missions irrelevant and robs the voters of their democratic rights twice.

Finally, a word about the man who would be president for the second time. By having the elections rigged and then clinging to the trappings of power, Kibaki has shown an abysmal lack of moral principle and leadership. While the country self-destructs and his people turn on each other, while chldren are burnt to death, women and girls raped and many thousands become refugees in their own land, Kibaki has contributed strictly nothing by way of a solution. This is dereliction of duty and reponsibiity which is contemptible and which must be condemned. Kenya, after all is no man's personal property and elections, even when rigged, are not a passport to impunity.

* Annar Cassam is Tanzanian, former Consultant at UNESCO/PEER Nairobi and former Director, UNESCO Office, Geneva
** Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) urges the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) to "to adopt a specific resolution condemning intimidation of human rights defenders, and demand respect for the physical and moral integrity of human rights defenders" amongst other things.

MEMORANDUM TO THE ACHPR ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN KENYA

The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), its member organisation, the Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC), and the Kenyans For Peace, Truth and Justice (KPTJ – a coalition of Kenya's governance, human rights and legal organizations), welcome the decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) to examine the human rights situation in Kenya at the occasion of its 4th extraordinary session which will be held in Banjul, The Gambia, from 15 to 24 February 2008.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

FIDH, KHRC and KPTJ request the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights to:

1. Invite Kenyan, African and International NGOs to present an assessment of the state of human rights in Kenya at the occasion of the 4th extraordinary session.

2. Adopt a resolution at the occasion of the 4th extraordinary session to: a) Condemn the serious violations of the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and its Protocol on the Rights of Women;

b) Denounce the electoral irregularities that were committed during the presidential ballot of 27 December 2007 as blatant violation of the African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance;

c) Reaffirm support toward the efforts of the Mediation Team towards effective political solution to the crisis, based on peace, truth and justice ;

d) Request the Kenyan authorities and any other duty-bearers to: ? ensure unobstructed investigations on the alleged breach of the Presidential and National Assembly Elections Act and the Constitution of Kenya by the Electoral Commission of Kenya;

? ensure the protection of civilians, including human rights defenders; ? take all necessary measures to ensure the end of impunity of the authors, co-authors and instigators of post electoral inter-ethnic violence;

? ensure that all individuals responsible for directly inciting ethnic violence be investigated and prosecuted;

? ensure that all members of security forces responsible for disproportionate repression of peaceful demonstrators and other individuals be investigated and prosecuted; ? ensure the opening of investigations against militia members responsible for human rights violations;

? ensure unobstructed investigations on the murder of two opposition Members of Parliament; death threats pronounced against the human rights defenders;

? take all the necessary measures to ensure respect for the United Nations (UN) Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement;

? establish transitional justice mechanisms to address the underlying causes of the violence and provide justice addressing immediate and historical wrongs in Kenya;

? more generally, to take all necessary measures to settle the root causes of the crisis in Kenya, notably the issue of land and internally displaced persons, and to guarantee justice, respect for human rights and democratic governance.

3) Request, together with Kenyan and International NGOs, a meeting with the African Union Peace and Security Council, to present the human rights situation in the country so as to mitigate or prevent further or imminent violations

4) Invoke its inherent jurisdiction to draw the attention of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government the to existence of serious or massive violations of human rights in Kenya, and the trigger, namely the flawed presidential election

5) Urge the Member States to adopt the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. FIDH, KHRC and KPTJ request the Special Rapporteur of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Human Rights Defenders in Africa:

? To adopt a specific resolution condemning intimidation of human rights defenders, and demand respect for the physical and moral integrity of human rights defenders, in conformity with the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the Declaration on the protection of Human Rights Defenders adopted in 1998 by the United Nations General Assembly.

*Signed by: International Federation for Human Rights Kenya Human Rights Commission Kenyans for Peace, Truth and Justice : ? Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG) ? Awaaz ? Centre for Law and Research International (CLARION) ? Centre for Multiparty Democracy (CMD) ? Centre for Rights, Education and Awareness for Women (CREAW) ? (CRADLE) ? Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) ? East African Law Society (EALS) ? Haki Focus ? Hema la Katiba ? Independent Medico-Legal Unit (IMLU) ? Innovative Lawyering ? Institute for Economic Affairs (IEA) ? Institute for Education in Democracy (IED) ? International Commission of Jurists (ICJ-Kenya) ? Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) ? Kenya Leadership Institute (KLI) ? Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) ? Kituo cha Sheria ? Media Institute ? Muslim Human Rights Forum ? National Constitution Executive Council (NCEC) ? Regional Centre for Stability, Security and Peace in Africa ? Sankara Centre ? Society for International Development (SID) ? Urgent Action Fund (UAF)-Africa ? Youth Agenda.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

The council of the European Union cautions that until a legitimate political settlement is agreed upon, the EU and its Member States will not conduct business as usual with Kenya.

The Council adopted the following conclusions:

1. The Council expresses its deep concern that the violence, uncertainty and instability in Kenya continue.

2. The Council reiterates the urgent need for Kenya’s leaders to engage seriously and flexibly in order to bring an immediate end to the violence and to ensure security, stability and the protection of human rights for all in Kenya. The Council calls on the Kenyan parties to engage constructively in a genuine spirit of compromise in order to find a legitimate political settlement.

3. The Council strongly supports the efforts by the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, led by Mr. Kofi Annan, and stands ready to provide any further assistance it can to this process. The Council reiterates the necessity for the International Community to stand united behind the dialogue process chaired by Mr. Annan. The Council will monitor this process closely. Individuals who obstruct the dialogue process or who encourage violence will have to face the consequences.

4. The Council welcomes the agreement between the Kenyan parties on 1st February to take immediate steps to end the crisis. It is encouraging that the parties plan to address the long term issues as well as the short term ones. The Council welcomes the intention by the Kenyan parties to establish a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission aimed at bringing about debate and consensus on how Kenya should address the root causes of the crisis.

5. The Council welcomes the response by the United Nations to events in Kenya, both politically and in support of the affected civilian population.

6. The Council welcomes the agreement by all parties to an international investigation into the violence since the elections and calls for further co-operation by the Kenyan authorities with the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide of the Secretary General of the UN.

7. The Council reiterates that until a legitimate political settlement is agreed, the EU and its Member States cannot conduct business as usual with Kenya. The Council will continue to closely monitor the situation in Kenya and support all efforts towards ending the violence and ensuring democracy, stability and respect for human rights. "

*Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Community Based Human Rights Network declare full support to the Annan led committee and the progress that has been made so far.

CONCERNED with the political developments in our country resulting from the disputed presidential elections that have triggered politically and ethnically instigated violence affecting most parts of our country and has resulted in the killings of over 1000 people, displacements of an estimated 300,000 people, a third of whom are children who should be in school, teachers and health workers that should be at their workstations alleviating the physical and emotional effects of the violence, and destruction of property worth billions of shillings and the economic effects that this continues to have which include the price hikes of basic commodities,

NOTING the polarisation, negative ethnicity, repression, governance crisis and more so loss of confidence in state institutions.

UNDERSTANDING as human rights defenders that the on going crisis has resulted to violation of fundamental human rights such as rights to life, human dignity, self determination, right to education, right to food, security, information, property, development, protection, freedom of assembly, expression and association, right to information as well as freedom of the press.

APPRECIATING the significant steps through mediation by the Annan led National Dialogue and Reconciliation committee.

WE representatives of the 21 Community Based Human Rights Networks drawn from all the regions of Kenya, purposely convened at the SavelBerg Retreat Centre to discuss the aforestated crisis, wish to outline our observation and proposed remedial measures that in our view will curb the recurrence of a similar scenario in future, while giving adequate redress to the current situations.

WE note with concern that incidences of politically, instigated violence have been experienced in the past especially to the run up to the general elections of 1992,1997 and now 2007.These incidences were generally viewed as state sponsored violence whose purpose was to dispel the increasing demands for comprehensive and people driven reforms. The current crisis took the form of political contestation. It is our observation however, that the driving force for all these clashes were similar. This includes among others:

1. Historical injustices dating back to colonial times especially with regard to distribution of essential resources such as land.
2. Failure to address the constitutional legal policy and institutional reforms in order to redress the above injustices.
3. Negative ethnicity perpetrated by the political class to achieve selfish ends. Tribal political mushrooming.

It is our believe that a permanent and lasting solution can and must be found. In this regard, we wish to declare our full support to the Annan led committee and the progress that has been made so far in regards to;

Constitutional, legal and policy and institutional reforms targeting.
a) The Electoral Commission, The Executive, The Judiciary, Parliament
b) Redress poverty, insecurity and general inequalities
c) Redress historical injustices dating back to the colonial period through a properly constituted and independent truth and justice commission
d) Find a political solution to the current crisis at local levels (division and District levels)
e) Ensure that the state takes up primary responsibility for the IDPs, with non governmental and faith based organizations only playing a complementary role, in dealing with IDPs adhere to the UN Guidelines on IDPs in the numerous IDP camps within Kenya and those in neighbouring countries
f) Note particularly that the state has a duty to safeguard and respect the interests of the IDPs as per the International Humanitarian laws that oblige the state and its agents to provide protection to all IDPs that have a well founded fear for not returning to their homes. The camps must not be closed down without respecting the humanitarian laws.
g) We demand that the state ensures that law and order is maintained by averting further violence (including that perpetrated by state agents) and destruction of property by distinguishing between genuine grievances and the exploitation of the ongoing crisis to resort to criminal activity for personal gain under the pretext of expressing genuine grievance
h) Ensure that in maintaining law and order, state agents do not resort to witch hunting and victimization of real or perceived political opponents,
i) That Hon. Mwai Kibaki and Hon. Raila Odinga must put Kenya’s interests before their own personal interests.

SIGNED BY:

1. Narok Human Rights Networks
2. Wajir Human Rights Network
3. Pro-Active Youth Group, Kangemi
4. Miss-Koch Initiative, Korogocho Nairobi
5. Isiolo Network Human Rights Network
6. Daniel Muoti-Centre for Human and Civic Education, Mwingi
7. I.D.P’s network-Transzoia KTC
8. Kinango Human Rights Network
9. Taita Taveta Human Rights Network
10. Mombasa Human Rights Network
11. Siaya Human Rights Network
12. Laikipia Human Rights Network
13. Mara River Resource Centre
14. Mukogodo Human Rights Network, Laikipia
15. Citizen Land Network, Kibwezi
16. Nyando Human Rights Forum
17. Human Rights Education and Outreach in Schools.
18. Kakamega Human Rights Network
19. Kwale Human Rights Network
20. Ndula Information and Human Rights Resource Centre
21. Mt. Kenya Human Rights Network.

*Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

The The National Civil Society Congress calls for a Marshall-‘Anan’ Plan that will ensure that the country is rebuilt and put on a path to growth, development and prosperity amongst other things.

This is a constitutional moment! While some parties want to negotiate the future of Kenya on a flawed foundation of the current constitution, the National Civil Society congress (the Congress) wants a new constitution to be the basis of negotiating the future.

The congress therefore recommends a mediation package in this order:

RECOMMENDED MEDIATION PACKAGE:

1. The enactment of an Interim constitution to fundamentally transform Kenya’s governance; The congress has proceeded to prepare a progressive draft building on all the constitutional drafts that have been produced so far in the country and will be putting it to public discussion and scrutiny shortly.

2. The establishment of a transitional government that oversees the reconstruction of the country and carrying out transitional justice process;

3. The unveiling and implementation of a Marshall-‘Anan’ Plan that will ensure that the country is rebuilt and put on a path to growth, development and prosperity; and

4. A Truth, Justice and Restitution Commission

ON TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT:

The National Civil Society Congress examined seven options and finally settled at a ‘transitional constitutional and political arrangement’ as the best option. Having already acknowledged that the opportunity for a constitutional moment for our country has never been more ripe than it is now. The congress intends to galvanize the whole country using our networks on the ground to influence the mediation talks for the only constitutional and political arrangement that will save this country from similar-future catastrophe as we have witnessed since December 29th, 2007.

The other options were:

1) Maintain the Status Quo;
2) Presidential Election petition through the Court system;
3) A re-run;
4) Re- tallying of Presidential votes/Forensic audit;
5) Fresh election;
6) Coalition government;
7) Power sharing;
8) Transitional constitutional and political arrangement.

ON INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY:

Kenya as a member of the global community and has thus submitted herself to international support, scrutiny, evaluation and even criticism.

Regionally she is a member of a number of political formations;

- The East African Community (EAC);
- Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD);
- African Union (AU);

Internationally, she is a member of;
- Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM);
- The United Nations (UN).

As a member of these political groupings, Kenya has signed and ratified various regional and international instruments on democratic governance and human rights.

In addition we in the past have offered ourselves as peace mediators for Somalia, Sudan and Uganda and have volunteered Kenyan troops to various countries as part of UN Peace Keeping Missions.

*Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Lucy Hannan looks at the human toll of the Kenya crisis and calls for the Immediate assistance for the huge population of migrant returnees.

I am a television and print journalist providing material for international media outlets and humanitarian organizations. I followed a convoy of displaced Westerners from Tigoni, Central Province, to Kisumu town, Nyanza 9 – 11 February. We drove through Naivasha, Nakuru, Kericho, Mau Summit, and Kapsoit to Kisumu town.

MOVEMENT OF DISPLACED POPULATIONS

Thousands of people are on the move. It continues during the ‘wait and see’ period of mediation. People are seeking safety in their ancestral homeland while there is an opportunity. In many of the towns I passed through, ethnic segregation has effectively been completed. Post ‘cleansing’-violence, there is a new phase of aggression which is less overt but bold and uncompromising. Armed gangs patrol urban and rural areas, issuing threats and maintaining segregation.

Westerners are relocating West, and displaced Kikuyus moving towards Nairobi. Trucks piled high with furniture and household possessions characterize traffic flow on all parts of the route, most concentrated around Nakuru, Kericho and Kisumu. Yet major camps for the displaced have not emptied, indicating the population shift is massive and continuous; costs and logistics are inhibiting movement of the poorest; and, fear of attack and reprisals have not reduced despite the recent calm. The Showground (Kikuyu) and Stadium (non-Kikuyu) in Nakuru were still full on Sunday evening, including new arrivals.

Quote from Richard Maiko (Kisii), Kericho; waiting three days on the side of the road with house contents: ‘I live in Baraka estate, which is mixed, where there have been problems of burning and threats since the time of elections….I am married to a Kalenjin and thought I was ok. There are gangs of Kalenjin in the estate who move around looking for Kisii and Kikuyu.. Three days ago (Wednesday) they came to my house and said to my face: we don’t want to see Kisiis here, and we don’t want to hear about being married to a Kalenjin. Leave or die.’

There is a politicization of transportation and assistance for the displaced. ODM groups and individuals are assisting Luos and Luhyas to move; with donated bus lines and trucks, and funds raised from allied diaspora groups. Displaced Kikuyus are pursuing promises by the government to rebuild or relocate. Andrew Muturi, heading a group of displaced Kikuyus in Kisumu town, said ‘we are in dialogue with the DC, and have been offered a subsidy, we are making a claim for rebuilding. We have received no money but have been told it will take 7-21 days.’ He lives in Kondele police station and runs the gauntlet through town to the DC’s office in an atmosphere of threat. On Friday a Kikuyu was beaten to death in Kisumu town. Muturi says there is a case of a Kikuyu patient driven out of the hospital, and believes he as a Kikuyu no longer has access to the bank.

There is tangible bitterness from displaced populations that the ‘other side’ variously receives more assistance or sympathy. In Kisumu, this directly affects humanitarian assistance, with political divisions and accusations of partiality between NGOs. In the present climate in Kisumu, the Red Cross, for example, is considered government-allied. All arrivals are being taken to St Stephens Church run by local NGO, church and diaspora groups, despite better Red Cross resources and capacity. Heavy rain has exacerbated poor conditions for the displaced – many sit on plastic chairs all night in wet areas. There are problems with separated children, trauma, hunger, property loss, sickness - particularly respiratory diseases and diarrhoea as a result of long periods in police stations and previous camps. A small number say they have no ‘home’ to go to.

KISUMU TOWN

Kisumu town is in a critical transition stage and has imminent potential to become ungovernable.

The government and the security forces have lost legitimacy and respect. Raila Odinga/ODM has apparent ubiquitous support. Post-election violence has been through different stages: first, protest rioting and the targeting of Kikuyu businesses and property; next, ethnically-directed retaliation attacks; then, focusing on economic privilege or ‘discrimination’ within the Luo community itself.

It has entered a ‘wait and expect’ period. There is a widespread belief among the population that ‘mediation and negotiation’ means coming to the decision that Raila must be given what he was denied, i.e. the presidency. The process of mediation, at the moment, is considered legitimate and just: but time is likely to be a factor. Like the delay of the election results - which triggered the first round of violence in Kisumu – delays over reaching an agreement could have the same effect. In such a case, the local political class will also lose credibility and legitimacy. There have already been threats against Raila’s property (Molasses Plant and Bondo home) if he is seen to ‘betray or delay’.

‘Stolen votes’, and security force killings, are a general preoccupation, across the board. Government is generally held in contempt; and security forces are unable or unwilling to carry out their work, despite public fear of gangs and criminals who have moved into the vacuum. Security forces attempting to impose any sort of control or authority – like dismantling existing road blocks or shooting criminals – is seen as state repression, or political dissent. Bringing murder charges against the policeman filmed shooting two young men dead appears to have made no difference to this perception. The trial has the potential to become very political. There is suspicion that the officer charged – a Kalenjin – is in fact a ‘fall guy’ for a Kikuyu officer and the case will be a whitewash.

Ajulu, businessman, living in Polyview estate: ‘We organized our own security groups and patrol night and day. There were gangs who said they were looking for Kikuyus, but they would just identify an affluent-looking house, demand entrance, and then take what they could get. We had to actually fight these gangs…..I now have three pangas in my house …. We have become a target. It has been difficult at times for people like me to drive a vehicle, cars have been taken….for example, from town centre to Kisani there are about six road blocks and when things are bad you get charged about 100 shillings at each, harassed and threatened.’

Young boda-boda driver who has manned road blocks and demonstrated: ‘We are waiting for Tuesday to hear the result of the talks. If Raila is not president, we will fight…. We will kill each other.’

ARRIVAL OF MIGRANTS

Returning migrant labourers are now forced to live with families that they were previously supporting. It is a ‘poor impoverishing poor’ scenario. A tea picker in Tigoni, for example, gets paid about 5 shillings per kilo, sending home about 2-3,000 shillings per month to an unemployed extended family.

A high population of Western migrant workers resided in Central Province because Nyanza is a consuming rather than producing region, with poor economic indices. Nyanza migrants were described to me as an ‘underclass’ typically without property, credit facilities, job security or education. They are returning empty-handed. Many had lived for decades in Central Province, with a secondary, nominal relationship to their ancestral land.

There is nervousness among the Kisumu population what the impact of this influx will be. ‘They are coming to depend on us and we can’t afford it. We struggle, and they will struggle for what little is here, so we will be struggling among ourselves.’

Resentment for this is put in a political context: underdevelopment in Nyanza is perceived as deliberate economic and political marginalization and the failure of the government to give Luos ‘our turn’.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It would seem necessary to devise a practical strategy to explain the mediation and power sharing process in Kisumu town during this period, by civil society rather than politicians. Local politicians and leaders are held hostage by a hardline constituency who have an enormous sense of distrust and injustice over the election results – so politicians are under pressure to ‘perform’ to expectations rather than explain, as was the case this weekend by a visiting group of MPs. Taking into consideration the reaction in Kisumu during the delay of election results, there should be concern about any perceived delay in the mediation process – particularly during News Blackout. Since the December riots, Kisumu town has gone through progressive stages of violence, including unprecedented state violence. A new trigger could make Kisumu ungovernable.

Immediate assistance for the huge population of migrant returnees would seem to be an essential component of any solution, as, apart from humanitarian reasons, in the present context, its absence or inadequacy is perceived to be deliberate marginalization; and returnees are particularly vulnerable to the state and security vacuum.

*Lucy Hannan is a Television and Print Journalist.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

John Samuel argues that the opiates of new conservatism, fundamentalism and other forms of politics of exclusion- make a bad divine comedy of Politics and makes a tragedy of democratic process.?

??In the beginning there was word, word was with God and word was God. Then the Priest came to represent the Word and the God. Then came the sword. Sword was with the Prince. And sword was the Prince. Then prince became the state and State became the sword. Then came the trade. Trade was with the merchant. Trade was Merchant. Merchant became the Market. Market became the Missionary. Hence, the World was made of words, swords and trade. Word was spread through the sword. Words sustained the sword. Then trade helped to spread the word and the sword. Here began the divine comedy of words, sword and trade. Priests, Prince and Merchant ran the world with their words, swords and trade. This divine comedy is the mother of all politics.??

Politics is the dynamics of power-relations in a given society at a given point in time. Power relations often get channeled thorough and negotiated by social institutions. Historically, socio-cultural institutions like religion, clans, tribe and family played a very important role in channeling, mediating and negotiating power and political process. ??Divinity was evoked to legitimize and sustain power in the realm of religious institutions and religion often subcontracted such process to family by “legalizing” and legitimizing the most important events of human life- birth, death, and procreation through male-female relationships.

Religion created the soft-power through beliefs, knowledge, myths, rituals and institutions. Such a sense of soft-power was a pre-requisite to build hard power through the sword. Priest became the first ideologue of political power. He gave moral legitimacy for domination through patriarchy. The Brahmin, Mullah, Monk, or the Bishops interpreted the world and legalized the words- by making the norms, canons and law. Priests played multiple roles as philosophers, theologians, teachers, sorcerer and alchemists. Priests created the “order of things”. Priest was a necessity for the entry and sustenance of the Prince. The most common form of evident power was always the “physical” contestation to acquire and dominate. This gets institutionalized through weapons, army and war. Military provided the bull-work to dominate and sustain power for the Prince- from Darius to Alexander to the Romans, from Genghis Khan to Ottomans Turks, from Napoleon to Hitler, and from Stalin to George Bush!??

Power was legitimized by the Priests, disguised as philosophers or teachers, and sustained by the Military of the Prince. The hegemony at given time was managed through the process of creating consent (often through religious –social networks) and coercion (by the Military power of the Prince). Priest and the prince together made the Law and Order- where they combined the power of the word and the sword.??

With the emergence of trade, market, and surpluses, money began to play a role in shaping politics. Eventually the art of politics was managed by the Prince (with weapons and army), Priest (who derive authority from the divine) and the Merchant (who financed war). The entire colonial project and imperialist politics were driven by the old power trinity of the Prince- Priest and Merchant. They used trade, sword and bible to appropriate territories, markets, culture and human mind. In many ways religions and priests provided the moral and ideological framework to capture and dominate the world. Most of the major religions spread across the world either through sword or trade. Hence, the priest was an ideological necessity to give moral veneer to any act of atrocity and domination. All major religions have the smell of blood acquired through war and plunder at one point or other point in history. Patriarchy, totem and taboo and identity based contestation became the underlying factors to acquire, sustain and manage power relationships.??

Then the nation-state came. Prince, Priest and Merchants were not supposed to be in charge. “We the people” were supposed to be in charge of the modern manifestation of power. New institutional formations came into being to channel, negotiate and sustain power. That is how political parties came in as a modern social- and political institution, in the context of the liberal democratic politics and state. ??With the separation of the Church and State, a relatively secular democratic process emerged in many of the countries in Europe and other parts of the world. Secular democracy became the flavour of the month. Thus the priest and the merchant retreated to background of the political process. The emergence of the political parties helped to replace the old political nexus of Prince-Priest and the Merchant. In the process, the new power-elites competed with each other, in the name of various political parties, to capture and sustain the state power. Those leaders in the business of capturing and sustaining state power, through “democratic processes, became the modern day equivalent of the Prince.?????

In the course of democratic exercise of capturing and sustaining the state power, merchants once again came to the forefront as the financiers of the political parties and electoral process. This nexus of political elites and powerful corporate elites appropriated the modern state and institutions of governance. With the emergence of neo-liberal policy framework, the cash-rich corporate leaders began to influence political and policy making process through financing political parties, electoral process and through knowledge- media network. ??While this new nexus subverted the democratic process and appropriated the policy making process, political party leaders lost the moral authority to influence society or people. This made them increasingly dependent on religious institutions and networks to seek social legitimacy and to gather votes. They needed the blessings of Bishops- Mullahs or Swamis or Monks to sustain to their State power and electoral base. Thus, the priest too returned to the forefront of the political process.?

So the old nexus of the Prince, Priest and Merchants are back in their new avatar of the power trinity of political leaders- transnational corporations- new religious networks and leaders. In spite of secularism and democracy, religion refuses to fade away from politics (with their divine commissions, sanctions, authority and vested interests). Religious leaders and networks too adopted a marketing approach, using modern media, advertisement, high-tech networking and strategic influence to increase their power and presence. Military and market are still in charge in most of the countries in the world. In many cases, both the religious institutions and the military are in the business of discrediting, undermining and sabotaging political parties to sustain their power. Media often play a subservient role to Market and Religion- as both are sources of revenue. Instead of being the fourth-estate among the democratic institutions, Media has become the pimp of the new power trinity... They have successfully appropriated the state power and institutions of governance- by subverting the political process.??

The interesting thing is that most of the authoritarian military regimes do not touch religion and many a time they rule in collusion with religion or religious institutions. Such religious institutions or network are also well entrenched social network to channel power, to collect information, to manage, to control and to dominate through power-networks of the prince and the priests. The prince and the priest tend to seek validation and resources from the merchant to sustain the power. All three of the “power-characters” see political parities as a necessary modern evil! This new power nexus has either appropriated political parties as an instrument to capture state power or discredited political parties to directly capture the state power through military coup. ??Thus democracy has been reduced to a formal electoral mechanism or a farce. Democracy is often used as a mere veneer of legitimacy to capture and sustain State- Power. In fact, the priest is back in the form of new conservatism, in the form of vote-bank, in the form of new fundamentalism and in the form of new identity politics. As the political parties and leaders get seduced into the big money and corrupt practices, the religious leaders (Bishops, Mullahs, Swamis and Monks) tend to influence society through their media, social network and identity politics; harvesting on the new insecurities and paranoia in the context of consumerism, advanced capitalism and terrorism.?

Thus Politics itself is being turned into a Divine Comedy- where Priests once again return to the centre stage with their divine aura and new marketing techniques to become the king-makers in the postmodern world. Prince and Merchants get into in to a new power-sharing. In the process, state becomes subservient to market, with the blessings of the Priest. Citizens are reduced to consumers or believers- who are ready to buy and follow, who are ready to kill themselves or be killed for their beliefs. When the citizens are robbed off their sense of agency, most of the “mass” end up as the puppets of the merchant or priests and they dance to tune of the prince. This dancing of “mass” –alienated from the sense of agency- to the tune of Priests – to the tune of new conservatism, fundamentalism and politics of exclusion- make a bad divine comedy of Politics. It makes a tragedy of democratic process.?

It is high time to reclaim the state and democratic process from the new avatars of the old nexus of Prince-Priest – Merchants. It is also time to ensure that the Bishops-Mullahs Swamis and Monks do not make a divine comedy out of democracy.

* John Samuel is a human rights activist and is currently International Director of Actionaid, based in Bangkok.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Kola Ibrahim argues that unless the Nigerian students and workers take on the government and make it rescind its commercialization of education, it will be become exclusive to rich.

For those who still nurse the illusion that the present Yar'Adua's government will be different from the past should be having a rethink as the current capitalist government is bent on continuing the neo-liberal economic policies of the past especially as it concerns the education sector. Just few weeks ago, the minister of education, Igwe Ajah Nwachukwu was quoted in two forums reiterating the government's decision to hike fees in all Nigerian universities. The new policy will see already impoverished students coughing out tens of thousands in a country where over sixty percent are officially recognized as living in penury; and where government find it a onerous task to pay N11, 000 minimum wage for workers.

This new policy is to say the least anti-poor and incoherent. It is anti-poor because it will definitely deny thousands of youth access to university education while placing the burden of funding education on parents and students many of whom are from poor working class, peasant and wounded middle class background. It is incoherent because it failed to justify the logic of government’s so-called increased budgetary allocation. If the federal government claimed to have increased budgetary allocation - which in the real sense is a ruse - why then is the need to further place burden of education funding on poor parents and students since the increased (?) budgetary allocation is meant to, at least, lessen the burden of parents and students, and to improve standard. The new regime of fees to be introduced could hardly resolve a single of the problems confronting the education sector. The hypocrisy of the government is further shown by the fact that no public probe has been made into billions being squeezed out of the pockets of parents and students, and the huge billions being budgeted for education yearly but looted through crooked means making most of the facilities in our schools at all levels continue to rot despite increased charges.

The real reason why the government cannot undertake a serious and holistic probe of the education fund is because the budget itself, drawn up in the boardrooms of IMF/World Bank officials are built on the sandy foundation of neo-liberalism which means acute cut in social spending vis-à-vis education, health, etc and concentration on policies that will enhance the profit of the business community and the international moneybags in Nigeria, that is through budgetary allocation for bailing out big private businesses – who have been engaging in rapacious exploitation of the resources of the country especially the human labour – after they might have run into competition crisis. The rest of the budget is used to invite the foreign experts through consultancy projects that have little on no impacts on the lives of ordinary Nigerian. This is why a huge chunk of the education budget is allocated to seminars and lectures on issues such as AIDS/HIV when in actual facts many young ladies are taking to prostitution as a result of the failed education sector.

As against the so-called much lauded thirteen percent of the budget being allocated to education, the real education budget is less than 8.8 percent. The thirteen percent that has received unprecedented applause from our "respected" public analysts and the media is only for the recurrent/over head cost which does not cover the developmental projects such as expansion of facilities. To further show the hypocrisy of this government, the 13 percent does not include increase salaries especially for teachers (majority of whom are living in abject poverty), reduction in fees paid by poor students, etc. already the university lecturers are already bemoaning the stagnation in university special grants. In the real sense, the increase in recurrent budget is meant for consultancy service. Even, the highly anti-poor Obasanjo government budgeted about 11 percent for education at its inception. The capital budget that could have expanded the facilities in schools received little or no increase.

Therefore, the budget is a continuation of the old ruinous policy of cut in education budget in a bid to maintain fiscal balance for non-existent investors. Coupled with this is the continuous commercialization of education especially in order to lay the basis for its total privatization which has been achieved in the primary education sub-sector. Is it not instructive that all governments, especially state and federal government have laid the basis for private takeover of secondary schools as this sub-sector has witness unprecedented rot with mushrooms of private secondary schools – mostly owned by public officials and their acolytes –growing of the rot. In the University sub-sector, the same process is going on with public universities being under funded while private ones charging hundreds of thousands continue to increase. The new agenda is to commercialize public education to a point where public education will be totally unattractive to the people and thus lay the basis for their eventual privatization. This is what is being planned for the Law Schools and the Unity Schools. While the law school fees was hiked 100 percent to N230,000, which has denied hundreds of law students access to this year's law school programme, new generations of students are not allowed into the unity schools so as to justify their rottenness and thus eventual privatization. Already less than ten percent of university-aged youth are currently in schools or have graduated. Nigerian resources if judiciously used could fund free and qualitative education but the neo-liberal, pro-rich, anti-poor market-oriented policies which subsequent Nigerian governments have committed themselves to will not allow this.

Between 1999 and now, Nigeria has accrued nothing less than over N10 trillion naira with practically nothing to show for it than opulence for the few. This money is enough to lay the basis for massive development of the country economically and politically but the neo-liberal ideology teaches Nigerian leaders to subject provision of social service such as functional education, affordable healthcare, massive transportation development (road, rail, water), job creation, food and energy supply, etc to market forces, that is the law of the survival of the fittest which gives the service to the highest bidder. These policies have meant that it is the rich that will be buying up the country’s resources at token while majority will not be able to afford the huge cost needed to access social service. This is in addition to the mindless looting of the nation’s wealth by the unproductive Nigerian ruling class and their private collaborators, both local and foreign which itself is facilitated by the market idea that deify the ruthless private sector. All societies that have developed does so based on government massive intervention in the provision of basic facilities for the industrialization of the country including social services. Even the much glorified Asian Tigers were massively supported by the US as a counterweight against the fast developing ‘communist’ China. Also in Nigeria, the little development, universities, research institutes, health institutions, road and rail constructions, etc that we have had was products of the massive investment in developmental projects by past governments of the 1970’s and ‘80’s. in fact, introduction of top up fees contributed to the early and inglorious exit of Tony Blair in Britain.

Unless the NIGERIAN students and workers are ready to take on this government and make it rescind its anti-students education commercialization, education will be made the exclusive preserve of the rich. It is unfortunate that no students' union or NANS structure in the country has taken any step to stop this policy not even on the law school fee hike, yet students' unions are being destroyed in preparation by university administrators for the introduction of this policy while various state governments have already begun the process, for instance Lautech (N6,000 to N40,000), UniOSun (Between N160,000 to N300,000), Tai Solarin University (N50,000), etc. Crisis are already brewing in many campuses where education are being or are going to be commercialized – UniAbuja, ABU, OAU. Those institutions which have destroyed students’ unionism such as UI and UNILAG have turned the campuses to ghost of themselves with students being in serious insecurity and living under unfavourable living and studying conditions with no students' body to agitate for them.

It is funny that a government that wants to create an industrialized economy by 2020 is not ready to dedicate not even 20 percent of its budget to education when UNESCO prescribed 26percent for a developing economy. It is unfortunate that many students' unions have turned themselves to the extension of their various managements. Notwithstanding this, students across the country must pressure their local students’ union leaderships and NANS leaders to declare “days of actions” to include press campaign, rallies, lecture boycott, protest marches to demand for proper funding of education by at least 26 percent of the budget as prescribed by UNESCO for developing economies coupled with DEMOCRATIC running of the education sector to include education workers’ unions and students' movements. If the NANS leadership fails, genuine radical students’ unions and organizations must build a radical pan-Nigerian students’ platform to lead this campaign. They must reach out to workers’ movements and link their demands with that of other oppressed strata in Nigeria as a basis of building supports.

The current ruling class is ready to defend its class interest through neo-liberalism, unless the workers, students, peasants and the oppressed through their organizations such as NLC and TUC, students’ unions, ASUU, market men and women organizations, community movements, etc must resist this by fighting for their own class interests through the struggle for an egalitarian society which can only be achieved through nationalization of the commanding height of the Nigerian economy under the democratic control of the working and toiling people themselves. This raises the need for a radical, socialist-oriented, working people’s political party that will fight for powering order to enthrone the working people’s government which will develop the vast resources of the country.

*Kola Ibrahim Activist from Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife Member, Education Rights Campaign (ERC).

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Kofi Akosah-Sarpong argues that the key challenge for African leaders to work with states created by Europe in a way that they are able to appropriate the various ethnic groups’ histories and traditional values that form their nation-states, for peace and progress.

"We have met the enemy and he is us," Pogo

The December, 2007 presidential elections troubles in Kenya that saw over 1,000 people killed reveals the unresolved “rage” of Africa’s ethnicity, as the Polish-born novelist Joseph Conrad will tell you in his famous “suppressed rage” phrase that fits some of Africa’s deadly ethnic conflicts. Despite attracting charges of racism and paternalism in the “Heart of Darkness,” Conrad’s observation of Africa mired in something primal and savage may be as relevant as practicable in certain ways as some African ethnic conflicts and bad governments show.

Some of the ethnic conflicts and some of the bad governments tell Africans that the central issue of genuine consolidation of their nation-states isn’t well formed and that it isn’t whether the African nation-states weren’t created by Africans or in the ensuing creation by the Europeans some ethnic groups are thought to be incompatible as some Nigerians will tell you of some of the 250 ethnic groups that form their country. The key challenge is how African elites can work with their European creation in such a way that they are able to appropriate the various ethnic groups’ histories and traditional values that form their nation-states for peace and progress. For scholarship and research, as Daniel Tettey Osabu-Kle makes clear in “Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key to Development in Africa,” part of the solutions of resolving some of the perennial African ethnic tensions and conflicts lies in “using modified, indigenous political structures and ideologies.”

In Ghana, the Konkomba and Bimoba, among some few groups, have been having on-again, off-again bloody conflicts. Still, in Ghana the Ewe ethnic group of the Volta Region, some of which groups have suffered some bloody chieftaincy conflicts recently, feel hated within the nation-state and one of their traditional rulers, Agbogbomefia of the Asogli, Togbe Afede XIV, has observed that not only the ideals of good governance can cure long simmering tribalism and ethnicity. In eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the story is as fearful and bloody today as Conrad’s 1902 “Heart of Darkness,” which was set in the DRC.

In Central African Republic, the ethnic conflict is so bad that it appears it has become a "forgotten emergency," country suffering from “more than a decade of political instability.” In Chad, in mixture ethnic conflicts, family feud and oil windfall over 100 people have been killed in the past weeks. In Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country with 250 ethnic groups and over 800 dialects, ethnic conflicts in some of the regions has become a daily diet and some Nigerians think their country is ungovernable. With nearly two million displaced people living in squalid camps and thousand killed, Sudan’s ethnic conflict ridden Darfur region is as true as Conrad’s character.

Once again, Kenya’s election-influence ethnic conflict reveals the weak foundation of the African nation-state. Despite its pretensions, as Robert Calderisi, author of “The Trouble With Africa: Why Foreign Aid isn’t Working,” recalls, from start, Kenya, if its troubles are viewed from the bigger picture, hasn’t been as cool as the uninformed thinks - its foundational ethnic structures weak. In the 1950s, in the land war among the Kikuyu ethnic group called the Mau Mau Rebellion, some 50,000 people were killed. In an assassination that traumatized Africa, Tom Mboya, a rising politician of his age group was killed. For fear of ethnic conflict, Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, was virtually shut down for three days when President Jomo Kenyatta died in 1978.

Still, to avoid ethnic conflict between the Kikuyu, who have ruled Kenya since independence in 1963, and the Luo, their main rival, as Calderisi argues, the ruling party, KANU (Kenya African National Union), chose an interim leader from a small group, the Kalenjin, Daniel Arap Moi, who ruled for 24 years. In a pattern where watchers argue reveal Kenyan leaders brewing ethnic conflicts during election periods to suit their political whims and caprices, in 1992 and 1997, in the western Rift Valley and along the coast, bloody conflicts were common feature, disrupting one of Kenya’s sources of income, tourism.

The Kenyan ethnic conflict also shows that for the past 50 years Africans have suffered from bad leaders who either have weak grasp of the traditional values wheeling their nation-states or do not understand their nation-states, from within their foundational traditional values, or do not care about their people’s peace despite their long-suffering and fatalism. But how durable is African peoples’ peace? Calderisi argues that in the 1990s as some of Africa’s states such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Somalia and Zaire (DRC) smoulder, “eight in ten Africans were still living in peace. But it was false peace.”

Africans’ false peace emanates from the fact that their traditional values do not technically drive their nation-states’ progress but rather their ex-colonial ones, and in the ensuing confusion, creating false development processes among the over 2,000 ethnic groups with their over 3,000 dialects that form Africa – and creating all sorts of conflicts, some of which tension dates back to pre-colonial times, with the slightest mishap as the recurring ethnic conflicts in some parts of northern Ghana show. The false peace and deadly conflicts also show an Africa which two solitudes – the traditional and the ex-colonial neo-liberal/Western – not reconciled enough to harmonize the two Africas for peace and progress, as George B. N. Ayittey argues in “Africa in Chaos.”

In most of the 1980s, and good part of the 1990s, as African nation-states face severe crises and appear to be crumbling because of the rupture between ex-colonial legacies and African indigenous values, the London, UK-based African Confidential newsletter (January 6, 1995) explains that “There are signs everywhere that the era of the nation-state is fading and nowhere is this clearer than in Africa, where its roots are shallowest. The awkward marriage of the ‘nation’ in the sense of an ethnic coalition and the ‘state’ as the principal source of political authority is coming under pressure from above and below.” The fact is, the roots of African nation-state are not shallow, for it stands firmly in African traditional values. What is shallowest is the “state,” as ex-colonial creation, not skillfully and properly weaved into the “nation” as a development project.

How incompatible is the African state and the African nation, structurally and developmentally, is captured in Joshua B. Forrest’s investigative work “Subnationalism in Africa: Ethnicity, Alliances, and Politics.” Forest makes the case that the emergence of Africa’s subnationalism movements today, despite the near-commonality of African cultures, aim to rally political power as a way of seeking territorial autonomy within a particular nation-state because of either power issues as is seen in Kenya or natural resource problems as was seen in Sierra Leone or developmental inadequacies as Sudan show.

In a way, as Jeffrey Herbst analyses in “States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control,” the problem of state consolidation from the pre-colonial phase, through the short but intense interlude of European colonialism, to the modern era of independent states, is riddled with misunderstanding and many unresolved issues by African elites. As Kenya, Sudan’s Darfur, Central African Republic, the Niger Delta of Nigeria, eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, among others, show, Herbst's makes bold analytical case that the conditions now facing African state-builders is to work to resolve what had existed long before the European colonialists came to Africa.

While former United Nations chief Kofi Annan, the African Union and the international community may work to douse off the Kenya election-fueled ethnic conflicts, the underlying challenge is how to stem off the country’s self-destruction in the long haul. That may involve not only Annan and the international community, whose work will soon end, but the appropriation of Kenyan/African traditional values and institutions, as George Ayittey argues in “Indigenous African Institutions,” into resolving the long-running tensions and conflicts that pre-dates Kenya that will make the over 70 distinct ethnic groups that form the Kenyan nation-state feel good.

The idea isn’t only to avoid “ethnic rage” disguised under false peace but also as Pogo, the Walt Disney cartoon character, says, "We have met the enemy and he is us" – that’s the understanding that Africa’s troubles, as George Ayittey explains in “Africa Betrayed,” should start from its elites’ bad behaviour and their inability to understand the continent from within its traditional institutions and values. And that makes the African’s so-called enemy himself/herself first and any other second. The hard reality is that either in the Kenyan elections or the Togolese elections in 2005 that saw over 800 people killed, as Thomas Spears argues in “Neo-Traditionalism and the Limits of Invention in British Colonial Africa,” Africa’s ethnic conflict has much to do with Africans’ pre-colonial conditions as much as its colonial and post-colonial circumstances.

*By Kofi Akosah-Sarpong is a journalist with the Expo Times Independent Sierra Leone.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Edward Ball argues that in addition to a troubled Bush Africa legacy, Bush's family owned slaves

The image most people have of slavery involves a cotton plantation with a big white house, a black village where 300 people live in cabins and a cruel overseer in the wings. This was not the model followed by the ancestors of President George W. Bush when, 175 years ago, they enslaved about 30 people on the shores of the upper Chesapeake.

A new book by Jacob Weisberg, The Bush Tragedy, mentions in passing that at one time some of the president's family owned slaves. Weisberg doesn't dwell on the links between the White House and the antebellum past except to say the Bush clan's story is a long-held "family secret." The Bush Tragedy, a revealing book about family dynamics in the Bush political dynasty, treats the slavery matter only briefly, focusing instead on the "spectacular, avoidable flame-out" of the receding administration. But the story that joins the 43rd president to predecessors who held title to dozens of people bears retelling in detail.

The skeletal facts surfaced in April 2007, when an amateur historian named Robert Hughes published his research in the IllinoisTimes, a small paper out of Springfield. Hughes found census records showing that during the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, in Cecil County, Maryland, five households of the Walker family, the president's ancestors via his father's mother, Dorothy Walker Bush, had been slaveholding farmers. The evidence is simple but persuasive: genealogies of the Bush family match up with census data that counted farmers who used enslaved workers. With this, the president joins perhaps fifteen million living white Americans who trace their roots to the long-gone master class.

It's not as though the president is the only politician whose family owned slaves. Of the first eighteen presidents, from George Washington to Ulysses Grant, twelve owned people, eight of them while in office. At one time, Andrew Jackson was even a slave trader. Since Emancipation in 1865, a number of presidents have come from families that once contained slave masters. Even the current presidential hopefuls are likely to have slave owners among their ancestors. The descendants of slaveholders do not wear special tattoos or announce themselves in secret handshakes, but most know who they are.

The tragic story of America's slave days inspires disabling levels of fear among whites and anger among blacks. Probably neither the 43rd president nor his father, the 41st, possesses the introspection needed to grasp the relationship between the Bush family's slaveholding past and its present circumstances without escaping into defensiveness. Still, President Bush has talked about slavery from several microphones, most memorably in a 2003 speech on Gorée Island, one of the "slave castles" in West Africa from which captive youth and children were dispatched to the Americas. Speechwriters likely supplied the words on that occasion when the president said, "slavery was one of the greatest crimes of history." But the words fell short of an accounting by the White House for America's role in the Middle Passage, and they came before the revelation of the Bush family's own link to the slave past.

As for the African Americans in this tale, the Walker family slaves, neither names nor biographical details about them have survived. According to the genealogist who uncovered the records, Robert Hughes, the census accounts show that they lived at four different farms in Cecil County, Maryland, on a string of land called Sassafras Neck, which separates two slender rivers that empty into upper Chesapeake Bay. There, in 1790, William and Sarah Davis, direct ancestors of the president, owned seven people, while another branch of the family owned five. Twenty years later, in 1810, a third couple in the president's ancestral clan were counted as masters to eighteen people. The last appearance of the family as slaveholders of record comes in 1830, when George E. and Harriet Walker, great-great-great grandparents of President George W. Bush, owned 321 acres and two slaves, a female between 10 and 24 and a male between 24 and 36. The namelessness of the slaves is the fault of the so-called slave schedules used in the census, which called for nothing more than approximate ages.

With their small farms, the Walkers and their cousins did not belong to the class of oligarchs, whose vast plantations held scores or hundreds of workers. I've looked, and there were dynasties in Cecil County, places like Cherry Grove, former residence of a Maryland governor, and Mt. Harmon, a vast tobacco estate with a Georgian mansion. The president's forebears probably saw themselves as little people in competition with these fat-cat neighbors.

Still, all slaveholders were also slave traders. The president's family had to avail themselves of a slave auction on at least two occasions: initially, to buy people, and later, when a Walker farm failed, to sell some of the same people, much the way a stockholder liquidates an investment. No story has surfaced about how it happened, but in the mid-1830s, it appears that George E. Walker, the president's third great-grandfather, lost his land. After that, in 1838, he packed his family into a wagon and went west, settling in southern Illinois on a homestead near the town of Bloomington. It is from this branch of migrants that the current Bush clan descends.

Since the Walkers, in effect, declared bankruptcy, and there is no evidence they kept slaves after 1838, it is difficult to follow a money trail from the family's commercial stake in slavery to the White House. However, before he took his family west, it's likely that George Walker sold the people he owned, handing them off to a speculating slave dealer; thereby financing the family's fresh start in Illinois. Things get worse when you contemplate the probable circumstances. In the 1830s, the old tobacco economy of Maryland and Virginia was waning, while the new king, cotton, had caused Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia to boom. The tobacco states were selling tens of thousands of slaves to the cotton states, and sending these people south. It is quite possible the Walker slaves were marched 500 miles from Maryland to Alabama to end up on a giant cotton plantation, where the work regime - large crews on vast, unshaded fields - was crueler than the one they'd left behind.

The Walkers eventually quit farming and made a fortune as dry goods wholesalers in Missouri; later, they made another as investment bankers in New York. Nearly all the Bush/Walker family money dates from this more recent period, after the Civil War.

The family, nevertheless, seems to have looked back with nostalgia on their old slave hold. There are two pieces of evidence for this. In The Bush Tragedy, Jacob Weisberg refers to one of the later patriarchs, David Walker, as "a believer in eugenics and the 'unwritten law' of lynching," and cites as proof a letter Walker published in the St. Louis Republic in 1914. Black people, he wrote at the time, were more insidious than prostitution and "all the other evils combined."

The second piece of evidence is within living memory. In 1930, when they could afford it, the family again embraced the antebellum lifestyle. That year President Bush's great-grandfather, George Herbert Walker, bought Duncannon plantation, an old cotton estate in South Carolina, to use as a hunting retreat and vacation home. His namesake, George Herbert Walker Bush, the current president's father, spent many youthful vacations on Duncannon, where teams of black cooks, valets, and drivers served him and opened doors when he approached. The Bush heirs no longer own Duncannon plantation; but for a time, the estate provided a version of the baronial life, to which the antebellum Walkers aspired, but never achieved.

The heirs of slaveholders are not responsible for the past; but in a better world, they would be accountable for that past. They would make an effort to deal with the slave story, talk about it, and try to come to terms with it.

At present the Bush political dynasty seems to be dying in misrule, finished off by a president who, as Weisberg writes, is "driven by family demons, overflowing with confidence, and lacking any capacity for self-knowledge." The Bush clan may not be capable of reckoning personally with the tragic inheritance of the slave days. But this week, on a state visit, the president sets foot in three countries that sent hundreds of thousands of captives to America. Today, some of the tens of millions of descendants of those captives want a White House that is accountable. In West Africa President Bush had a superb opportunity, like one presented to a physician attending a wound. A sound physician would have chosen instinctively to apply medicine, not simply turned away in denial and neglect.

*Edward Ball is the author of Slaves in the Family and, most recently, The Genetic Strand.

***Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Tim Newman asks whether Bushs' view of trade and investment is really not paternalistic.

A central aspect of President Bush’s trip to Africa is the promotion of neoliberal trade policies and foreign direct investment as a path to “empowerment” and a “culture of self-reliance and opportunity.” The president has explicitly rejected “the paternalistic notion that treats African countries as charity cases, or a model of exploitation that seeks only to buy up their resources.”

But will the impact of his view of trade and investment on workers in Africa truly end this paternalism?

In Liberia

Bush will end his trip by spending a few hours in Liberia. There he will try to cast himself in the role of the compassionate conservative who successfully intervened in Liberia’s long civil war, thus heralding in a shining new democracy led by Africa’s first democratically-elected female president. In his February 14 press conference, Bush celebrated increasing private capital flows to sub-Saharan Africa. But the workers supposedly benefiting from foreign private investment in Liberia might have a different perspective.
For example, Liberia’s largest investor and employer, Firestone, has been exploiting workers on its rubber plantation for over 80 years. The company has been the focus of an international campaign and a lawsuit in U.S. courts because of its use of child labor and abuse of workers’ rights. Affidavits collected from child laborers on the plantation recently filed in the lawsuit show clearly how foreign direct investment and trade often do not benefit workers.
Sixteen-year-old James Roe IV is a typical example of a Firestone worker. He began working at the age of nine on the plantation, cleaning cups of latex and cutting grass with a machete. At the age of 11, he began collecting latex and applying toxic chemicals to trees without any protective gear. When he was nine, James was injured at work when he cut his foot with a machete. But he could not get proper health care because he lacked an ID card required by the company to access the Firestone Hospital. Since he works from 4 a.m. to 3 p.m., he has been unable to attend school and has only achieved a second-grade education. James was forced to work to help his father meet his daily production quota because if he failed to meet the quota, his family would not be able to afford food.
Firestone workers have seen few benefits from their labor and are stuck in a generational cycle of poverty. On the other hand, Firestone has built a multi-million dollar tire business using Liberia’s rubber. Firestone’s investment in Liberia is a textbook case of “exploitation that seeks only to buy up [Africa’s] resources.”

AGOA

Bush will also be stopping in Ghana to meet with entrepreneurs who benefit from the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Since 2001, international monitoring organizations have scrutinized Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire for the widespread use of abusive child labor, including forced labor and trafficking, on cocoa farms that supply the main ingredient for the chocolate bars sold by major U.S. corporations like Mars, Hershey, and Nestle. These chocolate companies have dragged their feet for years and refuse to acknowledge that the low prices they pay West African farmers for their cocoa beans create a downward pressure on wages and labor standards. A recent Global Witness report also found that the cocoa industry has helped to finance conflict in Cote d’Ivoire. Instead of using some of his time in Ghana to highlight the injustice facing cocoa farmers, Bush will be using his platform to further promote trade and investment policies that do not adequately protect labor rights.

AGOA provides clear benefits, however, for corporate investors. For example, a textile factory owned by the company Ramatex chose to take advantage of AGOA by locating in an Export Processing Zone (EPZ) in Namibia. Incentives offered to Ramatex for setting up shop in the EPZ include: an exemption from import duties, an exemption from sales tax, a guarantee of free repatriation of capital and profits, access to streamlined regulatory services, a refund of up to 75% of costs of pre-approved training of Namibian citizens, provision of dirt-cheap factory facilities, and of course, weak labor regulations. Ramatex is then able to export its products duty free to the United States through AGOA.
Meanwhile, AGOA has led to an increase in the low-skilled garment sector in Africa where workers are often abused. For example, a recent report by SOMO titled Footloose Investors found that in Swaziland, “violations documented at Asian-owned factories in the last 6 years include forced overtime, verbal abuse, sexual intimidation, unhealthy and unsafe conditions, unreasonable production targets and anti-union repression.” These violations of workers’ rights do not represent the commitment to fair trade that Bush promoted at his February 14 press conference.

Bush’s talk about “a new era of development” looks like more of the same – abuse of workers and extraction of Africa’s resources for the benefit of wealthy corporations. While the Bush administration clearly embraces both paternalism and the exploitation of Africa’s workers and resources, there is another option. We can stand in solidarity with African workers by actively supporting their organizing efforts – from the Firestone rubber plantation to Group 4 Securicor workers in Malawi to cut-flower workers in Kenya. U.S.-based corporations should be publicly accountable for their abuses in Africa, and U.S. trade policies should provide strong protections for workers. U.S. citizens, meanwhile, should participate in corporate campaigns and scrutinize their own investments and purchasing decisions.

* Tim Newman is a Campaigns Assistant at the International Labor Rights Forum and a member of the Stop Firestone Coalition.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Historical and political dimensions

Recent political problems that threaten to tear Kenya apart require analysis that goes beyond ethnicity as portrayed in the media and current analyses that attempt to explain the situation. More correctly, emphasis and focus should be placed on the interpenetration of historical and current political developments whose origins can be traced in the early stages of state formation in Kenya. In 19th century the area that became Kenya could be described as stateless, but was made up of various nationalities (currently considered sub-nationalities if seen from the eye of British Historians and ethnographers). Some commentators have claimed that peoples' civility, and ethnicity was shaped by their subsistence farming or herding, or some mixture of both".

However what ethnographers and Eurocentric commentators ignore is that there was clear territorial ownership of space by each “nation” even though at times there were conflicts over pasture and adventurer expeditions into the regions occupied by other groups. In the late 19th century most of the people of Kenya resisted British conquest, and land grabbing when white settlements began in the fertile highlands of Rift Valley and central province. Administrative structures were designed and to-date, have been effectively used as part of state machinery to impose illegitimate authority on the people. Besides land, there were conflicts over forced “labour” (basically Africans and latter Indians) and hut tax. These conflicts led to the 1923 Devonshire White paper, which stated that ‘Kenya is an African country and the interest of the natives must be paramount’. The Africans especially the Kikuyu in Central province, Masaai and Kalenjin in the Rift Valley, lost much of their best land to the white settlers and the growing population meant increasing land hunger and discontent. A new land redistribution scheme was introduced under Lyttleton constitution of 1954 followed by other constitutional changes however these scheme did not adequately address the land question.

Nationalism in Kenya begun as early as 1922. Violence and armed struggle was led by the Mau Mau and by 1955, 13,000 Africans had lost their lives (see Anderson, 2007). In the early 1960s, Moi, Muliro and Ngala of KADU supported regionalism against Kenyatta, Odinga and Mboya and KANU's nationalism (associated with the centralised system). By 1960, two national parties were formed (what could be described as the first multi party era in Kenya). These two parties were already divided over the type of system that would serve the African interests. Alliance by leadings lights from various groups which made up KADU and KANU respectively, also played out in the struggles for release of those in detention and efforts to form the first government. The British were forced to retreat from Kenya and subsequently, release Jomo Kenyatta from detention at Kapenguria.

When Kenya gained “independence” from Britain in 1963, it inherited non-democratic institutions and cultures, which later fell into the hands of corrupted politicians and governments. This exemplifies the de-colonization programme that retained the colonial apparatuses of security forces and political repression in the post-colony (see Anderson, 1998) and compromise over the land question. Post-colonial “officials” lavished themselves with political and economic favours in a pattern that has extended into the post-post-colonial era (Moi who was a member of KADU and later KANU, Kibaki who was technocrat in KANU from 1963, Michuki the Internal Security Minister, Njenga Karume, the Defence Minister among others). This process has been captured by some analysts who have pointed out that these developments mirrors what was a distinctly colonial view of the rule of law, which saw the British leave behind legal systems that facilitated tyranny, oppression and poverty rather than open, accountable government(Elkins, 2007/8)

Ethnic composition and competitive politics

While national level political competition in Kenya is often misunderstood and shallowly interpreted in terms of a competition between the Kikuyu and the Luo, most commentators on Kenya’s politics do ignore the position and role of the Kalenjin, Luhya, Kamba, Kisii, Coastal peoples (Mijikenda), Swahili, Arabs, Indians and Europeans who live in large farms/ranches and important urban areas in Kenya. Each of these groups subsumes a number of smaller ethnic units that become relevant bases of social identity in more localized settings. The groups hardly mentioned are the Ogieks, and the Jemps who are the original occupants of some parts of present Rift valley but have since been displaced or evicted to create room for current occupants. What is however neglected in the debate about Kenyan politics is the reality that all groups have a stake in the running of the Kenyan polity, but due to systematic exclusion of some groups from the national leadership, competitive politics in Kenya is bound to have an ethnic dimension

When Kenya became a one-party state in 1969 Kenyatta ruled the country with a clique around him mainly from his ethnic Kikuyu, who eventually alienated other groups in Kenya from the political and economic order for his entire reign (1963-1978). Although Kenyatta did not instigate ethnic clashes, he targeted eminent persons from ethnic groups that he felt were a threat to his leadership. Many people were assassinated including Pio Gama Pinto (Kenyan Indian), JM Kariuki (Kikuyu) Tom Mboya, D.O Makasembo, Arwgings Kodhek (all Luo) Ronald Ngala (Mijikenda of Coast), Seroney (Kalenjin) among others. This was a strategy that Moi also adopted at the height of his reign when prominent persons were assassinated or died in mysterious circumstances. They include, Robert Ouko, Owiti Ongili, Otieno Ambala, Hezekiah Oyugi (all Luo) Bishop Kipsang Muge, (Kalenjin), Adungosi and Muliro (all Luhya,). Many students, journalists, lecturers, and politicians like Raila Odinga, Charles Rubia, Keneth Matiba, Martin Shikuku, among others were also detained and tortured. What is also missing in most analyses is the role of other communities during the struggle for independence, while the Mau Mau has been presented as the epicentre of everything around impendence struggle, but historical facts point to other contributions but because this ignorance has been presented as the truth, coupled with arrogance and superiority complex, Kenyan liberation history has been constantly distorted.

The struggles for political ascendancy begun immediately after the postcolonial government were formed. While the first cabinet was quite representative of the face of Kenya, soon ideological difference, impact of cold war and betrayal on key issues cropped in, thus dividing the original personalities in the independence struggle; the Mau Mau veterans were sidelined and politics of exclusion and elimination begun with earnest, sometimes combined with assassinations. Electoral politics never took shape in a democratic sense since Kenyatta who ruled mainly through the provincial administration, outside the KANU framework, rendered the party system that could have rallied the people around issues and programmes meaningless. Fears of ethnic ascendancies, power-hungry ethnic political elites, undemocratic processes and institution, which are all hallmarks of today's Kenya, begun to play out; a confirmation of the undemocratic historical trajectory that Kenya has been moving along. The 2007 election fiasco has exposed the deliberate stoking of ethnic tension by power-hungry elites, feeble democratic traditions and institutions in Kenya, one that threatens to consume it if not adequately addressed.

Electoral politics

Electoral politics in Kenya can also be understood best by looking at the role of the process and institutions charged with overseeing such a process. The electoral system in Kenya is based on constituencies whose boundaries are congruent with the boundaries of tribal areas. These boundaries have been used to manipulate democratic outcomes. The constituencies are represented by a member of parliament and a number of local authority representatives at ward, town and urban council levels. Their election takes place at the same time as that of presidential and parliamentary ones. The boundaries are determined by the electoral commission if there is evidence that populations have outgrown the current demarcations. This decision is however made by the electoral commission without consulting the local communities and in most cases at the directive of the president. The president without parliamentary approval appoints the Commission. However the problem with numbers in Kenyan politics is that they are never correct or close to truth. This originates from history of manipulation of constituency population numbers during the single party era, but also lack of regular census and update of births and deaths records. It is therefore not surprising to see “ghost names” in voter registers (not deleted even after a whole five year preparation and multibillion investment in the process) or to see number of registered voters increase during presidential vote tallying contrary to the actual number at constituency level or previous attempt to create extra constituencies in the incumbent friendly regions in order to meet the 25% constitutional requirement for presidential eligibility.

But the problem with the electoral process did not start in recent years; the political competition that followed immediately after independence gave birth to the mechanisations, manipulation of the institutions responsible for electoral process and the blatant rape of the constitution to suit those in power. This begun with the erosion of the party system, when immediately after independence in 1963, the political alliances begun to fall apart with KADU joining KANU and internal struggles within KANU leading to the formation of KPU. Although the fall out between Kenyatta and Odinga has been described as ideological, the actual cause was the feeling that Kenyatta had betrayed his colleagues and the entire nation on three crucial promises at independence, namely eradication of poverty, illiteracy and disease. Kenyatta betrayed this cause by allocating huge parcels of land left by white settlers to himself and cronies, including large tracts in the present Rift Valley province.

Upon Kenyatta’s death in 1978, Daniel arap Moi, a member of the Kalenjin, assumed power in 1978. During his 24 year reign, Moi exploited the Kenyan diversity and politicised ethnicity to levels where he could instigate clashes in districts and provinces with mixed groups, a practice he perfected in the 90’s in order to discredit the onset of multiparty democracy in Kenya. Politically motivated ethnic clashes were used to disrupt and displace populations and groups that supported the opposition (mainly the Kikuyu in Rift Valley, Luo in the slums of Nairobi and Mombasa). He also used divide and rule tactics, pitting on group against another and at times bought politician through patronage in order to have more support in parliament. These tactics ensured that that the opposition lost the elections of 1992 and 1997. It was not until 2002, when his constitutional terms in office expired that he had no options, but also due to the unity of the opposition through NARC (Rainbow coalition of Kijana Wamalwa FORD- Kenya, Raila Odinga of LDP, Charity Ngilu and Kibaki of NAK/DP) got together and managed to defeated Moi’s preferred choice of successor, Uhuru Kenyatta (the son of Jomo Kenyatta). Moi was voted out of office in 2002, and Kibaki became president.

Anger against Kibaki’s leadership is real and genuine and it stems from the fact that Kibaki was elected on a platform of reform, in the sphere of constitutional change, end to corruption, tribalism and establishment of an equitable system that could uplift the living conditions of all Kenyans regardless of their ethnicity and other background factors. Kibaki’s failure to grasp these genuine concerns, self imprisonment from reasoning and lack of desire to leave a legacy in Kenya, caused a great anger in the majority of Kenyans whose hopes had been dashed by Kibaki’s conduct, corruption and arrogance of people around him. For instance People’s disgust with Kibaki’s regime was expressed at the 2005 referendum in which the Wako Draft (a diluted version of the Boma’s draft, which was a constitutional product of a people led process) was defeated. Seven provinces made up of diverse ethnic groups voted for “NO” while the Yes vote was only represented by central province. This outcome reflected the wishes of the majority and cannot be seen as a vote against the Kikuyu since the vote was for a devolved system or a unitary system. But then, one cannot lose sight to the ethnic dimension the vote took during the campaigns, when people of central province were told to vote for “Yes” because it meant protecting “their presidency”. This anger and frustration was captured in the 2007 elections in which Kibaki lost his close allies from his own backyard (central province) and high profile lieutenants from other regions who were rejected at grassroots level. The 2007 elections also saw a new trend of ethnic alliances, which were formed for political expediency, even though hidden behind critical issues. Some groups could however identify with each other in terms of political and economic marginalisation than others, thus the divide the has been reflected in the post ethic conflict even if some analysis attempt to reduce it to the work of political leaders as the ones behind the ethnic divide. In the current situation, old wounds have been revived but the degree of suffering under previous regimes differ from group to group, while frustration also exists within the groups themselves, whereby, Kalenjin rejected their own, in Moi and his sons, while the Kikuyu rejected the cabal that have surrounded Kibaki since 2002. The same was witnessed in Nyanza where Luo and Kisii Nyanza voted out MPs that they thought did not deserve another parliamentary mandate.

* Antony Otieno Ong’ayo is a researcher at the Transnational Institute, Amsterdam.

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Introduction

As part of the Grand Debate on the Union Government, the Accra Summit in July 2007 took two important decisions, among others. Firstly the Assembly set up a Ministerial Committee of ten to look into the different aspects of a possible Union Government; and Secondly the Assembly requested an Audit of the African Union. For this purpose, a High Level Panel of 13 Africans were appointed by the Chairperson of the African Union to conduct the Audit. Both the Committee and the Panel worked under severe time constrain . The Panel met four times between 10th September and 18th December 2007. The Audit Report was submitted to the President of the African Union President Kuofor of Ghana on 27th December after which copies were distributed to Heads of states and Governments. According to AU procedures, the Report was then put on the agenda of the Executive Council to meet on 29-30 January. The Council would then submit the Report with its recommendation/comments on the Report to the Assembly meeting on 31stJanuary and 1st February 2008.

After submission, the Audit Report (AR) became an instrument to be manipulated (opposed, delayed, supported etc) by different forces within the AU for their different agendas. The Panel had little or no say on the fate of the Report after its submission. The panel attended both the Executive Council as well as the Assembly Meetings. The chairperson of the Panel gave a lengthy briefing to the Foreign Ministers of the Executive Council. But the Council hardly discussed the AR on the grounds that they had no time to study it and therefore needed three months to study the report and then discuss it at an extraordinary meeting of the Council. This recommendation to the Assembly of Heads States was discussed very briefly and, in its wisdom, the Assembly decided to refer the AR to a Committee of twelve Heads of States set up mainly to discuss the issue of the Union Government.

The Panel was rather disappointed at this outcome – its expectation was that the AR will be discussed seriously by both the Ministers and Heads of States and Governments and at least some of the recommendations for immediate implementations would be approved. However in the AU culture, being referred to a Committee, is not a positive message.

The Panel’s disappointment was deepened by two happenings. Firstly the AU Commission ( the Secretariat of the AU) issued an unexpected written reaction to the AR while the Report was still being distributed to Governments. It disagreed with some important aspects of the Panel’s analyses and recommendations. This document was disseminated to the Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers and thus encouraged a negative reaction to the AR. This was a reaction to the Panel’s overall finding with regard to the Commission that it is characterized by internal institutional incoherence and disarray, with a dysfunctional working and managerial culture at all levels. In fact 40% of almost 160 recommendations of the AR are on the AU Commission. They are designed to rationalize, strengthen and improve the Commission. Clearly any critique from the Panel however constructive was not taken kindly.

Secondly, an important recommendation of the Panel designed to avoid the kind of problems besetting the AU Commission at the cabinet level, was that the January Assembly should elect the next President and his/her Deputy only and that the Commissioners be appointed by the President in July on the bases of their qualifications. It seems that this important recommendation was not well received and the Commission as well as the Executive Council proceeded to put on the agenda of the Assembly the election of all Commissioners. The election took place and four of the Commissioners were re-elected as a result of intense lobbying at all levels. Was this a message that changes in the Commissioned are not welcomed?

The Audit Report

The AR is about 225 pages and contains 159 recommendations. I will not try to summarize or attempt to describe the Report. I will however highlight what the Report refers to as “accelerators”. And the suggested Benchmarks. The Report suggests that if the accelerators are injected into the process of implementing the AR they will speed up and deepen the socio-economic and political transformation towards African Unity and eventual Union Government.

1. The accelerators are:

i. Free movement of people;
ii. Building inter regional and transcontinental infrastructures especially in the fields of transport, communications and energy;
iii. Promotion of African multinational private investment companies for financing integration projects including infrastructure, and;
iv. The early establishment of the financial institutions as provided for in the Constitutive Act. “To assure progress, there is need for constant and regular monitoring. Accordingly, eight broad but measurable benchmarks have been proposed. It is on these that the project of African unity, integration and transformation will stand or fall over the long run.

The benchmarks will, therefore, serve both as radars of hope and the barometers of progress towards a future Union Government and towards the United States of Africa”. The Benchmarks are. Institutional revamping so that the organs and institutions of the AU, particularly the Commission which has a central role, will accelerate the integration process, not only by prompting pro-pan-African policies, programmes and projects, but also in implementing them diligently and fully; Internalising the Values of Pan-Africanism by genuinely promoting pan-African consciousness through the values that are enshrined in Article 3 of the Constitutive Act; Engagement of the people by moving away from a unification and integration process that is driven from above by political leaders into one that is infused with energies from below and which is provided by the generality of the people – a kind of Public-Peoples-Partnership Paradigm; The free movement of the people.

The year 2010, which marks the golden jubilee of the independence of many of the countries of Africa, and the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the Constitutive Act, will be the symbolic occasion to commemorate the dismantling of all the restrictions on the free movement of the African citizens on the continent; Rationalisation, strengthening and dynamising the RECs with a view to achieving synergy among the 8 AU recognised RECs and between them and AU Commission; Creation of the African Common Market and the establishment of the African Economic Community, through an effective harmonisation of the integration process throughout the continent using the instruments outlined in the Abuja Treaty; Acceleration of monetary and financial integration through the establishment of continental, financial and monetary institutions, and; The mobilisation of African entrepreneurs to become engaged in investing in transcontinental and inter-regional infrastructure and pan-African enterprises, by providing them with favourable and enabling environment, thus freeing Africa from the capital shortage illusion which cultivated a culture of dependence on foreign capital and foreign aid.

All the recommendations – 40 per cent of which are on the AU Commission – are intended to rationalise, strengthen and improve the functioning of all organs and institutions directly involved in the integration process in the continent. These recommendations, if approved and fully implemented, will enable the AU to provide a higher level of service and thus pave the way for the achievement of the political and economic integration in the shortest time possible. Many of the recommendations have far reaching implications both in the short and medium run. There are, however, recommendations that require the urgent attention and decision of the Assembly. They are identified in the Report. The Panel strongly believed that their adoption in a form of decision by the Assembly would contribute to releasing the potential of our continental organisation for a better service to the peoples of Africa, their governments and to the continent as a whole in its stand in the world community. But alas! So far no such decision has been taken by the Assembly!

As I have intimated earlier, I personally doubt if there are strong enough forces (representative of States) in the AU which are committed to support drastic changes in the AU – changes which are likely to speed up the process towards African Unity. Hence I believe that significant pressure for change must come from the African people and those CSOs which represent them and fight for them. Such pressure for the implementation of the AR recommendations can be exerted on national governments and through ECOSOC and PAP. More importantly the African people if mobilized on this issue, will become a significant force in exerting pressure for change. For the Audit itself is entitled “Audit of the African Union: Towards a People-Centered Political and Socio-Economic Integration and Transformation of Africa”.

I sincerely believe that these pressures – from the CSOs and the people - will help the small but committed force within the AU struggling to bring about change in the AU as a step towards African unity. Once again I urge all those who are committed Pan-Africanists and who are also interested in the process and movement towards African unity, to read this important document carefully – the whole Report. The Report is not perfect and there are several areas on which, in my personal view, the Report is weak or silent. Nevertheless, given the time constraint, the Report’s analyses, findings and extensive recommendations, makes it the best document available on the AU. Indeed some people believe that this is a historic document in that it did carry out a serious and objective audit of the AU.

*Abdalla Bujra is Executive Director DPMF Member of the Audit Panel.

**For the full audit report, please visit titled "Towardfs a People-centered Political and Socio-economic Intergration and Transformation of Africa, please visit Fahamu's AU Monitor at

** Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

It is easy – indeed tempting – to dismiss the violence that has engulfed Kenya in the last one month as an unfortunate, though not totally unexpected, resurgence of African atavist ontological disposition. Many analysts, particularly in the West, have argued that even though the breach of peace and mutual existence was triggered off by the stealing of the presidential election by the incumbent, what followed had nothing to do with electoral fraud in particular and politics in general, but an excuse by neighbours who have lived in an artificial harmony while harbouring pathological disdain for each other based on petty nationalism to settle scores with each other. This could be true. But only partially. The stark reality is that the crisis in Kenya has exposed the class tensions that have been peppered over for over more than one hundred years.

For full essay, please visit:

Things are calmer in much of Kenya after a week of national hell. In Kibera, Kangemi, Dandora and all the burning slums, people are trying to get back to work and to find food. The roads in and out of Eldoret are open now -- although it is there, and in other parts of the Rift Valley, where things remain volatile.

A “third force” for peace is gathering around honest brokers like ambassador Bethwell Kiplagat, a gentle man of great empathy and intellect, trusted by all in Kenya; retired general Opande -- known in military circles around the world as a formidable UN peacekeeper; and retired general Sumbeiwo, a man of honour, trusted as a mediator by both sides in the Sudan conflict. At times like this these three men are the most valuable real estate in Kenya.

For the full article, please visit:

Through an unexpected confluence of events Kenyans currently find themselves faced with a political conundrum. The spectacular abdication of responsibility by the Chairman of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), Mr. Samuel Kiviutu, has perpetuated a general sense of confusion, anxiety, anger, hatred and ultimately violence. The fact that Mr. Kivuitu has cast doubt on the final tally of the Kenyan presidential vote, held on 27 December 2007, means that the country is no longer faced with a situation that can be resolved through adjudication and arbitration by national judicial institutions, since they tend to favor the status quo. The situation now demands a process of political dialogue that should be conducted through negotiations, including at the very minimum, the Party of National Unity (PNU), the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), and the Orange Democratic Movement – Kenya (ODM-Kenya). These negotiations should be assisted by Pan-African and international mediation in the form of African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN). The recent intervention by Archbishop Desmond Tutu is a welcome step in the right direction. On 4 January 2008, Tutu indicated that the incumbent and self-declared President Mwai Kibaki of the PNU would be prepared to explore the establishment of a coalition government...

* For the essay, please visit:

In a follow up to her pre-election piece on Kenya, Wangui Wa Goro looks at the various ways democratic institutions have been challenged and charts a way forward.

On December, I wrote a piece for Pambazuka News reflecting on the pending elections entitled THE LONG ROAD TO DEMOCRACY. As in the 2002 elections, I was wary that Kenyans would be taken for a ride again.

It is chilling how soon the almost prophetic words I wrote came into play, not for the reasons that I had anticipated, in relation to people exercising their right to vote, but in what happened in the aftermath of what was an impressive election turnout. The inconclusive electoral process, particularly the tallying of the presidential elections and the subsequent violence, loss of life, damage to property, the fleeing of many Kenyans, the near collapse of the state and the fragile thread by which the state institutions are still held have left Kenyans and the world in deep shock because many did not anticipate such contested outcome and of that scale. The fabric of what has held society together has ripped severely in several places and in some places, very badly.

Kenya has been very lucky that the call to the international community was heeded through the intervention of the institutions and governments such as the Africa Union, the United Nations, the European Union, the United States of America, Canada and Britain amongst others. This responses has included His imminence Archbishop Desmond Tutu, former African heads of States, President Kuffour of Ghana and then head of the AU, Jendayi Fraser, US Assistant Secretary for African Affairs and the Secretary General of the UN, Ban Ki Moon and Kofi Anan, former Secretary General of the UN, the East African Community, and many other governments, institutions, organisations and individuals who wish Kenya well, including many Kenyans. It would be very impervious leaders who would fail to notice the depth which the Kenya is in, nor should they fail to heed its urgency and the importance that Kenyans and the international community are attaching to its resolution because we all know that if it spirals out of control, it will be a intractable as the last few weeks have demonstrated.

Many critics and observers, journalists including, members of the Kenyan and international civil society and many human rights activists, academic, scholars and several individuals have come out strongly to state that the current crisis in Kenya has long roots which date back to the colonial and post colonial era and should not be simplified to “tribal warfare” which it clearly is not. They observe that the electoral crisis has unearthed these simmering ills for several reasons including political manipulation, as well as genuine pent up frustration and anger over long festering hurts as well as outrage at the electoral crisis and the ensuing turmoil which has left Kenya in an unresolved situation where there is no clarity as to where power lies. Key to this is an outmoded constitution, a catalogue of violations including economic and human rights violations which although widely debated has not been resolved. Other concerns include real and perceived inequality and marginalisation, discrimination and the breakdown of the rule of law and mechanisms of democratic accountability.

As many have pointed out some of the key urgent issues include the finalising the constitutional review, entrenching multiparty democracy, equality, fair and proportional representation, equal opportunity and access to services, goods and resources, protection of the citizen and fundamental rights, intercultural understanding and the issue of devolution of power amongst others. For instance, on the land issues, the Rift valley crisis in the 1992 – 1998 left many people homeless and many others dead. During this time, over 1500 people lost their lives and over 300,000 people displaced including internally and internationally. Many of these people have never been able to return to their homes and this issue has never been dealt with conclusively despite the production of the several reports with strong recommendations which have been left collecting dust. Similarly are issues of corruption and human rights violations. The international community too undertook considerable amounts of work on these issues so Kenya does not need to go to the drawing board on it. Others issues of concern include the past violations of human rights, gross inequalities and discrimination such as that of women who over several years have been considered as unequal citizens and worse, they continue to suffer various forms of discrimination and violence, including sexual violence which has now extended to the public sphere and is also being used as a political weapon including against boys and men. Many communities in Kenya also feel marginalised and therefore the question of devolution of power and resources is one which must be addressed as a matter of urgency as much as the cultures which allow such impressions for form. Most important, however, at present, is how we move out of the immediate crisis.

As can be seen, the question of how Kenya is to get out of the crisis is one which is occupying most Kenyans and the world and resolution needs to be found sooner rather than later as it may be too late. Some of those concerned, including the UN and its members, the AU, Kofi Anan and his team of imminent mediators Graca Marcel and Benjamin Mkapa and others such as the civil society and the business community agree that some of the issues require short term solution and others a longer term solution.

The immediate concerns include resolving the question of peace, dealing with the humanitarian crisis, the electoral crisis, which has unfolded leaving over 1000 people dead and over between 300000 and 600000 people displaced. The country has also come to a standstill and normal life such as economic engagement, medical treatment, schooling etc. have become impossible and these need to be resolved urgently.

The longer term issues include resolving the constitutional issue, the distribution of resources, including land distribution, issues of poverty, inequality and justice and the processes and mechanisms for achieving these. It has also become abundantly clear that confidence in the key institutions that uphold democracy including the presidency, the Parliament, the Judicial System, and the Executive has taken a hard knock and this will have to be rebuilt through demonstration.

The question of how to deal with past injustices which has led to the disquiet and loss of life, including human rights violations has become a significant one. Further, the role of the state institutions in safeguarding the constitution, protecting Kenyans and upholding the rule of law and justice have emerged as areas of weakness.

In terms of the political mandate, Kenyans have come a long way in winning multiparty politics as a mode of expression of political will and it is one which many will want to safe-guard. Multipartism was touted as the model for democracy but this has not proven to be helpful on its own without clear reforms of the powers of the presidency, the constitution and the supremacy and independence of the key institutions of governance and state management including the Judiciary, the Executive and the Parliament. Therefore, most people are agreed that new constitution needs to be put into place urgently. One way that has been suggested is the formation of a transitional coalition government to allow the key processes and mechanism to be put into place before fresh elections can be held. So far, this has been talked about in terms of parliament and the current political players.

Many are weary, however, owing to past failures of power sharing in the post 2002 elections and the fact that the key players are the same ones, Raila Odinga and Mwai Kibaki. This has cost Kenya several years and the current crisis has only exacerbated our impatience. It does seem that the idea of a coalition government of National Unity is seen as unsatisfactory in the long run as it leaves the question about the presidential election outcomes unanswered and therefore the question of trust. The hope is that this matter will be addressed squarely.

Kenyans have fought long and hard to break the deadlock of single party rule which led to dictatorships (in most of Africa and Kenya was no exception) in the belief that oppositional politics would enable accountability. It seems clear that a model or method which is acceptable to Kenyans needs to be found to place the instruments of democracy on a right footing so that we do not become appendages to any individual or party. The legacies of dictatorship still abound and Kenya has been dogged by inequality, corruption, lack of accountability, transparency and fair meting out of justice. For instance, at present, only the president has the powers to open, prorogue, recess or close parliament. This has shown that social practice is difficult to break without explicit expression, training and commitment to transform society from the bottom to the top and vice versa and without mechanisms for accountability to the people. The importance of the institutions and mechanisms which enable a healthy societal engagement in the democratic process is therefore critical including the fundamental rights of assembly, representation, association, life and freedom of expression.

The Kofi Anan led mediation is pointing to the importance of institutionalising democracy rather than leaving it as a promise of words on paper. This he is doing through placing the mediation process for endorsement and deliberations to Parliament as the appropriate arm empowered by the constitution to do so on behalf of Kenyans.

Many are calling for a transitional government of national unity to see through some of these processes by bringing together the various parties to work in what is called as a grand coalition, in a departure from the traditional model of looser takes all, given the current crisis. This power sharing may be useful if it is accepted with honesty and transparency and if it is allowed to tap into dialogue and consultation with the ordinary mwananchi either through their elected representatives through a broader coalition or through other fora. It will also need to takes advice from others who are experienced or those who may have insights into how the process can work through neutral or independent positions such as Kofi Anan and the imminent persons group and other international independent bodies such as the UN. Many hope that their involvement will continue through the transitional phase and beyond.

As well as the dialogues taking place, Kenya does have several instruments which can be used in search of justice and peace. Since the discussions of power sharing came up with the drafting of the new constitution and also the power sharing arrangements that were anticipated after the elections in 2002, many Kenyans are concerned that positions should not be created to appease individuals and that unprincipled peace which covers up crisis whether corruption, human rights violations or electoral crisis without resolution should not be sought. The critics argue that constitutional matters are for the country not for individuals or parties. However, these should not be so binding that people’s attainment of democracy is held to ransom and therefore the flexibility introduced by the mediation mechanism, underpinned by international support is important.

The use of existing instruments such as the Electoral Commission, the Courts and Parliament should not be selective and where these need strengthening, this is the opportunity to do so. These can be strengthened to function to acceptable standards for instance, the courts, the electoral commission, parliamentary representatives, the police and armed forces and the citizens themselves though tighter regulation, monitoring and evaluation . As Maina Kiai pointed out in a recent interview, for instance, in relation to the police: “The police have always been a problem in Kenya because they're colonial police. They were structured by the colonial regime not to be a police force to fight crime, but to repress the population against standing up against the colonial government”.

In another instance of selectivity, some have argued that if local elections are being run as the regime in power has proposed, then it should be possible to use the process to resolve the presidential election gridlock. Other instruments available to the citizens include the referendum, should the parties fail to agree on fundamental issues. The transition can also be buoyed by existing and new mechanisms such as a recall of BOMAS or a reconstituted BOMAS (body involved in the constitutional review ) or even a National Convention as some have suggested. Kenya is also a signatory member to many international instruments and so international support can be sought to ensure that Kenya stays within universally accepted mandates and standards.

Much hope is therefore pinned on the success of the negotiations which are taking place, although many are sceptical about the good will with which the parties have entered the negotiations and their capacity for staying power once the mediators have left. Kenya as a long history of betrayed promises and the danger is that if these talks and their outcomes fail, Kenyans will take the law into their own hands and there may be no turning back. Peace and fundamental freedoms such as the right to life, the freedom of association, the freedom of assembly etc. need to be restored and protected so they are not withdrawn at will just because they do not suit one party or the other.

Over and above these, there have been calls for a Truth and Conciliation mechanism which would allow the past ills to be addressed. This has to be worked out carefully because many fear that such a process could come with impunity, take too much time and may not in itself finally resolve the issues satisfactorily, particularly where a constitution and legal system have been violated.

Most people are however, agreed, that whatever happens at all levels of society needs to happen quickly and it is useful to see that the Kofi Anan initiative is placing a programmed agenda on the table, because as cynics fear, left to the various parties, they may continue serving their own vested interest to the detriment of processes and peace in such a volatile context.

Many are asking what the international community can do and here too, schisms have opened up because some of the failures point to the kinds of relationships that Kenya has had with the some members of the international community. It is therefore important that the international community continues reading from the same script and applying the same measures by working together on the basic issues and within acceptable international frameworks. Beyond the immediate goodwill in the humanitarian and democratisation process, here too, deep questions about the real kinds of relationships that Kenya has had with the some in the international community need to be examined and transformed. It is clear that some of the past injustices have taken place with the knowledge and sometimes connivance and complicity of the international community and this need not continue. All it will do is continue to harm Kenya’s chance for peace and jeopardize those common interests which are claimed by those players. A forward looking robust agenda which engages Kenya as a partner would greatly assist the processes on the ground because it would send the message that Kenyans are worthy global citizens like any other citizens of the world with equal right to fundamental rights. Different standards have been applied to Kenyans, Africans and many in the developing world and this has got to stop.

As ordinary Kenyans, we too have deep soul searching and facing up to do and it will not be easy or pain free. We should be brave and face our demons together and find ways of laying them to rest. We have in the past opted for denial and this has now exploded in our faces. Only when we face ourselves individually and collectively, that is assuming that most of us want to, can peace, truth and justice prevail.

* Dr. Wangui wa Goro: Kenyan human rights activist, writer, translator, academic and public intellectual. Currently Associate Fellow at the Institute of Human Rights and Social Justice; London Metropolitan University.

*Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

L. Muthoni Wanyeki, executive director of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, recently spoke to AllAfrica.com about a wide range of aspects of the crisis that erupted over Kenya’s disputed presidential election.

On the elections:

The position of my organization, and the coalition we've been working in, has been that the anomalies, malpractices, and illegalities witnessed with respect to the counting and tallying of the presidential vote were substantial enough to alter the outcomes... You have to understand that Kibaki may not be in office legitimately or legally.

On forms of violence:

It’s important to understand this violence not in the way it’s being presented, as though it's... people resorting to deeply-felt innate feelings of tribal hatred and resentment. Actually, the violence has taken very specific forms, the worst of which are highly organized. We've said consistently that we initially saw three, then four forms of violence, the first two of which have mutated and intensified.

The first form was disorganized, spontaneous protest at the announcement of the result – or the supposed result – across the country. That has largely died off or been suppressed. The second form was organized militia activity, beginning in the Rift Valley but then spreading out from Central [Province] in particular. In the Rift it took the form of deaths, destruction of property, displacement of people and so on, but has been responded to by the reactivation of existing militia organizations – like Mungiki – that are now moving out from Central trying to recapture territory that they believe has been lost or ceded, given the displacements that have happened.

Mungiki is an organized militia organization. It began really as a sort of genuine social movement out of internally displaced people from the politically-instigated clashes in the early 1990s. It was very quickly co-opted however by [former President Daniel arap] Moi, by different elements within the regime, to act during times of elections and political organizing. The problem is what you do with a group that's armed, that's trained, once you no longer need them for political purposes. They then took on the form of a protection racquet or mafia within low-income areas of Nairobi and other cities, basically providing protection to citizens and business people within these areas for a fee.

The third form of violence that we saw was the really extraordinary use of force... in trying to contain the protests... largely in Nyanza Province, where most of the deaths that have occurred have been through extra-judicial killings. There's been a very uneven pattern of police response [to protest]... a very heavy deployment around Nairobi in Uhuru Park, where they were trying to prevent ODM [the opposition Orange Democratic Movement] from mobilizing their rallies. Very insufficient security was provided to IDPs [internally displaced persons] and... extreme [police] presence in the stronghold of ODM.
The fourth form of violence is more recent and it has to do with a kind of communal response to the return of IDPs - people hearing their stories, then getting incensed and organizing revenge or retributive attacks on minority communities in the Central and Nairobi areas.

On economic sabotage:

Now the militia that was active in the Rift seems to really have shifted its activity to economic sabotage. They’ve blown up bridges that would connect the transit trade from the [coast] into Uganda; they've blocked the border. They’re allowing people but not goods, services, [or] oil to get through. And obviously the Rift valley is our agricultural breadbasket and the harvest has totally been lost.

Meanwhile, the militia coming out from Central to meet this group are not just carrying out revenge cleansing, they are also... as you leave ethnically homogeneous groups behind, resorting to protection activities. The Kikuyu, for instance, in Central, who have tried to harbor people from other communities, are being forced to pay protection fees for that. But [now] even if they're not harboring anyone, they are having to pay protection fees. So there's an upsurge of that kind of criminality, now outside of the low income areas where it used to be contained.

On police harassment:

With respect to the extraordinary use of force by the police, that seems to have shifted to harassment of human rights defenders, so far... intimidation more than anything else. But there's clearly cooperation between them and a higher level of organized activity or professional activity among the militia.

It’s a very complicated kind of situation, but it is for the most part organized and that's the important point to get across. Most Kenyans, left to their own devices, even though they may be upset and polarized over the election results, would not resort to hacking their neighbors to death. We’ve heard too many stories of people from across communities either providing security or trying to organizing safe passage [for those under threat] to allow us to buy into the myth that Kenyans have ended up descending into our primal ethnic selves.

There are very high levels of organized propaganda, to which people are, I think, responding out of a genuine fear and alarm, not realizing that they are playing into ideas that are being created about this myth of descent into civil war. [It] could happen, but if it did happen it wouldn't be because we descended into it of our own accord, it would be because [some forces] intended to do that.

On the international mediation of the crisis:

The mediation is extremely critical... We hold to our position about [Mwai] Kibaki being in office illegitimately and illegally, not so much at this point in time [to say] that Raila [Odinga] should come in but just... [for Kibaki] to recognize [his]... illegitimacy... and... that even were he legitimate, we have a country that is politically divided 50-50.

In terms of effective governance, in the sense of control over territory, PNU (Kibaki’s Party of National Unity] essentially controls Nairobi and Central province, ODM (Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement] controls everything from Nairobi to the coast, including our port, and everything from Nakuru West, right up to the border. ODM also controls parliament, despite the killings of two of their parliamentarians recently.

In that kind of situation it's ridiculous to try and hold on to power at all costs. Some sort of power sharing agreement has to be reached, but not power-sharing in the sense that PNU has presented it. They have presented it as if they are legitimate, they are in charge, and if they give power-sharing it will be a matter of one or two cabinet seats. That can't work. It can't work in the sense of long-term preparations for [the] 2012 [election].

But it also can't work in terms of the economy. We all know what it was like to go through the period of 1997 to 2002 where, with the threat of the Moi succession hanging over our head, nothing happened... We went into decline.

On reforms:

What we need is an interim power-sharing transitional arrangement in which several things get done. First, obviously, electoral reform, based on what we have called for - an independent audit and investigation into the counting and tallying of the presidential vote to let the whole country see what happened and regardless of the outcome, just to lay that matter to rest except in the sense that it would inform revision of our electoral process.

Second is constitutional reform, particularly around powers of the presidency.
Third would be the beginning of real processes of addressing historical grievances and inequalities and so on.

Fourth would be resettlement and re-enfranchisement of the IDPs.

We think that all of that can happen in a maximum of two years and we need a re-run [election]... The real sticking point is the PNU accepting that there was a problem with electoral fraud. We think that everything that can be done to keep PNU at the table should be done and that would include continually questioning their legitimacy and legality.

On threats to human rights defenders:

Several things have happened. First we received information from four different sources within the police and within intelligence that all of us involved in this coalition that is stressing electoral truth as well as justice around violence were targeted in one way or another and particularly Maina Kiai [chairman of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights]... We all took precautions... Whatever is done will obviously be made to look like ordinary criminality so [we are] careful driving alone, being alone, especially at night, [and with] security in our houses, that sort of thing.

Secondly, when we were releasing our electoral findings, which was meant to be to a closed media briefing... the meeting kept getting flooded by all these young men [from the Kibaki camp], which was a bit intimidating because we did not know what would happen. We alerted hotel security, but then hotel security as it turned out had already been alerted by the police. The place was surrounded by police – it was just an intimidation effort basically. There were people supposedly from the IDP camps protesting outside, you know, calling Maina Kiai, “msaliti, msaliti,” which means “traitor, traitor” because he happens to be Kikuyu, the same ethnicity as the president. The hotel we were at is only a few meters from Uhuru Park, where people weren't allowed to demonstrate but [here] other people clearly were.

Then when we were leaving, there was this heavy [police] presence checking every car supposedly for guns. It was ridiculous, as if any of us would carry arms. Then some of us felt we had been followed. So that was alarming but again it seemed to be an overt kind of intimidation rather than anything else.
[Thirdly] a list was released of supposedly Kikuyu traitors that included many of us, saying we should be targeted in the way Mau Mau targeted traitors during the independence struggle. The implication was that we have not been concerned about the violence – about our own people bearing the brunt of the initial militia attacks – and we are targeting this man who is supposedly our president and representative of our interests. That was scary because we were named and these groups operate outside the law. So that was probably the most disturbing thing.

[Most recently] somebody, purportedly from the General Services Unit, which is a paramilitary unit used for riot control, called the office, asking for a list of names of everyone who had ever provided training for the police and the GSU – supposedly to give us back-paid benefits. Of course the deputy director refused to give the list, and said if they wanted the list they could check their own visitors’ book. They insisted, referred him to someone who was supposedly higher up, and he still refused. Ten minutes later a policeman in uniform on a motorbike was at the office to collect the list.

None of the other organizations that provide human rights training to the police force had this request made of them. Also, in Kenya, the only people who use motorbikes are the traffic police and the presidential escort, so we actually believe this wasn't from the GSU, it was from presidential security somehow.
That is very alarming because in situations like this when security services are polarized, you don't know who is commanding what and what is coming through what kind of controls. Our belief is that NCIS, the intelligence service, knows exactly what we're doing. There is nothing illegal or threatening or seditious about what we're doing. It's what we always do. But it's doubtful whether NCIS's intelligence is being used to inform decisions that are being taken around a situation that is so highly polarized.

On what concerned outsiders can do:

Raise questions with your own governments about non-recognition of the Kibaki government,  about travel bans for people, particularly on the PNU side, about asset freezes, on both sides but particularly on the PNU side, mainly to keep people at the table. People have to realize this is serious, it's not going to die away, and for us this mediation has to work.

Also make it very clear to protagonists within the state, not just in the political parties but in relevant ministries, that the protection of people is critical: from IDPs to human rights monitors on the ground, to leadership of the human rights movement and of the media. You can't have people being exterminated or intimidated just because they are doing their work in a legal fashion.

*L. Muthoni Wanyeki, is the executive director of the Kenya Human Rights Commission. This interview was conducted by AllAfrica.com and first appeared at:

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

Simon Gikandi takes on the role of the intellectual in a time of crisis.

What is the role of the intellectual in times of crisis? Do ideas make any difference in the management of public affairs? Can the imperative to act to change things be reconciled to moral demands?

These are questions that many Kenyans, especially the intellectual and professional classes have been wrestling with in the aftermath of the flawed elections of December 2007 and the wreckage of destruction and death that it has left in its wake.

At the centre of the agonising and hand- wringing that has been evident in the writings of intellectuals responding to the crisis, has been the question of how individuals should respond to a series of events that have broken up families, destroyed old friendships, and turned the very notion of a Kenyan identity into a what Chinua Achebe, writing on Nigeria, once called a convenient fiction.

What now appears to be a moral or ethical gap in the conduct of public affairs in Kenya has tended to be blamed on the political class, its opportunism, and its greed.

What has been missing in this debate, however, is the role of the intellectual class, the one group of people who should have provided us with the theoretical apparatus for managing public affairs without consideration of the demands of power politics and the dangerous cocktail of sectarianism and careerism.

Indeed, since 1982, we Kenyan intellectuals have abrogated our responsibilities as custodians of free thought and willingly supported the antics and policies of the political class.

Now we are in danger of yielding the moral high ground to the most parochial segments of our population. Soon, we will be at the beck and call of the Kenyan equivalent of John Kony or the late Alice Lakwena in northern Uganda.

Intellectuals are not likely to be seen walking across the rural countryside dressed in “tribal” dress, and wielding machetes, but it is a well-known fact that in Kenya some of our best minds have provided the ideas and the idiom that has fuelled communal conflict.

The worst kind of failure has been one of omission: The values we hold and the stories we tell ourselves, has often been distorted by respective governments and their opponents, but intellectuals have not been quick to correct such distortions.

The history books used in Kenyan secondary schools are a glaring example of this failure. They are all written to confirm to a syllabus established by the Ministry of Education and thus, instead of presenting history in a critical version, they rehearse political mythologies in the language of bureaucracy.

The section on political leaders in the New History Syllabus is a glaring example of what happens when the regimen of truth is sacrificed to bureaucratic expediency: it talks about the achievements of Jomo Kenyatta, Tom Mboya, Ronald Ngala, Oginga Odinga, and Daniel arap Moi, without even a hint of their monumental failures, the colossal mistakes that have brought us to the current crisis.

The history books used in our schools do not even pretend to invite critical thinking or to raise basic questions about historical memory, actions, or ideals.

The sections dealing with the structures of government, especially the role of the Electoral Commission of Kenya in governance, are banal recitations of the statutory function of this now disgraced body and others.

And it does not end there: Turning to the subject of “Mau, Mau” is even more troubling. Here, the most contentious event in the modern history of Kenya is represented as a list of causes and results, not conflicts and debates.

Major scholarship has been done on “Mau Mau” in some of the major universities in the world and great advances have been made on the politics of the movement, its causes and its aftermath, but the new history syllabus is not very different from the one in operation 35 years ago when I was a high school student.

Then and now, the education of Kenyan children was organised around a bureaucratic consensus. No wonder many products of our educational system rehearse some of the darkest moments of our cultural history with a bizarre mixture of ignorance and impunity, willing to slaughter their neighbours, friends, and even members of the own family in the name of invented colonial identities.

There is another dimension to the failure of national pedagogy: Why have Kenyan intellectuals failed to rise beyond partisanship to provide the voice of reason when rationality is needed most? I have known some of the intellectuals associated with both the Kibaki and Raila camps since I was an undergraduate at the University of Nairobi in the late 1970s and I worked with many of them in various groups opposed to the last dictatorship.

Yet, the people who should be providing guidance through the crisis, promoting the larger ideals that might still hold the country together, now seem to be functioning as the cold war warriors of the plutocracies.

What happened? It is common knowledge that after the 1982 coup attempt, the Moi government embarked on a systematic destruction of the university as an autonomous unit of knowledge production.

The campaign against the university took two forms: First, there was the imprisonment and forced exile of intellectuals and the wilful emaciation of institutions of higher education which, deprived of essential material resources and overwhelmed with unreasonable demands for admission, were reduced into skeletons of their former selves.

Second, the professorial class was incorporated into the State apparatus. Shuffled between the university and the bureaucracy, professors and lecturers could no longer claim to be custodians of free thinking; instead, they had become workers in the service of power. here were several consequences of the destruction of the university as an autonomous body.

One was the emergence of the Non Governmental Organisation as an alternative sphere of knowledge production. Unable to get jobs or sustain research projects at the university, intellectuals turned to non-governmental organisations, most of them funded by foreign interests.

It is here that some modicum of research was conducted in such areas as the rule of law, democracy, and gender equality. NGOs were crucial in creating a space in which issues that were not part of the state’s agenda for the university could be explored, but NGO knowledge could not provide a real alternative to the university as an autonomous space for disinterested thought.

It is not my intention here to malign NGOs, which I consider crucial in civic education, poverty eradication, and the general business of ensuring good governance, but NGOs are dependent on the interests of their foreign donors who decide research priorities within the larger project of “development.”

Much more seriously, NGO knowledge could not be pure knowledge because it was premised on utilitarian ends and its success was judged on its ability to influence policy. NGO knowledge could not be a substitute for the university as a conduit of pure knowledge.

A final consequence of the destruction of the local university was the expatriation of Kenyan knowledge. Kenyan intellectuals, working in all fields of human knowledge, hold prestigious positions in some of the leading universities in the world. Many of them produce important knowledge on Kenyan issues.

But in relation to the Kenyan polity, this is extroverted knowledge, produced within the confines and privileged spaces of foreign universities, and tied to the institutional needs and desires of foreign audiences and interests.

Research on Africa outside Africa carries the burden of its own alienation in relation to the place that is supposed to be its object of study.

* Prof Gikandi teaches at Princeton University. This article first appeared in the Business Daily Africa.

* Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org