http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/368/47866zim.jpgIn this plea, Maxwell V Madzikanga argues that Zimbabwe belongs to the many ‘courageous daughters and sons of Zimbabwe who in their prime paid the ultimate price in the inaugural Chinhoyi battle, in Tanzania, Nyadzonya, Chimoio and Tembwe, and across the breadth of Zimbabwe during the war for liberation.’

I read about the situation in Zimbabwe and saw images of what is happening there in the 23 April edition of the Zimbabwean newspaper. l cannot continue to betray my country by keeping silent on the need for total respect of human rights and human dignity in Zimbabwe. The reports and pictures show the extent of the shocking degradation of our humanity as peace-loving and civilised Zimbabweans. I feel that this enjoins me to visit a number of historical and current issues relating to the situation in Zimbabwe.

The UN must intervene immediately and comprehensively in Zimbabwe rather than holding meetings as if everything is okay. It does not help for the UN and world leaders to sit around gold-plated tables and diamond-coated chairs, sipping wine and salivating for and savouring fat cheques of per diem allowances while Zimbabwe goes up in smoke, burning the dried remnants of humanity. Hiding behind diplomatic nuances does not help either; the situation in Zimbabwe is a crisis of unimaginable proportions. The position taken by President Thabo Mbeki is very disheartening. The call that he step down as mediator in the crisis is valid. President Mbeki has let Zimbabweans down over the last two years of ‘quiet diplomacy’. I am, however, quite encouraged by the mature and courageous (albeit unpopular) comments made by the ANC President, Jacob Zuma. These are words for progress and for the future, not just for South Africa but for Zimbabwe, SADC and Africa as a whole.

Zimbabwe does not and will never belong to Morgan Tsvangirai; Robert Mugabe will never own Zimbabwe’s title deeds. This sacrosanct country belongs to our forefathers, to ourselves, and to future generations. Our forefathers had a deep respect for human rights that is reflected in our culture, traditions and customs. They worshipped the sanctity of human life and dignity in every aspect of our society. They were noble people who understood that leadership is not a lifetime calling but a duty and responsibility that had to be cherished and perfected for passing on to subsequent generations. So why are our current leaders refusing to acknowledge this, and to play their part in upholding our age-old democracy in Zimbabwe?

Zimbabwe belongs to those many fine and courageous daughters and sons of Zimbabwe who in their prime paid the ultimate price in the inaugural Chinhoyi battle, in Tanzania, Nyadzonya, Chimoio and Tembwe, and across the breadth of Zimbabwe during the war for liberation, majority rule and human rights. Zimbabwe belongs to all of us Zimbabweans. It is our duty to uphold values of life and dignity and responsible leadership for our generation and for generations to come. None of us owns these values. We are custodians and conduits for the evolution of the history of our people from the last to the next generation.

There is no justification for inflicting the amount of fear, pain, and injury on innocent women, men, grandmothers, grandfathers, girls and boys that has been witnessed in Chiwundura, Musana, Murehwa or Zvimba communal areas simply because they voted for MDC or Zanu-PF. Every Zimbabwean who has attained the age of suffrage has the constitutional right and freedom to select representatives and leaders of their preference without fear of reprisal whether before, during or after the election process. Zimbabwe belongs to the many invisible millions who should exercise their right to vote freely and to live dignified lives. Unfortunately our leaders do not see this, beyond political rhetoric.

The leadership in SADC in general has been a great disappointment. Despite isolated utterances, very little has come by way of tangible action, making all the regional initiatives ineffective. There is a clear need for more action, openness and courage from SADC, otherwise Zimbabwe will continue to bleed socially and economically – but not because Gordon Brown is tightening his grip on Zimbabwe. Harare is burning because we have turned against each other, torched our beautiful home, maimed innocent villagers and killed for no justifiable cause. We have turned Zimbabwe into a land of mourning, fear and uncertainty where painful, unnecessary and undignified death has become an ever-attendant reality.

Torture in all its forms is an abomination to human existence, whether perpetrated by the military, war veterans, Zanu-PF or MDC. A day of reckoning will come when all human rights violators will be called to account. Running to the east or flying to the west will not help. Going down into the abyss will not save the perpetrators from inevitable justice. This resonates with Zimbabwe’s culture, traditions, and beliefs, according to which no crime can be concealed forever, the truth will always out, and justice will be served. Zimbabweans are intricately bound by blood, tradition, ethos, totem, region, history and race. To decimate such a rich and strong heritage is an unforgivable crime; it is anti-Zimbabwe. Our children should be able to admire and be proud of the beauty of our land. Every citizen should be able to cross the breadth and explore the depth of our beautiful country without fearing the cruelty and harm now associated with the darkness. Zimbabwe’s youth should be able to hold hands in the spirit of brotherhood and sisterhood and enjoy bright prospects for their future.

Zimbabwe’s schools need to function again and achieve the high standards and reputation that they are capable of attaining and so richly deserve. The health system needs to be rejuvenated to deliver effective, equitable and sustainable services for all citizens in urban and rural areas. The clergy and worshippers of all persuasions should be able to worship in genuine peace and security. The army, police and other security agencies should carry out their roles professionally and impartially. One should be able to stand under and salute the Zimbabwean flag in the full knowledge and confidence that it represents the sovereignty of the country, and that all our political leaders respect and value this sovereignty and conduct their duties with integrity. Our economy should be resuscitated so that prosperity starts flowing through its arteries and veins again. Our rivers should flow with freedom and life. That to me is what our people are asking for from their political leaders, not the violence and abuse of human rights that resulted from the March elections.

I cannot underscore the importance and significance of breathing life back into all spheres of Zimbabwean society, a society l love and am attached to so deeply. My father was tortured for a long period during the liberation struggle. As he lies in his grave, I wonder what he makes of the Zimbabwe of today. I guess one question he would ask is whether it was worth his suffering for the liberation of the country. Josiah Magama Tongogara, the late freedom fighter, famously implored the liberation military wings to return home and rebuild Zimbabwe when the war was won. What happened to the liberation slogan ‘we are our own liberators’ that we chanted from an early age? Do our leaders now want us to be liberated from ourselves? We must always cherish our liberation from oppression and tyranny.

I write with passion because the situation in Zimbabwe tortures me and l cannot remain silent. Nor can I be silenced. Our leadership has made glaring mistakes and continues to act as if they own our people, as if only they can and will determine our people’s destiny. They continue to transact hatred and hate speech. They continue to grandstand, whether from the safety of exile or of government.

We need a new Zimbabwe: a Zimbabwe that upholds basic and fundamental human rights, a Zimbabwe that reflects on its past and present experiences with wise counsel, a Zimbabwe that breathes life into the future, a Zimbabwe that values the life and dignity of the poor, impoverished and marginalised members of its society.

Zimbabwe deserves a visionary leadership that carries out its role of national stewardship – a leadership that can swallow its pride and say, ‘Morgan, you are my brother. I know we have fought for supremacy in the past, but our people are bleeding. For their sake let us sit together at the table of brotherhood and plan for the future of our beloved country.’ A leadership that can swallow its pride and hatred and say, ‘Robert, you are my brother. I know we have fought viciously and bitterly for dominance and caused suffering to our people because we neglected our responsibilities as leaders. Let us sit down as brothers, put our differences in the past and create a legacy for future generations – a legacy for them to cherish and be proud of, a legacy that will make our country a great nation again.’ Zimbabwe deserves a leadership that acts with humility, courage, honesty and wisdom – a leadership that is God-fearing and peace-loving and that identifies with the suffering, wounded and dying. Are our leaders suggesting that these values are beyond them?

We all love our beautiful country. Let us all play our part in accepting the mistakes we have made and start rebuilding the ruins. We must negotiate with sincerity, persuade honestly, pray humbly, advocate with conviction, live our daily lives with integrity and honour and treat our sisters and brothers with fairness and compassion. If we don’t, there will be a Zimbabwe that we will neither be proud to talk about nor identify with. Let us remember that this is not about Thabo Mbeki declaring that Zimbabwe is crisis-free, or Levy Mwanawasa, Kofi Annan and Gordon Brown declaring that the crisis exists. It is about Zimbabweans, with the support of the international community, standing up and saying that the current Zimbabwe is not what we as Zimbabweans want or yearn for – that we as Zimbabweans long for a genuinely free, peaceful and prosperous Zimbabwe where all its citizens are respected and can live in dignity.

I would like to end by calling on the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to execute its mandate fully and impartially. Sooner or later the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission will be called to collective and individual account for the deeds it has done. It is not too late to avert total erosion of the trust placed in this august body by the people of Zimbabwe.

In conclusion, let us not tire in seeking justice, freedom and prosperity for our country, and in seeking to serve our country with commitment and integrity. Zimbabwe belongs to the dead and the living, to you and to me, but more importantly to the ‘invisibles’ among us and to posterity.

*Maxwell V Madzikanga is a senior HIV/AIDS and human rights researcher at the Human Rights Centre, Colchester, Essex, United Kingdom.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Civil society organisations call upon the membership of the United Nations to encourage the building of development partnerships that increase the volume and maximize the poverty reduction impact of the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA).

For the second year in a row, global ODA figures have fallen, and very few countries have met the target of 0.7% of GNP. Most donors have not made the substantial increases in ODA required to meet the Millennium Development Goals and the commitments from the Monterrey consensus. Much of the recent ODA has been due to debt relief, and to a lesser extent to emergency assistance and administrative costs of donors. In real terms, debt relief alone explains almost 70 percent of ODA between 2004 and 2005. ODA towards core development programs continue to remain subdued.

At the same time there is little progress towards the availing of long-term resources to the international financial system, coupled with democratic reform of the international financial institutions to ensure development effectiveness and increased resource flows to regional and sub - regional institutions and funds. These reforms and increased flows are needed to allow the regional and sub - regional institutions and funds to adequately support sustained economic and social development, technical assistance for capacity-building, and social and environmental protection schemes.

Improvements in aid effectiveness have been patchy and piecemeal both at the global and national levels. At the global level, there continues to be little effort to build mechanisms that enhance the overall effectiveness of national institutions, through increased country ownership, operations that raise productivity and yield measurable results in reducing poverty and inequality, and closer coordination with donors and the private sector. In the same vain unreformed supply-driven technical assistance is continuing to favour policy conditionality and undermine ownership.

Civil society organisations therefore call upon the membership of the United Nations to encourage the building of development partnerships that increase the volume and maximize the poverty reduction impact of ODA.

In particular we call upon donor and recipient countries to:

1. Intensify their efforts to enable effective partnerships among donors and country recipients, based on the recognition of national leadership and ownership by developing countries. The outcome document of the Doha conference should include a commitment to end all donor-imposed policy conditions. It should recognise that such conditions undermine democratic ownership.

2. Commit to give aid to eradicate poverty and inequalities and to promote human rights, gender equality, full employment and decent work and environmental sustainability as central development goals. The outcome of the Doha conference should interpret the terms of national country ownership as democratic ownership and elaborate on its implications in the context of countries' obligations to international Human Rights law, core labour standards, and international commitments on gender equality and sustainable development.

3. Commit to end the practice of using aid for their own foreign and economic policy interests and priorities, and military interventions. In addition, an effective and transparent international mechanism must urgently be put in place to improve aid allocation so it goes to those most in need.

4. Untie technical assistance from the disbursement of aid and reform technical assistance to be aligned to national strategies, which respond to national priorities and build capacity. The right of recipient countries to contract according to their needs should be respected. More effective South-South forms of technical assistance should also be promoted.

5. Commit to the highest standards of openness and transparency. This should include: timely and meaningful dissemination of information, particularly during aid negotiations and about aid disbursements; and the adoption of a policy for automatic and full disclosure of relevant information, in languages and forms that are appropriate to concerned stakeholders, with a strictly limited regime of exceptions. Southern governments must work with elected representatives and citizens’ organisations to set out open and transparent policies on how aid is to be sourced, spent, monitored and accounted for. This requires that government ministers and officials are accountable to their citizens, with effective mechanisms of answerability and enforceability, based on improved transparency of information

6. Mutually agreed transparent and binding contracts to govern aid relationships would make partnerships more effective. Aid terms must be fairly and transparently negotiated with participation from and accountability to people living in poverty and inequality. Donors and recipient governments should agree to base future aid relationships on transparent and binding agreements including clear commitments by donors on aid volumes and quality,

7. Develop multi-stakeholder mechanisms for holding governments to account for the use of aid in both partner and donor countries. The mechanisms should be open, transparent and structured, with room for citizens to hold their governments to account in their respective constituencies. As a universal and multilateral institution the UN, through a considerably strengthened ECOSOC Development Cooperation Forum should become a multi-stakeholder for democratic involvement in the design and monitoring of conceptual and operational aspects of the emerging aid architecture.

8. Adhere to the 2001 OECD/DAC agreement on untying aid to developing countries. Very little progress has been made in enhancing this mechanism. Donors should commit to expanding the agreement on untying aid to all countries and all aid modalities (including food aid and technical assistance).

9. Make disbursement of aid more predictable by freeing up administrative blockages at donor headquarters and agree to multi-year, predictable and guaranteed aid commitments based on clear and transparent criteria.

10. Reform the way aid is monitored to improve targeting, coordination and measurement of its impact. An independent monitoring and evaluation system for aid and its impact on development outcomes should be created at international, national and local levels. At the international level, new independent institutions will be needed to play this role, in order to hold donors to account for their overall performance. At the national and local levels monitoring and evaluation should involve a range of stakeholders – including CSOs, women’s organizations and trade unions. Monitoring and evaluation should also take much more account of the links between reforms in aid modalities and development outcomes and progress towards respect for human rights, core labour standards and gender equality.

11. Establish an equitable multilateral governance system for ODA in which to negotiate future agreements on the reform of aid. This should have clear and transparent negotiating mechanisms, equitable representation of donors and recipients, and openness to civil society.

12. Put the issue of international taxation for development, including the Currency Transaction Tax on the Doha Conference agenda. The outcome of the Conference should contain an agreement to introduce a Currency Transaction Tax or a Currency Transaction Development Levy at a low rate to gain experience in its implementation.

13. Donor and developing country governments must ensure direct funding and establish clear mechanisms for the participation of civil society, including trade unions, women’s rights organizations, in all the national development planning processes and aid planning, programming, management, monitoring and evaluation.

The World Bank and other regional development banks play a crucial role in channelling development finance to poor countries and setting the framework in which development aid is delivered. Thus, their development policies have a strong impact on other bilateral donors’ financial flows. Their initiatives towards greater democratic governance with voice and vote for developing counties should remain firmly on track, and development finance channelled through these institutions should fully respect the above-mentioned principles of aid effectiveness, with a particular emphasis on country ownership and leadership over national development strategies.

In this regard, it is of utmost importance that multilateral development banks put an end to their use of economic policy conditionality and systematically make ex-ante assessments of their development finance (such as Poverty and Social and Employment Impact Analysis). The World Bank, the IMF and other regional development banks should instead seek to promote local knowledge and capacities in their role of providers of policy advice and technical assistance.

*Organisations: AFRODAD EURODAD; UBUNTU Forum secretariat; New Rules Coalition; International Presentation Association of the Sisters of the Presentation

* Please send comments to or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/367/47801farm.jpgIn this open letter to the Secretary General of the Food and Agriculture organization (FAO), Henry Saragih argues that the food price crisis exposes the instability of liberalized agricultural markets and calls for concrete measures that will strengthen peasant and farmer-based food production.

OPEN LETTER To : Mr Jacques Diouf Secretary General of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Mr. Yasuo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, President of the G8, Mr. John W. Ashe, Permanent UN representative, Antigua and Barbuda's Permanent and Chairman of the Group of 77

Dear Mr. Diouf, Mr. Fukuda, and Mr. Ashe,

Our movement, La Via Campesina, consists of millions of small farmers and landless workers in more than 60 countries around the world. Although we are the ones producing food for our families and communities, many of us are hungry or living in poverty. Over the last months, the situation has worsened due to the sudden rise in food prices. We are also severely hit by the crisis because many of us do not have enough land to feed our families, and because most producers do not benefit from those high prices. Large traders, speculators, supermarkets and industrial farms are cashing in on and benefitting from this crisis. This current food crisis is the result of many years of deregulation of agricultural markets, the privatization of state regulatory bodies and the dumping of agricultural products on the markets of developing countries. According to the FAO, liberalized markets have attracted huge cash flows that seek to speculate on agricultural products on the “futures” markets and other financial instruments.

The corporate expansion of agrofuels and the initially enthusiastic support for agrofuels in countries such as the US, EU and Brazil have added to the expectation that land for food will become more and more scarce. On top of this in many southern countries hundreds of thousands of hectares are converted from agricultural uses in an uncontrolled way for so-called economic development zones, urbanization and infrastructure. The ongoing land grabbing by Transnational Companies (TNCs) and other speculators will expel millions more peasants who will end up in the mega cities where they will be added to the ranks of the hungry and poor in the slums. Besides this, we may expect especially in Africa and South Asia more severe droughts and floods caused by global climate change. These are severe threats for the rural as well as for the urban areas.

These are highly worrying developments that need active and urgent action! We need a fundamental change in the approach to food production and agricultural markets!

Time to rebuild national food economies!

Rebuilding national food economies will require immediate and long-term political commitments from governments. An absolute priority has to be given to domestic food production in order to decrease dependency on the international market. Peasants and small farmers should be encouraged through better prices for their farm products and stable markets to produce food for themselves and their communities. Landless families from rural and urban areas have to get access to land, seeds and water to produce their own food. This means increased investment in peasant and farmer-based food production for domestic markets.

Governments have to provide financial support for the poorest consumers to allow them to eat. Speculation and extremely high prices forced upon consumers by traders and retailers have to be controlled. Peasants and small farmers need better access to their domestic markets so that they can sell food at fair prices for themselves and for consumers.

Countries need to set up intervention mechanisms aimed at stabilizing market prices. In order to achieve this, import controls with taxes and quotas are needed to avoid low-priced imports which undermine domestic production. National buffer stocks managed by the state have to be built up to stabilize domestic markets: in times of surplus, cereals can be taken from the market to build up the reserve stocks and in case of shortages, cereals can be released.

Regulating international markets and supporting countries to strengthen their food production

At the international level, stabilization measures also have to be undertaken. International buffer stocks have to be built up and an intervention mechanism put in place to stabilize prices on international markets at a reasonable level. Exporting countries have to accept international rules to control the quantities they can bring to the market, in order to stop dumping. The right to implement import controls, set up programs to support the poorest consumers, implement agrarian reform and invest in domestic, farmer peasant-based food production has to be fully respected and supported at the international level.

We ask the FAO, based on its mandate, to take the initiative and create the political environment for a fundamental change in food policies. In the International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (ICARRD) a broad majority of governments recognized and agreed on the importance of rural development and agrarian reform to combat poverty and hunger in the rural areas. The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), an assessment of the agricultural sector that involved Civil Society organizations, the private sector, and governments as well as the FAO and the World Bank came to the conclusion that corporate-led agriculture and the increasing dependence of peasants and small farmers is at the heart of the problem. They also concluded that peasant, and farmer-based sustainable agriculture has to be supported and strengthened. The International Fund on Agricultural Development (IFAD) also recognizes the key role of peasants and small farmers in the production of food.

We request that G8 governments allow these initiatives to be taken. They should stop the promotion of agrofuels as these are no solution for the climate crisis and add to the destruction of forests. Especially in the southern countries, agrofuels occupy millions of hectares that should remain available for food production.

We also demand that the G8 analyze critically their own agricultural policies, take initiatives to stop the ongoing volatility of the international markets and shift their financial support away from industrial agriculture towards sustainable family farmer-based food production.

We also demand that the G8 stop and cancel any free trade agreements that will only contribute to the destruction of food production in developing countries and block any possibility of autonomous industrial development.

The influence of transnational corporations and financial speculative interests has to be controlled as much as possible and kept away from the the international food market. Food is too important to be left to business alone.

A possible WTO agreement in the Doha Round will mean another blow for peasant-based food production. We demand that the governments of the G77 assess again the WTO negotiations on agriculture in the Doha round and reject any agreement that has negative implications for domestic food production and does not allow the taking of all necessary measures to strengthen food production and increase national self sufficiency.

Peasants and small farmers are the main food producers

La Via Campesina is convinced that peasants and small farmers can feed the world. They have to be the key part of the solution. With sufficient political will and the implementation of adequate policies, more peasants and small farmers, men and women, will easily produce sufficient food to feed the growing population. The current situation shows that changes are needed!

The time for Food Sovereignty has come!

*Henry Saragih is the International Coordinator for La Via Campesina.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Seth Donnelly looks at the continuing human rights abuses by UN soldiers in Haiti.

Note: the following article is based on a recent investigation carried out in Haiti by a member of the Haiti Action Committee and other US human rights observers in Haiti.

On Saturday, April 11th, a little past 3 p.m., a MINUSTAH (UN) soldier, Nigerian Cpl. Nagya Aminu, was shot and killed in downtown Port-au-Prince. While this killing was widely reported in the international media, what followed the killing was not.

In the immediate aftermath of the killing, at approximately 3:30 p.m. that same afternoon, MINUSTAH troops launched a massive assault on Haitian vendors at the open-air sidewalk market near the main Cathedral in downtown Port-au-Prince - the area where the soldier had been killed.

According to many different street vendors who directly witnessed the MINUSTAH assault, four or five MINUSTAH soldiers emerged from parked trucks near the market and began smashing up the property of street vendors, setting the market on fire, setting off tear gas, and shooting directly at unarmed vendors.

According to one vendor, MINUSTAH soldiers used flame throwers to torch the stalls. He said the soldiers also grabbed hammers and began destroying property. This vendor was hit in the head by MINUSTAH soldiers with these hammers. On April 17th, he showed a member of the Haiti Action Committee and other US human rights observers a massive wound to his head and a blood soaked shirt. He lost consciousness and was taken by a friend to the St. Joseph Hospital nearby.

Another vendor reported that he was shot in the leg by MINUSTAH soldiers and showed his wound to the delegation. He also showed his medical records from the hospital where he had gone to be treated.

Vendors spoke of people killed by MINUSTAH gun fire. According to an officer of the National Association of Vendors, at least three people were shot and killed by MINUSTAH soldiers, who allegedly zipped bodies into bags and took them away. Reportedly, the families could not locate the bodies in the local morgue. A different source indicated that more people may have been killed. The Vendors Association officer also stated that several hundred vendors may have lost their property in the raid.

The National Association for the Defense of Haitian Vendors and Consumers has filed a formal complaint asking the Haitian President to take action and secure compensation for the 263 Haitian vendors whose property was reportedly destroyed by the MINUSTAH troops. Members of the association provided our human rights delegation with a full listing of the names of these vendors, what property they lost, and how much it was valued. For many of these vendors, who live in dire poverty, the loss in property is truly devastating. Additionally, the Association provided us with a list naming seven people who were injured and two killed - Amonese Pierre and Anna Ainsi Connu - by the MINUSTAH troops.

This kind of massive assault by MINUSTAH troops on the civilian population has happened many times before, such as the notorious attack on the people of Cite Soleil on July 6th, 2005. I was part of a small human rights delegation that visited Cite Soleil approximately 24 hours after this attack. We saw firsthand the bodies of murdered civilians, including a mother and her two young children, who community members told us were gunned down by MINUSTAH soldiers. Our delegation later interviewed the military high command of MINUSTAH who reported that the command was unaware of any civilian casualties during the assault.

It is time for the international human rights community to face squarely what has happened in Haiti: a US-backed coup in 2004 that ousted a popular, democratically elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and a subsequent UN occupation (MINUSTAH) authorized by the rich nations on the Security Council. Under this occupation, some 9,000 military and police officers from different countries - ranging from Jordan and Sri Lanka to China and Brazil - are charged with keeping the "peace". These forces have been accused by many in Haiti of targeting Aristide supporters. Indeed, the occupation serves to consolidate the anti-democratic qualities of the coup. Until the international human rights community starts to pay attention to what is happening in Haiti and join in solidarity with the Haitian people, more egregious human rights violations will be perpetrated in the name of "peacekeeping" operations.

Take action to demand that the MINUSTAH soldiers involved in this latest outrage are prosecuted for crimes against civilians!

Take action to demand that the street vendors receive full compensation for what they lost!

Contact:
UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
Tel: 011-509-244- 0650/0660
FAX: 011-509-244- 9366/67
Or, Fax Office of Secretary General (New York): 212-963-4879

President Rene Preval
Send a fax to 206-350-7986 (a US number) or email to [email][email protected]
Your letter will be hand-delivered to the Presidential Palace in Haiti.

Haitian Ministry of Justice
Tel: 011-509-245- 0474

*Seth Donnelly is a Bay Area High School social studies teacher and a member of the Haiti Action Committee. This article first appeared at www.dissidentvoice.org

**Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Dale McKinley analyses the various routes resistance in Zimbabwe has taken, the limitations of the MDC and calls for a "a strategy of well-planned, participatory, inclusive, sustained and combined political and socio-economically-driven mass action".

The character and content of the past and ongoing political, economic, social/humanitarian and (progressive) organisational crisis in Zimbabwe has received huge amounts of analytical and empirical attention from the broad left in Southern Africa and, to a lesser extent, from the global left. Several books, numerous essays/articles, frequent seminars/workshops and countless blogs and emails have been offered on almost every aspect of the crisis. While these efforts have certainly provided much-needed intellectual stimulation/debate, important information, degrees of organisational impetus and knowledge-generation about the crisis, and have often catalysed practical efforts to assist, and be in solidarity with, progressive forces in Zimbabwe, the Achilles heel of the struggle for a new Zimbabwe - the strategy and tactics of resistance/opposition – has, for the most part, been treated as a ‘poor cousin’, forever condemned to sit on the margins of the main ‘conversation’ and struggle.

It is a serious weakness that is not specific to the Zimbabwean struggle (witness the general strategic and tactical disarray of left forces in South Africa in the early-mid 1990s), but it is one that is located within a very specific Zimbabwean context and which has had an adverse impact on the general trajectory of resistance/opposition struggles in Zimbabwe over the last several years. Thus, the main questions that need to be posed are: what have been the main reasons for such as weakness on the strategic-tactical front that have led the struggle in Zimbabwe to its present day strategic cul-de-sac? and, what needs to be done to change that?

IDEOLOGICAL DISCONSONANCE OF THE ZIMBABWEAN LEFT

There has never been any meaningful degree of ideological consonance amongst left forces/individual activists in Zimbabwe. For the first decade or so, the institutional existence and political dominance of a ‘socialist’ political party in the form of ZANU-PF, engendered a ‘civil society’ that was effectively confined to the margins of key political/ideological and social debate and contestation. While opposition to the negative effects of Structural Adjustment Programmes and a subsequent raft of neo-liberal policy prescriptions in the early-mid 1990s fostered union-based, student and other smaller-scale resistance, eventually leading to the formation of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and then the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the dominant strategy of this accumulated resistance was bounded within a dominant constitutional and legal framework – i.e. to seek, through existing societal and state institutions, an expression of growing popular demands for changing the character and content of those institutions. This strategic orientation, and the tactics employed to pursue it (e.g., the formation of a political party to contest representational power through the existing institutional and legal framework) was understandable given the existence of political-social space at the time, the fact that the MDC was the first, meaningful and mass-based political challenge to the post-independence hegemony of ZANU-PF and the subsequent ‘victory’ of the nascent opposition forces in the constitutional referendum.

However, the ‘spaghetti mix’ (as left Zimbabwean activists have called it) of the MDC meant that once Mugabe and ZANU-PF had connived to steal the 2000 parliamentary elections, and in the process begin to close down the institutional and legal space for political dissent and opposition, there was no dominant ideological foundation to act as the basis for strategic and tactical re-assessment. As a result, the strategic ‘line’ remained the same – to gear up for contestation of the presidential elections in 2002 and continue the demands for a new Constitution, using the MDC as the main driver/vehicle and allied ‘civil society’ formations as fellow passengers,. Tactically, the main emphasis was on using the available (but fast-closing) institutional and legal space to launch strikes and stay-aways (by a diminishing number of employed workers and an increasingly survivalist general population), mobilise international opinion and support and embark on a standard electoral campaign to influence and mobilise support amongst the Zimbabwean population. Under such a strategic rubric though, there was little the oppositional forces could do once Mugabe and ZANU-PF began to unleash their war veteran-driven ‘land reform programme’, youth militias and institutional/legal manipulation as a means of consolidating power (especially in the rural areas) and covering the creeping dictatorship in the cloak of an incomplete ‘national democratic revolution’.

It is testimony to the hope placed in such a strategic line of march by a majority of Zimbabweans, that the MDC’s presidential candidate – Morgan Tsvangirai - only narrowly ‘lost’ the 2002 presidential elections. But Mugabe and ZANU-PF were never going to allow ‘normal’ politics to frame, and decide, the struggle for institutional (state) and representational power and when this election was rigged/ stolen, the oppositional forces fell further into the quagmire of their own ideological and thus, strategic, contradictions. As one grassroots Zimbabwean left activist put it at the time: “It is important to reemphasize that the lack of ideological discipline in the civic movement at the moment subjects it to manipulation in many ways. It allows domination by foreign funding. It also paralyses internal discourse to counter ideological offences by enemies. It creates a base for manipulation for individual pursuits. It remains one of the reasons why penetration of the grassroots has been difficult.” Despite such contradictions, and combined with the intensification of Mugabe/ZANU-PF’s post-election closing down of institutional/legal space for ‘normal’ opposition politics, there remained a dominant belief amongst oppositional intellectuals and activists/leaders that there was no need to change the strategic framework, although there was one call for ‘civil society’ to “break the bond with the MDC” and focus on grassroots “bread and butter” struggles as means to build an independent mass base capable of mounting a “meaningful challenge to the Mugabe dictatorship and neo-liberalism”.

CONSEQUENCES OF STRATEGIC CONFUSION

The continued pursuit, after the 2002 election, by the vast majority of oppositional forces of a strategy of inclusion – i.e., participation in the institutional and representational framework under a Mugabe-ZANU-PF run state combined with occasional, short-lived and largely ineffective spurts of mass action designed to mobilise domestic and international opinion – only served to further splinter such forces and catalyse a growing political disillusionment amongst the general populace. In turn, this paved the way for Mugabe/ZANU-PF to not only survive, but to strengthen their hold on state power, provide new avenues of accumulation for the bureaucratic, managerial and military elite, intensify their onslaught against the remaining little institutional and legal space available for ‘normal’ democratic politics and manipulate racial and ethnic solidarities both internally and regionally. The few (politically and ideologically) left voices that were left in Zimbabwe recognised this. In a stinging 2004 ‘review’, the International Socialist Organisation stated that the opposition had sent, “confusing signals of the way forward and strategy by the leadership to the rank and file ... It was not clear what the decisive grand strategy was – mass action or talks? Where action was done it was done in a half-hearted, half-organized manner with unrealistic illusions of a one – off big bang action to overthrow Mugabe’s dictatorship. This reflected the now overwhelming influence of the party by the cowardly bourgeois and petite bourgeois sections … who were and still are hostile to serious mass action for fear of revolution.”

The impact of such confusion was evident in the late 2004 call by the NCA for a boycott of the upcoming 2005 parliamentary elections, where the stated purpose of the boycott was to pressure the Mugabe government into “meaningful” changes to the Constitution. The NCA claimed that it would, “employ various strategies and there are a number that we are mulling at the moment … boycotting the election is just one option. People can disturb the whole purpose by deliberately spoiling ballot papers or just disrupt the whole process so that it does not even take place… but it will be a matter of strategy”. Not only was strategy becoming confused with tactics, but it was clear that there really was no alternative strategy outside of the now well-worn path of knocking on the door of existent (but now extremely minimalist) institutional and legal space.

Not surprisingly then, the boycott tactic fell apart, the MDC contested the 2005 elections and Mugabe/ZANU-PF (for the third time) rigged and bullied their way to an electoral ‘victory’. And once again, the main voices of the opposition cried foul, threatened all sorts of ‘people’s power’ mass action to bring Mugabe to his knees and turned even further towards the pillar of regional/international opinion. That none of these tactical ‘measures’ effected any meaningful/sustained change in the political and/or socio-economic status quo – such change having now become the sole preserve, even if backward, of the ever-intensifying kleptocratic and dictatorial rule of Mugabe/ZANU-PF - was further confirmation (if ever that was needed) of the strategic bankruptcy of the main opposition forces. The subsequent leadership-dominated in-fighting and occurrence of factional violence within the MDC, eventually leading to a split, was nothing more than the logical outcome of such. Even while record amounts of donor funds found their way into the coffers of a plethora of ‘oppositional’ NGOs, the repressive toll of a rapacious state combined with a precipitous decline in the social and economic fabric of Zimbabwean society ensured that by 2007, over a third of the population resided outside Zimbabwe’s borders, the average life expectancy had nosedived to the late 30s and inflation was running close to 100 000%.

Such a state of affairs had led another grassroots activist to offer a belated, but crucial, riposte: “Whilst terms like legitimacy, governance, and constitution are legitimate the ordinary man and woman on the street interprets the crisis more in terms of its socio-economic havoc. Thus we must articulate our agenda in terms of questions of hunger, poverty, wages, availability of ARVs, affordable sanitary pads, student grants, water and electricity cut offs, collapse of municipal services, harassment of cross border traders and vendors, food shortages, transport costs, price increases, access to land and so on. This is the language that will resonate with people’s day-to-day lives.”

2008 ELECTIONS: TAKING DESTINY INTO ZIMBABWEANS’ HANDS

And yet, despite all of this the MDC (now in two parts) and its ‘civil society’ allies returned once again to their chosen strategy. Surely this time, the combination of socio-economic meltdown, changes to the electoral laws, international outrage, regional pressure and ‘mediation’ (despite misgivings about the key role of South African President Thabo Mbeki), factional battles within ZANU-PF as well as the ongoing and increasingly desperate fight for new avenues of accumulation amongst the elites would ‘deliver’ victory to the opposition in the 2008 elections (now combining both presidential and parliamentary voting). And sure enough, by the time the election was over, even the sceptics had been caught up in the euphoria of an expected MDC (Tsvangirai) victory … the long-suffering people of Zimbabwe had finally had their say. The numbers were there for all to see – ZANU-PF had been defeated in the parliamentary elections and Morgan Tsvangirai had either defeated Mugabe or had garnered enough votes to force a presidential run-off. But as the post-election days have gone by, the reality (for the fourth time) has bitten hard – the same reality that was not as clear at the very beginning of the opposition’s strategic sojourn – namely, that Mugabe and ZANU-PF were never going to allow ‘normal’ democratic politics to frame, and decide, the struggle for institutional (state) and representational power. And so it continues.
In a statement issued a few days ago, the MDC said it is time for Zimbabweans to take “destiny into their own hands”. They are right about that. But then they said that the way in which Zimbabweans should do so is to stay at home until the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission releases the presidential results. They are wrong.

The ‘story’ of Zimbabwe’s last decade is, in all respects, a tragic one despite the immense resilience and courage of ordinary Zimbabweans (wherever they are) and the commitment and bravery of innumerable peasants, workers and other activists from all walks of life. Yet, this tragedy is not immutable. Mugabe/ZANU-PF and all of their hangers-on have been on a downward spiral ever since they abandoned the only basis for democratic legitimacy in a capitalist world – the political will and socio-economic well-being of the mass of the workers and the poor. In Zimbabwe, as elsewhere in our world, it has always and forever been impossible to realise and affirm that will through a dominant strategy of struggling on a terrain not of the ongoing making of that mass. Inclusion can only have real and lasting meaning when it is those who are excluded who set the terms.

As Zimbabwe sits on the edge of a precipice that continues to crumble under the weight of its various architects making, the time is ripe for a (re)making of another sort - a strategy of well-planned, participatory, inclusive, sustained and combined political and socio-economically-driven mass action to cut the remaining ground from underneath the shaky feet of the oppressors. After all, it is ground that is only, ultimately, being held up by the that mass. Now is not the time for sitting on the sidelines to wait and hope that the oppressors jump off the precipice. Now is not the time for recycling a tired and failed strategy. Now is not the time for quiet activism. It is time to inspire and lead.

*Dale McKinley is a socialist activist and researcher who is a member of the Anti-Privatisation Forum. He was born and raised in Zimbabwe and spent the first 18 years of his life in Zimbabwe. This article first appeared at

**Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/365/47645cross.jpgAs the shepherds of the people, we, Church leaders of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC) and the Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), express our deep concern over the deteriorating political, security, economic and human rights situation in Zimbabwe following the March 29, 2008 national elections.

Before the elections, we issued statements urging Zimbabweans to conduct themselves peacefully and with tolerance towards those who held different views and political affiliation from one’s own. After the elections, we issued statements commending Zimbabweans for the generally peaceful and politically mature manner in which they conducted themselves before, during and soon after the elections.

Reports that are coming through to us from our Churches and members throughout the country indicate that the peaceful environment has, regrettably, changed:

Given the political uncertainty, anxiety and frustration created by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC’s) failure to release the results of the presidential poll 4 weeks after polling day:

- Organized violence perpetrated against individuals, families and communities who are accused of campaigning or voting for the 'wrong' political party in the March 29, 2008 elections has been unleashed throughout the country, particularly in the countryside and in some high density urban areas.

People are being abducted, tortured, humiliated by being asked to repeat slogans of the political party they are alleged not to support, ordered to attend mass meetings where they are told they voted for the 'wrong' candidate and should never repeat it in the run-off election for President, and, in some cases, people are murdered.

- The deterioration in the humanitarian situation is plummeting at a frightful pace. The cost of living has gone beyond the reach of the majority of our people. There is widespread famine in most parts of the countryside on account of poor harvests and delays in the process of importing maize from neighbouring countries.

The shops are empty and basic foodstuffs are unavailable. Victims of organized torture who are ferried to hospital find little solace as the hospitals have no drugs or medicines to treat them.

As the shepherds of the people, we appeal:

- To the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) to work towards arresting the deteriorating political and security situation in Zimbabwe.

We warn the world that if nothing is done to help the people of Zimbabwe from their predicament, we shall soon be witnessing genocide similar to that experienced in Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi and other hot spots in Africa and elsewhere.

- For the immediate end to political intimidation and retribution arising from how people are perceived to have voted in the March 29, 2008 elections and arising from the desire to influence how people will vote in the anticipated run-off in the presidential poll.

Youth militia and war veteran/military base camps that have been set up in different parts of the country should be closed as a step towards restoring the peace and freedom of people’s movement that was witnessed before and during the March 29, 2008 elections.

- To ZEC to release the true results of the presidential poll of March 29, 2008 without further delay. The unprecedented delay in the publication of these results has caused anxiety, frustration, depression, suspicion and in some cases illness among people of Zimbabwe both at home and abroad.

A pall of despondency hangs over the nation which finds itself in a crisis of expectations and governance. The nation is in a crisis, in limbo and no real business is taking place anywhere as the nation waits.

- To, finally, the people of Zimbabwe themselves. You played your part when you turned out to vote on 29 March 2008. We, again, commend you for exercising your democratic right peacefully. At this difficult time in our nation, we urge you to maintain and protect your dignity and your vote.

We urge you to refuse to be used for a political party or other people’s selfish end especially where it concerns violence against other people, including those who hold different views from your own. It was the Lord Jesus who said, 'Whatever you do to one of these little ones, you do it unto me' (Matthew 25:45).

We call on all Zimbabweans and on all friends of Zimbabwe to continue to pray for our beautiful nation. As the shepherds of God’s flock, we shall continue to speak on behalf of Zimbabwe’s suffering masses and we pray that God’s will be done.

We remain God’s humble servants:

The Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ)
The Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ZCBC)
The Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC)

*Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/365/47644muga.jpgThe Swaziland Coalition of Concerned Civic Organisations, supports the efforts of its colleagues in the Lwas Society of East Africa when it hosted an emergency consultation on ‘Africa Taking the Initiative on the Zimbabwe Election Crisis’ held in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania on 21st April.  The meeting brought together the finest African minds from over 100 civic and legal organisations from all over the continent. 
 
After lengthy discussions on the Zimbabwean situation it was concluded that, in spite of what President Mbeki and Minister Sgaoyoyo Magongo might find politically or personally expedient, it is most definitely a crisis.  In fact it is multiple crises of democracy, security, the rule of law, constitutionalism, independence, freedom of speech, safety of people, the role of the police and military and the death free and fair elections.  It calls Mugabe’s post election actions simply and clearly a military lead de facto coup d’etat.   

Three weeks delay in counting only the presidential vote is a crisis of due process.

Calling for a recount before the result of the count is announced is a crisis of free and fair election law.

Assaulting citizens and killing them on the basis of their vote is a crisis that goes to the heart of democracy – the secrecy of the vote.
Ordering a shipment of arms 2 days after the election in times of peace when no external aggression is present is a crisis of internal repression and of international law. 

We concur with the East African Law Society when we say that the Mbeki lead process has contributed to the greatest failure of all – the will of the majority of the long suffering people of Zimbabwe has been systematically and structurally stolen. 
 
We call on the AU to replace the SADC / Mbeki driven mediation process with one of the calibre that was appointed to address the recent problems in Kenya. 
We also call on the AU and its Commission on Human and People’s Rights to appoint special rapporteurs to investigate the horrific allegations that are coming from many independent and respected sources of planned and programmed human rights abuses. 

We also call on SADC, AU and the world to turn their backs on the so called Mugabe Government and not to recognise its legitimacy.  We call on a complete embargo on any form of weapons shipments to be imported to the country and we support the moral courage of the African Trade Unions in preventing the Chinese shipment from landing in Durban and Maputo. 
 
We finally call on our King Mswati III as he meets President Thabo Mbeki to use their collective influence to ensure that the legitimate will of the people of Zimbabwe to elect a government of their choice is restored and respected and reflects the true results of the 29 March elections. 

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/365/47643bullet.jpg “Zimbabwe is staring into the abyss. Violence is growing and the people are suffering greatly as a result. It is now vital that we all do what we can to calm the situation.

In particular I join the worldwide calls to stop the supply of weapons to the country - by land, sea or air - until the political crisis is resolved. It is obvious that supplying large quantities of arms at this stage would risk escalating the violence, perhaps resulting in the large-scale loss of life. We should be proud of the African Trade Unions and governments who refused to let the most recent Chinese shipment off-load in their ports but China must now agree not to try and send these arms by air instead.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/365/47599zimchina.jpgThe Congress of South African Trade Unions welcomes the statement by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman that the China Ocean Shipping Company which owns the An Yue Jiang, has decided to recall the ship because Zimbabwe cannot take delivery of the 77 tonnes of weapons and ammunition onboard.

If true, this is an historic victory for the international trade union movement and civil society, and in particular for the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union, whose members refused to unload or transport its deadly cargo.

Today's meeting between the COSATU General Secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi and the Secretary General of the Movement for Democratic Change, Tendai Biti, confirmed beyond all doubt that the people of Zimbabwe are now facing a massive crisis - a brutal onslaught from a regime that is determined to cling to power by stealing the elections and imposing its will through violence.

In COSATU's view the 'government' of Robert Mugabe is now illegal and illegitimate. Its term of office expired at the end of March when the people voted. Its has refused to release the results of the presidential election and has illegally organised a recount of votes in 23 constituencies in which the ruling ZANU-PF lost narrowly to the MDC, long after the time limit of 48 hours had expired. It has even been 'recounting' the presidential votes in those constituencies before they had been announced.

Combined with this blatant vote-rigging, the ruling party has unleashed a systematic campaign of violence against MDC members and supporters, which has already claimed at least ten lives. Thousands have been displaced from their homes, five hundred injured and hospitalised and these numbers are increasing by the day.

Meanwhile the 'government' is continuing to rule illegally, with the former ministers restored to their posts, even those who lost their seats in the parliamentary elections. COSATU demands that the governments of Africa refuse to recognise this despot who is desperately hanging on to power, and to stop inviting him to meetings of the SADC or AU.

COSATU salutes the stand taken by its transport affiliate SATAWU and other unions around the continent, and now calls upon all its affiliates and Southern African trade union partners, to identify, and refuse to handle, any goods destined for Zimbabwe which could be used to assist the illegal government or be used to oppress the people.

The federation will be holding a meeting with civil society, church and NGO groups on Thursday, 24 April, at which plans will be finalised for a huge protest march in South Africa, in solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe, and to demand the removal of the Mugabe dictatorship and the installation of a government elected by a majority on 29 March 2008.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/365/47598beat.jpgFurther to the two statements ZADHR issued last week we report a further 81 cases of organised violence and torture which have been seen and treated by members of the Association in the three days ending Monday 21 April 2008. This is not a cumulative total – this is the number of cases seen in these 3 days alone. The total number of cases seen since 1 April 2008 is 323. It seems likely that there are substantial numbers of similar cases occurring across the country which have not presented to ZADHR members and are therefore not represented in these figures.

54 of these cases occurred in Harare, Chitungwiza or Epworth, 20 in Glen View alone. 13 more occurred in Mudzi and Murewa, 4 in Mount Darwin, and 6 in different areas of Manicaland.

By far the commonest alleged perpetrators are now the uniformed forces (ZRP and ZNA).

Fourteen (17%) of these 81 patients were women. They include a 7 year old girl who suffered a fracture of her right radius and ulna on falling down while running after her father who was being chased by members of the security forces, and a 10 year old boy with a probable dislocation of the right elbow resulting from being kicked by a soldier who was trying to kick someone else. One 47 year old woman reported being sexually assaulted.

Soft tissue injuries again predominate, with 6 probable fractures. These include the case of a 39 year old man who was abducted from his home at midnight, was beaten and suffered a fractured left ulna, fractured ribs on the left side, and a pneumothorax underlying the rib fractures. A pneumothorax is when air leaks out of the lung through a hole in the lining of the lung, caused for example by a broken rib, and collects in the virtual space between the linings of the lung and the inner surface of the chest wall. It can rapidly threaten life because it may enlarge and cause collapse of the lung itself and distortion of the large blood vessels arising from and draining into the heart. This patient required a tube to be inserted into his chest to prevent that complication.

4 cases of falanga were recorded. Falanga is torture in which the soles of the feet are repeatedly beaten with a hard object such as a baton or bar. There is often severe tissue damage beneath the skin, within the sole of the foot, which never fully heals, resulting in walking being painful for the rest of the victim’s life.

Physical injuries are the most visible. Many of these patients report extreme psychological stress which itself results in both mental and physical symptoms. The stresses reported include many having had their homes and property completely burnt, being forced to roll in muddy or sewage-containing water, running and hiding in ‘the bush’ from fear of assault, being abducted and detained with beatings continuing over several days with no knowledge of when it will end, and having no knowledge of the safety of spouse or children. One 64 year old man presented with full-blown ‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder’, the major manifestation of which was his being incapable of speech.

Some of the reported physical and psychological wounds will take a long time and require much care and attention to heal.

 ZADHR condemns the continuing violent assault and torture on Zimbabwean citizens, in particular that allegedly perpetrated by security forces. We continue to appeal to the UN, AU and SADC to engage with the authorities to bring an end to this systematic assault on large numbers of Zimbabweans.

ZADHR further appeals to the Zimbabwe Medical Association, the World Medical Association and other concerned national medical associations to condemn these acts of violence, and engage their Governments in working towards resolution of the crisis in Zimbabwe.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Pambazuka News brings you the last part of William Gumede's chapter on Mbeki and the controversies surrounding his AIDS policies. This is from his book 'Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC'.

In the end, economics rather than compassion would force Mbeki’s hand on HIV/AIDS. Members of his international investment council warned him at roughly the same time as the NEC meeting that investors found the confusion over the government’s approach to the disease unsettling, if not downright frightening. Mbeki’s association with the AIDS dissidents was fuelling negative perceptions about South Africa as a potential investment opportunity, and unless a clear and unambiguous change in policy could be discerned, his meeting with the G8 in June to discuss NEPAD could be blown off course.

Trevor Manuel and Reserve Bank governor Tito Mboweni were also starting to feel the pinch as foreign investors probed them on government’s AIDS policy, and they, too, began dropping cautious hints to the president of looming economic consequences.

When the cabinet met in April 2002, Mbeki proposed that ARVs be made available to pregnant women and rape survivors without further delay, pointing out that despite the absence of conclusive evidence that they worked, they were already being routinely used by medical staff who suffered puncture wounds sustained from hypodermic syringes.

It was a landmark decision and a radical departure from Mbeki’s position to date. He followed through by starting to distance himself from the AIDS dissidents, and gave cabinet an undertaking that no longer would the dissidents or Mokaba be allowed to speak on his behalf regarding the disease.

In an interview with the Star, Mbeki denied that there was a lack of govern- ment leadership on AIDS. ‘Perhaps we are not communicating that message loud enough, ’he said. ‘But I think there’s been very strong leadership on the matter. It is critically important that I communicate correct messages.'

Since then, like many other developing countries, South Africa has increasingly channelled funds into AIDS programmes, albeit at the cost of poverty alleviation or opening up their markets to trade with poorer countries. Development funding is now earmarked almost exclusively to halt the infection rate and treat the victims.

But in fairness, the business community has not been a partner to govern- ment in this battle. The South African Business Coalition on HIV/AIDS surveyed 1006 companies throughout the country on the impact of the disease in commerce and industry, and found that only 25 per cent of them had implemented a formal HIV/AIDS policy. Less than 20 per cent had introduced voluntary counselling and testing programmes, or provided care, treatment and support to infected workers.

Having previously announced with great fanfare that it would make ARVs available to employees free of charge, mining giant Anglo American subsequently withdrew the offer, saying it would be far too costly.[68]Incredulously, trade minister Alec Erwin would claim as late as April 2002 that AIDS had ‘no impact on the South African economy or workforce’.

The harsh reality is that South Africa is now faced with creating the largest AIDS treatment programme in the world. The ARV roll-out in the public sector will require a major upgrading ofthe existing health-care infrastructure,recruitment and training of a vast corps of health workers, and a well-coordinated national programme for HIV tests and counselling.

It is a daunting prospect, to be sure, but it can be done. In the mid-1980s,the picture looked equally grim in Thailand, but thanks to a dedicated monitoring programme, concentration on high-risk groups, general AIDS education combined with 100 per cent condom use and vigorous efforts to dispel the stigma attached to the disease, the situation has been brought under control and infection rates appear to have stabilised. The secret ingredient to success, however, has been large doses of political will.

Worryingly, Mbeki still firmly believes that those who contract the disease should assume individual responsibility for their care and not simply expect the state to pick up the tab. He remains unconvinced that HIV causes AIDS, and many senior ANC leaders share his view. Said Smuts Ngonyama, the party’s official spokesperson and one of Mbeki’s closest associates: ‘It’s based on a scientific assumption, and like all assumptions, it can be disproved.’

Small wonder, then, that Mbeki could tell the world, without blinking an eye, ‘I don’t know anybody who died of AIDS’ in an interview with the Washington Post in September 2003.

Cynics have no doubt that the only reason the government backed down on the ARV roll-out was to deny opposition parties the chance to use the issue as a vote-catcher in the 2004 elections. Many claimed that the ANC still lacked the political will to tackle AIDS head-on, and predicted that the issue would be moved to the back burner again once the election was over.

In August 2004, Tshabalala-Msimang confirmed that the government would not meet its target of supplying ARVs to a paltry 53 000 people by March 2005. After all, she sighed, ‘we are just a developing country’. Somewhat tellingly, she added: ‘If you say to the nation that you are providing ARVs then you will wipe out all the gains made in the promotion ofa healthy lifestyle and prevention.'

Government’s AIDS policy soon regressed to such an extent that, at the Make Poverty History rally in 2005, Nelson Mandela urged Mbeki to ‘recognise that the world is hungry for action, not words’.

Although by the end of 2006 there was a noticeable increase in government’s delivery of ARVs, with about 200000 patients receiving the drugs through the public health system, making it one of the world’s largest ARV treatment pro- grammes, a further 800000 were in desperate need of them. In many other respects, government rapidly returned to doing things the old way. The AIDS plan was heavily undermined when Jacob Zuma said during his rape trial that, after having unprotected sex with an HIV-positive family friend, he had taken a shower to prevent infection. His testimony showed that AIDS denial was endemic within the highest echelons of government and the ANC. Zuma was the former head of the country’s National AIDS Council.

At the World AIDS Conference in Toronto in August 2006, international activists, medical doctors and the media accused South Africa of ‘lunatic’ negligence regarding HIV/AIDS. The official South African stand prominently displayed lemons and garlic, along with condoms and ARVs, as ways to deal with AIDS. At the start of the conference, the display had also included apples, nectarines and grapes, but these were quickly eaten by passing delegates. Such was the inter- national criticism that investor perceptions of South Africa slumped, which spurred Mbeki into action. The AIDS issue again became part of a political football game. A day after being acquitted of rape in May 2006,Zuma publicly apologised for the irresponsible statements he had made during his trial. Cynical as this apology was, his position was immediately contrasted with that of Mbeki, who had elected to maintain a stony silence on the topic of AIDS. In addition, the SACP and COSATU rained fresh hammer blows on Mbeki over the government’s approach. AIDS activists stepped up their criticism and embarked on a strategy to shame government, particularly at prestigious international forums.

In September 2006, the TAC was joined by eighty-one leading scientists to demand the sacking of Tshabalala-Msimang.This was particularly effective, as Mbeki and his cabinet are super-sensitive when it comes to international, and especially business, perceptions of government. Deputy health minister Nozizwe Madlala-Routledge broke ranks with her superiors in October and admitted that government was failing to fight the pandemic. ‘Our country is in pain. We are all in pain,’ Madlala-Routledge said. She later demanded that all government leaders – including Mbeki – should take public AIDS tests, but backtracked quickly after being reprimanded by senior officials in the presidency and denied that she had singled out the president. On World Aids Day at the end of November, the government announced it would cobble together a new five-year plan to expand treatment and prevent new HIV infections. Mlambo-Ngcuka and Madlala-Routledge became the first government leaders to meet with civil society groups and activists such as Zackie Achmat, previously shunned like the plague. The new plan would make those aged between fifteen and twenty-four a priority, halve the rate of new infections and provide treatment for 750000 adults and children by 2011.‘This is a sea change, ’exclaimed Mark Heywood, a leading AIDS activist. ‘We’ re not across the ocean yet, but now the government is sailing in the right direction.

Mbeki’s strategists blamed Tshabalala-Msimang for previous failures, and she was quickly sidelined. Although government strategists grudgingly conceded that the health minister had become identified with the abysmal failure to manage the disease, Mbeki still refrained from firing her. Ironically,it would take Tshabalala- Msimang falling seriously ill in late 2006 for Mlambo-Ngcuka, with the help of Madlala-Routledge,to finally wrest control of government’s AIDS policy from the health minister. Mlambo-Ngcuka was assigned to lead the new AIDS approach, and was appointed as head of South Africa’s National AIDS Council. Some of Tshabalala-Msimang’s responsibilities were transferred to her deputy, who had previously been excluded from making decisions on AIDS policy. Mlambo-Ngcuka promised to consult non-governmental groups and outsiders on government’s future AIDS policy. However, Tshabalala-Msimang has tried to fight back in-between bouts of illness, attacking both Madlala-Routledge and Mlambo-Ngcuka: ‘The incident of my illness was portrayed as an opportunity to turn others into champions ofa campaign to rid our government of the so-called “HIV and AIDS denial at the highest level.”

Nevertheless,Mlambo-Ngcuka and Madlala-Routledge – with Mbeki’s backing – have revitalised the moribund battle against the pandemic and have deservedly been showered with praise by HIV/AIDS experts and civil society groups. However, some long-suffering AIDS veterans remain sceptical: they have been here before and have seen many false dawns.

Practical considerations aside, there is much work yet to be done, by govern- ment, the TAC and other civil society organisations, to destigmatise the disease. Gugu Dlamini was stoned to death by a mob near Durban after she disclosed her HIV-positive status on radio. The veil of secrecy surrounding the deaths of Peter Mokaba and Parks Mankahlana show how pervasive the stigma is.

The Sisulu family proved a rare exception when they went public after a family member died of AIDS. Buthelezi, an arch-traditionalist, also broke the silence by acknowledging that both a son and a daughter had died of AIDS within months of one another in 2004, and publicly speaking of the devastation the disease has caused within the family circle. And when Nelson Mandela announced that his son, Makgatho, had died of AIDS in January 2005, it was a move aimed at breaking one of the most stubborn taboos surrounding the pandemic.

It is true that there are cultural taboos against speaking about death, but the continual denials perpetuate the terrible stigma surrounding AIDS in South Africa. The vast majority of the population still see the disease as something that happens to ‘other’ people – prostitutes, migrant workers and moral lepers. Only those who have done something bad, behaved immorally or been sexually promiscuous get AIDS, and ‘decent’ folk are right to treat them as outcasts. Sex, too, is something that polite people don’t discuss in public. It happens, but one does not talk about it, hence Zuma’s mind-boggling statement that those who dare to mention oral sex are ‘un-African’.

The fact that Mbeki has never led the way in talking openly about AIDS, as President Yoweri Museveni did in Uganda, has seriously undermined all government efforts to combat the disease. Mbeki’s refusal to acknowledge that HIV is sexually transmitted is a major obstacle to facilitating behaviour modification and greatly diminishes the dedicated attempts of sex educators to protect another generation from wholesale infection. A more enlightened leader such as Chandrababu Naidu, chief minister of the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, for example, insisted that all his ministers should make mention of AIDS in their public addresses, no matter what the topic.

Mbeki’s role is crucial. Though South Africa has the most progressive Constitution and Bill of Rights in the world, with women’s rights firmly entrenched, gender relations are far from being democratised. Age-old perceptions of women as ‘possessions’ run deep, and in November 2003,a South African Medical Research Council study offered conclusive evidence of links between gender-based power inequalities and the risk of South African women contracting AIDS.

The study recommended that reducing gender inequalities and making men more respectful of women are crucial weapons in the fight against AIDS, and in building a society in which women have the right to live free from violence. The most recent research shows that women aged between fifteen and twenty-nine are three to four times more likely to be infected than males. As the country’s president and leading male role model, Mbeki could be extremely influential in changing attitudes towards women.

Recent official surveys show a high level of HIV infection – 20 per cent – among young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four. In addition,1.5 million children under the age of eighteen are maternal orphans, who have lost either a mother or both parents, and 66 per cent of them have been orphaned as a result of HIV/AIDS. In all, 1.8 million AIDS-related deaths have occurred in South Africa since the start of the pandemic.

Mbeki’s handling of the AIDS issue has reinforced his image as a lone, remote intellectual and contrarian battling against the world. It has also illustrated the president’s Don Quixote side, which caused his mentor, Oliver Tambo, many headaches. Tambo once told an associate: ‘That Thabo is such a clever young man, but I always have to keep a close eye on him,because he tends to wander off[on intellectual pursuits].He would cause my death,if I am not careful.’

In dealing with AIDS, Mbeki may have wandered off on a deadly diversion that has helped place an entire nation in denial and needlessly taken the lives of millions of its citizens.

*William Gumede is the author of Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC - Published by Zed Books (http://zedbooks.co.uk). His latest book, 'The Democracy Gap - Africa's Wasted Years', will be published later this year.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/368/47585aids.jpgPambazuka News continues to serialise William Gumede's chapter on Mbeki and the controversies surrounding his AIDS policies. This is from his book 'Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC'. Be sure to look for the last part in the next issue.

For COSATU, the link between HIV and AIDS was irrefutable. General secretary Zwelinzima Vavi pointed to the success of Brazil, a country with similar income disparities to South Africa, in providing medication to its infected citizens, and called on the government to declare a national emergency in terms of TRIPS so that ARV delivery could start.

Formal criticism from inside the ANC was slow to emerge, with those who differed from Mbeki scared of reprisals if they spoke out. Most criticism was uttered in hushed tones, but Madisha’s and Vavi’s relentless public attacks on Mbeki’s AIDS stance opened the way for other prominent black figures to join the choir.

Some had kept their own counsel for fear of being lumped with white conservatives who had taken up the AIDS cudgel only because they could use it to bash the ‘inept’ black government. Thanks to Madisha, Vavi and prominent scientist William Makgoba, the Mbeki-ites could no longer charge that criticism was confined to white reactionaries bent on undermining the black government.

Once the wall of silence had been breached, the AIDS policy came under fire from within. Some of the harshest critics were members of the ANC’s health committee, one of the party’s constitutional structures, while former health minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma told Mbeki privately that his stance was undermining not only the government’s own policy, but his presidency.

The most serious opposition came from individuals serving on the ANC’s powerful NEC, but only as late as mid-2000. At an NEC meeting in Johannesburg, Dlamini-Zuma and Shepherd Mdladlana cautiously warned that Mbeki’s high-profile international advisory panel on AIDS was adding to confusion over the official AIDS message. They couched their arguments in a way that spared Mbeki from direct criticism, emphasising that the government’s message was not being effectively conveyed. They also warned that AIDS had the potential to undermine the ANC’s efforts in the 2000 local elections, given that opposition parties and civil movements were threatening to make AIDS, as well as slow social delivery to the poor, central campaign issues.

Mbeki loyalists such as Essop Pahad and Manto Tshabalala-Msimang responded dismissively that government was doing enough, within its capacity, to deal with the AIDS crisis. They listed AIDS education programmes and the amounts spent on them, arguing that it would cost too much to accede to calls by NGOs, trades unions and churches for the government to supply ARVs to all AIDS sufferers. Tshabalala-Msimang reiterated that the toxicity of ARVs had not been unequivocally determined, and cited warnings by the American government that some ARVs were believed to be so toxic that their use could prove fatal.

Mbeki was adamant that he would not backtrack on any of his AIDS statements, and continued to believe that his views were correct.

But he did agree, albeit reluctantly and unhappily, to refrain from further public comment on AIDS, at least until after the municipal elections. His chief policy guru, Joel Netshitenzhe, was assigned the unenviable task of extricating Mbeki from the hole he had dug for himself, without repudiating anything the president had previously said on the subject of HIV and AIDS.

Fully aware of the damage that had been done to the government’s reputation, Netshitenzhe fell back on the spin doctor’s hardy annual and attacked the media for colluding with critics of the official AIDS policy. Insisting that the government’s programmes were fully effective but not ‘on message’, he got the go-ahead for a R2-million advertising blitz that would somehow make it clear that neither the president nor anyone else in a position of authority had ever said that there was no link between HIV and AIDS.

‘We want to put the theorising behind us and programmes to fight the pandemic in front of us,’ said one senior NEC member optimistically. Mbeki’s international AIDS advisory panel would continue to meet, but behind the scenes, and the president would avoid all public reference to the pandemic until the local government ballots were cast.

The advertising campaign failed to clear up the confusion, not least because no one could admit what lay behind Mbeki’s withdrawal from the public AIDS debate. And since the dissidents continued to use his name in support of their own agenda, his silence was widely interpreted as confirmation that he did not agree with the messages imparted by official government policy.

In the wake of the NEC meeting, members of the ANC’s parliamentary wing became emboldened enough to make their voices heard on a range of issues, including the economic policy, Mbeki’s ineffective ‘quiet diplomacy ’with Zimbabwe and AIDS.

Nelson Mandela tried to meet with Mbeki to raise his concerns over the AIDS policy, but the president was smarting over what he saw as his predecessor’s constant criticism on the subject, and refused to take Mandela’s calls.

At a special meeting of the ANC’s parliamentary caucus in October 2000, Mbeki raged against senior leaders who criticised him in public, specifically on AIDS and Zimbabwe, and slammed the media for its coverage of the AIDS debate.

In contrast, he spoke approvingly about a conference in Uganda the previous month, where some 60 dissident scientists had argued convincingly that there was no scientific proof that HIV caused AIDS. He quoted from a document stating that the virus had never been isolated, and said reports that Uganda had scored significant successes in the fight against AIDS were untrue.

He told the gathered MPs that if one agreed that HIV causes AIDS, it followed that the treatment lay with drugs manufactured by Western corporations. The pharmaceutical companies therefore needed people to believe that HIV and AIDS were linked, in order to peddle their products. One drug company, which he did not name, had confessed, he said, that it had spent vast amounts of money on the search for an AIDS vaccine, but had abandoned the effort after failing to isolate the virus. This fact remained hidden from the public, Mbeki claimed, because the company’s share price would plummet if the truth were told.

He accused the CIA of being involved in a covert plot to spread the belief of an HIV/AIDS link, and cited statistics showing that 10 per cent of Africans died of AIDS. It made no sense, Mbeki argued, to focus the bulk of a state’s resources on this 10 per cent, to the detriment of the remaining 90 per cent. Drug companies continually urged governments to pay attention to a growing number of AIDS orphans, but how, asked the president, were the authorities to distinguish between the needs of AIDS orphans and orphans of any other kind?

He claimed he had the support of the editor of South Africa’s conservative daily newspaper, the Citizen, but said it was less clear that members of his own cabinet stood with him on this issue. They should declare their positions, he said, and the ANC’s MPs should join him in fighting off attempts by international forces to undermine him and the government’s agenda.

Those within the ANC who criticised him were playing into the hands of the local and foreign media – some of whom had dared to describe his views on AIDS as deranged – and unwittingly supporting the campaigns of the powerful drug companies and their allies, Western governments opposed to Mbeki’s vision of success for developing countries.

Before launching his tirade, Mbeki had made it clear to caucus chair Thabang Makwetla that he would take no questions. Deeply shocked by the virulence of his attack, none of the ANC MPs challenged anything he said. According to one, ‘there was a stunned silence in the room’.

Throughout his presidency, Mbeki’s Achilles heel has been his uncompromising ‘you are either with us, or against us’ attitude. He sees all criticism of government policy as a personal attack, and those who dare express views that contradict his own are categorised as secretly hating him, or, worse, wanting to topple him.

His censure of the AIDS critics choked any further criticism of the government’s policy. Not even the bravest ANC leaders would risk being labelled allies of a hostile ‘white’ media, greedy drug manufacturers or covert Western intelligence conspiracies.

In October 2001, during question time in parliament, it emerged that a number of ANC parliamentarians were taking ARVs, paid for by their state medical aid. The inescapable conclusion among activists was that the government could afford to pay for medicine for its own officials and representatives, but such help was too costly for the masses. Former opposition Pan Africanist Congress firebrand Patricia de Lille openly denounced the government’s ‘absolute hypocrisy’, but Mbeki’s response was merely to warn the ANC MPs that the drugs could be toxic. Having successfully drawn a curtain of silence over AIDS critics within the ANC, the president broadened his attacks to include black intellectuals, activists and individuals of all political persuasions who agitated against the government’s policies. A particularly vicious campaign was launched against outspoken physicist and political analyst Sipho Seepe, while Essop Pahad slammed local medical experts as ‘pseudo-scientists’.

Mbeki accused William Makgoba of deliberately leaking a long-awaited MRC report on the devastation wrought by AIDS in South Africa to the media before it was handed to him or the cabinet. Tshabalala-Msimang ordered a forensic audit to sniff out the source of the leak.

Achmat and TAC activists, many of them ANC cadres, were next to face Mbeki’s ire. He refused to meet any TAC representatives, telling confidants: ‘I will not give them the credibility of my presence.’ The vilification of Achmat as a pawn in the hands of Western interest groups intensified, and he was publicly accused of defying ANC discipline.

Achmat had infuriated Mbeki by travelling to Thailand in late 2000, buying 5000 fluconazole pills for 28 cents each, and bringing them back to South Africa in a well-publicised stunt. The government had him arrested for smuggling, and the attacks on the TAC only let up after Mandela visited a very sick Achmat at home in 2002 to plead with him to take ARVs.

Mandela lauded Achmat’s commitment to the ANC and praised him as a role model and loyal member, pledging to ensure that his protests were heard in the right government circles. ‘We were really under siege', Achmat later reflected, ‘and Nelson has given us protection. It was not for us that he did it. He’s not interested in opposing the government. He’s interested in doing what is right.’ Mandela had visited a clinic where the international humanitarian agency, Médicins Sans Frontières, was treating 400 patients with ARV and achieving a compliance rate that exceeded that of most AIDS clinics in America. After his emotional meeting with Achmat, the former president broke his own rule of non-interference with his successor’s governance and increasingly began criticising both Mbeki and the official AIDS policy in public. Mandela was greatly concerned about a growing perception that ‘the ANC does not care about the death of millions’.

He tried again to arrange a meeting with Mbeki, hoping to advise him that he and the First Lady, Zanele, should lead the anti-AIDS campaign. But every time Mandela called, Mbeki’s aides would say he was not available.

In November 2001, Mandela, frustrated at his inability to see Mbeki, used a speech at an ANC rally in the Cape Town settlement of Khayelitsha to extend the challenge to Mbeki and his wife to be the visible faces of government’s attempts to combat AIDS. ‘We have wasted time,’ he said, ‘but the more vigorous and focused we are in what we do, the greater the chance we have of moving forward.’ Mbeki was outraged. Yet again, he took the criticism personally, and privately accused Mandela of overstepping the line. He instructed aides to telephone Madiba and demand an explanation. Mandela denied that he had been attacking the president, and Mbeki finally agreed that they should meet, along with the ANC’s national working committee, to discuss the subject.

At the appointed time and place, however, Mbeki was conspicuously absent. Mandela joked that Mbeki was ‘too busy’, and told the committee that the government’s AIDS policy was creating the impression that it did not care if millions of South Africans died. He urged the immediate introduction of ARVs for pregnant women, as a start.

Jacob Zuma, standing in for the president, assured Mandela that the government was serious about the pandemic, but was not ready to roll out the ARV programme because the effectiveness of the drugs was still being tested in a pilot project. The only problem the government would admit to was one of communication, in keeping with Netshitenzhe’s earlier strategy.

Mandela agreed to reserve his doubts and questions for the next NEC meeting, which Mbeki would hopefully attend, but urged Zuma to play a leading role in the fight against AIDS, because Mbeki’s busy schedule frequently took him abroad.

Archbishop Tutu, just as exasperated as Mandela over the government’s vacillation on AIDS, went public with what was undeniably a rebuke of Mbeki:

'It would be tremendous if our president said this is the common enemy. The stance adopted by the president has harmed his image. He has done wonderfully well – the world thinks the world of him, I want to see him succeed. I think it is silly to hold on to positions that are untenable. At the present time, everybody recognises that the president’s position is undermining his stature in the world. When the New York Times is constantly bashing us over this issue, it is not good for us or for him. He has so much going for him.'

Tutu threw his full support behind efforts to prevent mother-to-child transmission of the virus. ‘Yes, this means the use of Nevirapine if that is what is available. It is irresponsible of us not to save lives we could save. It makes us appear hard-hearted where we are not. We are seen to be lacking in compassion and [seem] uncaring. Women who are raped should be put on a course to ensure that they are not infected.’

He also made the point that, whereas AIDS was considered a chronic condition in the United States, it was tantamount to a death sentence in South Africa. At a January 2001 cabinet meeting, Mbeki finally acknowledged that negative perceptions of South Africa’s AIDS policies were based not on bad communication, but on a lack of consensus over what the government’s message should be. A year later, he and his cabinet accepted, for the first time, that confusion over the policy was no longer a medical or scientific matter, but a major issue that was undermining the country’s interests.

The opposition Inkatha Freedom Party leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, decried the lack of leadership on the AIDS front and proposed more stringent monitoring of the activities of Mbeki’s international AIDS advisory council. In his State of the Nation address at the opening of parliament, Mbeki hinted at finally putting the issue to rest when he spoke of government’s intention to ‘intensify its comprehensive programme against AIDS’.

Ahead of the NEC meeting in March 2002, Nelson Mandela was attacked by a number of Mbeki-ites, including one of the president’s loudest cheerleaders, Dumisani Makhaye, a KwaZulu-Natal ANC leader. Thami Mazwai, the black entrepreneur in charge of a publishing house, also launched a broadside against Mandela in the mass-circulation Sunday newspaper City Press, accusing him of unprecedented interference in government affairs.

The NEC spent a whole day discussing the government’s AIDS policy. All the provincial health MECs had been invited to the meeting, but members of the ANC’s health committee, who had been critical of the failure to make ARVs freely available, were barred. When Mandela voiced his concerns, he was heckled and jeered by Mbeki supporters.

The loyalists urged Mbeki to bulldoze ahead with the controversial AIDS policies rather than reverse or revise them, lest this be seen as caving in under pressure from Mandela and others. After hearing impassioned arguments from the likes of Peter Mokaba, the NEC resolved that rape victims, health workers and pregnant women should not be provided with ARVs, because the effectiveness of the drugs remained unproven. The hardliners also pushed through a bizarre decision that the government would appeal against the recent judgment by Judge Chris Botha in the Pretoria High Court ordering that Nevirapine be given to pregnant women.

This was one of several truly extraordinary reactions by the government to a high court ruling. Immediately after it was handed down, then justice minister Penuell Maduna, a trained lawyer, said the judgment could be enforced only in the province where the case was heard. He later retracted his statement, but Tshabalala-Msimang said on national television that the government would not obey the court order. For Mandela, the NEC’s decision to appeal against the ruling was the final proof that people were justified in seeing the ANC as a party that did not care about those who were dying of AIDS.

*William Gumede is the author of Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC - Published by Zed Books (http://zedbooks.co.uk). His latest book, 'The Democracy Gap - Africa's Wasted Years', will be published later this year.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Pambazuka News continues to serialize William Gumede's chapter on Mbeki and the controversies surrounding his AIDS policies. This is from his book "Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC." Be sure to look for parts four and five in upcoming issues.

What made Mbeki turn to the AIDS dissidents? In July 1999,Anthony Brink, an advocate and the author of the online book Debating AZT, had given him and senior health department officials copies of his book, which argued that the so-called life-giving drug was highly toxic.[33] His interest aroused, Mbeki began doing further research on his own, via the Internet.

While surfing the Net, he stumbled on virusmyth.net, a website favoured by the international dissident community. On 28 October 1999, Mbeki told the National Council of Provinces that he had examined ‘a large volume of scientific literature’, which showed that AZT was dangerous.[34]

The orthodox scientific community has never claimed that AZT is not toxic, but makes the point that all drugs have side effects, and that those known to be caused by AZT were far outweighed by its benefits to AIDS patients.

But Mbeki had been seduced, and before long his meanders along the inform- ation highway led him to question whether HIV caused AIDS and whether the virus was sexually transmitted.The dissidents argued that HIV was a benign ‘passenger virus’, and that AIDS was a lifestyle disease caused by poverty, malnutrition and narcotic abuse by homosexuals. They claimed that, far from helping the infected, ARVs caused even greater damage to their compromised immune systems.[35]

The World Health Organisation and the MCC had classified AZT safe, but Mbeki, newly installed as South Africa’s president, decided that his health minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, would be entrusted with determining the ‘truth’ about the disease and its treatment once and for all. On 2 December 1999 she met with AIDS dissident Charles Geshekter, and came away from their discussions convinced that the president was right to question views that had already gained wide international acceptance.

In his nocturnal online research, Mbeki also found the writings of American biochemist David Rasnick, a leading rebel against the conventional premise that AIDS stems from HIV. Mbeki contacted him by fax and spoke to him at length by phone, and soon the two were in regular e-mail contact. Rasnick enthusiastically agreed to support Mbeki’s quest for the ‘truth’. The president also made contact with another prominent AIDS dissident, Peter Duesberg, a professor of molecular and cell biology at the University of California in Berkeley.

There was a major stir when a South African newspaper published Rasnick’s assertions that ‘condoms don’t prevent AIDS because AIDS isn’t a sexually transmitted disease. In fact it isn’t contagious at all. AIDS in Africa is just a new name for the diseases of poverty caused by malnutrition, poor sanitation, bad water, parasites and so on. Using condoms to prevent the diseases of poverty is the leading obscenity of our time.’[36]

Mbeki was sincere in challenging mainstream science and in his support of AIDS dissidents. He stoically believed that he was a modern-day Copernicus who would ultimately be vindicated, even if posthumously. Needless to say, the dissidents, long banished to the scientific wilderness, latched on to the new legitimacy that the president provided, and it would prove all but impossible for Mbeki to dissociate himself from them later.

His next mission was to persuade unsuspecting world leaders of the dangers of treating AIDS with conventional methods. In a brazen and bizarre letter to Bill Clinton and UN secretary general Kofi Annan dated 3 April 2000, South Africa’s head of state defended an alternative approach to dealing with AIDS. In the five-page document, Mbeki passionately defended Duesberg and the other dissidents, and suggested that factors other than HIV could be the cause of AIDS in Africa. He called for a uniquely ‘African solution’[37] to the problem, as AIDS seemed to affect Africans differently to those who live in the developed world. He also defended his right to consult dissident scientists, and accused unnamed foreign critics of waging a ‘campaign of intellectual intimidation and terrorism’ akin to ‘the racist apartheid tyranny we opposed’. In an earlier period in human history, Mbeki wrote, Duesberg and his followers ‘would be the heretics that would be burnt at the stake. The day may not be far off when we will, once again, see books burnt and their authors immolated by fire by those who believe that they have a duty to conduct a holy crusade against the infidels.’[38]

The letter, copies of which were delivered by hand to Clinton and Annan, concluded: ‘It would constitute a criminal betrayal of our responsibility to our own people to mimic foreign approaches to treating HIV/AIDS.’[39]

The Clinton administration initially thought the letter was a hoax. Upon realising it was genuine, the contents were leaked to the Washington media. Mbeki was suitably embarrassed, and furious, convinced more than ever that Western leaders were conspiring against their African counterparts.

Bolstered by the counsel of the AIDS dissidents, Mbeki and Tshabalala-Msimang reiterated that the government would not provide ARVs through the public health system, adding the inability of existing infrastructure to implement the drug protocols to their earlier claims of toxicity and cost. Tshabalala-Msimang now argued that anti-AIDS drugs alone would have scant effect, and that the state simply did not have the money to simultaneously offer recipients clean water, sanitation, nutritional food and adequate housing.

Mbeki would charge his AIDS critics, especially those who were ANC members or belonged to the TAC, of being willing ‘to sacrifice all intellectual integrity to act as salespersons of the product of one pharmaceutical company.’[40] Later, he would use this accusation again, to attack ANC MPs critical of his policies,[41] and when he opened the international conferences on AIDS in Durban in July 2000, he lambasted activists in the same manner. He blocked every effort by civil society and private organisations to set up AIDS treatment projects involving ARVs, prompting Desmond Tutu to comment: ‘In South Africa we have to introduce a vibrant and lively education for the people. Churches and religious communities are already playing a role but are hamstrung by the constant worry about what government will say, when they ought to be on the same side.’[42]

Mbeki has consistently placed poverty at the heart of all South Africa’s health problems, and few disagree with him, in general. But he found no broad support for his insistence that AIDS should be treated as just another disease, like malaria or TB.The scariest realisation for many people was that Mbeki genuinely believed that a number of factors, including poverty, caused rather than exacerbated AIDS, and that HIV was not to blame.

Tshabalala-Msimang drew hoots of derision when she famously announced that people with AIDS should preserve their health not with drugs, but with a diet of garlic, lemon, olive oil and the African potato.[43] In March 2003,her credibility took another dive when she appointed Roberto Giraldo,a leading AIDS dissident and one of the most vocal naysayers regarding the link between HIV and AIDS, as a consultant on nutrition.

Amid mounting evidence of AZT’s effectivity and growing criticism of the government’s opposition to ARV distribution, he Mbeki-ites began searching for compliant scientists who would support them.

In October 1999, Tshabalala-Msimang had rejected a report favouring the use of AZT by South Africa’s MCC on the grounds that it had not been subject to a satisfactory review process. A month later, she commissioned the Cochrane Centre, an international health-care NGO that reviews clinical trials on new drugs and has branches all over the world, to research the risks of ARVs, especially AZT. Their preliminary study found strong evidence that both an intensive or shorter course of AZT was effective in decreasing the risk of mother-to-child transmission of HIV, even in breastfed babies. The most serious adverse effect the researchers identified was anaemia, but this condition tended to disappear once the full course of drugs had been concluded. Nevirapine, less expensive than AZT, was found to be both safe and effective.

These findings were given to the health minister in December. She filed the report and allowed it to gather dust while she turned to the National AIDS Council for an outcome more in line with dissident opinion, as well as her own. Tshabalala-Msimang appointed new members, renamed the former AIDS Advisory Council the Presidential AIDS Advisory Council, and extended the council’s influence to sectors not previously involved in AIDS programmes.

Activists saw through the ploy and criticised the council as just another attempt by Mbeki and his health minister to muzzle and marginalise those with a different viewpoint. In due course, the council would issue a report that did nothing but reiterate both the orthodox and dissident views on AIDS, without attaching particular weight to one or the other.

In a new affront to activists, government revealed that in the 1999/2000 financial year,40 per cent ofthe AIDS budget had gone unspent. Worse, it announced that funding of AIDS service organisations was to be cut by 43 per cent the follow- ing year. In March 2000, dismayed by government’s persistent obfuscation and continuous flirting with AIDS dissidents, Judge Edwin Cameron, Archbishop Njongonkulu Ndungane (head of the Anglican Church in Southern Africa),Bishop Mvume Dandala (head of the Methodist Church in South Africa), Professor Jerry Coovadia,(chairman of the 2000 International AIDS Conference) and Merci Makhalamele (a prominent AIDS activist) wrote a personal letter to Mbeki, expressing anxiety over the government’s head-in-the-sand policies. They also asked him to reconsider the decision not to provide life-saving drugs to pregnant, HIV-positive women.[44] The Sunday Independent was given a copy of the letter. Mbeki responded by fax, again questioning available evidence that AZT was safe and effective. He warned the signatories that a similar consensus had existed over the use of thalidomide, with deadly consequences. He urged them not to fall into the same trap.

Throughout all the polemic, Mbeki was telling senior ANC leaders that the magnitude of the AIDS crisis in South Africa had been exaggerated to serve the interests of the drug giants and NGOs. Unfortunately, South African AIDS statistics have been the subject of dispute for several years, but it remains the only country in Africa that has even remotely reliable figures, even though, as author Rian Malan45 points out, they are computer projections based on surveys on antenatal clinics.

The situation has not been helped by international studies of dubious credi- bility. As recently as 2003, the World Bank warned in a report that South Africa faced imminent economic collapse as a result of HIV/AIDS, and, even though respected local experts such as Standard Bank chief economist Iraj Abedian and the South African Business Coalition dismissed the report as inaccurate and unreliable, Mbeki grasped at hyperbole to defend his claims that the figures were inflated.

But the first extensive and broadly credible surveys on the incidence of HIV/ AIDS, conducted independently by the South African Medical Research Council and Statistics SA in 2000 and 2001, painted a bleak picture. They estimated that 5.3million South Africans would be infected with the virus by the end of 2002, and that it would be killing 600 people a day.[46]A government report leaked in late March 2004 said 100 000 public servants were HIV-positive, presenting a very real threat to normal government administration.

In August 2001, the government was back in court as the TAC and various NGOs claimed it was acting unconstitutionally by refusing to make ARVs available at state hospitals. In its March 2002 judgment, the Constitutional Court agreed, ordering that pregnant women should start receiving the drugs immediately. Still the government prevaricated, claiming that state hospitals did not have the infrastructure necessary to administer ARVs. It was not until seven months later that Nevirapine became available at some urban hospitals as part of a pilot scheme, and not until the eve of the 2004 election that distribution was extended.

Costs have unquestionably played a role in the government’s response to the AIDS crisis. GEAR, the economic policy adopted in June 1996,calls for economic austerity and financial prudence, and structural adjustment programmes have seen jobs frozen and public service cuts. In 2000,finance minister Trevor Manuel and Manto Tshabalala-Msimang sketched a gloomy picture for Mbeki of the costs involved in the proposed ARV roll-out, and the government concluded that it was not financially feasible to make the drugs available to all HIV-positive patients at state cost.

Thenjiwe Mtintso, assistant secretary general of the ANC at the time, pointed out: ‘Making antiretroviral drugs available is only one side of the story; the state will have to take responsibility for all the costs ofAIDS-infected individuals. The state doesn’t have that kind of capacity or resources.’[47][ Manuel was more blunt: ‘The rhetoric about the effectiveness of ARVs is a lot of voodoo and buying them would be a waste of limited resources.’[48]

Underlying the decision was an unspoken belief among Mbeki’s inner circle that spending money on ARVs would be futile, since the real problem lay with the reasons for South Africa’s masses being particularly vulnerable to AIDS. At its most cynical, the view suggests that the exchequer was to be spared the cost of subsidising treatment for the poor and unemployed, who were a drain on resources rather than contributors to the state coffers. It suggests that in the long term, resources would be better utilised by creating jobs, educating people, and fighting poverty and malnutrition.

Manuel said as much at a closed hearing of the committee that investigated the feasibility of a basic income grant: ‘It does not make financial sense to spend money on people dying anyway, who are not even productive in the first place.’[49] He apologised when he realised that the commissioners were shocked by his comments, but, far from being an isolated aberration, such sentiments were the driving spirit behind the economic mandarins’ response to the pandemic. The tendency to focus on the healthy has been the overriding objective of govern- ment’s financial managers.

In June 2003, Mbeki’s media spokesman, Parks Mankahlana, asked in an interview with Science magazine: ‘Who is going to look after the orphans of AIDS mothers, the state?’[50] The clear implication was that prevention of mother- to-child transmission of HIV would be counterproductive, since the children saved would end up as welfare cases in any event.

Of course, no one in government could say this publicly – it would simply be too cold-hearted. But Tshabalala-Msimang apparently had no qualms about allegedly telling London’s Guardianin 2002 that South Africa could not afford AIDS drugs because it needed submarines to deter US aggression, though she later denied saying anything of the kind. However, many authoritative studies show that public provision of ARVs with an uptake of around 50 per cent reduces the impact of HIV and AIDS on economic growth and greatly justifies the cost involved. One study calculated that a roll-out of ARVs could reduce the number of HIV/AIDS deaths by around 100000 a year between 2008 and 2010.[51]

Mbeki’s attitude to the AIDS problem was almost certainly strongly influenced by his great personal distaste for the stereotypical Western portrayal of black sexuality, which he condemns as racist and neo-colonial. In his mind, this viewpoint extended to scientific postulations that AIDS originated in the African jungle and was primarily spread through sexual transmission. Many share these views. In a lecture at Fort Hare University in 2001,Mbeki said: ‘And thus it happens that others who consider themselves to be our leaders take to the streets carrying their placards...convinced that we are but natural born, promiscuous carriers of germs, unique in the world, they proclaim that our continent is doomed to an inevitable mortal end because of our unconquerable devotion to the sin oflust.’[52] The argument found support among many ANC leaders and intellectuals outside the party. Tshabalala-Msimang is a great believer in this precept, to which Achmat responds: ‘The president doesn’t want to believe that people in Africa have a lot ofsex.’[53]

In autumn 2002,Mbeki sent an e-mail to members of his cabinet, expanding on this thesis. A 114-page document, chiefly authored by former ANCYL head Peter Mokaba, virulently attacked pharmaceutical companies, ARVs and mainstream opinions on HIV. The sarcastic monologue lashed out at the bigotry that equates blacks with promiscuity and portrays Africans as diseased and poor, and always running to the West for aid:

Yes, we are sex crazy! Yes, we are diseased! Yes, we spread the deadly HIV through uncontrolled heterosexual sex! In this regard, yes, we are different from the US and Western Europe! Yes, we, the men, abuse women and the girl-child with gay abandon! Yes, among us rape is endemic because of our culture! Yes, we do believe that sleeping with young virgins will cure us of AIDS! Yes, as a result of all this, we are threatened with destruction by the HIV/AIDS pandemic! Yes, what we need, and cannot afford because we are poor,are condoms and antiretroviral drugs! Help![54]

Within weeks of writing the paper, Mokaba, like Parks Mankahlana, died from what is widely believed to be an AIDS-related disease, though their families persistently denied this.It was around this time that Mbeki announced that he would launch an international advisory council to investigate the high incidence of heterosexual infection in southern Africa and assess drug-based responses. Renowned medical scientist Jerry Coovadia urged him to leave science to the scientists.

Mbeki’s stubborn AIDS denial epitomised the ANC’s battle to keep its traditions of internal democracy alive as it underwent transformation from a liberation movement to a governing political party. The debate split the tripartite alliance down the middle, with COSATU and the SACP siding with the TAC, as did two ofthe great post-apartheid moralists, Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu. COSATU president Willie Madisha accused Mbeki of wasting his time on scientific speculation and hindering the fight against the disease. ‘The current public debate on the causal link between HIV and AIDS is confusing,’[55] Madisha worried publicly.

Privately, government officials warned that Mbeki’s intellectual approach was preventing the government from getting across the message that people should use condoms. Indeed, AIDS educationists frequently encountered resistance based on the argument that if the president did not believe there was a link between HIV and AIDS, unprotected sex posed no danger of infection.

A disturbingly high number of ordinary South Africans saw Mbeki’s views as an endorsement that, since AIDS was not sexually transferable, they had no reason to alter or modify their sexual behaviour.

The health department was as divided on the issue as the general public, with individuals having to battle their own consciences and decide whether they should administer ARVs and risk being fired, or follow orders. Many senior health officials at national and provincial level supported ARV distribution, and though he refused to talk publicly about the reasons for his departure, Tshabalala-Msimang’s director-general, Dr Ayanda Ntsaluba, quit and went to work for foreign affairs, allegedly because of his inability to reconcile his own beliefs with those of the minister and president.

Health professionals at state hospitals were also confused. Should they admin- ister life-saving ARVs or not? If they did, would they be punished? At grassroots level, health-care workers were dealing almost daily with the fatal consequences of confusion over government’s policy, which led the uninformed to believe that the disease was not transmitted sexually.

The greatest tragedy was that Mbeki failed to see that his refusal to acknowledge the effectivity of ARV treatment was undermining the entire AIDS education programme. It had been designed around the premise that HIV causes AIDS, and condom use was a mainstay of the government campaign that was being waged through awareness projects, educational television, radio, posters and in classrooms throughout the country.

*William Gumede is the author of Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC - Published by Zed Books (http://zedbooks.co.uk). His latest book, "The Democracy Gap - Africa's Wasted Years", will be published later this year.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

Pambazuka News continues to serialize William Gumede's chapter on Mbeki and the controversies surrounding his AIDS policies. This is from his book "Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC." Be sure to look for parts three through five in upcoming issues.

In 1996,researchers linked to Pretoria University and representing a biotech company called Cryopreservation Technologies claimed they had found a cure for AIDS.[10] Zigi Visser and his ex-wife Olga lobbied senior officials in the department of health and in the ANC, who put them in touch with Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.

The go-between, Joshua Nxumalo, a former MK cadre, played a crucial role in setting up meetings between the Virodene drug researchers, Dlamini-Zuma and eventually Mbeki. Nxumalo was later part of a BEE consortium that bought the rights to Virodene. Dlamini-Zuma was sufficiently impressed with the Vissers’ report on their research to secure a quicker meeting with Mbeki, then deputy president and whose diary was notoriously almost always full. The Vissers were looking for government endorsement and money. Their scientific peers had been sceptical. The Medical Control Council had refused to issue the company with a licence to produce Virodene. Following a review of their research, the MCC, Gauteng health department and senior scientists at the University of Pretoria had rejected the application for a licence on the basis that the drug was ineffective, even dangerous. The Pretoria group hoped that Mbeki would prove more receptive. Shortly before Christmas 1996,Dlamini-Zuma and Mbeki set aside protocol and convention and secured for the researchers a cabinet hearing for their preliminary findings, which had not been subject to peer review.

The Virodene researchers arrived at the Union Buildings in January 1997 with a posse of ‘cured’ patients who testified to the ‘positive’ effects of the treatment. An excited Mbeki had primed his colleagues well. The cabinet received the group warmly, and almost without question accepted the researchers ’claims[11] and their accusation that the MCC had rejected them because it was in cahoots with inter- national pharmaceutical companies.[12] Jakes Gerwel, Mandela’s cabinet secretary, said later that ministers were overwhelmed with ‘awe and pride ’as the Virodene researchers’ ‘patients’ related tales of miracle cures.[13] Mbeki would later write in the ANC’s journal Mayibuyewhat a ‘privilege’ it had been to hear the moving testi- mony of AIDS sufferers who had been treated with Virodene,with seemingly very encouraging results.[14]

The Virodene team’s sales pitch was that not only was the product much cheaper, but it was also home-grown. The latter particularly aroused Mbeki’s interest. At the time, he and most of the cabinet ministers saw themselves as being under siege from a vast conspiracy of local white critics, black trade unions and civil society activists, Western governments and international business. The Virodene researchers appeared to be a godsend. The deputy president had already just about settled on an idea (after much contemplation) that would define his upcoming presidency.[15] Mbeki hoped his term of office would be defined by an African Renaissance, which would see the continent, under the leadership of a democratic South Africa, undergoing social, political and economic renewal that would finally make it an equal partner ofmore prosperous regions, especially the West. An important component would be African solutions for African problems.[16] Mbeki latched onto the Virodene proposal as a possible African solution to one of Africa’s greatest challenges.

Virodene was later shown by an independent panel, led by the South African Medical Research Council, to contain dimethylformamide,a toxic industrial solvent used in dry-cleaning. A month after the Virodene researchers so persuasively addressed cabinet, the MCC announced that Olga Visser and her associates were flouting accepted testing norms, and promptly banned them from testing their product on humans. Mbeki and Dlamini-Zuma were severely embarrassed. Oppo- sition parties and the media hit out at the government. DA leader Tony Leon accused Mbeki of being obsessed with finding African solutions to every problem’.[17] He said Mbeki’s support for Virodene amounted to resorting to ‘snake oil cures’ and ‘quackery’.[18] The Sunday Times lashed out at a cabinet whose ‘combined technical knowledge of the HI Virus fits on the back of a postcard’.[19]Both Mbeki and Dlamini- Zuma viewed the attacks as racist, if made by whites or the political opposition, or personal, if made by blacks or those associated with the ANC family. Mbeki called Leon ‘the white politician’ who ‘practices in Africa’.[20] Dlamini-Zuma said bitterly:‘If they [Leon and the DA] had their way, we would all die of AIDS.’[21]

Sadly, neither Mbeki nor Dlamini-Zuma admitted to being wrong, instead persistently presenting themselves as victims of racist baiting, and nursing grudges against their critics. In fact, Mbeki would continue to support Virodene’s pro- moters, later even mediating in a feud between the biotech company’s leading researchers.[22] Mbeki and Dlamini-Zuma now also saw the MCC, especially its chairman Peter Folb, as representatives of the ‘racist conspiracy’ against which battle must be joined. Folb was fired a year later.[23]Partly as a result of the Virodene conflict, Dlamini-Zuma abolished the MCC in March 1998 on the recommen- dation of a review team she set up to evaluate the council’s operations, which concluded that the MCC was too intimately linked with the pharmaceutical industry. A new institution, the Medicines Regulatory Authority, replaced the MCC in September 1998.In June 1998,a group of investors, including Nxumalo, who had originally introduced the Vissers to Dlamini-Zuma and Mbeki,bought the rights to their AIDS ‘cure’.[24] Virodene is not officially registered in South Africa, but it is still punted on the Internet as a cure for HIV/AIDS.[25]

However dubious these early government forays into the AIDS field were, they were based on the accepted scientific consensus that HIV is the principal carrier of AIDS, rather than the dissident argument that the virus is a ‘harmless’ passenger, and that symptoms associated with AIDS are due to ARV therapy, malnutrition and poverty. From the Virodene saga onwards, the AIDS issue became racially charged in South Africa, and it has remained so. All future responses would be coloured by race, as had already happened in some parts of greater Africa, and even among some Afro-American groups who gave credence to the urban legend that the deadly virus had been brewed in a laboratory as part of a covert Western intelligence plot to decimate blacks – the CIA’s ‘final solution’. For example, a study conducted by the Rand Corporation and the University of Oregon revealed that almost half of all African-Americans believe that the virus that causes AIDS is man-made; more than a quarter believe it was produced in a US government laboratory; and one in eight thinks it was created and spread by the CIA.[26]

Bizarre as they were, such rumours were fuelled by revelations from the mid-1990s that the apartheid defence force had run a top-secret germ warfare programme, which included experiments on ethnic-specific killer bugs. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission heard senior former security policemen confess that HIV-positive agents had been instructed to have unprotected sex with black prostitutes as part of a diabolical state-sponsored plan to spread the infection. In 1995,the South African government launched a battle against international tobacco companies by instituting stringent anti-smoking laws, and with the pharmaceutical giants over the high price of essential medicines.

The ANC had worked hard to make medication more accessible and more affordable to the majority black population. This led to repeated skirmishes with drug manufacturers, and a protracted trade dispute with America and various countries in the European Union. At the heart of the matter was an amendment to the Medicines and Related Substances Control Act, which gave government the power to fast-track compulsory licensing and parallel imports of medicines.

The government argued, correctly, that this was consistent with the World Trade Organisation’s Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Agreement (TRIPS), which stipulates certain exceptions to normally strict commercial regulations. In times of health emergencies, for example, poor countries are allowed to circumvent patent laws in order to produce cheaper generic versions of desperately needed drugs. Compulsory licensing allows a country to manufacture a drug in such circumstances without the permission of the patent holder, provided that ‘adequate remuneration’ is paid to the company. Parallel importing permits a country to buy a drug from the lowest bidder without the consent of the patent holder. But there is huge resistance from developed countries and pharmaceutical companies to these concessions, and South Africa was placed on an American ‘watch list’ of potential offending countries. The drug manufacturers exerted enormous pressure, both directly and indirectly, on the South African government, outraging Mbeki, Dlamini-Zuma and the ANC leadership.[27]

The pharmaceutical industry in the US lobbied the Clinton administration, which threatened sanctions if South Africa went ahead with plans to push through legislation to facilitate the import of cheaper generics. American vice-president Al Gore found support in the South African media and with opposition parties for his demand that the amendment be repealed.

It was particularly galling for Mbeki, his policy guru Joel Netshitenzhe, his ‘enforcer’ Essop Pahad and his trusted ally Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to have their political opponents and the predominantly white-owned media support foreign opinion against what they saw as South Africa’s interests.[28]

The tussle ended when thirty-nine companies joined forces under the banner of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Association of South Africa and took the government to court. They poured millions into their campaign, which was vigorously opposed by the government and, importantly, the TAC and several trade unions.

Dlamini-Zuma herself was an energetic campaigner against both international pharmaceutical and tobacco companies. This made her very unpopular with busi- ness groups, so much so that many business leaders view the possibility that she could replace Mbeki as leader of the ANC at the end of 2007 with undisguised horror. Shortly before the 1999 elections, she told members of the TAC: ‘If you want to fight for affordable drugs, then I will be with you all the way.’[29] Marking the end of his first six months as president of South Africa, Mbeki launched a tough attack on pharmaceutical companies:‘(A)s long as [AZT] is only available at exorbitant prices, it is impossible for the government to make it available to ordinary people.’[30]

In the face of local and international protests organised by the TAC, the pharma- ceutical companies reached an out-of-court compromise with the government and withdrew their legal action. By that time, the amendment to the Medicines Act, which applied to all drugs, not just ARVs, had become law.

Finally, government seemed to waken to the gravity of the AIDS crisis. Billboards were erected, condom distribution increased and the ABC (Abstain, Beware, Condomise) campaign put in place. Yet, despite what amounted to a victory against the pharmaceutical companies, the government still refused to make ARVs available to the masses.

Activists were enraged when the health department announced that AZT would not even be given to pregnant women as a matter of course. There was ample evidence that the drug greatly reduced the risk of foetal HIV infection, but the government stuck to its claim that AZT was both toxic and unaffordable.

In December 1998, Zackie Achmat announced that he would go on a hunger strike until ordinary South Africans could be given ARVs at state hospitals. ‘On principle, I won’t take ARVs until they are freely available to the poorest,’[31]he said. His decision coincided with the TAC’s launch of a campaign to prevent mother- to-child infection. By 1999,an estimated 40 000 babies were being born with HIV in South Africa annually, their mothers too poor to pay $75 for a short course of AZT,which would lower the risk of transferral by half. The TAC would maintain its relentless pressure on the pharmaceutical companies for the best part of a year, with NGOs in America staging solidarity protests at various points on US vice- president Al Gore’s campaign trail until the threat of sanctions was withdrawn.

The TAC’s sustained efforts to shame Western governments and highlight their indifference to the plight of AIDS victims in South Africa compelled President Bill Clinton to pledge in 2000 that the US would ensure that ‘people from the poorest countries won’t have to go without medicines’. His announcement came as the United Nations revealed that it had negotiated a deal with five multinational pharmaceutical companies to reduce the price of AIDS drugs in the developing world.

The South African government’s response was guarded. Mbeki, Pahad, Netshitenzhe, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, who had replaced Dlamini-Zuma as minister of health, and trade and industry minister Alec Erwin now argued that price reductions negotiated with manufacturers were neither substantive nor a permanent solution. If costs could not be decreased any further, it would be better to obtain the drugs through local generic production or parallel importation from Brazil, Thailand or India, where they were successfully being made at a fraction of even the discount price.

In the event, it soon became clear that the high-profile offers of cheaper drugs from the US administration came with punishing strings attached. South Africa could avail itself of some $1.5 billion in the form of export–import loans, at commercial interest rates, to buy American drugs at market prices. In addition, by May 2001, five of the world’s biggest pharmaceutical companies had agreed to enter into talks with African nations on reduced prices, provided the countries concerned agreed to health action plans being drawn up by McKinsey, a leading business consultancy!

The offers were turned down, but they had reinforced suspicions that Western governments and the drug manufacturers were locked in a conspiracy against Africa. As Mbeki’s views hardened, the relentless pressure applied by the TAC and various NGOs was starting to pay dividends. Drug companies squirmed under accusations of greed, and some began privately to offer significant discounts on their products. By mid-2001,Boehringer Ingelheim was offering Nevirapine, a drug commonly used by HIV/AIDS sufferers, free for a limited period to pregnant women in South Africa. Glaxo offered AZT at 30 per cent of the average inter- national price.

But government still refused to buy the drugs, claiming they were toxic. According to some of Mbeki’s close advisors, the offers were seen as a piecemeal strategy to stave off production of cheaper generics. Yet no moves were made to launch local production or import generics. In fact, keen to play a leading role in the global economy and to be seen as playing by the market rules, the government started back-pedalling on earlier threats to import generics.

In November 2001, British trade minister Richard Caborn wrote to the London-based Action for Southern Africa, an organisation that campaigns for Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC peace, democracy and development across the region: ‘I don’t believe that this or related measures such as parallel importing are the answer here.’[32]

South Africa had had the option all along of circumventing TRIPS by citing ‘national emergency’, but Mbeki had come to believe that the pharmaceutical companies were greatly inflating the AIDS threat in order to exploit developing markets.

*William Gumede is the author of Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC - Published by Zed Books (http://zedbooks.co.uk). His latest book, "The Democracy Gap - Africa's Wasted Years", will be published later this year.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

I was just sent a copy of this statement by the Feminist Political Education Project [http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/47404] and must admit to being more than a little bewildered and shocked by what is suggested in light of recent events in Zimbabwe, by sisters whom I know very well – who are part of the Feminist Political Education Project.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/363/47439women.jpgSisters dare I say, I have worked with you over the years – some of you have mentored me to be the woman I am. I hope that in the interest of fostering a robust debate amongst ourselves as sisters, feminists, comrades in the struggle you will read and understand my response to the positions you have put forward, with a view to promoting holistic transformative politics in our country, not a duplication or reconstruction of the status quo under a different order, in which as women especially are forever held at ransom by elitist, patriarchal notions of what constitutes our liberation.

I hold no brief for Morgan Tsvangirai, neither can I even be classified as some-one who belongs to his 'inner' circle. I respond to fellow sisters on matters of principle as a comrade with a track record and history in the struggle for Zimbabwe's liberation, firstly and as a Feminist who has stood up against male 'bigotry', within the MDC and the broader democratic movement.

Based on these 'credentials' I have no fears or guilt in taking on fellow sisters on -especially when they advance or propagate reactionary views as a way to resolving a crisis that has left us not only scarred but deeply traumatised. What they suggest is a preservation of the status quo! Particularly if those views are then misconstrued as representing the broader Feminist movement in Zimbabwe – I beg to differ.

I will not at this stage go into an intellectual or theoretical discussion on Feminism and its various components and articulations, especially in our Zimbabwean case – that is a subject those of us who claim to be Feminists have to debate at some stage. Of concern for me at the moment is the 'Position Paper.' And wonder whose 'Position', we are debating here while asserting that this 'Position' has nothing to do with us women.

Indeed, it appears from the views put forward to be an implicit acceptance that the democratic will of the people is not paramount, and infers that a group of men (as this is who makes up the political 'leadership') are going to sit around a table and work together in a Transitional Authority for the common good of all Zimbabweans - and this promoted by a group of self-proclaimed feminists, nogal!

How many of our female comrades in the labour, student, constitutional movements or even the church were consulted before such a paper was presented to the world? Do the opinions of these women matter? Or by virtue of belonging to the lower classes in our society they remain excluded and marginalised even in discourse by senior Feminists who purport to be pushing their cause? Not taking into account the fact that the bulk of these women are at the front-line of our struggle as they take Mugabe on daily- they pay with their lives, their homes and their loved ones. The continued refusal by my sisters to acknowledge the existence of these women as leaders in their own right is a cause for concern.

I have argued elsewhere in the MDC Teresa Makone debacle that as women we are not a homogenous group – but there are certain sisters who know better than to be agents of replicating the same patriarchal notions in terms of our participation in the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis in a way that normalises our second class citizen status. We refuse to be under-dogs in perpetuity!

Can we therefore locate the 'Position –Paper' by fellow Feminists within the context of them using Feminism to fight certain male agenda's? That has nothing to do with us as female comrades, including our sisters, mothers and grand-mothers who continue to suffer under the yoke of Mugabe's dictatorship.

What is suggested also presupposes that Zanu-PF has the capacity to act honestly as a coalition partner - something of which there is absolutely no evidence. This is almost similar to Trevor Ncube's commentary through Ferial Hafferjee's editorial 10 days ago in the Mail & Guardian that suggested a coalition must include 'moderate' Zanu-PF people such as Mnangagwa, Gono and Murerwa! And that there must be a blanket indemnity for Mugabe and his security chiefs – whilst some sort of amnesty may well be negotiated, South Africa's experience as elsewhere shows that immunities from prosecution can, and I would argue must be bolstered by some form of accountability (especially if a line is to be drawn in the sand to avert a repeat performance at a later stage). This need not always mean prosecution, but this potential stick must always be present!

The equating of Tsvangirai with Mugabe in the FePEP statement is, to put it mildly, obscene. Certainly, there is much to be concerned about in terms of internal issues within the MDC, although one could hardly argue that they have operated in normal circumstances. The conflation of concerns and grievances has clouded many people's vision. Certainly, Tsvangirai should look for coalition partners and should draw on expertise within fellow opposition ranks and maybe even ZANU-PF, but it must be on collective acceptable terms - NOT as part of a negotiated settlement, or in this case something that is suggested for imposition as in this statement! The assumption that he will not adopt a constructive conciliatory route unless this is imposed on him is arrogant, patronising and fundamentally undemocratic.

It should also be noted that Tsvangirai is not the MDC and that the MDC is a political movement with structures from ward to national level, to whom Tsvangirai, Khupe and the rest of the top leadership have to account. We have fought and resisted 'Mugabeism', in the MDC – some battles we have lost others we have won. It is the principles around the formation of the party, collective leadership, accountability, transparency and its ultimate goal for total liberation – political and economic justice that puts us in the awkward position always of resisting attempts at subverting the will of the people through the back door.

That will which expressed itself so strongly on March 29 – a will for change some will selectively ignore in pursuit of unpopular agenda's that appease certain elites within ZANU-PF and the ANC Mbeki camp.

It seems to me that those who have promoted a 'third way' to date have fundamentally misread the situation as it stands at the moment in Zimbabwe. I see that some are now promoting the argument that the failure of the ZANU_PF rank and file to come out in their large numbers is largely due to Makoni. I'm struggling to find any empirical basis for this assertion. Are the FePEP promoters suggesting Makoni must be the national leader?

My reading of the arguments put forward by comrades on the ground and Zimbabweans in general in not supporting the Makoni project are as follows – he is the only leader with an apparent national profile who does not have a registered political party; a man with less than 8% of the vote? People did not vote for Makoni because they did not trust him, because he comes from Zanu-PF, because his track record in government is nothing to shout home about, and because of his enduring silence regarding human rights violations that have characterised Zanu-PF rule. Those marketing Makoni should have addressed the above concerns as a matter of strategy to appeal to the electorate other than seem to be imposing him through the back-door.

Are these the credentials of a man 'fit to govern'? He may have jumped ship – although he still claims loyalty to the party, but that the current leadership has lost its way. The reality is that Zanu-PF is a ruling party that is dying – at least as a ruling party formation (as UNIP did in Zambia, the MCP in Malawi and KANU in Kenya) - it can limp along for the foreseeable future with an ever decreasing capacity to service its extensive and mutating patronage networks, but it has fundamentally lost its ability to control the support of the people - even though they tried hard to manipulate and buy it in this last election.

What was different this time was the acutely lower levels of violence and intimidation (although it was certainly present) and the small spaces that were opened up for the limited campaigning season. Mbeki has been praised for helping provide the space – but he has disingenuously argued that the only differences outstanding in terms of the mediation process between the MDC and Zanu were procedural. The differences were much more fundamental than that, but once again it was the MDC who was coerced to compromise into participating in elections where conditions were improved, but certainly not free and fair.

Leaving aside the evidently flawed electoral process, the fundamental problem in Zimbabwe remains the concentration of executive powers, which have rendered parliament largely impotent. It was this dilution of power that the MDC sought during the mediation in terms of constitutional changes, but which Zanu-PF failed to follow through on, despite the agreement of its negotiation team!

In this context of trickery and treachery, should we support positions such as the FePEP statement that essentially promote and reward such bad behaviour? There is no 'magical' solution to the situation in Zimbabwe in terms of making everyone happy. Elections mean there are winners and losers. Certainly, particular circumstances may necessitate negotiated outcomes, but negotiating the suggested governance situation (i.e. a TA with equitable representation) in these circumstances sets an awful precedent for the region - one which, in the future, we may see elements of other faltering and failing ruling parties adopting as some kind of survival strategy. If Zimbabwe can do this they may ask, why not us?

Let's not even get into the sycophantic support for SADC's 'mediation' initiative and the assumption that Mbeki has done a good job. Many people strongly believe that he has a great deal of responsibility for the mess the country is now in. The extent to which this is really the case is no longer relevant. He has consistently reinforced a perception that he is biased in favour of Zanu-PF, as have the ANC who continue to refer to Zanu-PF as their 'comrades' in a quirky turn of revisionist liberation history. Mbeki, alas, is simply no longer trusted to be an honest broker by most Zimbabweans and this perception alone disqualifies him from continuing to play this role.

It appears that the FePEP statement is little more than a reflection of desperation and the thinking of an elitist group of women purporting to speak on behalf of a 'majority' that I doubt they have any meaningful contact with. Certainly none can claim electoral legitimacy / representation (at least any more) in terms of popular support. Several work for corporate NGOs and large donor agencies – essentially insulated from the hard realities of life in Zimbabwe or exile. What is suggested is done so from the armchairs of comfortable hotels and NGO boardrooms. It is also very distressing that those who promote such positions appear to also have a certain amount of influence over where donor funds get located and utilised. Many NGOs and individuals have been beneficiaries of the Zimbabwean crisis. Theirs is a 9 to 5 struggle.

There is a very real danger that a 'managed transition' (as suggested) with the window dressing of transitional justice will be little more than an exercise in 'elite pacting', designed to ensure the old wine is decantered in new bottles. I'm afraid the FePEP 'position paper' simply feeds such agendas and does not further a transformative course of action that is so desperately needed.

*Grace Kwinjeh is a Zimbabwean Feminist.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

On March 29 the people of Zimbabwe cast their votes for President, Parliament, and local representatives. To date, the results of the Presidential election have not been announced, leading to widespread accusations of vote manipulation. Charges of intimidation and the threat of violence grow daily, while the population suffers from spiraling inflation, commodity shortages, and joblessness. Ultimately, the people of Zimbabwe will determine their leaders, but as concerned citizens we can send a message to the Government of Zimbabwe, the African Union and to the nations of Southern Africa that we stand in solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe and that we support their struggle for human rights and justice.

The following Message of Solidarity includes the points outlined in such popular documents as The Zimbabwe We Want, the People’s Convention (February 2008), as well as the platforms of human rights and justice groups in Zimbabwe. We invite you to add your name to the following message.

MESSAGE OF SOLIDARITY HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE FOR ZIMBABWE

The people of Zimbabwe have been betrayed, both by the government that represents them and by Western governments that claim to support their desires for economic development and democracy. Internally, corruption, government mis-management, military excesses, and poor economic decisions have deepened the country’s multiple social and economic crises. At the same time, the post-independence promises made by the international community were not kept and the imposition of World Bank/IMF economic structural adjustment policies further entrenched inequality and reversed the initial gains made by the country. We, the undersigned, support the people of Zimbabwe in their calls for a peaceful resolution to the current crisis. We urge the Government of Zimbabwe to work towards: 1. A new constitution, a people-driven document that ensures that any elected government runs the country to benefit its people, not the elite.

2. Economic justice, specifically:

- An audit of Zimbabwe’s 4.2 billion dollar debt - Repatriation of stolen assets, particularly funds diverted from public coffers to individual accounts in international banks. - National investments in social development, job creation, and regional economic integration efforts.

3. A national “Truth and Reconciliation” process to begin the healing process. We urge the international community to:

- End the “undeclared economic sanctions.”

- Cancel the colonial debt, including apartheid-related debt, along with debts related to failed structural adjustment policies, following an audit of the country’s national debt.

- Work with the Zimbabwean people to identify and repatriate public funds that have been diverted to private accounts in international banks.

To add your name to this Message of Solidarity, please send an email TransAfrica Forum at [email][email protected]

*Imani Countess serves as TransAfrica Forum’s Senior Director of Public Affairs. TransAfrica Forum is the leading advocacy organization for Africa and the African Diaspora in U.S. foreign policy. TransAfrica Forum helped lead the world protest against apartheid in South Africa and colonial rule in southern Africa. Today, the organization works for human and economic justice for African people on the continent of Africa, in Latin America and in the Caribbean.

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/364/47421mbeki.jpgIn this Pambazuka exclusive look at William Gumede's "Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC", we serialize in five parts Gumede's chapter on Mbeki and the controversies surrounding his AIDS policies. Be sure to look for parts two through five in the upcoming Pambazuka issues.

For too long we have closed our eyes as a nation, hoping the truth was not so real. For many years, we have allowed the HI virus to spread, and at a rate in our country which is one of the fastest in the world. – Thabo Mbeki, 9 October 1998

Now ... the poor on our continent will again carry a disproportionate burden of this scourge – would if anyone cared to ask their opinions, wish that the dispute about the primacy of politics or science be put on the backburner and that we proceed to address the needs and concerns of those suffering and dying. – Nelson Mandela, 13 July 2000

It is important that we recognise that we are facing a major crisis and that we want to invest as many resources as we did when we fought against apartheid. This is not a state of emergency but it is a national emergency. – Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 30 November 2001

As his international AIDS Advisory Council met for the first time, Thabo Mbeki mulled over the words of Irish poet Patrick Henry Pearse: ‘Is it folly or grace?’

Notwithstanding the conclusions of mainstream scientists almost a decade before, Mbeki set up the council to examine both the cause and most effective way of treating acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) in developing countries. His ‘folly’ in reopening the debate on what causes AIDS rather than focusing on practical ways to curb the pandemic sweeping Africa was roundly condemned. ‘Stop fiddling while Rome burns,’[1] chided Desmond Tutu, former Archbishop of Cape Town. But AIDS denial is not the exclusive province of presidents. Mbeki’s controversial health minister, Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, enthusiastically prescribed an alternative therapy that sounded more like a salad dressing than treatment for a sexually transmitted disease that kills around 600 South Africans a day[2].

After years of foot-dragging and obfuscation, the South African government finally rolled out antiretroviral drugs that could save the lives of millions at state hospitals two weeks before voters went to the polls in April 2004.The long-awaited plan to distribute ARVs to an estimated 5 million people had been approved in November 2003, but due to what officials claimed were ‘capacity constraints’, patients had to wait another five months for the first drugs to reach them.

Few were surprised when AIDS activists questioned the government’s timing and motives. ‘Even though we welcome the roll-out plan, we have mixed feelings about whether the government reached a turning point because of elections, ’said Tembeka Majali of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC), the country’s most vocal and visible AIDS activist group.

Before the limited public roll-out, fewer than 20000 South Africans were taking ARVs, as only those with expensive private medical insurance could afford them. Zackie Achmat, head of the TAC and the country’s best-known AIDS activist, only started taking ARVs towards the end of 2003 after refusing for years to avail himself of the life-giving drugs until the government agreed to offer treatment through the public health system.

Leading black gay activist Simon Nkoli,a close friend of Achmat, died in 1998 after contracting AIDS-related thrush. He was among the millions who could not afford the drugs, and at his funeral Achmat announced that he was launching a campaign to make ARVs available to poor South Africans.[3] He had learnt that a single dose of the generic version of fluconazole, used to treat thrush but not sold in South Africa because of international patent laws, cost just eighty cents.[4]

Government blamed lack of efficacy, potential toxicity and high costs for ARVs not being made available at state expense, but scientific evidence indicates that the drugs are highly effective against mother-to-child transmission of HIV and, at least in the short term, the benefits appear to outweigh the risks.

In Europe, North America and Brazil, ARVs have reduced mortality due to HIV/AIDS-related illnesses by between 50 and 80 per cent. In South Africa, two critical barriers remain to the widespread availability of these life-saving medicines and a possible nett saving on the health budget in the long run: lack of political will, and resistance on the part of patent holders to generic competition.

Pharmaceutical companies are protected by intellectual property rights policed by the World Trade Organisation from the manufacture or import of cheaper versions of their drugs. The corporate view is that high prices are necessary to recoup research and development costs.

However, generic anti-AIDS drugs are sold in India for a quarter of the price charged by the big pharmaceutical companies, and have the added advantage of Thabo Mbeki and the battle for the soul of the ANC combining three drugs in a single pill that has to be taken twice a day. The Western ARV protocol requires patients to take up to twelve pills – all produced by different companies – a day, at different times, some with water, some without. Despite the obvious advantages of a simplified regimen, South Africa succumbed to pressure from the West and opted for the more expensive and complex therapy in its limited ARV roll-out.[5]

Private health care in South Africa makes up around 70 per cent of the total national budget, yet only about 7 million of the country’s 44 million citizens can afford private health insurance. The rest depend on government services. Until 1999, medical aid funds were allowed to cherry-pick their paying members, and typically accepted young, healthy, low-risk candidates.

The poor and unemployed were generally excluded due to the high premiums, and relied on the state for health care. An Act of Parliament put a stop to the rejection of certain candidates by insurance carriers, but most South Africans still cannot afford the astronomical costs of private care.

Drug costs are a significant factor in the national health budget. Only medication that is included on a list of essential drugs is available within the state system, and generics are encouraged where possible. When no generics exist, the health department buys in bulk from the pharmaceutical industry via a tender system. Drug companies have fiercely resisted parallel imports of cheaper generics, insisting that their patents be respected.

The social, economic and health consequences of AIDS for South Africa are devastating. Particularly harrowing has been the rise in the number of orphans and the emotional impact on millions of children who will grow up without parents. Not only are crime and social instability destined to follow in the wake of the pandemic, but current and future demands on the state coffers are astronomical. In alliance with COSATU, the SACP, churches and social organisations, the TAC has been at the forefront of attempts to shift government’s head-in-the-sand AIDS policies. The cabinet plan released in November 2003 promised that government would establish a network of centres for distribution of ARVs, beef up efforts to prevent transmission of the virus and increase support for families affected by HIV/AIDS.

The cost of offering treatment to all South Africans with AIDS by 2010 was estimated at between $2.4 billion and $3 billion a year. The cabinet cited the lower costs of ARVs as a major factor in the decision to go ahead with the roll-out, noting: ‘New developments pertaining to prices of drugs, the growing body of knowledge on this issue, wide appreciation of the role of nutrition and availability of budgetary resources [had] allowed government to make an enhanced response to AIDS.’[6]

But why had it taken so long to reach this point?

In the heady days following the unbanning of the ANC, little attention was given to AIDS. Although alarm bells were ringing, South Africa’s collective political focus was on the delicate and engrossing negotiations for a democratic dispen- sation. The apartheid regime had been deaf to calls for action, seeing AIDS largely as a disease that affected gays and blacks, constituencies the previous government was not particularly interested in, and was most prevalent among migrant workers from the southern African region.

AIDS was not high on the first democratic government’s ‘to-do’list either. The ANC alliance’s priority was trying to hold the fractured country together while getting to grips with governance, delivery and the economy. AIDS was one among many seemingly less urgent problems.

Given South Africa’s combustible social mix – a large migrant population, people displaced because of apartheid, the breakdown of traditional family bonds, a labour system that keeps men away from home for most of the year – it is hardly surprising that AIDS struck with such devastation. But when the full realisation sank in, there was first denial, then perplexity, and finally escapism, as confronting the situation became mired in foolish debate over what had caused the pandemic in the first place.

During his term of office, Nelson Mandela effectively ignored AIDS, avoiding the subject on the grounds that, in his culture, an elder did not publicly discuss sexual issues.[7] Since then, he has recognised the severity of the problem and become deeply involved in efforts to stop the spread of AIDS.

When Mandela assumed the presidency of the ANC in 1991, SACP general secretary Chris Hani and future health minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma were the ANC’s most vocal harbingers of a looming crisis.[8]As deputy president, Mbeki barely mentioned AIDS, except for allusions in a couple of speeches to the disease being as great a threat as poverty in the new South Africa.

In fact, the AIDS time bomb threatened to decimate the world’s youngest democracy unless vast resources were made available to defuse it, but the initial response of the ruling elite was ‘this isn’t happening to us ... it cannot be as bad as people say’.[9]

But it was.

The ANC in exile had held a number of meetings on HIV/AIDS, and the first paper on the disease published in South Africa in 1985 forecast that it would remain largely confined to male homosexuals, as had been the case in America and Europe up to that time. In the same year, the government appointed an AIDS advisory group, followed six years later by a network of training, information and counselling centres.

In 1992, the ANC’s health secretariat, the government, non-governmental organisations, AIDS service organisations, representatives from business, trade unions and churches, and a diverse group of concerned individuals set up the National AIDS Coordinating Committee of South Africa (NACOSA). In the spirit of the CODESA talks, it was instructed to reach consensus on a national AIDS strategy for the new South Africa.

Their plan, adopted in July 1994,recommended the pooling of large amounts of money from government and donor organisations for expenditure on countrywide education and prevention programmes.

First, however, an AIDS infrastructure had to be established. The centrepiece was a special directorate in the department of health, and the government also appointed a ministerial AIDS task team, headed by Mbeki. Awareness campaigns and support for an HIV vaccine initiative followed.

By early 1996,it became apparent that the plan was full of holes. Much of the intended funding was diverted by the Treasury to more pressing needs, while money that was allocated to the health department remained unspent as the AIDS plan was buried by competing priorities in a health system in transition. Many of the AIDS policy targets were never attained.

Public controversy followed revelations that a hefty chunk of the AIDS budget – R14.27 million – had been spent on Sarafina II.The musical production by acclaimed playwright Mbongeni Ngema was designed to raise AIDS awareness among African youth,but the critics panned it as an ineffective and costly failure in terms of relaying the anti-AIDS message. Worse, it emerged that normal tendering procedures had been bypassed in awarding Ngema the funds, and the production was scrapped in midstream.

The resulting scandal strained the bond between government and AIDS activists. Opposition parties, the media and many NGOs unleashed a barrage of attacks on the health minister, who withdrew into a defensive shell. Government and Ngema claimed the criticisms were anti-government, anti-black and racially inspired,and on the eve ofWorld AIDS Day in 1996,activists and health workers denounced the entire National AIDS Plan as a shambles, greatly angering both Dlamini-Zuma and Mbeki.

The furore erupted just as the gloss of freedom was starting to give way to grassroots anger over non-delivery and thwarted expectations. Acutely sensitive to criticism, especially when it emanated from the ANC camp, political home to most of the AIDS activists, the government lashed out in anger. At the party’s national conference that year, President Mandela railed against NGOs that stood in judgement of government.

The dust had hardly settled when a new AIDS scandal broke out.

*William Gumede is the author of Thabo Mbeki and the Battle for the Soul of the ANC - Published by Zed Books (http://zedbooks.co.uk).

* This article is the first part of a chapter in the second edition and is published with the kind permission of the author. His latest book, "The Democracy Gap - Africa's Wasted Years", will be published later this year.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

It’s been more than two weeks since Zimbabweans went to the polls to elect a legislature and President. But instead of the outcome of the elections, Zimbabwe’s ruling ZANU-PF party led by President Robert Mugabe has delivered harsh crackdowns and stonewalling to the electorate.

Defeat can be hard to accept, “but at the very least, the people of Zimbabwe have the right to know the result of their vote,” says the Executive Director of ARTICLE19, Dr. Agnes Callamard. The government of Zimbabwe is obligated under the International law “to conduct an election and to let the people know those they’ve chosen to lead them.”

ARTICLE 19 urges Zimbabwe’s government to heed the calls of Zimbabweans, the 2008 first extra-ordinary SADC summit of Heads of State and Government, and the international community “to comply with the rule of law and SADC Principles and Guidelines governing democratic elections.”

It is in the interest of Zimbabwe and the southern African region that President Mugabe adheres to electoral procedures as set out in Zimbabwe’s electoral law and release the result of the election immediately. “In the event that a run-off is needed, that must also be conducted according to accepted norms and standards.” ARTICLE19 strongly urges Zimbabwean authorities to back away from chaos and violence and move towards reason and the rule of law in settling the outcome of this election.

*ARTICLE 19 is an independent human rights organisation that works globally to protect and promote the right to freedom of expression. It takes its name from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guarantees free speech.

ARTICLE 19 (www.article19.org) is an international human rights organisation which defends and promotes freedom of expression and freedom of information all over the world. It takes its name from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/364/47414rape.jpg

Following Ann Jones' "The War against Women in Africa" and Marie Claire Faray-kele's "D R Congo: Women – Violence in war and in peace" [email protected] or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/362/47412violence.jpgSam Kabele looks at the fault lines along which violence in Zimbabwe is traveling and calls for solidarity the Zimbabwean people

At the time of writing President Mugabe is refusing to engage with his reasonably supine fellow southern African leaders, concerned about the crisis and lack of declared results from the presidential elections. Instead he has chosen the path he knows best, that of formal and informal state-inspired violence with reports coming in especially in Manicaland of targeted intimidation and beatings of opposition activists, especially in areas that swung to MDC. The votes in the parliamentary elections went so overwhelming for the opposition that the government was unable to fix that election and we thus had a historic victory for the Movement for Democratic Change. It seems clear the ruling ZANU-PF party are desperately trying to avoid a similar meltdown in the presidential ones. So, unsurprisingly, Zimbabwe’s High Court refused to rule on the MDC’s urgent application for release of the presidential election results on April 14. 

As President Mugabe opts for the path he knows best, that of formal and informal state-inspired violence, it is worth asking how we even reached the stage where the opposition was allowed to win the parliamentary elections and where the usual violence and intimidation appear not to have paid off. Were the ruling party over-confident and the rest of us, expecting the usual stolen election, too dismissive of the effect of the crisis on ordinary Zimbabweans – urban and rural? Of course in any normal situation, hyperinflation signals an end to any ruling government, but Zimbabwean ‘normality’ has been different since 2000, and arguably before that. Given the normal retaliation that ZANU-PF unleashes when it is threatened as in 2000 after the referendum (farm invasions etc) and Operation Murambatsvina after 2005, there is a second and probably more important question. Who is willing and able to stop a descent into repression and violence? And, thirdly, who in Zimbabwe and the region has the strategic vision to change this? Is there still the possibility of a peaceful transition (even if not a transformation as such)? 

The ZANU-PF government has largely appeared impervious to international pressure to reverse repression and its economic policies. Zimbabwe has few close allies, after leaving the Commonwealth, having been near to expulsion from the International Monetary Fund (perhaps the only possibly advantageous element), its policies criticised by the UN and some African institutions like the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, and with its elite subject to ‘smart’ sanctions from the EU, Switzerland, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It has retained some African, Chinese and some Third World state and popular support by astute playing of the ‘anti-imperialist card’.   Is, however, the southern African region now sufficiently worried to push harder for real change after the (unadmitted) failure of their negotiation process and the obvious gerrymandering of the ‘harmonised elections’?

CAN ZIMBABWEANS CONTINUE THE MOMENTUM OF THEIR MASSIVE REJECTION OF ZANU-PF?

Whilst the results dribbled out, the courts are largely supine and the counter-offensive starts. After the failure of the negotiation process and the obvious gerrymandering of the ‘harmonised elections’ perhaps the real question is whether their self-interest in a reformed ZANU-PF without Mugabe is likely to continue? With the exception of South Africa’s ANC president Jacob Zuma - who called for the election results to be declared after meeting Zimbabwe’s opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai - the region has been largely silent. It has, however, after its weekend summit issued a lame statement calling for the election results to be ‘expeditiously’ declared and for the parties to contest any run-off. This is despite evidence of increased intimidation and violence and strong opposition from regional civil society.

The only path appears to be people power, but is the fearful population, committed peaceful forms, subject to eight years of intimidation, and having to engage in every possible strategy for mere survival able to sustain this? Recent general strikes such as the one called for from 15th April cannot really be anything other than staying at home since only 8% of Zimbabweans are actually employed. 

It has been argued that in any transition Zimbabwe should be characterised as a post-conflict state since it exhibits many characteristics of a society in violent conflict due to the scale of economic collapse and casualisation, political violence and social trauma, the breakdown of basic services (although the party structure of ZANU-PF remains intact), mass flight of people and capital. Zimbabwe currently has the highest rate of inflation in the world, with an annual rate of over 100,000%.

1. Wages have plummeted as the cost of necessities spirals out of control.  About 80% of the country’s population lives in poverty, while about 3 million people have left the country in search of work.

2. Failed agricultural policies have meant widespread food shortages of food with this year’s harvest predicted to be one of the lowest on record.

3. Agriculture was the motor of the pre-crisis economy, but is massively depleted in production and export. Zimbabwe once a food exporter (in good years) is now food insecure with up to half the population reliant on food aid.

4. The above is particularly worrying given the generalised HIV and AIDS pandemic and life expectancy being the lowest in the world at 34 years for men and 33 years for women.

5. The humanitarian crisis is exacerbated by government food distribution being manipulated to secure votes.

6. Demands for change emanating from civil society have been routinely suppressed by the state, including the use of assaults, arrests and torture.7 The number of health professionals fleeing the country has escalated while resources for the health sector have collapsed, with dire effects on the around 20% of the population with HIV or AIDS.  

The strategies of the Zimbabwean state of both structural and physical violence in all its parallels with the last years of apartheid seem to be both unravelling and at the same time becoming more vicious. The combination of centrally directed and presidential-inspired incitement to violence, including sexual violence, securitisation of state institutions, state of emergency in all but name, the use of informer networks and covert ‘Third Force’ hit squads to brutalise the opposition and destroy its structures before elections, and the manipulation of the media and hate speech attacks, all seek to provide ideological justification for the demonisation of the opposition and licensed informal violence. However, whether through over-confidence or under pressure from South Africa and the region, there was less violence in this election with both the opposition factions of the MDC and the ZANU-PF ‘renegade’ Simba Makoni being able to campaign in rural areas. 

Several post-Mugabe scenarios are possible, including a transition to Mugabeism without Mugabe, an MDC-led government, the rise of a reformist faction within ZANU-PF, a broad government of national unity, a military coup, or even a descent into chaos. But at present a Mugabe hardball response urged on by the ‘Jacobin’ faction inside the party around a presidential run-off seems likely. Violence and intimidation have worked in the past to keep the president in power, have tended to divert the party from its internal divisions, and sidelines the ‘moderate’ ZANU-PF faction which is tempted to reach out to MDC and the international community – not least to try to safeguard their businesses, and other resources including land. Use of the militia and to some extent the police also avoids using the military some of whose loyalty is suspect – at elite level where the would-be kingmaker is thought to have bankrolled the Makoni presidential bid, and at lower ranks level, where many soldiers presumably voted MDC. 

ELECTIONS

The background to the elections was of fear of state-sanctioned violence through use of police, military and militias with the aim of ensuring a ruling party victory at whatever cost8.  Conditions for free and fair elections in the called for in the recent pastoral letter from the Catholic bishops were not followed. Key aspects of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, ratified by the Zimbabwean government were not respected.9  These included the pro-government bias of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)10, insufficient mechanisms for voter registration and roll inspection and ZEC failing to clearly publicise boundaries of new voting constituencies and locations of polling stations. There was also the disqualification of three million diaspora Zimbabweans, lack of voter education, state domination of the media and a lack of independent international and civil society observers.  

All reports from partners and credible observers note that the organisation of the elections was partisan, the opposition parties had little access to state media and to rural areas of the country, and the state media overwhelmingly privileged the messages of the ruling ZANU-PF party11. Nor was there sufficient time between the unilateral announcement on 25th January of the election date for political parties to organise their campaigns. Indeed the electoral commission itself was disorganised as well as partisan. The weighting of the new constituencies is also towards the rural areas – normally seen as government strongholds where opposition parties rarely get access. (But it seems that rural voters were less intimated, including in areas that were formerly ZANU-PF-leaning, although there have to be concerns about any second round where there are no observers). There were widespread reports of government attempting to buy voters’ allegiances through provision of agricultural equipment and (deferred) pay rises to the armed forces and teachers. President Mugabe also amended the electoral law on 18th March to allow the police into polling stations - widely seen as an intimidating tactic, although it is not certain that it was that effective. 

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NOW IN RELATION TO ELECTIONS

The conditions of the post-election period do not promise well for Zimbabwe escaping from its current interlinked crises and hence helping to stem the increasing poverty of its citizens. Civil society is currently working out its strategy, but it is uncertain what the MDC’s is bar the general strike weapon and Tsvangirai’s regional tour of uninterested leaders. There are worries in civil society that violence and intimidation will characterise any possible second round and that manipulation of results is aimed at gaining either an outright victory or to provide a weakened MDC that will be railroaded into a spurious government of ‘national unity’ to provide greater regional and international legitimacy for continued ZANU-PF misrule. 

It seems that any effective response to the Zimbabwean crisis must be African-led, however unlikely that currently seems.  There should be support and encouragement for the efforts of the African Union (AU) and SADC to provide stronger political mediation in the post-election period aimed at securing government commitment to political and economic reform and to the restoration of basic rights of citizens. Secondly, there is a need to respond to the long-term humanitarian crisis and its effects on the people of Zimbabwe. 

Even if Mugabe were to win the run-off vote he faces a country in total meltdown. A transition point - if not a transformation point - now appears inevitable. The immediate tasks will be to reform the security and legal sectors; create legitimate institutions of government; political reconciliation; rebuild the state; economic recovery, normalisation of relations with the international community for aid; debt relief  and investment. All will take place under circumstances in which Zimbabweans will be extremely vulnerable to externally imposed agendas.

Sequencing of reform will be vital. A return to due process of law and transparency needs to take place with depoliticisation, demilitarisation and demilitia-isation of formal and informal state institutions top of the agenda. Perhaps Zimbabwe can then start to move away from a culture of violence, impunity, corruption and cronyism.

Addressing the question of land will be a volatile process. There will need to be a detailed investigation into who has what land under what conditions. It would be politically unacceptable to return to the highly unequal colonial-pattern of land ownership. But for those former commercial farmers prepared to share their expertise innovative land sharing/ renting schemes could be piloted.

The tasks will be immense and there is already talk of creating a Trust Fund to help Zimbabwe’s absorptive capacity which will be fairly modest. Measures to help the skilled and the diaspora return will need to be balanced with employment creating schemes for those who stayed,without overwhelming what few social services remain. Health care professionals could be invited back, initially on a short term basis without losing residence rights elsewhere, and with a range of inventive packages.  

A national convention process could be vital in producing a new people-driven constitution. A stakeholder conference to take this forward could address issues of constitutional reform, electoral reform, land reform, truth recovery and economic and social recovery.

Promoting justice and reconciliation will be a long term process, but Zimbabwe is one of the best-documented sustained human rights abuse processes. Finally from a rather longer run historical view are we seeing the end of the sustainability of the nationalist/ liberation project as it is unable to recuperate and reproduce itself except through violence? State authoritarianism had the dual inheritance of the interventionist settler state and the command politics of the liberation movements.

The seeming illogicality of the politics of disorder has been functional for rewarding clients and supporters, once the original nationalist coalition of workers, peasants, trade unionists, urban dwellers, students and intellectuals had been destroyed through structural adjustment, elite accumulation strategies and corruption. ZANU-PF has been unable to address what Chris Alden saw as the interlinked crises of illegitimacy, expectations and governance; it has only been able to respond through violence/ clientilism, destruction of the disparate social forces opposed to it such as farmers, farmworkers and urban dwellers through militarisation/ militia-isation. This has been accompanied by a location of the crisis as external – Western imperialism and ‘sanctions’. Whilst these have their niche the crisis is overwhelmingly local although not without an initial external dimension that Patrick Bond has pointed to - acceptance of settler debts, ESAP etc, with an ideological debate around ‘who is a real Zimbabwean’? This has acted to exclude urban, white, farmworker, professional etc Zimbabweans through denial of their legitimacy as citizens. The battleground is not just economic and political but also ideological through identity, exclusion and exclusion questions and demonisation of non-ZANU supporters, ruralisation/ totems etc.  

For now Zimbabweans need the greatest international solidarity and pressure on regional governments. The UN Security Council should also be a forum for laying open the human rights abuses which are likely to get worse in the days and weeks ahead. 

*Sam Kabele is a human rights activist. 

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org