At a mini-summit in Ivory Coast, political leaders ended in disagreement after failing to reach a consensus on preparations for elections. Also, mediation does not seem to be serving its purpose. Yveline Deverin argues that: “To be a mediator in the Ivory Coast crisis is, in effect, to validate one’s own diplomatic credentials, to raise the profile of oneself and one’s country, and to show oneself a champion of political correctness and of democracy. What is validated here is the function of the mediator, not the success of the mediation.”

For a mediation to “work” requires a common will for peace and reconciliation. The role of the mediator is to convince those involved that the conflict must be halted and to give up part of their claims so as to move towards each other. For the mediation to be effective, there must be political will on the part of both protagonists and mediators.

However, there is a factual dissonance between this official will and particular interests - between the “politically correct” label and the “geopolitical interest” which the parties and mediators act out in reality.

Although 19 September 2002 marked the beginning of the crisis, the conditions surrounding the election of President Gbagbo were a preliminary phase.

During preparations for the elections, an initial mediator intervened without success. On 10 August 2000 in Yamoussoukro, President Mathieu Kerekou of Benin, at that time president of the Conseil de l’Entente (although remaining very discreet since then) had tried to persuade General Guei not to stand in the presidential elections: “Do what your conscience tells you is good for your country”. His initial undertaking amounted to agreeing not to become a candidate.

At this same meeting in Yamoussokro, Alpha Oumar Konare and Gnassingbe Eyadema had tried to ensure that no artificial exclusion would apply to any of the candidates. Before them, the Senegalese President, Abdoulaye Wade had expressed his active concern about the Ivory Coast situation.

Once battle had commenced, mediators succeeded each other without interruption, each passing to the others the baton of seeking an improbable peace. Some intervened at several stages in relation to different issues.

From 19 September 2002 to March 2006 the following participated at different points:

- the CEDEAO (Economic Community of West African States)
- the African Union
- France, former colonial power and privileged partner of the country with which it has defence agreements – a mediator which one could describe as “permanent”.
- Abdoulaye Wade, President of Senegal, in his role as President of CEDEAO (2002-2003)
- Eyadema Gnasingbe, President of Togo, as a senior member of the Presidents of the CEDEAO countries (remaining a mediator until his death)
- Alpha Oumar Konare, former President of Mali, in his role as President of the Commission of the African Union
- Amani Toumani Toure, known as ATT, President of Mail.
- John Kuofor, President of Ghana, in his role as President of CEDEAO (2003-2005)
- Omar Bongo, President of Gabon, as a senior member of the heads of African states
- Mamadou Tandja, President of Niger, in his role as President of CEDEAO from 2005
- Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria, in his role as President of the African Union from 2004 to 2006 ( a frequent mediator)
- Abdou Diouf, former President of Senegal, in his role as President of the OIF (International Francophone Organisation)
- Thabo Mbeki, President of the South African Republic, designated as a mediator by the African Union on 7 November 2004
- Mohamed VI, King of Morocco who “almost” entered the fray in February 2005, but who withdrew precipitously following a diplomatic-political imbroglio
- Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Congo, in his role as newly-elected President of the African Union (2006).

MEDIATORS – MEDIATIONS: “ BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE”

The mediator is at once envoy, commissioner and referee, but a referee who blows the whistle only when he has the consent of both parties. It is worth recalling that, in the role of envoy, the mediator is taking a risk, as he is frequently the bearer of bad news and often held responsible for the content of the message he brings.

The continuation of the Ivory Coast crisis is due, not only to the fact that none of the protagonists has a vested interest in its resolution, but also because the various mediations have failed. It is not possible to bring together two parties without their mutual consent.

It is interesting to note that the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, has “lasted” longer at this game than others, but, like the others, he has been both rejected and recognised by the two parties in turn. Until August 2005, he appeared to be adulated in turn by one side and vilified by the other in equal measure, but from August his “mediation” became “stabilised” in favour of the ruling power and was thus totally discredited.

Before him, all the mediators underwent similar ups and downs: Eyadema of Togo was in turn denounced as a “rebel subversive” then as a “supporter of Gbagbo,” sometimes both in the same week!

To be a mediator in the Ivory Coast crisis is, in effect, to validate one’s own diplomatic credentials, to raise the profile of oneself and one’s country, and to show oneself a champion of political correctness and of democracy. What is validated here is the function of the mediator, not the success of the mediation.

Almost all the mediators found a personal interest in intervening: Mbeki wished people to forget the bad image left by his policy of inactivity against Aids. He tried to resurrect his tarnished image within the ANC (African National Congress) where his liberal management of his country is more and more heavily criticised.

Eyadema took advantage of his status as mediator to bring about, in the face of complete international indifference, a change to the Constitution, permitting him to become President for life. President Kuofor of Ghana, changed, thanks to the Ivory Coast crisis, his status as an unknown President to that of an internationally known President, appreciated for his efforts at mediation. He was re-elected easily in December 2004.

Omar Bongo was able to draw a veil over his internal problems, as was Tandja of Niger, whose administration was being heavily criticised for the food shortage which arose in the North of his country over the winter of 2005.

It is typical that those who withdrew very quickly from any involvement in mediation were those who had nothing personally to gain from it: Amani Toumani Toure (known as ATT) of Mali and Mathiew Kerekou of Benin, with stability in their own countries and having already gained plaudits for “good governance” to a degree. Moreover, many African countries or, rather, their elites, gained economic or geopolitical benefit from the situation.

From the beginning of the crisis, the different Ivory Coast parties requested the intervention of other countries, arguing that in the sub-region, “ the Ivory Coast is pivotal” that it represents “ 40% of the wealth of the WAMU (West-African Monetary Union) and that the collapse of the Ivory Coast would bring about, de facto, that of the whole of West Africa.

These political and geopolitical interests should not allow us to forget the economic interests that accompanied them. For instance, South African business interests in Ivory Coast have developed since the mediation role undertaken by their President.

For example, MTN, a South African business, became a majority shareholder in Telecal (mobile telephones, one of the three sectors which are still profitable in Ivory Coast). Sotra (the State public transport company) signed a contract to buy buses with a South-African company [Le jour, 20/10/2005, DNA 17/9/2005].

A huge market was taken over from the Ivory Coast electricity company (CIE). A South-African company was contracted to provide electric meters with prepayment cards [DNA 17/9/2005]. Similar arrangements were instituted in less visible, but more widespread markets.

Le Nouveau Reveil of 13 August 2005 notes: “For some time, South African wine has been well represented in our supermarkets…” and “Now that the South-African President has been called to play a mediation role, a systematic presence of South-African businesses is developing” and “with Gbagbo, Mbeki is well placed to undermine the economic hegemony of France in Ivory Coast.”

The paper notes: “Despite the significantly increased risk in Ivory Coast because of the state of war, a striking penetration of South-African business into our country’s economic fabric is noticeable.”

We should guard against any naivete or anthropomorphism in geopolitical analysis. “A State has no friends, it only has interests” as General de Gaulle lucidly remarked.

Mediation/intervention attempts by France are in a paradoxical position. Intervening to block the advance of the rebels on Abidjan, it seemed good that the attempts had as their objective the evacuation of the children from the American Baptist school in Bouake (25 September 2002), thus stemming any American attempt to intervene in its sphere of influence.

The evacuation of “foreign” nationals followed the next day and was accomplished by 27 September. This operation necessitated the establishment of the “ligne de confiance” [trust line] which split the Ivory Coast in two. Its perpetuation was justified by the notion that it would prevent the resumption of hostilities through contact between combatants.

“Foreigners” in Korhogo were evacuated on Sunday 29 September by the American army [announcement by the Ministry of Defence, 4 October 2002). This last little-known point reveals an evident exchange of favours, permitting France to let the United States intervene in a “humanitarian role”, without letting it evacuate the children from the Baptist school, which would have been perceived as France’s incapacity to guarantee the security of “foreigners” in its former colony.

From the evidence, France intervened at an early stage to protect its position, above all. Afterwards, its mediation interventions (Marcoussis in particular and the Licorne intervention force which often carried out local mediation) can be understood in the context of France’s absolute need for a pacified, and if possible, a well-disposed Ivory Coast.

HIJACKING THE MEDIATION PROCESS

The first demands of the rebels were very precise and concerned three points:

- the law relating to rural land
- the nationality code and
- the repeal of article 35

Very quickly, discussions were turned aside, to disarmament (a favourite theme which recurs regularly), the elections and the issue of the referendum (giving authorisation to the change in article 35). The attention and energy of the mediator were thus diverted from the fundamental problems at the root of the crisis.

At the time of the peace agreement on 4 July 2003, the emphasis was placed on matters relating to the gathering of combatants and on an inventory of military material on both sides, rather than on a response to the causes of the crisis.

Discussions ran into difficulties on the order of events: disarmament or legislative reform. The rebels demanded reforms as a prerequisite for any disarmament, the “loyalists” demanded the opposite. And this without any discussion of the content of the reforms!

It was only on 9 July 2004 that article 26 of the law on rural land was changed, following the Marcoussis agreement (giving back to non-Ivory Coast heirs the right to inherit ownership of land acquired by their forebears).

The laws, whose modification was agreed at the time of the Marcoussis agreement, were never voted through. The debate turned abruptly to the manner in which they were to be passed, then to their form, which, given the potential for discussion about the formulation, led to months of sterile debate.

On the other hand, the rebels refused to disarm for security reasons (given the intensive armament undertaken by the government party). Disarmament therefore became the object of successive frustrations: disarmament at that point being not “disarmament of all those with arms” (to take up the expression of General Ouassenan Kone in March 2006) but only of the rebels. President Gbagbo demanded that the rebels alone disarmed, claiming (despite what everyone knew) that there were no armed militias (sic!). Then the discussion turned to suitable gathering places, then to finances, then to whether the militias and the rebels should be required to disarm simultaneously or consecutively etc.

Another practice in which President Gbagbo was a past master consisted in transferring the crisis onto the agreements resulting from mediation. In this way, attention was no longer focused on the mediator, but on the results of the mediation process. The point at issue then became, not the rebellion, but the mediation agreements.

The stereotypical example was the reaction which followed the Marcoussis/Kleber agreements (26 January 2003), which was accompanied by the first large-scale anti-French riots. But the same observation could be made for all the agreements, with points of violence against the agreements or the mediators, the most recent being the flare-up in January 2006 against the GTI (International Working Group) in relation to the delegates’ mandate which was about to expire.

The enemy became the mediator. The problem was no longer “to resolve the crisis” but “whose side is the mediator on?” The problem was no longer the crisis but the mediator. It is not a good idea to meddle in other people’s business [translated from French proverb “between the bark and the tree one should not put one’s finger”]. There is an understandable reticence on the part of governments of neighbouring countries to intervene militarily, as was shown by the extreme slowness in which the CEDEAO intervention force (consisting of troops from Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, Benin and Togo) was set up.

Under the Accra I agreement of 29 September, it [the intervention force] was due to take over from France from October 2002 and the first troops, whose arrival was constantly reported, were not deployed until March 2003!

This reticence was reinforced by another tactic of which President Gbagbo was also a past master, making use of an appeal to patriotism – that of taking hostages from among the nationals of countries which were taking their turn at mediation, in order to put pressure on the mediation process. This was particularly evident in the case of French nationals (notably after Marcoussis in 2003 and November 2004) but nationals of Senegal, Mali and Nigeria had also to pay their tribute to the mediation role of their country, although this was less highlighted by the international press.

The mediator’s margin for manoeuvre is thus considerably curtailed.

* Yveline DEVERIN is a lecturer in Geography at the University of Toulouse-le-Mirail GRESOC-UTM SEDET-Paris VII. This article was kindly translated from French to English by Fiona Campbell.
* Please send comments to: or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

“We are far from reaching the end of the tunnel,” writes Yveline Dévérin of the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, as she describes the complicated progression of the conflict over the last four years. She writes that: “All those who are in the position to have the power to turn the situation towards peace have an interest in the crisis continuing, not only because it is lucrative but also because it is validating. And this is exactly the same for the powers that be, as for the opposition powers, as for the rebel powers.” For further information on Côte d’Ivoire, see last week’s Pambazuka News article at

From the 15-19 January 2006, the Côte d’Ivoire experienced a new wave of violence of the kind it has been hitherto accustomed. Both in Abidjan, but also in the west and different parts of the south of the country, for some four days, troops from the ‘patriotic galaxy’ (the presidential side) occupied the streets, hijacked cars and duly occupied the Ivorian radio and TV network (Radio Télévision Ivorienne) so as to broadcast their messages. Most significantly – and this is without precedent – they attacked UN premises, and even the Blue Helmets of the United Nations Mission for Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) themselves, forcing them to withdraw into the ‘security zone’ which separates the government zone from the ‘ex-rebel’ zone.

In order to appraise the ins and outs of this new phase of the crisis, it is first appropriate to review the general circumstances that have brought about this situation.

The inexorable march of immobilisation since September 2002

The immobilisation is on the march, and nothing can stop it. ¬– Edgar Faure

Without going back over the different episodes of the saga of the Ivorian crisis, it is nevertheless useful to review the recent context of these events. It should be remembered that in the Côte d’Ivoire, since September 2002, there have been six agreements and dozens of mediation operations and that these have not succeeded in progressing the situation. Now in 2006, the population has reached the stage of exasperation. The regular refrain, repeated in Abidjan for over two years: ‘We’ve had enough’, has now become ‘Even the Bétés [1] have had enough’.

In January 2006, the escalating tensions linked to the various deadlines to which the people had grown accustomed – an announced military coup, presidential elections, the nomination of the Prime-Minister, the formation of the government – came to a head. At every hurdle, the population fears a reprisal of the war, and so lives in a constant state of expectant anxiety.

The military coup announced by General Doué

Along with other exiled soldiers, the former Head of the Army has been sending several open letters via the internet to the Abidjan press. Whilst there are some who have recognised an unpleasant build-up in these undisclosed letters, it was nevertheless a shock that a broadcast on the 19 August 2004 on Radio française internationale (RFI – the French language world news service) disseminated an interview with the disgraced general, in which he is cited as explaining:

“I have chosen to break the silence because I am of the opinion that the situation has lasted for too long and that a return to peace in the Côte d’Ivoire is wholly conditional on the departure of President Gbagbo. If the international community is not willing to commit to making him go quietly, I will do so myself, by any means necessary. And let it be understood that this will not be done without serious damage.”

Nothing has happened yet, but the waiting is causing everyone to live in a state of nervous exhaustion. The mysterious attack on the military camps at Akouédo on the 2 January 2006 has raised the tension yet another notch (the reasons for, and circumstances of this attack had still not been established at the beginning of April 2006).

Elections

It was constitutionally anticipated that elections would take place on the 30 October 2005; but they did not, leaving a constitutional void. On the 20 October, the UN decreed the impossibility of holding elections. In accordance with Resolution 1622, it decided instead to prolong the mandate of President Gbagbo for another 12 months, which allowed him to remain ‘head of State’, whilst at the same time delegating a major component of his executive powers to a Prime-Minister who would be ‘acceptable to everyone’. This state of affairs was supervised by the International Working Group, whose members include the African Union, ECOWAS, the UN, the EU and France.

Nomination of a Prime-Minister ‘acceptable to everyone’

After endless dithering (the differences in nuance between ‘acceptable to everyone’ and ‘acceptable for everyone’ caused huge problems), Charles Konan Banny, the governor of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) was finally accepted as - or rather, designated - Prime-Minister on the 4 December 2005.

Formation of the Government

After more than three weeks of bitter disagreements, Charles Konan Banny formed his Government on the 28 December 2005. The arguments were essentially over the sharing out of posts, how many were allocated to each party, and which individuals were chosen. (The parties each preferred their ‘Party bosses’, whilst Charles Konan Banny wanted technocrats.). And for the politicians the stakes were economic as well as political: as much do with personal enrichment, as with party-financing. The Ivorians refer to them as ‘fat-cat Ministers’, which aptly summarises the real problem!

The issue of the Minister of Finance

This one is far and away the fattest cat of all the ministers, and a major source of funds. He returns to the Government in the Cabinet, therefore escaping from the Ivorian Popular Front, which is finding itself cut off from a major part of its provisions. This is a crucial element in grasping the succession of events.

The National Assembly

2004 has amply demonstrated how the National Assembly has been used by Laurent Gbagbo as a mechanism for blocking reforms. But it is also a financial godsend. The members of parliament receive a not negligible amount, in a country which is weakened, and where numerous people have lost their jobs or seen their incomes much reduced following the events of November 2004.

Moreover the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI- Gbagbo’s presidential party) is largely in the majority, and therefore, importantly can make payments to the militias again: ‘A militant is someone who shares and who distributes’, declared the ‘Patriote’, the daily paper close to the opposition RDR party, remarks attributed to a mysterious and anonymous ‘official of the central office [who] was questioning Gbagbo’.

Gunpowder

Against this background, there is the additional problem of the mandate of the MPs, which, constitutionally, was supposed to expire on the 16 December 2005. As was the case for President Gbagbo, there was the problem it would be prolonged. The question was put to the International Working Group which is supposed to ‘consult all Ivorian parties with the aim of ensuring that all the Ivorian institutions function normally until elections are held’, conforming to the UN Resolution 1633. The position of the working group is clear: it acknowledges the fact that the mandate of the MPs ended on the 16 December 2005. According to the Closing Remarks of the Meeting of the International Working Group, 15 January 2006):

“In conformity with paragraph 11 of Resolution 1633 in relation to the expiry of the mandate of the National Assembly, the International Working Group has held lengthy consultations with all the Ivorian parties about the functioning of state institutions. The working group has come to the conclusion that the mandate of the National Assembly, which expired on the 16 December 2005, should not be extended.”

Incidentally, this communiqué is only repeating the terms of Resolution 1633.

The reaction was very violent by MPs, the Ivorian Popular Front, the ‘people on the streets’ and the ‘young patriots’. But we should point out that the MPs who protested were less concerned about the vindication of their function than of their status: they are quite happy no longer having legislative power, but are keen to remain MPs or to put it another way, to have their hands on the allowances. The Ivorian people were not duped by a scant mobilisation of about 3000 ‘patriots’, and this part of negotiations was notably suspect, marked by the image of the behaviour of the MPs as compared to the ordinary population.

The reaction is assuming new forms, compared with what has happened before. The ‘patriotic galaxy’ in the presidential sphere is still ahead of the game, but it is no longer mobilising the same crowds as it did in January 2003 or November 2004. Its power to cause a stir is intact, perhaps more concentrated. The theme of independence that was blown-out by the international community has been taken up again, as on previous occasions.

On the other hand, we are witnessing few physical attacks against the French (largely owing to the lack of targets). Though without historical precedent, these attacks are now being directed against the UN and the Blue Helmets. The UN headquarters are being attacked to the point where the UN is being forced to evacuate its staff. All UN symbols are being attacked; and the offices of certain UN agencies and NGOs, such as the UNOCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), UNHCR and Save the Children are being pillaged, ransacked and set on fire. These attacks on NGOs are also a new phenomenon.

Another difference between this new wave of violence and those that occurred earlier is that this time, movements can be observed in all the towns of the southern zone (Daloa, Guiglo, Douékoué, San Pedro, Yamoussoukro). In the west, recent attacks on UN bases at Guiglo led to four deaths in the ‘patriot’ ranks. Everywhere, equipment essential for working is being savaged. UN military equipment was abandoned on the spot when the Bangladais Blue Helmets had to evacuate their bases in Douékoué and Guiglo, and to withdraw into the security zone, escorted by the ‘Ivorian Defence and Security Forces’ (Agence France Presse 18 January 2006). These are the same security forces which a number of observers have seen openly supporting the militias in the field, for example, opening the doors of the Ivorian Radio/TV network (Radio Television Ivoriennes) for them.

The patriots are demanding the departure of the UN. Pascal Affi N’Guessan, the Secretary General of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI- Presidential party) has been very clear on this point. In a declaration, he has ‘demanded the departure of all UN and ‘Licorne’ [a French army operation] forces from the country which are exploiting and enslaving the Côte d’Ivoire’. At the same time, in line with the intentions of Abidjan, he has called for ‘the establishment of a national liberation government, which will bring together all the patriotic forces’. Which would mean the end of the government so painfully assembled by Charles Konan Banny.

Consequences

Paris is finally able to retreat from a perilous tête-à-tête with Abidjan. For once, ‘Licorne’, the French occupation army, is not in the firing line.

In contrast, the UN is totally discredited. Once again, it is brandishing threats it is then reluctant to apply: sanctions have been regularly announced for three years now. Not until the beginning of February 2006 were three names to be proposed, and then sanctions came into force on the 7 February. But those who have been sanctioned are of secondary significance – the heads of the two patriotic movements, Charles Blé Godé and Eugène Djué, and, for the sake of balance, one war leader from the north, Fofié Kouakou, the commander of the zone [2] of Korhogo (responsible for human rights violations).

Moreover stirring the UN to impose sanctions first required that its own equipment was set fire to, and its own soldiers were displaced. And yet again the ‘valets’, those who are politically responsible for the crisis remaining completely untouched by them. Meanwhile the UN has succeeded in overcoming the dilemma of its credibility: to dare to sanction despite the fear of a reprisal of violence against its personnel and equipment, so as not to make it obvious that fear of the latter is preventing all effectiveness.

Above all, we are witnessing the total discredit of the United Nations Mission for Côte d’Ivoire. The Blue Helmets have been attacked and have the Ivorian Armed Forces to thank for their ‘welcome’ to the west (Douékoué and Guiglo). This army escorted them as far as Bangolo (in the [UN] ‘security zone’!) where the Licorne army could protect them.

In Abidjan, French soldiers from the Licorne army had to intervene by helicopter to ‘filter out’ UN soldiers from their headquarters, where they had been barricaded. The UN soldiers are all the more discredited given that they had already been denounced as ‘tourists’ before this particular crisis [3]. Some newspapers have referred to them as ‘armed tourists’. Perhaps the most surreal development is that in February, transferrals of soldiers liberated by the peace in Liberia were effected not to safeguard the population, but rather, to safeguard UN agents.

The political consequences are important too: UN soldiers were supposed to ensure the security of the ministries of the ‘G7’ group (grouping of the 7 opposition parties). But the New Forces are refusing to invest any confidence in soldiers who are incapable of ensuring their own security! They are therefore demanding the return of their ministers to the northern zone, under their own control, or the possibility of providing for their own security – which would suppose allowing ex-rebel armies to enter Abidjan!

In view of the escalation of violence, John Bolton, the US Ambassador to the UN recently declared to the Security Council that it was possible that the United Nations Mission for Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) is more of a problem than a solution to the Ivorian crisis’. (UN Press Agence 0/02/2006).

In the event, the New Forces have identified excellent lines of argument and a supplementary excuse for postponing the deadlines for disarmament. This at any rate is what has been posted on their website since 21 January: ‘Unilateral Disarmament of the New Forces? The Ivorian Popular Front can give up hope of that’. The incapacity of the ONUCI to fulfil its mandate, added to open concern of the Ivorian Security Forces’ for the patriots is unlikely to reassure them.

Nevertheless, the international community has reaffirmed its support for Konan Banny, and this alone appears to reinforce his power.

The ‘patriotic galaxy’ has shown that it is now mobilising fewer people (about 3000 patriots – against several hundreds of thousands in November 2004 – though this weakness has however effectively succeeds in mobilising 7000 Blue Helmets of the UN). Manifestly, there are some cracks at the heart of the ‘patriotic galaxy’, particularly between the supporters of Blé Goudé and those of Eugène Djué. The latter have already protested against the fact that they are less ‘highly regarded’ (understand, ‘highly paid’) than those of Blé Goudé. It was Djué’s supporters who delayed in ‘liberating the streets’ on the 19 January 2006.

It should not be forgotten either that the military check points were also opportunities for racketeering. The troubles should not last too long: the armed forces which are collecting taxes from the population could not allow civilian ‘patriots’ to replace them for too long at the check points, and thus to compete with them: ‘The armed forces have come back in order to racketeer.’ (Le Front No: 111 8, 21 January 2006)

To understand the inward tensions of the different groups, particularly those at the heart of the army and of the patriotic galaxy, it is essential to understand the financial motive – which is a crucial element in deciphering the crisis. Exploiting the divisions within the opposing side is effectively also a component in the struggle between the ‘G7’ (coalition of Houphouétistes – the opposition) and Laurent Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front. Cutting the Ivorian Popular Front off from its resources through the biased redistribution of the ministries was one element of a strategy designed to force the government party to negotiate a peace process.

Conclusion

We are far from reaching the end of the tunnel. Sometimes it is even tempting to ask oneself if it is not circular. The sanctions the UN has finally decided to apply (freezing bank accounts, travel bans) have only affected the intermediary figures, and have not touched either those who are making the biggest profits out of the crisis, or those who are fuelling it. The ‘patriots’ who have been affected have transformed the impact of the sanctions into martyrdom – into a grand ceremony glorifying the heroes. Their flourishing investments in the Côte d’Ivoire – cyber-cafés, petrol stations, property acquisitions – have not been hit, and they continue to receive tax-breaks from the presidential milieu, which, needless to say, is not affected by the sanctions either.

All those who are in the position to have the power to turn the situation towards peace have an interest in the crisis continuing, not only because it is lucrative but also because it is validating. And this is exactly the same for the powers that be, as for the opposition powers, as for the rebel powers. It would be reasonable to assume that considerable severance of the income linked to the crisis would mean that a large part of the interest in it would be lost, especially if this could be matched with the promise of an appearance before the International Criminal Court, which would at least cause some discomfort in retirement. But this would require all those responsible to be sanctioned. On both sides. And would therefore run the risk of another wave of anti-UN violence, which, the solidarity between heads of State makes all the more difficult to imagine.

* Yveline Dévérin is Lecturer in Geography, University of Toulouse-le-Mirail, France

* This article was translated from the original French version by Stephanie Kitchen. See [email protected]

Notes

[1] The ethnic group of President Gbagbo, who is accused of pursuing ‘tribalist’ politics, which favours his own group.

[2] The ‘commander of the zone’ is, in the rebellion organisation, responsible for the region (zone). He has functions similar to those of a ‘Préfet’ [a State representative in Fraoncophone political systems – translator’s note]

[3] The people from Abidjan criticise their excursions in 4-wheel drives, in the trendy areas, their sexual tourism; which is all the more distasteful given the Ivorian population is financially shattered, and because it creates the impression they are benefiting from the crisis.

As the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire drags on and each successive peace process ends in disappointment after disappointment, many have reached the conclusion that the situation of “neither war nor peace” prevails because it suits those who are benefiting. Yveline Dévérin makes a case for this argument, identifying the trends in the war economy of the country and the forces behind the profiteering.

The Ivorian crisis has now lasted for over three and a half years, from September 2002 to March 2006. The country is split into two zones – the governmental zone in the south, and the ‘ex-rebel’ zone in the north – separated by a ‘security zone’ which is patrolled by the United Nations Mission for Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) and the UN-mandated French army operation ‘Licorne’. Despite repeated attempts at mediation, the crisis persists.

For mediation to be effective, there must be the political will to make it work on both sides. In the Côte d’Ivoire, this is effectively stage-managed. Officially and publicly, political will conforms to political correctness: it would be unimaginable for the protagonists to state otherwise. Who could dare to claim they rejected peace and were content with being at war – with a situation of limbo, of ‘neither peace nor war’? There is therefore considerable dissonance between official political will and vested interests; between staged political correctness, and the economic and social interests that both sides of the conflict are actually pursuing.

The mediation process can only fulfil its mandate so long as the protagonists agree in principle about the final goal – peace, and are only divided as to the means of how to achieve it. However, the unpleasant evidence resulting from close observation of the facts indicates that in Côte d’Ivoire, it is otherwise the case: everyone is in agreement with the status quo. The situation has even been blessed locally as ‘neither peace nor war’ – which is a perfect expression of the reality. The hard truth is that the current situation suits all those who have the power to make it stop. From whatever angle you look at it, no one is interested in unblocking it.

After three years of the crisis, the overwhelming impression is, firstly, that there is extremely weak motivation on either side to achieve peace. On one side, as on the other, there is an endless offloading of responsibilities for the conflict on to others. The crisis is always ‘someone else’s fault’, that someone being – depending on the argument – France, Burkina Faso, Mali, or the whole World (an international conspiracy), or the ‘presidential entourage’. United in mutual, beautiful irresponsibility, the different sides also feign unanimous agreement that resolution of the conflict rests with the mediator. We are thus witnessing total abdication of all responsibilities by the powers that be: for each side, the conflict is the fault of another, and there must be a third-party resolution – to which each side is accordingly indifferent.

Both sides would like to see the conflict resolved to their own advantage. Delays are furthermore in the interests of both sides, as each is gradually becoming deserving of the label people in Ivorian circles are slowly daring to truthfully name: war profiteers. Not only from an economic viewpoint but also from social and political perspectives, the crisis is lining the pockets of the perpetrators.

The Economic Profiteers: ‘We’re still building, even at night’

The economic profiteers are the most visible; their spoils being all the more manifest for being ostentatious, whilst conversely, the ‘ordinary’ people are being driven to stagnation, depression and economic insecurity.

Government zone

In the government zone, right from the onset of the crisis, there has been a proliferation of luxury cars and elaborate buildings, without there even first being denunciation of the profits of those close to power. Bank accounts abroad, luxury vehicles, generous expense allowances, apartments in France, investments in cyber-cafés and petrol stations – which have multiplied in Abidjan since the crisis began – are some of the many signs of personal wealth, all the more visible, since their beneficiaries often had no assets before the crisis. The people of Abidjan, on their own initiative, have moreover coined relevant terms for this group of people who are popularly referred to as ‘patriots of the stomach’. And beyond the rhetoric of patriotism, there is a clear understanding, as in all such similar situations, that this is a classic case of a war economy, operating on the basis of various underhand deals. This flourishing war economy is epitomised by the anguished cry of one man in Abidjan: ‘We’re building in Abidjan at the moment; it’s not a crisis for everyone. We’re still building, even at night.’

Northern zone

In the northern zone, the phenomenon is less perceptible owing to the problems of access to and distribution of information. But we do know for example, that following the death of the war leader ‘Kass’ (Bamba Kassoum), during the conflicts in Bouaké in June 2004, his cyber-café was pillaged, confirming that he did at least own a cyber-café – which was not the situation in 2002! Other testimonies from the northern zone indicate that petrol stations are springing up all over the area.

Korhogo, a onetime sleepy northern town has undergone important urban change, and there has been an upsurge in activity linked to the war. Unlike Bouaké, Korhogo was not a battle zone, and was therefore not destroyed in 2002. It is far enough to the north to not be in the frontline, were conflict to resume, and it is in a prime location for trafficking between Burkina Faso and Mali.

Even though the ‘ordinary’ people are suffering from the war, they are at least finding some compensation in the new parallel economy: taxes are lower than in the southern zone, and thus, for example, there are reports that it is possible to buy motor-vehicles ‘tax-free’, imported from Burkina Faso. This gives many habitants who are have stayed in the zone access to materials to which they previously had none. By the end of 2005 some were beginning to recognise a conflict between on the one hand wanting to see the situation normalise, and on the other, fearing loss of the ‘collateral’ advantages, which, at the end of the day, are not negligible to the ordinary people.

Finally, it seems certain that the most financially influential people have invested heavily in Burkina Faso, particularly in Ouagadougou.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) has concluded meanwhile that, ‘it is clear the current situation in the west is serving the economic interests of politicians and pro-government military chiefs’, who are omnipresent in the region. One journalist expressed it thus: ‘Even the soldiers in the zones under government control are able to buy motorbikes in Bouaké.’ (L’intelligent d’Abidjan 10/3/2005).

The role of the cocoa industry

On a completely different level, the cocoa industry has supplied billions of CFA francs to the various presidential regimes. An expert report (AMIRI, Sid, GOURDON Alain, 2005) underlines that the Fund for the Regulation of Cocoa (FRC), the institution responsible for ‘the financial regulation and management of the industry’s funds’, is being used by those in power to finance the purchase of arms. The report also mentions that ‘a loan of some 10 billion CFA francs’, stipulated for ‘the war effort’ was completed in October 2003.

The boundaries between the war effort and personal enrichment have not been established very clearly. The Dakar-based Journal de l’Economie reported in November 2004 that more than 200 billion CFA francs spent every year are simply accounted for by the State under the heading ‘exceptional right to withdrawal’ (Le Journal de l’Economie, Dakar 16 November 2004). The Ivorian press meanwhile, regularly denounces irregular transactions. Funds are thus being used with complete impunity. Stakeholders in the cocoa industry are meanwhile immune from any public control procedures, and treat the monies allocated to them by the State as bribes. In September 2005, a joint IMF and World Bank investigation concluded that out of the 400 billion CFA francs allocated to the cocoa planters between 2002 and 2004, only 130 billion had been spent to the benefit of the industry. Meantime, between 1997 and 2003, the foreign multinationals (American, Dutch etc.) have seen their market share grow from 10% to 30%; the big concerns having never been so powerful or so profitable as since the war began in Côte d’Ivoire.

The Social Profiteers: To be counted amongst ‘those to be reckoned with’

Beyond the economic gains, the war – or rather the situation of ‘neither peace nor war’ – has proved for some to be a genuine social accelerator, which, moreover, is perceived as being provisional: it will only last as long as the current situation obtains. There are numerous people, in the north as well as the south, who, from being ‘nobodies’, have become important overnight, individuals to be reckoned with at a national level, whose names are suddenly cropping up everywhere.

In the southern zone, young people, who are frustrated and who are blaming society for their marginalisation ,constitute an important component of the ‘patriotic entourage’. Now suddenly, they are becoming significant, are patronising the ‘great and the good’, and are conversing with major Statesmen, at the very least indirectly, whenever there are significant developments. They occupy TV screens, even the RTI (Radio, Television Ivorienne) network itself. They are dominating the press and deciding what information is distributed, even what is published. Thus in November 2004, just before the hostilities which led to the bombardment of the French military base in Bouaké resumed, the ‘patriots’ first made the distribution of opposition newspapers very difficult through effecting commando operations to destroy opposition newspapers at newsstands. Then on the 3 November, the night before the first bombardments in the north, they finally destroyed the newspapers’ headquarters, thus demonstrating their extreme closeness of coordination with the powers that be.

In the northern zone, it is equally apparent that a band of young people has joined the rebellion, though here the phenomenon is on a smaller scale. To avoid making them visible at national, indeed at international levels, the rebellion has lent them importance at a local level. It is also worth reflecting on a particular grouping, called the ‘Dozos’, referring to the members of a brotherhood of traditional huntsmen from the north, who were, before the war, relegated to private security functions for the entire national territory. Overnight, they have resumed their primary function of local public security, and are officially recognised by the new authorities.

The assimilation of the rebellion forces into the military world is straightforward, particularly as many of the soldiers already belong, by personal name, to the brotherhood of the Dozos. What is new however is that the Dozos are being identified as a group, and discussed the world over, a phenomenon that is not insignificant, even if it entails no immediate direct material advantage.

Finally, the local chiefs of the two zones are gaining international recognition. Guilllaume Soro was until recently only a student, and his sole position of responsibility had been as head of the Ivorian student union, 1995-1998, ‘FESCI’ (The federation of students and school pupils in Côte d’Ivoire, a union created in 1990 as part of the development of a multi-party system). Now he is seeing his name published in all the world’s media, and he is summoned to speak with the elites. Soro does not simply talk on the phone to the heads of political parties, but also to heads of State. Furthermore, on the 29 December 2005, he became ‘Minister of State’, a position regarded to be number two in the government, and some are even now calling him the ‘vice-Prime-minister’. This is an honour he owes entirely to the situation of ‘neither war nor peace’, which has made him a major negotiator in the peace process.

On the same side, there is Charles Blé Goudé, who was also a student and the successor to Guillaume Soro, as head of the student union from 1998-2000. He is known as the ‘general’, the ‘youth general’, and the ‘street general’ (the ‘general of the public street’ as he detractors refer to him). He is leader of the young patriots, an inescapable personality. Charles Blé Goudé was the founder of the ‘Coordination of young patriots’ (‘COJEP’). He is regularly interviewed on international channels, and his face is known all over the world. He has debated face to face with Emmanuel Beth, the leader of the French ‘Licorne’ operation in Abidjan in 2003.

Eugène Djué, president of the ‘Patriotic Union for the total Liberation of Côte d’Ivoire’ (‘UPLTCI’) is less renowned internationally but it is nevertheless in charge of an entire section of the ‘patriotic galaxy’. The battles for influence between the different groups play themselves out as the fame of some casts a shadow over others. This is sharpened, as the stakes are often financial (there are incessant and unverifiable rumours of ‘suitcases’ being distributed by the President to some, and not others).

The war is therefore no longer merely about gains in personal wealth but also about demonstrating advancement in the social hierarchy. The same kinds of phenomena can be observed in the patriotic sphere, particularly in the west, where there has been an emergence of local war chiefs who are becoming all-powerful. This level of recognition cannot be dreamed of in peace times, even for those on the ‘winning’ side.

The Political Profiteers

Beyond the direct material and social interests, the situation of ‘neither peace nor war’ is equally beneficial from a political point of view. First of all, it provides a space for the surfacing of personal ambition: the most visible case is that of Guillaume Kigbafori Soro. Even though the name of the ‘MPCI’ has been communicated in the press since the 20 September 2002, this mysterious movement, outwardly very organised, with surprisingly well coordinated actions and equipment, remained faceless until the press conference of the 14 October (almost a month after the onset of the rebellion), when Guillaume Soro was presented as its Secretary General. Until then, he had appeared to be the likely ‘straw man’, standing in for a discreet silent partner. Little by little, he gained in statue, was recognised as a spokesperson, and invited by various media from Marcoussis, through Pretoria to Accra, Tana (Togo) and Abuja as a representative of the rebellion. He communicates with heads of States and international organisations. Gradually, he became a leading authority until when on the 28 December 2005 he became the number two in the Government of the Côte d’Ivoire.

On the presidential side, the President of the National Assembly, Mamadou Koulibaly, the President of the FPI (the ‘Ivorian Popular Front’ – President Gbagbo’s party), Pascal Affi N’Guessam, the President of the Ivorian Popular Front group at the National Assembly and Simone Gbagbo (wife of the President, Laurent Gbagobo) are all becoming important personalities in their party, thanks to the positions or actions they have taken in the debates about the conduct of the peace process. But here again, if peace comes, their positions will simply reveal themselves to be nothing more than internal rivalries.

In summary, the situation of ‘neither peace nor war’ is a kind of insurance for the protagonists on both sides: they do not have to be accountable, neither within their own camps, nor at national or international levels. As terrible as it may seem, the situation serves as a kind of guarantor for impunity. There will only be time to reckon up the balance sheet once peace has returned.

A cogent example is found in a report by Amnesty International, which amongst other things uncovered in February 2003 the execution of policemen in Bouaké during the first few days of the rebellion. The report is entitled ‘Côte d’Ivoire: A Succession of Unpunished Crimes. From the Massacre of the Police Officers in Bouaké, to the Mass Graves of Daloa, Monoko-Zohi and Man’. Its overriding concern is with the danger of impunity. The objective of the report is to demonstrate the danger of impunity through illustrating how the massacres of Yopogougon, executed by the police offices in the pay of the Ivorian Popular Front when Laurent Gbagbo seized power on the 26 October 2000, are at the root of the chain of violence, because of the impunity that surrounds them.

Amnesty International is congratulating itself because the international community has alluded to the possibilities of bringing the assumed instigators of the human rights violations committed by all the parties in the conflict to justice. It should however be clarified that even if the Côte d’Ivoire had signed the statutes of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it has not yet ratified it. Therefore, the ICC has no authority to pass judgement on these acts, unless the Security Council can get hold of the dossier under the terms of article 13(b) of the Statute of Rome relating to the creation of the ICC (Amnesty International, 2003). In the circumstances, it is thus understandable that the protagonists are in no hurry to see the situation normalised, which could permit the Côte d’Ivoire to ratify the Statutes of the ICC.

In any case, until October 2006 elections (postponed from October 2005) President Gbagbo is playing for time: he must hang on until that date because he is hoping to stay in power beyond the 30 October, the fateful date that would marks the end of his fifteen year reign.

Thus officially, in a very politically correct manner, he appears to be doing everything necessary for elections to take place on the 30 October. But in fact, everything is being done to prevent the elections being organised. External observers sometimes even have the impression that the protagonists may even be united in this perspective: no one seems to want elections, even if everyone is busy loudly proclaiming that they do. The ‘ex-rebels’ and the political parties with whom they are associated are not assured of winning them, and not only for reasons to do with the serious concerns about the conduct of the elections. Nor it is certain, by any means, that they would retain their unity if they did win, given that their unity is essentially based on opposition to Laurent Gbagbo. As for the President himself, we can quite understand why he is dragging his feet. Oumar Bongo (President of Gabon) in an interview with Jeune Afrique l’Intelligent in March 2005, first stated his ignorance about what can happen when the President’s mandate expires and then added: ‘Elections are needed so that there is a successor to Gbagbo.’ But that’s exactly the problem: Luarent Gbagbo does not want a successor!

We finally arrive at a paradoxical observation: each time the peace approaches, it is the work of the armed forces! We should not forget that the armed forces, though on different sides, are comrades in training, and live common everyday lives. They are not necessarily interested in seeing the war prolonged, if only because the controlled zones in peace time (which are not in competition with the rural militia and their holds on important traffic routes) may bring them more spoils than the hypothetical spoils of war; and because traffic passing through army check points is reduced because of the war. On several occasions, militia from the two camps have come to an agreement that points a way through to the end of the war. But each time, very quickly, the politicians have acted so that the tension is restored.

This was notably the case in July 2003 when the joint declaration of FANCI and FNCI seemed to be real ‘peace strike’ against the civil society perpetrators of the war. President’s Gbagbo’s repost was clear: ‘Just because the soldiers have ended the war does not mean the war is over. I will make a statement to the nation the day I consider the moment has come when a page has definitely been turned.’ (Agence France Presse, 10 July 2003) From August, the situation became tense again. On the 13 August, a report by the Secretary General of the UN expressed concern about ‘confirmed information’ about the rearmament of the national armed forces (FANCI) in the Côte d’Ivoire and about ‘suspicions’ of the rebels’ rearmament. The entire Ivorian press was making noises about the resumption of the fighting (APF 23 August). Then there were attempted air strikes over Abidjan (L’Inter, 25 August 2003).

This same scenario has developed, each time the armed forces attempted peace. It is caricatured in the situation which preceded the bombardment of the northern zone in November 2004. Following the Accra III agreements, the FANCI and the FNCI met three times (on the 16 August in Raviat, the 30 August in Bouaké and the 6 October in Yamoussoukro) to organise disarmament and billeting which were meant to take effect from the 15 October. But on the 4 November, the President’s planes began the bombardments of the northern zone! On the occasion of the first meeting, General Doué, who is the State’s Chief of the Army, a loyalist, had issued a caution. ‘General Doué blames the confrontations between FANCI and the “New Forces” on the politicians’ was the headline of the daily, Soir Info in the edition of the 17 August 2004, which reported the words of the General: ‘Fundamentally, we are victims of a process with which we are not associated. The politicians take no responsibility for what happens. But when it’s a question of making peace, they turn on us’.

The situation is therefore durably stuck. The protagonists all have the opportunity of working to unblock it but have no interest in doing so. For not only is the crisis simply lucrative, it is also validating, and therefore it goes on. And so long as it lasts, the mediators will come together around the table at the head of the country.

Conclusion: ‘We’ve had enough. Even the Bétés have had enough”

The ‘Ivorian crisis’ seems pointlessly destined to persist for some considerable time to come. Observers (GRIP – Groupe pour la Recherche et d’Intervention sur la Paix, International Crisis Group, and others) are unrelenting in their warnings about the unceasing threats that the conflict may resume. Only the ordinary population has an interest in returning to peace, but this group has no power to move things in that direction. In truth, the longer the problem persists, the more serious it will become. Because it is not enough for the crisis to simply come to an end. It would be pure self-delusion to imagine that one wave of the magic wand, and elections, however just and transparent, will bring about a durable peace. Because peace cannot simply be decreed, it must be lived.

The limits of this situation of perennial conflict lie within the limits of what the ordinary people are prepared to put up with. Sick of being pushed about since 2002 from city to city for meetings with the elites, and through endless 'agreements', ordinary Ivorians from both the north and the south are now protesting with the throbbing refrain: 'We have had enough'. Today, in 2006, the pitch has been raised yet another level: 'Even the Bétés have had enough' (President Gbagbo belongs to the Bété ethnic group). However the increasing internal rivalries on all sides and the vested interests of all parties leave little reason to hope for a rapid resolution of the crisis.

Little by little, the thinking is developing that this situation of ‘neither peace nor war’ is actually benefiting those who have the power to make it stop. ‘That’s to say, we are not yet out of the woods’, was the bitter conclusion of the Dernières Nouvelles d’Abidjan 25/7/2005. ‘The events and the succession of declarations this weekend alone indicate and demonstrate that the country is not yet out of the woods. And should we even dare to think, that worse still, the worst of all, may yet still be to come.’ (Le Nouveau Réveil 23/8/2005) ‘We are not yet out of the woods’ has become the new popular refrain.

* Yveline Dévérin is Lecturer in Geography, University of Toulouse-le-Mirail, France

* This article was translated from the original French version by Stephanie Kitchen. It was first published in the French edition of Pambazuka News No 5, Please send comments to [email protected]

Bibliography

References have been made to the West African press, particularly the Ivorian press; also to dispatches from the following agencies: Reuters, Associated Press and the Agence France Presse. The dates of the references are given within the text. Additionally, the following works and reports are cited:

AMIRI Sid, GOURDON Alain (2005): Etude diagnostic des organisations et des procédures de la filière café-cacoa de Côte d’Ivoire (‘Diagnostic study of the organisations and procedures of the coffee-cocoa industry in Côte d’Ivoire’), Cabinet ECO, Brussels, Cabinet BAA, Barcelona Report for the consideration of the Côte d’Ivoire Government on European Union financing.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (2003): Côte d’Ivoire: Une suite de crimes impunis. Du massacre des gendarmes à Bouaké aux charniers de Daloua, de Monoko-Zohi et de Man (‘Côte d’Ivoire: a succession of unpunished crimes. From the massacre of the police officers at Boauké to the mass graves of Daloua, Monoko-Zohi and Man’), 27 July 2003

AMPROU Jacky (2005): Crise ivorienne et flux régionaux de transport (‘Côte d’Ivoire and regional variations in transport’), Rapport thématique Jumbo, September 2005. Agence Française de Développement, p.18

BOUQUET Christian (2005): Géopolitique de la Côte d’Ivoire. Le désespoir de Kourouma (‘Côte d’Ivoire geopolitics. Kourouma’s despair’) Armand Colin, p.315

DEVERIN Yveline (2005): La crise ivorienne (‘The Ivorian crisis’) in VOLVEY Anne (ed), DEVERIN Yveline, HOUSSAY-HOLZSCHUCH Myriam, RODARY Estienne, SURUN Isabelle, BENNAFLA Karine L’Afrique, coll. Clefs-concours, Atlande, p.288

GRAMIZZI Claudio (2004): La paix s’éloigne de Côte d’Ivoire (‘The distant peace of the Côte d’Ivoire’), Note d’analyse, Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité [GRIP], 10 November 2004, http://www/grip.org/bdg/g4554.html

HOFNUNG Thomas (2005): Le crise on Côte d’Ivoire. Dix clés pour comprendre (‘Ten keys to understanding the Ivorian crisis’) Ed. La découverte, p.140

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (2005): Côte d’Ivoire: The Worst May Be Yet to Come. Africa Report No. 90 –24 March 2005

MELLET Sabine (2004): Cocoa: An Opaque Sector in African Geopolitics, No. 17
http://www.african-geopolitics.org/

SORO Guillaume (2005): Pourquoi je suis devenu un rebelled. La Côte d’Ivoire au bord du gouffre (‘Why I became a rebel. The Côte d’Ivoire at the edge of the abyss’) Hachette, p.174