cc. With the rejection by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) (Tsvangirai) of the flawed Southern African Development Community (SADC) plan for a government of national unity, there are signs of further economic collapse, increased repression of civil society and opposition and increasing hunger and death for Zimbabweans. As Zimbabwe's crisis worsened, Kofi Annan, Jimmy Carter and Graca Machel were banned from pursuing their humanitarian mission to Zimbabwe. They are members with Nelson Mandela of the Elders, a group of former leaders who try to resolve conflict. The cancellation of their visit came as a deadly cholera epidemic spread, amid reports of 20 prisoners dying daily of disease and malnutrition.

The revived ZANU-PF militarised government under the control of Mugabe and the Joint Operations Command (JOC) - which may well call itself a government of national unity (aka impunity) - is interested only in its own survival and has no solution (or even perhaps desire for one) to the problems facing ordinary Zimbabweans. Zimbabwe has been without a government for six months and things are falling apart. In the words of an academic and activist I interviewed during a recent visit we are seeing again 'the DNA of liberation movements allergic to giving up power to ‘civilian’ parties'.

On 14 November, an MDC communiqué at the end of a national council meeting criticised SADC, said it would peacefully campaign against any unilateral government appointed by Mugabe, and called for internationally-supervised new elections. It further alleged that since the signing of the power-sharing agreement on 12 September, Mugabe had pursued an "obstructionist approach" and an "entrenched power-retention agenda" including the "crafting of an assassination plot, codenamed Operation Ngatipedzenavo, intended to eliminate the MDC leadership", amid a wider campaign of violence and intimidation aimed at the party "and the people of Zimbabwe".

Thokozani Khupe, deputy leader of the MDC, said that although the MDC remained committed to dialogue, before joining a power-sharing government it wanted a constitutional amendment defining and implementing the terms of the power-sharing deal, especially defining the new post of prime minister, supposedly to be filled by MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai. Further talks this week in South Africa on a ZANU-PF sponsored draft amendment, are unlikely to provide a breakthrough given the latter was unilaterally-produced.

The power-sharing deal, brokered by SADC-appointed Thabo Mbeki (whom the MDC no longer wish to see as a ‘neutral arbitrator’), was meant to divide ministries fairly between ZANU-PF, Tsvangirai's MDC, and a breakaway faction of the MDC led by Arthur Mutambara. Despite losing the election of March 2008, Mugabe was to retain the presidency, Tsvangirai was to become prime minister until new elections in 2012. But no constitutional amendment was passed to create the post of premier, and the deal was quickly overcome by stalemate over posts and powers, including the composition of the new National Security Council. One can also note, as a church activist said, it was contrary to the popular will that voted for Tsvangirai as President and almost got him as the Prime Minister.

Whilst the illegal ‘president’ Mugabe has yet again outfoxed his opponents, it is at the cost of his ‘own’ people’s lives and livelihoods with a failed currency, hyper-inflation of an independently-estimated 2.7 quintillion % (18 zeroes), lack of access to basic services, including water and the spread of once-tamed killer diseases like cholera with 300 (under-) reported deaths already. Zimbabweans are now ‘hunter gathering in a casino economy’ where the elite can still make vast amounts of illegal money for personal use.

Although ordinary Zimbabweans voice disappointment over the collapse of the 'Global Political Agreement (GPA) in which SADC only appeared interested in accepting Mugabe’s continued rule, despite its rhetoric of increased pressure – many still say no deal is better than a flawed deal. The entire system was designed for ZANU-PF rule and all the key personnel such as permanent secretaries would have remained in place under the agreement.

Many Zimbabweans cannot believe that the region is more concerned with maintaining stability and averting supposed post-Mugabe chaos than following its own principles of democratisation and free and fair elections. SADC appears to fail to see this is a government determined to stay in power, no matter what cost to ‘its’ people and indeed to the region. Even Botswana and South Africa, which made noises about getting tough with ZANU-PF (as indeed did Kenya), fell in line with Zimbabwe’s natural allies the Angolans, Namibians and Congolese in the interests of ‘African leadership solidarity’, not that many actual leaders were at the summit. This comes amid reports that 3,000 Zimbabwean soldiers (with up to 7,000 more expected), along with Angolans have been sent again into the Democratic Republic of Congo, alongside President Kabila's army against the Rwanda-backed rebels of General Laurent Nkunda. Mugabe was quick to respond to Kabila's invitation, for the rich pickings including diamonds, gold and copper.

The recent interview with South African Foreign Minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma alleging the crisis was the fault of the EU and US ‘sanctions’ rather than one of internal bad governance marked a nadir even from her low standards of unquestioning support for the ZANU PF regime. But the South African cabinet seems unsure of its response; it threatened on 21 November not to release $30 million in agricultural aid until a power-sharing government is formed, linking the cholera crisis to the stalled formation of a government of national unity. SADC is equally unsure as to its response. Even though Zimbabwean human rights lawyer Gabriel Shumba won a challenge in the SADC courts that Zimbabwe had an illegitimate ‘government’, SADC limply said it would deal with Mugabe’s dictatorship as a de facto government. In which case the region, according to activists, is complicit in allowing basically 200-300 people to hold their countrymen and women to ransom. It still remains possible that African heads of state could insist on March 29 being implemented as they did in Kenya, but the likelihood decreases as ZANU-PF reasserts its internal and external control of the situation.

Zimbabwean civil society and mass-based movements and outside supporters will now be re-thinking strategies and it will need to be medium term. The regime is well ahead of them in this. The mass pre-emptive arrests of activists including of health workers protesting against the collapse of the public health delivery system on 18 November suggests that planning for a failed power-sharing agreement, including a dirty tricks campaign, was part of the JOC strategy. The failure to release activists arrested from the end of October onwards suggests backup for the allegations that the MDC, along with the Botswana government, is attempting violent regime change.

The JOC's main focus will be on winning elections – again at any cost such as happened between March and June 2008 - knowing that the region will remain toothless and the international community will be preoccupied with the multiple crises. The youth militia (‘Green Bombers’) are already being mobilised under the control of the senior military as the shock troops for a ZANU-PF victory. As ZANU-PF has more or less destroyed the education system it now has available and pliable youth at its disposal. There are reports from international NGOs of the hijacking of their meetings by youth militia. Military chiefs are attending all party meetings, although the rank and file dislike of this plus their dissatisfaction over the lack of seeds and fertiliser of this may be highlighted at the ZANU-PF congress in December .

It appears less likely that the MDC was as prepared for SADC’s pro-Mugabe ultimatum, although in the past, whenever SADC has been pushed to do anything, it proves to prefer the devil it knows. Up to that point and indeed in refusing to commit political suicide a la Joshua Nkomo in 1987, the MDC handled things well on not signing. And they had good advisers in South African ANC-linked Mac Maharaj and Cyril Ramaphosa Their playing and timing was right in terms of staying in the process whilst ZANU-PF was merely playing for time, counting correctly on SADC to bottle the decision.

Where does the MDC go from here and what kind of alliances can it form? Many in civil society refuse to get engaged with them and they have not had strong relationships with the churches, although discussions may begin. Like ZANU-PF, MDC is holding its party congress shortly (in January), although whether by then it will still be an 'overground' party remains to be seen.

The question will be not only what are its strategies, but also where the battleground will be? ZANU-PF will be wanting to fight in the rural areas and streets where it has the monopoly over the use of violence. The state is also pursuing MDC by tying them up with legal cases, including reason charges against. MDC Secretary General Tendai Biti. Elements of civil society – such as the National Constitutional Assembly and Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) - will continue to use the streets for peaceful purposes. But the MDC would prefer to continue pressing for democratic reform in parliament which is not only their comfort zone, but also where they have a majority if the Mutambara faction votes with them. However, currently Parliament has no money to sit and there is certainly not a legitimate government to respond to. The MDC also has to work out how to regain access to the rural areas where rural people might now "love the MDC but how can they show that support?", as an activist asked. Additionally the party structures are not in good shape after years of ZANU-PF's strategy of physical, personal and ideological violence directed against the party with no rebuilding initiatives.

ZANU-PF's strategy will be to combine violence against MDC supporters with attempts to suborn or buy off MDC MPs and thereby regain parliamentary power. Although the economy is on the rocks, ZANU can, if it has to bring back money from bank accounts of plundered money, attempt to suborn certain MDC MPs – a process described as ‘recruit, corrupt, incorporate’. The elite is still plundering the economy of an estimated $1.2b per month to Malaysian, Namibian and perhaps Botswanan banks to be invested in stock and property.

ZANU-PF alleged at the SADC summit that there were MDC military training camps in Botswana. A Zimbabwean fact-finding team is supposedly being invited by Gaberone to check out the allegations. What appears more sinister are the rumours that the Chinese arms shipments that eventually arrived in Zimbabwe were never delivered to the armouries. The implication is that they would be planted to discredit the MDC, allowing ZANU-PF to declare a state of emergency. MDC structures would then be (and arguably is already) under threat of being ‘disappeared’. Already 13 activists have disappeared after being arrested by police, and they have not been presented in court despite a court order. This is a trademark ZANU-PF strategy from the 1980s that surfaces every time the elite feel under attack. ZANU-PF moderate factions may also be under threat of being eliminated/ swallowed.

In this situation the Mutambara faction appears also to have little room for manoeuvre – it was largely rejected by the electorate outside Matabeleland, has been flirting with ZANU-PF on accepting the deal. But if it does so and goes into government with ZANU-PF, it is unlikely to maintain either its MPs or popular support. ZANU-PF also has major faction fighting. Former leaders of the opposition PF ZAPU party ,forcibly incorporated into ZANU in 1987, plans to break away from ZANU-PF as they felt sidelined by the GPA – building on a history of the ruling party neglect of and violence towards Matabeleland.

At the present time there does appear to be a greater desire than before to hold demonstrations against the political and social situation that Zimbabweans find themselves in. There are also reports from rural areas that local populations are putting pressure on chiefs, with communities refusing to accept chiefs they know have been implicated in murder, rape and such crimes. Rumours abound in Zimbabwe that any resistance to a new ZANU-PF government being imposed could lead to a military coup. There are also mixed views on whether the MDC could go to ground and sit it out or whether their structures will be irrevocably damaged.

In this situation where are the pressure points for solidarity activists? There is talk of using the 2010 World Cup as a pressure point, to call for the withdrawal of EU cooperation with SADC states (demands made by the UK Zimbabwe Vigil), increased sanctions against the ZANU-PF elite whilst maintaining support for the vulnerable inside Zimbabwe. The MDC-T which appears to reject further tightening of sanctions has called for African Union and United Nations resolution of the crisis. However their record of procrastination and world recession, events in the DRC, Iraq and Afghanistan, this could take five years with and many Zimbabweans dead by then,

In the aftermath of Georgia, it is unlikely that any serious attempt at pressure on Zimbabwe would get through the UNSC. The West may ratchet up sanctions whilst maintaining humanitarian aid, but little other action appears likely. Mugabe is now past the point of being swayed by international or regional criticism. Responses like ‘food bombing’ Zimbabwe if access proves difficult, or invoking the UN ‘Responsibility to Protect’ procedures (when governments fail to protect their own populations) are very difficult to get started and even harder to implement.

Two particular indicators of ZANU-PF’s desperate need for forex to maintain their rule and patronage were the allegations of stealing money from the Global Fund. The latter desperate to fund needy people living with HIV and AIDS has sought ways of getting the money to them without it going through the Reserve Bank which regularly steals forex. The other example was that major goldmines, a source of government revenue, had to shut down when the government did not pay over US$ 30 million owed them for delivering gold. Zimbabwe gets 40% of its export earnings from gold, but production for 2009 appears already under threat at a time of high world gold and metal prices. The money went on providing vehicles for judges, ministers and tractors to bribe the rural electorate.

Amid the hyperinflation and the Zimbabwe dollar having been replaced effectively by the US dollar, the last amount of sustainable resilience is now. According to the UNDP it will take the economy 16 years of interrupted growth at 5% pa to get back to levels of 1990. Meanwhile Zimbabweans unable to get US dollars (which is the vast majority), queue forever for cash that is about equal to their bus ride to get to the bank. Imminent famine is a major possibility with people already dying outside the ‘hunger months’ of February to April. Government unconcern shown by the banning of the Elders Group is matched by allegations of UN agencies being similarly unconcerned. There are already calls for increased humanitarian aid with lack of food possibly being compounded by drought. But according to some reports aid is holed up in bonded warehouses on Zimbabwe's border to be released as part of ZANU-PF's electoral strategy. All indications are that the harvest will be very poor with reports already of deaths from hunger (as well as cholera). The regime is trying assert control over food distribution and trying to unload any food aid in chiefs’ homesteads and thereby evade MDC councils.

Suggestions that humanitarian agencies state that until the political situation is resolved and the forex money that is regularly raided by the Reserve Bank is returned, they will withhold aid would be very difficult. 'The rainy season is upon us and land should have been prepared but you have to know someone to access seeds and fertilisers' stated a church development worker. She added that Zimbabweans are not likely to be fooled by the eventual release of humanitarian aid – they know it comes from overseas. The rural population has now got rid of all assets and agencies are trying to help survival through basic asset protection. At the same time when both survival strategies and ethics have gone, there was a story of the local MP buying animals from his constituents at knockdown prices in return for maize.

The regime ritually blames sanctions for all its problems but the ZANU-PF politburo was also reportedly deeply divided over whether Mugabe should keep Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor, Gideon Gono in post, although reports on 26 November suggest that he has been re-appointed for a second five-year term, extending his time in the post to Nov. 30, 2013. Some blame him for the state of the economy whilst others see his uses as someone prepared to print money to maintain the regime’s patronage networks. A rumour is that when he learned that as part of the GPA Mugabe had reluctantly handed over the finance ministry to Tsvangirai, Gono went to the US Embassy, to offer to exchange details of the looting of the country by Mugabe via share transfers and foreign exchange deals for US$5 million and residence permits in a western country for himself, his wife and indeed his mistress.

The GPA impasse means the dire socio-economic conditions are bound to worsen. The cholera outbreak led Médecins Sans Frontières to state that a million people could be at risk. However, innovatively, the police banned MDC rallies due to the outbreaks. More seriously, the regime cannot deny however that the health system has collapsed and overwhelmed medical staff are on strike. Major hospitals have almost closed down due to staff exodus and unavailability of drugs. The shortage of life-saving drugs in state-run hospitals has led to patients' relatives being told to try to find them at private pharmacies in town.

So where are the focal points for resistance to this multiple crisis? Civil society is seemingly divided on its on its strategy towards MDC with some calling for a united front and moving to prop up MDC grassroots support. There is the paradox of the MDC and civil society as seemingly natural allies that do not help each other. There is the common perception that the NGOs are too urban, elitist, male-dominated and middle class with no knowledge of how to organise communities. There has also been a great loss of personnel in the sector with the civics being described to me as practically non-existent. After three months the spaces that briefly opened up are now closing.

In terms of the role of churches it would seem that eventually there has been a much stronger attempt to bring unity. An international faith-based NGO has attempted to bring the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA) and the Protestant churches closer in a reconciliation initiative between ZCA, ZCC (Protestants) and EFZ (evangelicals). A communiqué from that meeting talked of the churches failing each other and hence the people. There is talk of the church involving itself in any truth and reconciliation process. A national conference is planned with an invitation to Archbishop Tutu on lessons of truth and reconciliation but also on the need for repentance and within church. This appears to open up opportunities even if there is vagueness on key issues and timeframes. There was also the desire to bring in the various Apostolic churches that in the past have provided support for ZANU-PF.

So how do international activists provide support but also ensure that in any kind of transition Zimbabweans themselves shape that agenda not just the North and the international financial institutions, and that there is no going back to the unequal system of ownership of resources, especially land, before 2000? There is need for a process that combines joint actions, greater coordination and activity between northern and southern-based actors on their respective states and institutions; learning and exchanges between European organisations and between Zimbabwean, Southern African and European civil society groups; development and adequate use of high quality, timely briefings on specific issues and influencing funding decisions and timings for Zimbabwe, and responding to developments in Southern Africa. Zimbabwe needs:

* Full and equal access to humanitarian assistance
* Commitment to significant Zimbabwean (diaspora as well as resident citizen) input into transitional and stabilisation programmes to overcome the dangers that a recovery process be too ‘stabilisation-oriented’ (without adequate social provisions), does not adequately deal with macro-economic issues such as debt clearance and be ‘appeasement-oriented’ (avoiding accountability and perpetrator responsibility);
* Restoration of the rule of law, including an independent judiciary;
* Commitment to the democratic process and respect for internationally accepted human rights standards, including a commitment to freedom of expression, freedom of print and broadcast media, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association;
* A commitment to timely elections held in accordance with international standards, and in the presence of international election observers.

It might need an international peacekeeping force to put these into place, but no-one is expecting this to happen. In its absence, work should build on the significant sustained and coordinated regional solidarity actions undertaken in southern Africa around the blockage of Chinese arms shipment and the SADC summits. Initiatives on Zimbabwe have been coordinated by Cosatu and other trade unions as well as civic movements and churches throughout the region and Africa. These regional developments provide a positive example for Africa-wide – as well as Northern – advocacy on democracy, human rights and social justice.

A South African activist pointedly said this needs to be combined with grassroots work far away from the focus on international / regional structures, legal frameworks, rule of law, election related issues etc. ‘Whilst important, these issues are so remote from the grind of daily reality and the emphasis, therefore must be placed on empowering poor people to cope / survive and god knows, even thrive, in a context where government services will not be resuscitated in the short to medium term future, and in so doing  we need to engender a culture that does not reinforce dependency and 'wait' for government service delivery but seeks to develop parallel service mechanisms to deal with health, education, food security issues.’

* Sam Kabele is a human rights activist

* Please send comments to [email protected] or comment online at http://www.pambazuka.org/

POSTSCRIPT:
Morgan Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) said today it was determined to have former president Thabo Mbeki removed as facilitator before it would proceed with Zimbabwe's power-sharing negotiations. Tsvangirai, who accuses Mbeki of continuing bias against the MDC in the talks with Zanu PF, has written to President Kgalema Motlanthe asking him to remove Mbeki. He will travel to Dar es Salaam this weekend to seek Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete's support for the move. The long-simmering tensions between Mbeki and the MDC boiled over yesterday over an exchange of letters between them, as negotiations resumed in Gauteng. Tsvangirai's deputy Tendai Biti wrote to Mbeki on November 19, rejecting as a "nullity" the Southern African Development Community's (SADC's) demand that the MDC share the home affairs ministry with Zanu PF. Mbeki wrote back a strongly worded letter on November 22 to Tsvangirai in which he slammed the MDC for denigrating SADC and - according to the MDC - implied that the party was being influenced by the West. Mbeki wrote "It may be that … you consider our region and continent as being of little consequence to the future of Zimbabwe, believing that others further away, in western Europe and North America, are of greater importance." These remarks seem to have been the final straw for the MDC. Tsvangirai's spokesman George Sibotshiwe said today that the MDC would now formally withdraw from the negotiations until the issue of Mbeki's removal was resolved. However the MDC would continue to engage with the facilitation and other Zimbabwean parties but only in a "without-prejudice discussion."

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/362/47412violence.jpgSam Kabele looks at the fault lines along which violence in Zimbabwe is traveling and calls for solidarity the Zimbabwean people

At the time of writing President Mugabe is refusing to engage with his reasonably supine fellow southern African leaders, concerned about the crisis and lack of declared results from the presidential elections. Instead he has chosen the path he knows best, that of formal and informal state-inspired violence with reports coming in especially in Manicaland of targeted intimidation and beatings of opposition activists, especially in areas that swung to MDC. The votes in the parliamentary elections went so overwhelming for the opposition that the government was unable to fix that election and we thus had a historic victory for the Movement for Democratic Change. It seems clear the ruling ZANU-PF party are desperately trying to avoid a similar meltdown in the presidential ones. So, unsurprisingly, Zimbabwe’s High Court refused to rule on the MDC’s urgent application for release of the presidential election results on April 14. 

As President Mugabe opts for the path he knows best, that of formal and informal state-inspired violence, it is worth asking how we even reached the stage where the opposition was allowed to win the parliamentary elections and where the usual violence and intimidation appear not to have paid off. Were the ruling party over-confident and the rest of us, expecting the usual stolen election, too dismissive of the effect of the crisis on ordinary Zimbabweans – urban and rural? Of course in any normal situation, hyperinflation signals an end to any ruling government, but Zimbabwean ‘normality’ has been different since 2000, and arguably before that. Given the normal retaliation that ZANU-PF unleashes when it is threatened as in 2000 after the referendum (farm invasions etc) and Operation Murambatsvina after 2005, there is a second and probably more important question. Who is willing and able to stop a descent into repression and violence? And, thirdly, who in Zimbabwe and the region has the strategic vision to change this? Is there still the possibility of a peaceful transition (even if not a transformation as such)? 

The ZANU-PF government has largely appeared impervious to international pressure to reverse repression and its economic policies. Zimbabwe has few close allies, after leaving the Commonwealth, having been near to expulsion from the International Monetary Fund (perhaps the only possibly advantageous element), its policies criticised by the UN and some African institutions like the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, and with its elite subject to ‘smart’ sanctions from the EU, Switzerland, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. It has retained some African, Chinese and some Third World state and popular support by astute playing of the ‘anti-imperialist card’.   Is, however, the southern African region now sufficiently worried to push harder for real change after the (unadmitted) failure of their negotiation process and the obvious gerrymandering of the ‘harmonised elections’?

CAN ZIMBABWEANS CONTINUE THE MOMENTUM OF THEIR MASSIVE REJECTION OF ZANU-PF?

Whilst the results dribbled out, the courts are largely supine and the counter-offensive starts. After the failure of the negotiation process and the obvious gerrymandering of the ‘harmonised elections’ perhaps the real question is whether their self-interest in a reformed ZANU-PF without Mugabe is likely to continue? With the exception of South Africa’s ANC president Jacob Zuma - who called for the election results to be declared after meeting Zimbabwe’s opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai - the region has been largely silent. It has, however, after its weekend summit issued a lame statement calling for the election results to be ‘expeditiously’ declared and for the parties to contest any run-off. This is despite evidence of increased intimidation and violence and strong opposition from regional civil society.

The only path appears to be people power, but is the fearful population, committed peaceful forms, subject to eight years of intimidation, and having to engage in every possible strategy for mere survival able to sustain this? Recent general strikes such as the one called for from 15th April cannot really be anything other than staying at home since only 8% of Zimbabweans are actually employed. 

It has been argued that in any transition Zimbabwe should be characterised as a post-conflict state since it exhibits many characteristics of a society in violent conflict due to the scale of economic collapse and casualisation, political violence and social trauma, the breakdown of basic services (although the party structure of ZANU-PF remains intact), mass flight of people and capital. Zimbabwe currently has the highest rate of inflation in the world, with an annual rate of over 100,000%.

1. Wages have plummeted as the cost of necessities spirals out of control.  About 80% of the country’s population lives in poverty, while about 3 million people have left the country in search of work.

2. Failed agricultural policies have meant widespread food shortages of food with this year’s harvest predicted to be one of the lowest on record.

3. Agriculture was the motor of the pre-crisis economy, but is massively depleted in production and export. Zimbabwe once a food exporter (in good years) is now food insecure with up to half the population reliant on food aid.

4. The above is particularly worrying given the generalised HIV and AIDS pandemic and life expectancy being the lowest in the world at 34 years for men and 33 years for women.

5. The humanitarian crisis is exacerbated by government food distribution being manipulated to secure votes.

6. Demands for change emanating from civil society have been routinely suppressed by the state, including the use of assaults, arrests and torture.7 The number of health professionals fleeing the country has escalated while resources for the health sector have collapsed, with dire effects on the around 20% of the population with HIV or AIDS.  

The strategies of the Zimbabwean state of both structural and physical violence in all its parallels with the last years of apartheid seem to be both unravelling and at the same time becoming more vicious. The combination of centrally directed and presidential-inspired incitement to violence, including sexual violence, securitisation of state institutions, state of emergency in all but name, the use of informer networks and covert ‘Third Force’ hit squads to brutalise the opposition and destroy its structures before elections, and the manipulation of the media and hate speech attacks, all seek to provide ideological justification for the demonisation of the opposition and licensed informal violence. However, whether through over-confidence or under pressure from South Africa and the region, there was less violence in this election with both the opposition factions of the MDC and the ZANU-PF ‘renegade’ Simba Makoni being able to campaign in rural areas. 

Several post-Mugabe scenarios are possible, including a transition to Mugabeism without Mugabe, an MDC-led government, the rise of a reformist faction within ZANU-PF, a broad government of national unity, a military coup, or even a descent into chaos. But at present a Mugabe hardball response urged on by the ‘Jacobin’ faction inside the party around a presidential run-off seems likely. Violence and intimidation have worked in the past to keep the president in power, have tended to divert the party from its internal divisions, and sidelines the ‘moderate’ ZANU-PF faction which is tempted to reach out to MDC and the international community – not least to try to safeguard their businesses, and other resources including land. Use of the militia and to some extent the police also avoids using the military some of whose loyalty is suspect – at elite level where the would-be kingmaker is thought to have bankrolled the Makoni presidential bid, and at lower ranks level, where many soldiers presumably voted MDC. 

ELECTIONS

The background to the elections was of fear of state-sanctioned violence through use of police, military and militias with the aim of ensuring a ruling party victory at whatever cost8.  Conditions for free and fair elections in the called for in the recent pastoral letter from the Catholic bishops were not followed. Key aspects of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections, ratified by the Zimbabwean government were not respected.9  These included the pro-government bias of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)10, insufficient mechanisms for voter registration and roll inspection and ZEC failing to clearly publicise boundaries of new voting constituencies and locations of polling stations. There was also the disqualification of three million diaspora Zimbabweans, lack of voter education, state domination of the media and a lack of independent international and civil society observers.  

All reports from partners and credible observers note that the organisation of the elections was partisan, the opposition parties had little access to state media and to rural areas of the country, and the state media overwhelmingly privileged the messages of the ruling ZANU-PF party11. Nor was there sufficient time between the unilateral announcement on 25th January of the election date for political parties to organise their campaigns. Indeed the electoral commission itself was disorganised as well as partisan. The weighting of the new constituencies is also towards the rural areas – normally seen as government strongholds where opposition parties rarely get access. (But it seems that rural voters were less intimated, including in areas that were formerly ZANU-PF-leaning, although there have to be concerns about any second round where there are no observers). There were widespread reports of government attempting to buy voters’ allegiances through provision of agricultural equipment and (deferred) pay rises to the armed forces and teachers. President Mugabe also amended the electoral law on 18th March to allow the police into polling stations - widely seen as an intimidating tactic, although it is not certain that it was that effective. 

WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE NOW IN RELATION TO ELECTIONS

The conditions of the post-election period do not promise well for Zimbabwe escaping from its current interlinked crises and hence helping to stem the increasing poverty of its citizens. Civil society is currently working out its strategy, but it is uncertain what the MDC’s is bar the general strike weapon and Tsvangirai’s regional tour of uninterested leaders. There are worries in civil society that violence and intimidation will characterise any possible second round and that manipulation of results is aimed at gaining either an outright victory or to provide a weakened MDC that will be railroaded into a spurious government of ‘national unity’ to provide greater regional and international legitimacy for continued ZANU-PF misrule. 

It seems that any effective response to the Zimbabwean crisis must be African-led, however unlikely that currently seems.  There should be support and encouragement for the efforts of the African Union (AU) and SADC to provide stronger political mediation in the post-election period aimed at securing government commitment to political and economic reform and to the restoration of basic rights of citizens. Secondly, there is a need to respond to the long-term humanitarian crisis and its effects on the people of Zimbabwe. 

Even if Mugabe were to win the run-off vote he faces a country in total meltdown. A transition point - if not a transformation point - now appears inevitable. The immediate tasks will be to reform the security and legal sectors; create legitimate institutions of government; political reconciliation; rebuild the state; economic recovery, normalisation of relations with the international community for aid; debt relief  and investment. All will take place under circumstances in which Zimbabweans will be extremely vulnerable to externally imposed agendas.

Sequencing of reform will be vital. A return to due process of law and transparency needs to take place with depoliticisation, demilitarisation and demilitia-isation of formal and informal state institutions top of the agenda. Perhaps Zimbabwe can then start to move away from a culture of violence, impunity, corruption and cronyism.

Addressing the question of land will be a volatile process. There will need to be a detailed investigation into who has what land under what conditions. It would be politically unacceptable to return to the highly unequal colonial-pattern of land ownership. But for those former commercial farmers prepared to share their expertise innovative land sharing/ renting schemes could be piloted.

The tasks will be immense and there is already talk of creating a Trust Fund to help Zimbabwe’s absorptive capacity which will be fairly modest. Measures to help the skilled and the diaspora return will need to be balanced with employment creating schemes for those who stayed,without overwhelming what few social services remain. Health care professionals could be invited back, initially on a short term basis without losing residence rights elsewhere, and with a range of inventive packages.  

A national convention process could be vital in producing a new people-driven constitution. A stakeholder conference to take this forward could address issues of constitutional reform, electoral reform, land reform, truth recovery and economic and social recovery.

Promoting justice and reconciliation will be a long term process, but Zimbabwe is one of the best-documented sustained human rights abuse processes. Finally from a rather longer run historical view are we seeing the end of the sustainability of the nationalist/ liberation project as it is unable to recuperate and reproduce itself except through violence? State authoritarianism had the dual inheritance of the interventionist settler state and the command politics of the liberation movements.

The seeming illogicality of the politics of disorder has been functional for rewarding clients and supporters, once the original nationalist coalition of workers, peasants, trade unionists, urban dwellers, students and intellectuals had been destroyed through structural adjustment, elite accumulation strategies and corruption. ZANU-PF has been unable to address what Chris Alden saw as the interlinked crises of illegitimacy, expectations and governance; it has only been able to respond through violence/ clientilism, destruction of the disparate social forces opposed to it such as farmers, farmworkers and urban dwellers through militarisation/ militia-isation. This has been accompanied by a location of the crisis as external – Western imperialism and ‘sanctions’. Whilst these have their niche the crisis is overwhelmingly local although not without an initial external dimension that Patrick Bond has pointed to - acceptance of settler debts, ESAP etc, with an ideological debate around ‘who is a real Zimbabwean’? This has acted to exclude urban, white, farmworker, professional etc Zimbabweans through denial of their legitimacy as citizens. The battleground is not just economic and political but also ideological through identity, exclusion and exclusion questions and demonisation of non-ZANU supporters, ruralisation/ totems etc.  

For now Zimbabweans need the greatest international solidarity and pressure on regional governments. The UN Security Council should also be a forum for laying open the human rights abuses which are likely to get worse in the days and weeks ahead. 

*Sam Kabele is a human rights activist. 

**Please send comments to or comment online at www.pambazuka.org

http://www.pambazuka.org/images/articles/300/zim-violence.jpgSam Kebele’s analysis of recent events in Zimbabwe highlights the internal and external complexities at work in the country. He considers the possibilities of a broad non-partisan front emerging from the ranks of Zimbabwean civil society with a common agenda. He suggests ways in which outsiders and human rights activists can support Zimbabwean civil society in effecting sustainable change in the country.

Following Mary Ndlovu’s excellent article in Pambazuka News...

From last month, possibly for the first time, it seemed that in the African context, Zimbabwe was finally losing the propaganda war it had successfully pursued amongst its traditional allies.

The beatings in March of Morgan Tsvangirai and others flashed around the world caused an immediate drop in the Zimbabwe dollar of a quarter of its value. Any remaining tourism took another hit with mass cancellations at Victoria Falls hotels.

The strategies of the Zimbabwean state of both structural and physical violence reminiscent of the last years of apartheid seem to be both unravelling and becoming more vicious.

The combination of a centrally directed, presidential-inspired incitement to violence, securitisation of state institutions, state of emergency in all but name, use of informer networks and hit squads to destroy the opposition, and manipulation of the media seek to provide ideological justification for the demonisation of the opposition, and licensed informal violence.

Greater unity amongst independent democratic forces and the statement of the Catholic bishops conference unequivocally laying the blame for the first time for the current situation at the door of a ‘corrupt, greedy and repressive elite’ marks a significant step.

It is clear that regional uneasiness and internal ZANU PF struggles have created space for independent voices to organise for systemic democratic change. But, as in the scenarios that Mary Ndlovu outlines, there needs to be a realistic assessment of what can be done as well as strategic regional and international solidarity directed towards progressive targets.

The emergency Southern African Development Community (SADC) leaders' summit in Dar es Salaam on 29 March discussed the crisis. It appeared to give some succour to Mugabe’s regime, in line with its stance since the start of the crisis seven to ten years ago.

SADC appointed Thabo Mbeki, seen here in Zimbabwe as Mugabe’s chief defender, as mediator. It called for sanctions, i.e. the asset freeze and travel bans on Mugabe and cronies, to be lifted; and for the UK government to honour its land reform aid package promises.

Since these changes are unlikely to be implemented without some serious reform, this appears to some as yet more of the same non-interference and ‘Áfrican leadership solidarity’.

The alternative more optimistic assessment was that these two demands were a face-saving formula to get Mugabe to accept that SADC wanted an end to the crisis, which has begun to have a serious impact on the region.

For the first time there has been recent and outspoken public criticism of ZImbabwe from continental and regional leaders, notably the Zambian president Levy Mwanawasa, on more than one occasion.

This reading of the situation suggests there will be a more sustained engagement in Zimbabwe and the possibility for opening a space for manoeuvre.

Widely believed sources say that Mugabe was given the choice either to leave office at the end of his current term in March 2008, or to introduce significant reforms to end the economic and political crisis.

Many inside Zimbabwe felt that SADC could and should have gone much further in applying open political pressure. They argue that the regional organisation has dealt Mugabe a card to play.

The government press has certainly trumpeted the SADC statements as vindicating Mugabe’s speech to his fellow leaders: outlining his liberation war credentials, and berating the British as the sole cause of the crisis. One effect has been to give Mugabe a stronger hand to deal with his internal party critics.

At one point in the week of 26 March just before a politbureau meeting, sources within the Mujuru faction were reportedly informing journalists that they could persuade Mugabe to stand down for re-election in 2008. They allied opportunistically with the Mnangagwa faction (see below) to see off Mugabe’s bid to ‘standardise’ the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2010.

The assumption has been widely canvassed that Mugabe would become a ceremonial president with a Prime Minister. He would retire soon afterwards with no dangers of being whisked away to the International Criminal Court in the Hague. Then opposition factions could re-engage with the West.

The problem for both factions was that Mugabe was too paranoid to trust anyone, and had probably seen that impunity often has a limited shelf life.

The party’s central committee, packed with Mugabe supporters such as the youth and women’s league, duly endorsed the president as their sole candidate for the 2008 elections.

This has left the two different factions on the back foot. Despite claims that this time they would force the issue of succession, they appear to have retreated. They are perhaps biding their time to see what the SADC mission looks like.

At face value though, and as has happened without fail in the past, Mugabe has proved a better street fighter when he has his back against the wall than his would-be party presidential opponents. But the deep rifts in ZANU PF are very unlikely to go away.

It is far from certain, however, that Mugabe will automatically see off his critics outside the party whether internal, regional or international.

There was huge support for a signed petition in the press from regional civil society. There is considerable international support for the ZCTU stay away on 3-4 April. There has also been consolidation of concern and critical statements from church leaders. The deposing of the President of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), Trevor Mananga, who was suspected of getting to close to the ruling party, and who denounced the ZCTU stay away on state television, points to renewed energy amongst opposition forces, and possibilities for change.

Since the late 1990s, Zimbabwe has been trapped in major interlinked crises that have resulted in economic and political free fall. This situation has been described by diplomatic sources, even with the examples of DRC and Somalia in mind, as ‘just about unsustainable’.

A series of disastrous land reform policies; the adoption by ZANU-PF of draconian measures curbing civil and political liberties; a devastating HIV/ AIDS epidemic; widespread hunger and food; 80 per cent unemployment in the formal sector has driven tens of thousands of professionals to leave the country to find work abroad in the region and Europe.

This was compounded by the attack on urban dwellers known as Operation Murambatsvina (‘clear out the filth’). Inflation is now running at 1,720 per cent and rising, expected by the IMF to hit 5000 per cent by the end of the year.

The Fund says Zimbabwe is losing control of its economy. Anecdotal evidence is of the government having to visit the parallel market to gain US dollars to pay off debts on a day-by-day basis. Fiscal deficit is 40 per cent of GDP, which has fallen by 35 per cent.

Official UN statistics show that life expectancy for women is now just 34 years. The HIV infection rate has been 25 per cent, one of the highest in the world.

Zimbabwe has fallen 23 places over the last decade in the ranking of the world’s poorest countries and now stands as the 145th poorest out of 177 ranked countries (UNDP Human Development Report 2005).

So what is the likelihood of serious change? For those who remember some of their Leninist theory, the ideal conditions for radical change include fractures in the state and its apparatuses, unity of the opposition with a vision, leadership and a strategy, serious multiple crises and significant outside support.

It is hard to say that any of these major elements are in place, although there are some recognisable characteristics and opportunities for the development of more. According to a young civil society activist the current choice is between ‘Á New Zimbabwe’ or Somalia’.

There are other options beyond this binary interpretation, including the danger of a tainted and compromised transition brokered by the region with the support of the West. This could leave in place the systemic features of the repressive and kleptocratic regime, impunity and little real democratic change.

There is a danger that there will not be adequate forces to prevent this as many in Zimbabwe may accept this arrangement, especially if accompanied, as it was apparently proposed at the SADC meeting, by a substantial rescue package put together by the US and UK governments. It would probably save lives.

In terms of possible fractures in the state, divisions, often underpinned by ethnic rivalries within and without the majority Shona-speaking group, have been endemic in ZANU-PF for many years, although they have sharpened considerably over the last year.

Mugabe has been able to use and contain divisions with lesser or greater degrees of coercion, given his awareness of ‘where the bodies are buried’.

The current major divisions are between the equally corrupt Vice-President Joyce Mujuru (and husband Solomon) and Emmerson Mnangagwa factions, all of whom represent the ageing liberation generation.

Mugabe appears to retain most support. Although now arguably a faction leader himself, he remains dominant and is unlikely to be unseated before 2008.

As a result of the fallouts, Mnangagwa’s faction may be on top at the moment. Since Mugabe has explicity attacked the Mujuru faction for plotting against him, it might be now or never for Mnangagwa since he is widely believed to be dependent on anti-retro virals.

Much of the faction-fighting – beyond the usual desire for power and control of resources - is over who controls the army, Mugabe’s power base. The army controls most of the major institutions of the state and is likely to be a power broker in any new situation, through, it is generally thought, Solomon Mujuru, given his former position as liberation war vet and post independence army commander.

At his recent 83rd birthday party, Mugabe attacked Joyce Mujuru in a long rambling tirade that even ZBC felt obliged to censor - in itself an amazing step. Joyce it is understood subsequently to have resigned, but was reportedly persuaded by her husband to withdraw it.

Mujuru remains one of the richest men in ZImbabwe. Whilst he is largely believed to have significant army support, there is talk that this is not as strong as previously thought. There may be elements in the army who prefer Emmerson Mnangagwa to come out on top in the feuding over who would succeed Mugabe.

Whether there would be actual armed violence between the two factions is a matter of debate with younger activists seeming to expect it and older ones less sure. However, there have been no reports of conflicts so far. If they do occur, the point of conflict may be the recently discovered diamond field (se below) in which the Mujurus have a stake. There are also reports of plenty of buried weapons just over the border, from Mozambican war days.

There have been reports of great disaffection within the lower ranks of the army and police, even within the presidential guard, with reports of shootings at State House (and allegedly 22 executions, although in Zimababwe wild rumours are not uncommon).

It is believed that the presidential guard now consists of Congolese troops which suggests a deep mistrust of Zimbabwe’s own military. The lower ranks have also seen an increased rate of desertions which the regime has been unable to stem even by using the war veterans and the Green Bombers.

Reports of the imminent deployment of Angolan police units have been denied, with Luanda claiming they are providing ‘training’ to help replace the deserters. If, as is claimed, 3,000 Angolans will be deployed, this is clearly more that just a training mission.

There are also no facilities to support their deployment. According to the (London) Times correspondent, the police being sent are supposed be the dreaded Ninjas, famed for their brutality in Angola and in action against illegal garimpeiro miners from the DRC - which may not be coincidental.

If the Angolans are sending police, this strategy could backfire by generating further resentment from the ranks of the ZRP indigenous police as well as the population. Even the Angolans stressed the need for peace and security in overcoming internal problems.

It would not seem necessary that the Zimbabwean police need training in handing out beatings. There have been suggestions that the beatings meted out on and since 11 March are the responsibility of several special units, possibly including army in police uniforms. The violence also suggests the involvement of special units in ‘black operations’, such as the attacks on police stations and a passenger train – which the regime subsequently used as part of its propaganda in the region to portray their actions as necessary in the face of 'terrorism', which the state claims is being orchestrated by the MDC. The confessions in the Mail and Guardian at the beginning of April of ‘John Gweru’, a special operative in the Charlie Four hit squad, provide disquieting reminders of the tactics of the last years of apartheid.

For the people, the major problem remains the expected massive food deficit of 1.2 million tonnes (Zimbabwe needs 1.8m tonnes), and the likelihood of politicisation of any aid, especially in an election.

The region as a whole needs to monitor this situation far more carefully than for instance at the time of the 2005 election. Assuring independent verifiable information must be made a central component of the mediation.

The government continues to deny there is a problem, yet in one incident a permanent secretary is believed to have followed the visiting World Food Programme head out of a meeting saying that he had made denials of food shortages because CIO intelligence people were present in the meeting and that Zimbabwe really did need emergency and food aid.

Only belatedly has the country asked the EU to provide food aid. Nor is the region likely to help out with maize, given shortfalls and drought in countries such as Zambia and South Africa: the latter will have to import in a situation of high world maize prices. Malawi may have a surplus, but wishes to build up a strategic reserve. Discussions about a regional food security stockpile are only in an early stage. The UN has already launched a US$215 million appeal, of which $62m is for food aid. The Zimbabwe government has so far imported 400,000 tonnes to cover deficit. Zambia says it will honour existing contracts.

On energy, South Africa will also need all it produces and Zimbabwe is in debt to ESKOM (the South African energy parastatal), Mozambique and to SNEL, the Congolese power authority, which was in Harare in early April chasing the money it has already been promised several times.

Tobacco farmers who provide much of the foreign exchange are in dispute with the government over price and are not bringing their reduced crop to the selling floors.

So are the Zimbabweans losing their automatic regional and continental outside support? The Zambian president Mwanawasa, who will be the next chair of SADC, has compared Zimbabwe with a sinking Titanic - a statement that drew an immediate visit to Lusaka from Zimbabwean officials.

This followed a visit from Jakaya Kikwete, president of Tanzania and head of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. The SADC troika of Tanzania, Lesotho, Namibia allegedly want Zimbabwe to be top of the agenda at the next organ meeting (or did do before the recent summit). As well as being tasked with re-engagement with Zimbabwe and with the SA ambassador having had talks with Tsvangirai, the South Africans had already made it clear that they wanted commitment to at least formal democratic practices.

Furthermore, given their own history and that of the region, a declaration of a formal state of emergency would be received very negatively. It is arguable of course that Zimbabwe already has an informal one given the defiance by the state of its own repressive legislation e.g. refusing to obey court orders on allowing the opposition to stage rallies.

The ACP countries are also planning a special mission, according to diplomatic sources. Harare is said not to be resisting – presumably on the grounds they can continue to play the line: ‘imperialists are using terror against us’. Leaders of the African Union and African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights have offered to help Zimbabwe. This marks a further stage on from initial non-interference, then concerns expressed over Operation Murambatsvina, and now offers to help. Credibility will no doubt depend on what any mission does and who it talks to, and not falling for the benign guided tour Harare is likely to provide.

It seems unlikely that Harare’s historic allies, the Angolans and Namibians, will abandon their fellow invader of the DRC – despite reports that the Brazilians warned Angola not to overtly support Mugabe. But interestingly, the Namibian president remained silent during the Mwanawasa statement.

There is of course China and the ‘Look East’ policy. This policy follows a long line of failed rescue initiatives from the Libyans to the Malaysians. But each of those in the end want something in return for support, and the Zimbabweans had little to offer. According to diplomats, the Chinese are 'risk averse' and were tired of the Zimbabweans claiming after meetings that the Chinese would be providing support e.g. building a steel mill – a story the Chinese immediately denied. Zimbabwe was notably absent from the itinerary for the recent Chinese Premier’s visit.

The five person Southern African team charged with negotiations and coming up with solutions looks like being coordinated from the President’s Office by Rev Frank Chikane, a one time key anti-apartheid activist. According to reliable sources, the Tanzanian president, Kikwete, will be brought in to talk to Mugabe, Mbeki will liaise with the MDC, AND South African local government minister Sydney Mufamadi with ZANU-PF. There are two deputy ministers and two other DGs as part of the team.

This will occur against the background of the US and EU looking at how they might sharpen up existing ‘sanctions’. Such sanctions possibilities might be extended to include relatives of those banned from travelling to the EU, business leaders of ZPF companies or to widen areas.

SADC’s call for the lifting of sanctions is a sign of moral disapproval rather than a serious overture to ease Zimbabwe’s economic woes, despite claims by Harare that sanctions are responsible for the economy’s collapse.

It is highly unlikely that there would be major investment anyway given the economic downturn and extremely unfriendly investment climate with threats to nationalise major parts of the economy. One possible advantage to the Zimbabwean government is, as stated, the recent discovery of a major diamond field near Marange whose ownership is disputed and could exacerbate tensions within ZANU PF. However the possible deal with Equatorial Guinea trading oil debts for diamonds could run into legaL problems with the Kimberley Process, which regulates the diamond industry.

How united are the democratic forces and the opposition?

It is clear that the Mugabe regime retains some measure of support both within SADC and the AU leaderships. Domestically, Mugabe can call on much of the party, in particular the women’s league. Mugabe/ZANU PF also retains some support amongst sections of the church and other civic leaders, although outright support does appear to be waning.

But this situation is far from static. A shrinking economy has inevitably eroded the regime’s ability to service its client or find new sources of patronage. This situation has undermined the government’s means to retain all-inclusive loyalty from the police and army, to some extent elements of the war vets, and from other state employees.

This is a serious problem for the authorities, and will only get worse as the economy continues to shrink. Indeed, the state can no longer insulate most civil servants from the desperation that ordinary Zimbabweans have been living with for some time as they try to make ends meet.

Already, teachers, nurses and other civil servants have signalled their displeasure with the government – the reports of mass desertions from the police and military are a signal of these groupings voting with their feet. The extent to which, if at all, the democratic opposition can capitalise on these fissures remains to be seen.

But larger questions must be asked. It remains to be seen whether SADC’s intervention will take heed of Zimbabwean civil society’s concerns and priorities. For it to do so, Zimbabwe’s civil society will need to organise itself sufficiently to ensure the mediation team is aware of those concerns and priorities and not leave it at state and party level. The prospective mediation may provide an unprecedented opportunity, but this will certainly require significant coalition building and greater cohesion amongst opposition forces, as well as an awareness that reliance on US funding is not going to help their regional image.

As mentioned, Lenin stressed that democratic opposition must have have unity, vision and leadership. The democratic/social movement in Zimbabwe, however, has been largely characterised by turf wars, parallel forms of opposition, a multiplicity of largely uncoordinated activities, and personalist forms of leadership.

Since January 2006 and the launch of the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance (ZCA) and the Save Zimbabwe Campaign, there appears to be signs of a greater unity and sense of purpose – not only rhetorically, but also in practice. It was noticeable, for example, that when police raided ZCTU offices and stole the posters advertising the stayaway of 3-4 April, other parts of civil society were able to help out.

So what are the possibilities of a broad front emerging from the ranks of Zimbabwean civil society, a non-partisan platform, with a common agenda in relation to a new constitution, and a commitment to no engagement with electoral process without major changes and a level playing field?

Despite the split in the main opposition MDC and a sustained attack on their structures, the two factions, Tsvangirai and Mutambar, are generally working together; although there are clearly differences and many of the issues that precipitated their falling out have not been addressed.

Nevertheless, their cooperation intensified after the events of 1 March and was much in evidence at the memorial service for activist Gift Tandare – shot by police and secretly buried. It seems as if police tactics of allowing Mutambare rallies to go ahead with the objective of promoting suspicion that he was a government stooge have failed to work. Unity is thought to be better in rural areas – activists belong to most of the relevant groups and work together, although there has been a major crackdown on opposition supporters in rural areas.

The ZCA report great enthusiasm for their approach from the grassroots and their driving of the Save Zimbabwe Campaign. Civil society at one time appeared purely reactive, but some now feel that they have the government on the back foot instead of proactive. Certainly, continuous pressure appears to be forcing the regime to commit unnecessary public relations blunders like the beating up of opposition MP Nelson Chamisa at the airport on his way to an EU-ACP meeting.

Whether or not civil society groupings have the capacity and commitment to take advantage of these developments is a moot point. As ever, the problem is how to keep the democratic momentum going, and what route it should take. Their inability to capitalise on opportunities in the past does not generate much optimism in the current circumstances.

In terms of strategy, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) is continuing its brave street protests with the state seemingly only too willing to accept the invitation to commit unacceptable brutality. But these are often not well supported. A possible second phase to street protests is not yet there.

Amongst the talk of a new constitution there is also some disagreement around issues of process and what are the necessary preconditions. The opposition needs greater coordination behind the scenes as well, so that medics and lawyers who are prepared to put themselves in the front line, facing threats, do not end up doing all the mundane work.

What underground structures might be necessary, and who is willing to be out of the limelight? This ‘twilight zone’, between acting above board and covertly, has contributed to inertia and confusion – as the MDC and most of civil society continue to operate within the parameters of laws that they do not accept. Whilst some see the inevitability and utility of operating covertly, most are unwilling and indeed seemingly unprepared to do so.

There is also need to establish what strategies should be employed towards talks with the government. At the same time as calling for stayaways such as the partially successful one on 3-4 April 2007, the ZCTU is engaging with the government through the Tripartite National Forum on Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono’s ‘social contract’ – not that the latter which calls for price and wage stabilisation is likely to have any success given that even if prices stabilise -when they are rising astronomically - most goods only come through the parallel/black market.

The big question is whether civil society concerns are even on the mediators’ agenda. The intervention is essentially political – to talk to the Zimbabwe government (and Mugabe), ZANU PF and the MDC.

Civil society will not be on the radar screen unless they put themselves there. The small space will soon be gone. Unless civil society uses this brief opportunity to sent clear articulated message on what must be addressed they will be sidelined. They must do this in concert with their solidarity partners in the region, so they can also exert pressure on their respective governments.

In this regard, their link to the South African groupings is critical – but to date, solidarity has been piecemeal. This requires a clear communication strategy, not only between Zimbabwean groupings and the region, but within Zimbabwe civic society itself. At present, civil society is seen as a group of disparate groups and individuals, with a limited constituency base. Why should the mediators take them seriously? Despite the parallels with South Africa, there has not been the emergence of a UDF-type leadership that could provide strategic direction and utilise the practical energies of its constituent parts. Much work has been generated over the last few years, but there has not been a strategic division of labour that will pull activities and outputs towards a common vision.

Up to recently, church leaders in this very religious country have been seen as either ineffective, in collusion with the government, or silent, or self-serving, with notable exceptions such as the Archbishop of Bulawayo Pius Ncube. Even those who were not ZANU PF and/or alleged intelligence (CIO) agents (and there are plenty of allegations) had appeared more concerned about their hierarchical status and their conversations with the President and Gono, not dissimilar from other parts of civil society that seem to prefer constructive engagement, at cost to their perceived integrity. This had disappointed many Zimbabweans, given what impact they could have had.

There now appears to be a turning point: the pastoral statement from the Catholic Bishops’ Conference stressed the unacceptable face of the state in repression, violence, economic decline and lack of moral values. Unlike previous ecumenical statements from the Catholic, Protestant and Evangelical churches, which have been watered down to the lowest common denominator, and attempted to equate blame for violence to ‘both sides’.

The recent Catholic declaration followed a rather more hard-hitting Zimbabwe Council of Churches statement and was followed by the ousting of Bishop Mananga as President of the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe, who was seen as getting closer to the ruling regime. We wait to see if the recent Catholic pastoral letter has similar impact to their Malawian counterparts in 1993, or is dismissed as has happened to previous statements.

However it does not appear that the churches want to lead a civil society movement as yet, preferring for the time being to attempt to represent ‘all of their flock’, including no doubt their fellow Catholic Mugabe; and to continue ‘negotiations’ with the government; and talk to the South African churches about their government’s role in negotiations.

In talks with a church leader, there is as yet no follow-up on the letters although the called for days of prayer and fasting could provide such opportunities. There is also the National Vision Document process to integrate into this, whereby church leaders produced a document ‘The Zimbabwe We Want’; for some in the church this process had many contradictions and was seen as very hierarchical and topdown.

The consultations with government led to a second draft which had been substantially watered down at presumed government insistence. There is also, as with the trade unions, the contradictions of debating with the government as the space for debate is brutally closed down in all other areas. As one civil society activist put it ‘why engage with the government when they are beating you up?’

The ways forward

Are there yet key demands, commitments to an understood and widely-accepted process and some awareness of interactions with outside forces? It is difficult to ascertain, although the new situation presented by SADC’s intervention presents an opportunity that needs to be quickly seized.

There needs to be a solid front especially on not contesting elections under the present unfair and unfree conditions and for civil society and other democratic forces to organise to make that apparent to the South (ern) African team. To some extent as with the Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe (grouping NGOs) there could be a dual approach of calling for a boycott but preparing in case minimum conditions can be achieved.

The two MDC factions have stated both their wish to cooperate (possibly re-merge) and their determination not to stand in ‘pre-determined elections’ -said by Tsvangirai at the memorial service for killed activist Gift Tandare. In the past there have been calls for electoral boycotts but the MDC has then taken part, often under outside pressure. How can MPs, often desperate to keep their posts, be persuaded not to take part in elections; or even if the boycott is maintained not to enter stooge parties set up by the regime to provide democratic veneer?

One approach from a leading human rights activist says:

'The government is illegitimate and therefore it must go. We need a transition authority just to narrowly get the economy back on feet and perhaps prepare the ground for elections. Once in place we can have free and fair elections internationally observed.'

Other thinking revolves around calling for a national convention (parallel parliament) on the West African model, involving different sectors in policy making and transition. There may be need to call on outside regional civil society assistance. In other places the churches have played a major role in these types of initiatives, although that would not yet seem the case in Zimbabwe. Any such actions must incorporate an effective communications strategy within and outside the country, especially key players in the mediation process (including the MDC).

Areas that also need consideration are: who can help recapitalise and reprofessionalise the country? What mobilisation strategies are possible against rural chiefs in the regime’s pocket? What would be the earliest time it is possible to hold free and fair elections?

Possible outcomes

1) Stasis quo – maintenance of the present system whilst Mugabe purges his opponents inside ZANU-PF, enlarges the number of parliamentary, especially rural seats to ensure his tenure in power, and maintains what the South Africans called the kragdadigheid system of brutality.

This of course would be contrary to what SADC is planning, and would further economic and political freefall, anger and mass migration, and is not sustainable for much longer.

How would the Mbeki team counter it, and is the South African president wanting to make solving Zimbabwe part of his legacy – the recent interview with the Financial Times made reference to the Blair fix of Northern Ireland?

Some, including within diplomatic circles in Zimbabwe, would suggest that South Africa is too crippled by its own contradictions of the African Renaissance, bridge between North and South, not acting at the behest of the West, incomplete transition from liberation movement to governing party, historic and present day neo-liberal policies of the ANC to be able to make a significant difference. Zimbabweans are going to remain very suspicious of the true intentions of Pretoria/ Tshwane – despite the welcome from the MDC.

2) Outside-brokered incomplete transition. This still seems the most likely. Weary Zimbabweans might prefer it to what they have now, or to complete breakdown. The parallels with the incomplete transition of 1979 when ZANU took power are many.

If the solution is a government of national unity/ reformed ZANU-PF without Mugabe acting more or less under international tutelage, what happens to issues of accountability, impunity, genuine grass roots reconciliation, and whether the thieves keep their loot?

As well as keeping sections of the elite in power, the problems are of who can staff the transition given the systemic corruption and repression of precisely those organisations/institutions that need to lead change.

The alternative of parachuting in outside experts would quickly lead to alienation and possibly similar events as seen in Timor Leste. There is the diaspora to call on, but there is little sign of planning for the future bar some small organisations, mostly outside the country. There are however other transitions to provide comparative work – reunification of Germany, South Africa, Liberia perhaps.

Secondly who is it precisely that Mbeki is negotiating with and with what mandate? He seemed to pull out of involvement in Zimbabwe when things got tricky and much the same could be said of his peacebuilding attempts in DRC and Cote d’Ívoire He has courted disillusionment in Zimbabwe, feeding in wildly optimistic assessments of the government and opposition parties willingness to undertake genuine discussions and consider transformation. Few in Zimbabwe trust him given South Africa’s track record in defending Zimbabwe at the Human Rights Commission (as was) and in other forums. Obviously the democratic forces need enormous support from allies in South Africa such as COSATU, the church leaderships, the human rights activists and indeed ordinary people.

3) Spontaneous explosion possibly leading to option 4? There is the danger that anger could suddenly erupt out of nowhere as an inchoate explosion leading to possible reprisals and the dangers of formal army action.

4) Military option – either by a more overt military coup than the creeping securitisation that has so far characterised the state, or disaffected different parts of the army allied perhaps to different factions contesting power.

5) Civil society driven transition with some kind of national convention/ constitutent assembly process? At present there is no sign of this achieving critical mass and there needs to be an assessment what needs to be done internally and what pressure outside forces can provide – regionally and internationally.

There needs to be a multipronged approach, involving information gathering and dissemination on human rights abuses in international and regional forums, showing that the government is acting extra-legally as a matter of state policy.

The record of human rights abuse is a sustained and entirely credible one, but pressure for international reaction and action needs to be maintained. There is talk of a Human Rights Council office in Zimbabwe to monitor abuse. This needs to be backed up with interventions to the mediation team and maintenance of international support.

Outside supporters role

Assistance to Zimbabwean civil society in working out its strategies including toward the SADC/South African ‘negotiating’ team. There needs to be pressure from outsiders such as the EU to provide greater and practical support for human rights defenders; maintaining the Common Position (‘sanctions’) in particular on no invitation to Zimbabwe to the EU-Africa Summit in November/December 2007; what use can be made of the money from the European Development Funding (EDF) line from 2002 and can it be used to help Zimbabwean civil society?; to ask trades unions, churches, youth groups to create/sustain links with Zimbabwean counterpart groups and to engage with South African counterparts to the same purpose; to ensure that the Commonwealth remains focused on the Zimbabwean issue (despite Zimbabwe expelling itself from the body); help Zimbabwean civil society and take up the issue for further discussion at CHOGM in November in Uganda.

5-8 April, Harare/Johannesburg

* Sam Kebele is a writer on Zimbabwe currently having to use a pseudonym.

* Please send comments to