Partnership of Equals? France, Kenya, and the Africa-Forward Summit 2026
France’s Africa-Forward Summit 2026 under scrutiny amid its continuing colonial presence in the Pacific. Beneath the language of equal partnership, how does France continue to reproduce neo-colonial power in Africa through Kenya?
France and Kenya have recently co-hosted the ‘Africa-Forward Summit’ in Kenya from 11 -12 May 2026. The summit was held in an English-Speaking African country for the first time since its establishment in the 1970s.[1] The summit clouded with statements such as ‘continental inclusivity, redefinition of Africa-France relations, new partnership, foreign investment, new era.[2] The most presented banner was the ‘partnership of equals’. The question is how these actors, Kenya/Africa and France, act as equal partners, and how we define equal partnership. This article examines the French reroute to the continent through Eastern Africa, indicating that this reroute is a response to frustration stemming from French loss in the ‘Francophone’ countries, the uncertainty surrounding the CFA Franc, the desire to extend influence in the Eastern Africa region, and the need to maintain control of its overseas territories in the Indian Ocean. The ‘equal partnership’ narrative is an illusion and a neo-colonial strategy to push for France’s interests.
The French covert objectives in the ‘Anglophone’ countries, orchestrated through Kenya, are not far from the realities of new forms of accumulation in the neo-liberal forces, where foreign investment, partnerships, trade relations, global digital technology, and globalization are the key drivers of this mode of accumulation.[3] These forms deepen the integration of African economies into exploitative and extractive systems. The French have been using tactics like these to enhance exploitation in the erstwhile colonies even before those countries won their independence. In 1945, for instance, France established the CFA Franc in African colonies, tied it to the French currency; these currency arrangements later became part of the Françafrique ‘agreement’ in the 1970s.[4] The CFA franc, as we will see later, enhanced monetary and financial control, resource exploitation, and control of life in the ‘Francophone’ countries.
The summit in advancing these forms of accumulation promoted several themes, including the economic transformation, reform of the global financial architecture, climate financing, digital innovation and artificial intelligence, food systems, health sovereignty, and peace and security.[5] These themes suggest that Kenya and France are equal actors, obscuring the inequalities and France’s strategic interests underlying these relationships. To explain the inequalities and the hidden reality, this article examines the French loss of influence in Western African countries, the need to maintain its overseas colonies in the Indian Ocean, and the struggle to insert itself into the accumulation of resources in Eastern Africa.
France’s loss of influence in the Western African Countries
In 2017, students and youth in Burkina Faso protested against French domination in West Africa.[6] In Kenya, the anti-imperialist-counter-Africa Forward Summit conference and demonstration are happening, but on the other side, the French president received a whoop during one of the ‘Africa Forward Summits’.[7] The revolution in the Sahelian states (Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso) between 2020 and 2023 struck the final nail in Africans’ rejection of France.[8] Events in Kenya also sent a strong message to imperial France about the determination and resistance to French rule on the continent.
In the Western African countries, France, for decades, has maintained neo-colonial domination through military presence and interventions, the CFA Franc (monetary and fiscal domination), linguistic and cultural domination, as well as political control. The military bases and logistics stations in the region, although they claim to support peace and security, facilitate resource accumulation and serve the economic interests of their mother country. They enhanced France's access to natural resources, especially uranium, gold, bauxite, diamonds, phosphates, cobalt, copper, magnesium, and others.[9] Mali and Burkina Faso are among the top 10 gold-producing countries in Africa, with over 60 tons annually.[10] The military presence and interventions in the Sahel have recently been withdrawn, and some mining agreements, including those for uranium and gold, have also been revoked.[11]
This situation deprives France of its covert means of accessing these resources. Similarly, diplomatic clashes undermine its soft means of access. The need for new access to resources has to be established. The Eastern and Southern regions of Africa are home to natural resources such as gold, diamonds, rare earth minerals, petroleum, and others. For instance, Namibia is the leading producer of uranium,[12] and South Africa, Tanzania, Congo DRC, and Sudan are among the top gold-producing countries.[13]
Furthermore, the copper belt connecting Tanzania and Zambia, and oil and gas resources connecting Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Kenya, are imperative to understanding France’s interests. However, these countries are not former French colonies. Kenya hosts approximately 40 million tons of rare-earth-bearing ore along the coast, with significant reserves at Mrima Hili in Kwale County, 50 kilometers from Mombasa port.[14]
The question is: how can France access these resources? The strategy France is using in the region is similar to the Francophone strategy. Kenya recently added to its imperial military hosting 800 French soldiers under defense cooperation, ratified in April 2026, allowing France to establish its military training facility in the port of Mombasa.[15] This agreement suggests France’s efforts to penetrate the region under the banner of training and intelligence information sharing to access regional resources.
On the other hand, the CFA Franc component of the 1970s cooperation agreement allowed France to control monetary policy, required the former colonies to hold 50 percent of their reserves with the French Treasury, and facilitated French companies' dominance in the region.[16] Although the CFA franc remains the currency in the region, its future is in doubt, since France’s diplomatic relations with these countries are in shambles. But also, to France, this uncertainty means more frustration because of the growing movement to promote the multiplicity of currencies- the dollar, the BRICS currency initiative, the yuan, the renminbi currency, the euro, and others. This endangers France's ability to command the regional economy and, therefore, is key to seeking an alternative.
France’s Interests in Overseas Colonies.
France controls about 13 overseas ‘territories’ located in the Pacific Ocean (New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and Clipperton), the Indian Ocean (Reunion, Mayotte, French Southern and Antarctic), and central America (French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Saint Martin, Saint Barthélemy, Saint Pierre and Miquelon).[17] These overseas colonies give France strategic maritime dominance over other powers. Given its location in the Indian Ocean, France has access to the coastline from Mombasa, Kenya, to Durban, South Africa, allowing it to protect its overseas territories and control petroleum interests along the East African coast. It should be noted that TotalEnergies, a French company, holds about 62% of the shares in the Uganda-Tanzania petroleum pipeline, which runs from Uganda to the Tanga coast in Tanzania, very close to Mombasa.[18] In addition to the pipeline, the company has run an LNG project in the gas-rich province of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique.[19] In Tanzania, Cabo Delgado borders the Mtwara and Lindi regions, which are also rich in oil and gas.[20] This further adds to France’s economic, security, and political strategic interests in these areas.
Conclusion
Given the experiences with France's involvement in the continent and other places, it is impossible to regard the so-called ‘partnership of equals’ as genuine. It is surrounded by imperial interests and a long-standing attitude of superiority towards African people elsewhere. Furthermore, measuring equality is challenging, especially when considering what Kenya is giving and receiving under the agreement. Kenya, regardless of any defense, is in the receiving and losing hand, rather than gaining. The behavior of the deployed military personnel in Kenya reveals how the country is poised to lose and complicate its sovereignty. Similarly, the country, under the banner of equality, endangers security and may reverse the achievement of African independence. Similarly, the new relations of ‘equals’ call for extensive political economy analysis to contextualize the interests and forces shaping them. Global Africa will accept these claims of equals only if France recognizes the right to self-determination for the so-called overseas territories everywhere.
Ndg. Eliud Atugonza Kabamanya, is a Tanzanian student and researcher committed to understanding the social, economic, and political life of the country and Global Africa. Eliud is also a student in Political Science at Clark Atlanta University with concentration on African Politics, Political Economy, Political Theory, and Comparative Politics. Social media: @facebook.com/atugonza.elliud; x.com@AtugonzaKazungu.
Endnotes
[1] The Citizen, ‘Deals and New Partnerships on the Menu at Africa-France Summit, (National Media Group, May 11, 2026) available at https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/africa/deals-and-new-partnerships-on-the-menu-at-africa-france-summit-5454750
[2] Steve Otieno, ‘Ruto, Macron, Nairobi Summit Plan and Why France Courting Africa. (Daily Nation, May 10,2026), available at https://nation.africa/kenya/news/africa/ruto-macron-nairobi-summit-plan-and-why-france-is-courting-africa-5453332#story Accessed on May 11, 2026.
[3] Issa G. Shivji, ‘Accumulation in an African Periphery: A Theoretical Framework, (Tanzania, Dar es Salaam, Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2009), p.13-14.
[4] Thelma Chansa, Lufeyo Chilondo, and Daniel L Mpolomoka, ‘The Ongoing Influence of French Colonialism in Former African Colonies: A Comparative Analysis’, Global Scientific Journal, vol 11 (11), (November 2023), pp.1031.
[5] Otieno, ‘Ruto, Macron, Nairobi Summit’, May 10, 2026
[6] News Wire ‘Macron: 'I am of a generation that doesn't tell Africans what to do,’ French24 (November 28, 2017) available at https://www.france24.com/en/20171128-france-macron-burkina-faso-tour-africa
[7] Willy Mutunga, ‘Reading the International Situation Surrounding the Franco-Africa Forward Summit 2026 in Nairobi, (Pambazuka News, May 15, 2026) available at https://www.pambazuka.org/Forward-Summit-2026
[8] Marc Antoine & Perouse de Montclos, ‘Lessons not Learned: Ten Years of French Military Intervention in the Sahel, The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol 63 (2025) pg.52.
[9] Guy Martin, The Historical Economic and Political Bases of France’s African Policy’, The Journal of Modern African Studies, vol 23 (2) , Cambridge University Press, (1985), pp. 197.
[10] Sebastiane Ebatamehi, ‘Top 10 Gold Producers in Africa in 2025 [UPDATED]’ (October 24, 2025) available at https://www.africanexponent.com/top-10-gold-producers-in-africa-in-2025-updated/
[11] Tunde Alade, ‘Is France Losing its Once Tight Grip on Africa? theJour, (April 23, 2025) https://thejour.com/foreign-affairs/is-france-losing-its-once-tight-grip-on-africa/
[12] OECD, ‘Uranium 2024: Resources Production and Demand: A Joint Report by the Nuclear Energy Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency, OECD (2025).
[13] Ebatamehi, ‘Top 10 Gold Producers in Africa in 2025’
[14] Muflih Hidaya, ‘Kenya’s $62 Billion Rare-Earth Minerals Discovery Transforms East Africa’, Discovery Alert, (October 28, 2025), available at https://discoveryalert.com.au/kenya-rare-earth-minerals-2025-discovery/
[15] Samar Al-Bulushi, ‘Spurned by Sahel, France Courts Kenya Place it didn’t colonize, Responsible Statecraft, (May, 4, 2026), available at https://responsiblestatecraft.org/africa-france-summit/
[16] Martin, The Historical Economic and Political Bases of French’ p.191.
[17] Analytical Report: France’s Overseas Territories and Their Role in Securing French Strategic Interests, (February 24, 2026) available at https://www.hriui.com/en/analytical-report-frances-overseas-territories-and-their-role-in-securing-french-strategic-interests/
[18] East Africa Crude Oil Pipeline, ‘Overview, available at https://www.eacop.com/overview/ accessed on May 16, 2026.
[19] Victor J. Bassey, ‘TotalEnergies’ $20 billion LNG revival in Mozambique: What’s new since the last shutdown, (October, 29, 2025) available at https://energyinafrica.com/insights/totalenergies-20-billion-lng-revival-mozambique/
[20] See Ladislaus Tumbu, ‘Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) and Its Role in Self-Reliance and Sustainability”, master’s degree, Thesis (2025).