Efforts to assist more than 700,000 Angolans – mostly young children and returning refugees – will come to a halt unless new donations are received by the end of July, the World Food Programme warns.

The cholera epidemic in Angola has peaked and new cases are on the decline, but if water and sanitation issues are not addressed, aid agencies expect to be back for another outbreak within a year. Cholera is an acute intestinal infection spread by drinking contaminated water or eating contaminated food. Symptoms include vomiting, cramps and diarrhoea, which can lead to severe dehydration and death.

The World Health Organization has sent a consignment of drugs, re-hydration salts and disinfectant to help fight a cholera outbreak that has claimed close to 1,900 lives in Angola. An estimated 46,758 people have been infected since February when the epidemic began in the capital, Luanda. It has since spread to 14 of the country's 18 provinces.

More than 300 minefields still present one of Angola's biggest challenges to reconstructing its former breadbasket, the central province of Huambo, where villages, farms, water supplies and schools all straddle routes in "suspect areas". The province, with a population of almost two million, reportedly contributed about 22 percent to national cereal production in 1999, but almost three decades of civil conflict, which ended in a peace pact in 2002, devastated the infrastructure and displaced several thousand farmers.

The Canadian NGO Development Workshop (DW-Angola) has launched an online library, reports Balancing Act. The library will have three databases available for research, with emphasis on media information that give access to articles of Angolan newspapers published since January 2003.

Angolans living in South Africa would be more willing to return home if Angola's education and health sectors were improved, according to a NGO that focuses on development in the war-battered country. The South African government and the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, are to launch an information campaign on Thursday to inform Angolan refugees that 2006 will be the last year that they will be given assistance to return home. About 14,000 Angolan refugees are living in various parts of South Africa.

Health authorities have been unable to contain the cholera outbreak sweeping through Angola, a country considered to have some of the greatest potential for wealth and economic growth in Africa. The epidemic is currently claiming an average of 25 lives a day. A total of 1,034 deaths have been recorded since mid-February. Many of these are in Luanda, the capital of this former Portuguese colony in southwestern Africa.

Great article. It should be sent to major newspapers. It should be translated into Portuguese and sent to all Angolans to read. Please write Part II and III And IV… Thank you for a job well done. I am from Angola and I know people who are both benefiting and suffering in Angola. Once again, thank you for putting in so many words what most Angolans feel but cannot express it the way you did.

On Wednesday, Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos declared that his country would go to the polls before the end of 2008. Elections, not held since 1992, have been constantly delayed in the country, leading human rights activists to accuse the government of clinging to power. Steve Kibble analyses the complex nature of the Angolan state, concluding that: “Despite rhetoric on increased transparency, accountability and democratisation little has yet been accomplished to overcome the gap between ruler and ruled.”

Angola became independent from the Portuguese in 1975 after a costly and long running liberation war with three antagonistic independence movements based on different ethno-linguistic, ideological constituencies. In its almost fourth year of peace there is no immediate reason why war should resume. This follows 27 years of nearly continuous civil war between Uniao Nacional para a Independencia total de Angola (UNITA) rebels under their dictatorial leader Jonas Savimbi, and the governing Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA). The former were US and apartheid South Africa-backed, with a rhetoric of representing the poor ‘real’ rural Africans of the interior. The governing party was based on the coastal elite which has large urban and mestizo elements, with a commitment to nationalism, socialism, and anti-imperialism in a conflict overlaid by the Cold War.

In 1991 the Stalinist state with an inefficient command economy changed to a supposed multiparty democratic state and market economy. Few freedoms were realised although free and fair elections were won by the government in 1992 – the ‘excuse’ for UNITA to renew the war. The state remained heavily centralised with the president able to control extra-budgetary revenues for his own accumulation and clientilist purposes. It has massive oil production, revenues and potential. Much of the infrastructure, agriculture and rudimentary health services were destroyed by war with millions of landmines being laid - with knock-on effects on agriculture, transport as well as people’s lives.

War also meant excess mortality of one million deaths - roughly a tenth of Angola’s population, displacement and urbanisation with about half of all Angolans, perhaps seven million people, living in cities and towns. The agrarian system collapsed as did the health and education services – only 37 percent of primary-aged children were enrolled in school whilst most of the health budget goes to hospital-based curative services, including elite spending in South Africa and Portugal.

Peace broke out in April 2002 when Savimbi was killed, leaving the MPLA-controlled government undisputed victor, but espousing reconciliation (Although reconciliation here largely means (six) blanket amnesties, no truth commissions and inviting selected opposition elements into the elite) - for which civil society can claim some credit. The country in theory faces a triple transition from war to peace, from devastation to reconstruction, and from a state/elite patronage system to a transparent market economy. The first two are better advanced including a greater commitment to infrastructural (re)construction. Many in civil society express concerns over delays in and government commitment to reform. Inflation has been brought down although no major structural reform has occurred. In particular there is unlikely to be a challenge to the key nature of the bazaar economy (Cadongo) in trade and services controlled upstream by commercial tycoons and army officers able to accumulate resources by using special powers, granted them by senior politicians, to import goods (Angola is ranked 133 out of 145 countries on Transparency International’s corruption index. Between 1997 and 2001, $8.45 billion of public money was unaccounted for (an average of 23% of GDP)- IMF.).

Transition or Steady State?

There is an assumption that Angola is in transition and that its current dysfunctionality will change. Conversely we can see the ‘politics of disorder’ as a functional ‘steady state’ for the Angolan elite. It holds a number of cards, despite dependence on conditionalities such as high oil prices and ability to attract concessional oil-backed loans such as from Standard Bank and $2billion from the Chinese Eximbank in 2005 (As part of the loan agreement, the Chinese are repairing infrastructure but in an opaque non-competitive deal with only 30% of the work going to local (elite-linked) firms.).

Africa's second largest producer is one of its fastest growing economies with some of its poorest people (Revista Energia’, a publication that monitors the country's energy sector, puts yearly government oil revenues at between US $4 billion and $5 billion). In 2005 oil production was 1.3 million barrels a day set to increase to two million by 2008. Much of this estimated $6.88 billion revenue goes to a small number of wealthy Angolans with little reaching citizens (Nearly all of Angola's production is offshore and for every million invested in the industry, only $100,000 is spent onshore.). The government budgeted for 16% growth although the IMF paper projected annual growth at 18% a year over 2005-2007 [1].

The country had a UNDP Human Development Index of 0.445 – making it 160 of 177. There was neither formal agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2005 or the much-heralded donors’ conference. Donors appeared reluctant to commit to a poor country with a rich elite in relation to a conference or humanitarian appeals.

Angola is also the 4th or 5th largest diamond producer - like oil, an enclave sector with little regulation or accountability, where forced labour, ill-treatment and disappearances were common. Production was expected to raise around $900 million despite continued smuggling (Despite expulsions of 127,000 foreign nationals involved in the illegal diamond trade between April 2004 and February 2005 – accompanied by allegations of brutality).

Like many oil-producing countries. Angola sees the paradox between exploitation of oil, gas and minerals and high rates of poverty indicators of child malnutrition, low health care spending, low school enrolment rates and poor adult literacy (and war). Over one million Angolan people remained dependent on food aid, and one child died every three minutes of preventable causes – 480 per day.

The effect of oil wealth (‘Dutch disease’) is to cause economic contraction and inflation through high local prices, expensive exchange rates and depressed levels of manufacturing in other sectors plus lack of national accountability, especially with increased world demand, tightening supply and in 2005 continued high prices. The underlying problem is the ‘resource curse’ of oil-based economic enclaves with greater external than internal linkages, meaning a lack of reciprocity between domestic rulers and ruled in all spheres – ‘a state without citizens’ or certainly state-citizen reciprocity [2]. The industry employs only 10,000, although accounting for 90% of exports and 80% of tax revenues. Necessary economic diversification is complicated because it is uncertain the elite wants diversification given its control over import and export and reluctance to allow an unfettered free market.

There have been changes. Transparency has improved in revenue if not expenditure through publication of an oil diagnostic undertaken by outside consultants KPMG and moves towards declaration of signature bonus payments. Although allegations of corruption persist, with high-ranking government officials implicated in private business deals related to their public office, there were successful prosecutions of senior officials in 2003-2004. In July 2004 Angola signed up to the African Union’s Peer Review Mechanism – although it is far from meeting its conditions.

Angola then faces the task of moving from a state of non-war to a ‘Civil / Social Peace’. But despite GDP growth, a current account surplus, and the lowest inflation rate ever [3], transition would have to be from a fragmented national economy with a history of financial embezzlement and misappropriation of funds, a lack of international confidence and donor coordination, poor administrative capacity, a large child population at risk from disease, and largely weak opposition and civil society. If a genuine transition it would mean ending corruption, tackling poverty, allowing the development of a genuinely independent private sector, creating an open and transparent tendering process, transforming the political system into a pluralist democracy. Civil society also calls for action on disarming the armed civilian Angolans (an estimated one third of the population but not a government priority), clearing (the unknown numbers of) landmines, and addressing the exclusion of the poor and marginalised, especially women. A widely owned electoral process would legitimise the institutions of government, debatedly without it since 1996, and lead to a constitution guaranteeing citizens' rights.

But there are a number of reasons why the government can ignore these problems whilst maintaining its own stability and security. Renewal of war is highly unlikely whereas continued high oil prices and fields for development and oil-backed loans look set to continue. The latter are not as cheap as multilateral funding, but are more government controllable. Continued Middle East instability combined with US (disputed) hegemony over the Gulf of Guinea/ the ‘American Lake’ means that Washington is looking to increased African oil, expecting it to provide 25% of its supplies. The increasing market share for Angolan oil going to the USA and other states means national and international security considerations precede transparency or human rights questions.

Angola is a strong security state under few internal or regional threats. Cooption, division and occasional repression work well to negate any possible internal threats. The Angolan elite remain largely immune to what international pressure there is for good governance - directed more towards questions of transparency, and a secure climate for foreign investment (FDI) rather than democracy and poverty alleviation. The West wants to engage with a booming economy, keen to compete with China’s lion’s share of contracts for infrastructural (re)construction.

The continuing geo-petroleo-strategic interest of the USA in the Gulf of Guinea and Angola in particular as alternative sources of supply to the Middle East was shown in continued good relations. The country gained a growing share of the US market (although oil exports to China overtook those to the USA) and the latter continues as Angola’s chief trading partner, political patron and major aid donor and gives it on rather inconsistent grounds preferential African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) treatment. Relations improved with Bern after the resolution of ‘Falconegate [4]’ whereby the Swiss released $17m for humanitarian purposes of frozen Angolan funds [5].

This lack of international pressure is against the background of declining world oil production now over the ‘Bell curve’. Regionally, excluding Zimbabwe and (parts of) the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the region has been stabilised - in part by previous Angolan interventions to destroy UNITA bases. Angola is able to use the rhetoric of sovereignty and anti-imperialism which resonates well in the southern African region, despite the more partial AU view of sovereignty as opposed to the absolutist OAU version.

Luanda alleges negotiations are taking place on ending the Cabindan separatist conflict - distinct from though entangled with the civil war. Cabinda enclave from where oil wealth derives has separatist factions fighting for independence. Cabindan human rights organisation Mpalabanda Cabinda Civic Association (MACC) says although it received a document from the government in February 2006 on ‘greater autonomy’ for the enclave, it has heard little since of any negotiations. If Cabinda can be stabilised, Angola’s rulers can open up human rights a little especially in the coastal region/ Luanda without endangering control.

Additionally, rather than seeing forthcoming elections whenever they are as an opportunity, the population being only too aware of what happened in 1992, seems as much fearful or apathetic.

The governing MPLA can pay off and play off other parties [6]. Whilst there are factions, the president runs a parallel state and seems in control as with his reversal of not standing as its presidential candidate. Through government reshuffles he negates existing and potential opponents such as the chief of external intelligence agency General Fernando Miala (who paid the price for becoming too popular).

UNITA formally reconciled its three factions after 2002, but leader Isaias Samakuva is under threat for operating a patronage system and expelling possible leadership challengers. Other parties seem more concerned with ‘getting their snouts in the trough’ rather than representing distinct interests and policies.

Political disorder and its uses

Angola is an example of the use of ‘disorder as a political instrument’ where non-transparency, non-accountable authority, and a weak legal framework provide dynamics for elite accumulation. Historically there has been a ‘Bermuda triangle’ of resource flows between Presidency, Sonangol and the national bank, bypassing formal organs such as the Ministry of Finance (although the latter is gaining greater control). As well as vast corruption in the past detailed by many reports including from the IMF, Global Witness and Human Rights Watch etc, practices continue as shown in the reports from Brazil alleging illegal financial dealings linking the Angola Minister of Finance, and the Governor of the Central Bank [7].

Sogge notes that the domestic Angolan political economy “cannot be separated from the external constituencies, chiefly the global oil and banking industries, and strongly favourable diplomatic and military currents driven by Western (especially US) strategic interests.” [8] In this sense Angola’s problems of domestic governance “are at the same time problems of global governance” in which the constrained forms of global citizenship “practised by institutions offshore set limits to citizenship for ordinary Angolans onshore”.

Elections – paths to democracy or ensuring the right result?

Elections have been promised and not held since the end of the war in 2002. The parliamentary and presidential elections announced unconvincingly in 2005 for September 2006 and 2007 respectively are now postponed until there are infrastructural improvements – for which the government would gain electoral advantage and increased control over the process.

Civil society - small, autonomous but with some resistance

A third of Angola’s population live in atomised musseques (shantytowns), with little spontaneous collective action to solve common problems. Despite little alternative leadership and vision, there have recently been protests over forced removals in some neighbourhoods in Luanda, leading to the arrest of SOS-Habitat coordinator Luis Araujo and others. Change due to citizen pressure has been limited by the absence of public systems and institutions – part of the general disorder that has served elites well for many years. There has been civil society questioning the continuation of José Eduardo dos Santos as President, transparency and corruption in government, the land law and the new constitution, the DDR process, police and military impunity, freedom of expression and political action, and Cabinda.

International activism has raised issues and set agendas in corporate behaviour such as the ‘Publish What You Pay’ campaign on transparency of payments by oil companies.

There has been talk of freeing up government control of the media and willingness to address the low rate of HIV/AIDS and associated vulnerabilities despite difficulties in access to rural areas.

Despite low population density land is scarce, with an estimated four million people relying on subsistence agriculture for survival as the only source of family income. Land tenure and use are flashpoints for disputes with large-scale population return to rural areas. In the ideological shifts of the early 1990s, a huge privatisation programme saw an elite land grab at the expense of small peasants. There is potential for conflict between customary law and state land law with the former discriminating against women.

Although the 2005 land reform law allowed communities to access and legally register their land - leading to hopes of greater security for and improvement in Angola's agricultural production - it is doubted it will eliminate conflict.

Women – the burdens of war become those of peace

Women suffered enormously during the war both through the direct effects of violent conflict and the indirect effect of poverty on families and communities. 80% of IDPs were women and children, suffering high levels of mortality, malnutrition, illiteracy, poverty and HIV/AIDS and lack of access to health, information, education and water – and decision-making. Current government crack downs on informal commercial activity increase poverty levels amongst poor urban women with a knock on effect on domestic violence against women.

Enter the IMF – or not?

Angola has applied for an IMF programme to restructure its debt [9], but not for new loans given the ‘tiny amounts’ compared to Chinese and other loans. A syndicate of European banks led by French bank Calyon are organising a $2.25 billion [10] oil-backed loan to Sonangol to refinance existing debt and $800 million in new money for undisclosed use, with the Chinese buying the oil. Finance Minister Jose Pedro de Morais said endless failed talks with the IMF were due to its not having an accumulated knowledge of Angolan economics – interpreted locally as being unwilling to understand elite needs.

Conclusion

The ruling MPLA has for many years with justification been able to blame the war for its repressive and unaccountable policies. Subsequently it has been able to point to the need to move from a war economy and polity into transition. But we do not have to believe the rhetoric over transition and its difficulties if we consider Angola as is in a ‘steady state’ with economic and political policies marked heavily by the structures established by war and from command economy and state. It is able to use its oil wealth for elite accumulation and for overcoming resistance to its rule. Clientilism has largely replaced more repressive measures. As its oil wealth and ultra deep oil exploration possibilities increase it is increasingly able to ride out any international disquiet over its policies – accessing available if expensive oil-backed loans and able to put resources where it wishes. There are some constraints in the present and future - such as wanting to present itself as not so corrupt to attract FDI, a desire to deal with its debts and its dependence on the maintenance of high oil prices – but not sufficiently to disturb the equanimity of the elite and its accumulation strategy. Any opposition can be marginalised, bought off or in the last resort got rid off.

Despite rhetoric on increased transparency, accountability and democratisation little has yet been accomplished to overcome the gap between ruler and ruled. Apart from some NGOs it seems there is little help they can expect in terms of support or pressure from the international community. As well as the increased autonomy for the elite with high oil prices and vulnerable supply, there are significant shifts in international and regional alliances in the face of the ‘Chinese threat’ and the war against terror.

* Dr. Steve Kibble is Advocacy Coordinator for Africa/Yemen, Progressio

* This is a revised version of a talk to the Africa Business Group at SOAS, 16 March 2006, and based on a chapter on Angola for Africa Yearbook 2005 to be published by Brill on behalf of Africa Institute in Hamburg, Afrikacentrum, Leiden and Nordic Afrika Instituut Uppsala. A longer version has been commissioned by the Review of African Political Economy for publication later in 2006. Visit for more information.

* Please send comments to [email protected]

References:

[1] IMF, 2005, Staff Report for the 2004 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 05/228, Washington DC: IMF July.

[2] Thanks to David Sogge (personal communication) for this insight.

[3] In January 2006, the National Statistics Institute estimated it as averaging 18.5% over the year whilst the EIU country report thought 23.4% more likely (EIU Angola Country Report December 2005 p.11).

[4] French businessman Pierre Falcone was suspected of embezzling funds flowing from the restructuring of Angola's debt to Russia.

[5] although $37 million held in a Luxemburg-based bank account owned by a Panama-based company called Camparal, which belongs to Dos Santos allegedly vanished into tax havens

[6] Over 150 political parties continued to exist, many with identical platforms, undemocratic internal practices and with little parliamentary initiative, coalitions between opposition forces or promulgation of alternative policies or monitoring of government policies. A recent law on political parties allows government funding of parties not represented in the National Assembly during the election period (Diário da República 1.7.05).

[7] Over 150 political parties continued to exist, many with identical platforms, undemocratic internal practices and with little parliamentary initiative, coalitions between opposition forces or promulgation of alternative policies or monitoring of government policies. A recent law on political parties allows government funding of parties not represented in the National Assembly during the election period (Diário da República 1.7.05).

[8] Sogge personal communication.

[9] With estimated external debts of $10 billion Angola wants IMF approval of its would-be home-grown programme through a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) to tackle its $1.5 - $1.8 billion Paris Club debt and provide a seal of approval for creditors wanting assurances before discussing debt rescheduling.

[10] According to Global Witness, although the French press says over $3 billion.

Not only Zimbabwe is executing massive eviction campaigns against informal settlers in Southern Africa. The Angolan government has maintained the same policy "for many years," the UN's Special Rapporteur on adequate housing revealed. Citing specific examples, Mr Kothari said that hundreds of families were affected at the end of last year when the Luanda provincial government undertook "forced evictions and demolitions of homes" to implement the governmental housing policy, in the municipality of Kilamba Kiaxi in the Angolan capital.

An Israeli company is using the latest water-saving technology to grow fruit and vegetables in Angola, which imports much of its food after 27 years of civil war. A computer programme calculates the exact amounts of water needed, depending on temperature and humidity.

Restoring viable livelihoods is the single major challenge facing rural communities in post-war Angola. The communities in the municipalities of Conda, Ambuim, and Sumbe (CAS) in Kuanza Sul province are meeting this challenge. Given that land is the primary asset for rural households, access to land becomes, therefore, a fundamental imperative. The current land tenure systems offer both opportunities and constraints to the improvement of women’s and men’s rights to land. This research, which has been commissioned to review the dynamics of land tenure in the CAS area, its opportunities and risks, reveals a denial of land access rights to communal farmers, whose livelihoods are centred on land.

Despite claims that the Angolan government has opened a dialogue to bring peaceful resolution to the conflict in Cabinda, their counterparts in the enclave have yet to be invited to the table. The Angolan armed forces chief of staff, general Agostinho Nelumba 'Sanjar', told Ecclesia, a local Catholic radio station, on Monday (March 13) that "the government has opened a dialogue and, in the near future, the problem will be resolved".

The United Nations Children's Fund estimates that for every 1,000 live births in Angola, 17 women die from pregnancy-related causes. Angolan women are thought to carry a one-in-seven risk of maternal death, higher than the one-in-16 risk for sub-Saharan Africa -- and much, much worse than the one-in-2,000 and one-in-3,000 risk in Europe and the United States. To a large extent, these figures are a legacy of Angola's 27-year civil war between government and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola - UNITA).

Cholera, a disease associated with poor sanitation and access to potable water has claimed eight lives in a suburb of the Angolan capital, Luanda. The UN's World Health Organisation (WHO) said that 40 cases of the highly contagious disease, spread through contaminated water or food, were reported in the last few days in the Boavista shantytown located to the north of the capital.

Since July 2005, hundreds of families have been made homeless after being forcibly evicted from their homes in several neighbourhoods in Luanda, the capital. Their homes were demolished and other property was either destroyed or stolen by the police and municipal fiscal agents that carried out the forced evictions. Most of the forced evictions were carried out violently. Forced evictions - those which are not carried out in accordance with the law – are human rights violations clearly prohibited by international law. They almost invariably affect the poor and most vulnerable members of society; they increase social inequality and poverty and frequently give rise to social conflict. Yet, the Angolan government continues to forcibly evict people from their homes.

It has been four years of peace in Angola since the end of a decades-long civil war, but for the majority of Angolans the absence of fighting is the only benefit they enjoy, writes human rights activist Rafael Marques. Scheduled elections have been endlessly postponed, allowing the ruling elite to remain unaccountable to the population of the country while they maintain international legitimacy through corrupt use of Angola’s vast oil wealth.

For more than a decade, while the ruling class has focused on its own transformation into a bourgeois class by plundering the country’s riches, the majority of Angolans have been reviving their hopes for the future on empty promises in a vacuum.

Those in power are managing such a vacuum and selling it as a kind of stability pact. It is a pact similar to that established between a robber who points a gun at a citizen in broad daylight and in public, strips the victim of his belongings and then, civilly, requests the understanding, silence and quietness of the victim. The robbed person, in turn, thanks the perpetrator for the common sense shown in sparing his life. It is in this sense that Angolans are grateful for peace.

Four years have passed since the achievement of peace in 2002 after decades of civil war. Another legislative mandate has come to an end, since the first and last elections of 1992, without people casting their ballot – and, therefore, without the opportunity for them to hold to account and choose their political leaders as well as legitimize the rule of power.

Once again, the President of the Republic, in his much awaited state of the union address, disappointed people’s hopes for elections in 2006. Showing his normal political expediency, he now suggests voting might take place in 2007. In 2000 he announced the possibility of elections for 2001, whether the war stopped or not, and that he would retire. However, he has been pushing the prospect further into the future ever since.

Apart from the question of elections, the speech by President Dos Santos to the nation had two more key points, the setting up of the Bank for the Development of Angola (BDA) and the construction of housing for those in need.

For the President, the bank will be the catalyst for the reconstruction of the country. However, it is little more than another expedient for the redistribution of windfall profits from oil among the ruling families and their particular interests. Similar initiatives in the past, particularly the now defunct Caixa Agro-Pecuária (CAP), have suggested the final end of government-funded commercial banks. Once the ruling families and their associates borrow all the funds at a bank’s disposal, it is declared bankrupt, dismantled and privatized. As for the money lent, the trick is to write it off as bad loans and let the matter rest for good. The oil funds in question stem from rocketing prices in the international markets. This has generated a windfall, over and above the budgeted oil income, of a magnitude of which Angolans have no idea. Due to a lack of transparency and to the creative accounting practices in the Angolan public sector, the real sums the government has amassed are, at this point, anybody’s guess (The Angolan Ambassador to Brazil, General Alberto Neto, reaffirmed in an interview to the daily O Globo (21.11.2005) that “the country’s oil income does not pass through the Angolan financial institutions”, and such a procedure makes it even more difficult to track the real sums derived from the oil revenues, which officially account for more than 80% of the country’s income.)

Secondly, as far as building houses is concerned, the government should promote job creation, ensure the payment of real salaries and introduce policies for housing development that provide the incentives for the private sector to take up the task and for citizens to afford access to credit and to be able to pay for their accommodation out of their own salaries. Angolans need decent wages for decent jobs, not permanent government or international charity.

Electoral patriotism

As for the need for people to legitimize the exercise of power, society has been taking notice of the electoral mobilization the ruling Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) has set in motion even though it remains silent on the setting of a date for elections. People have also been ready for elections to be called at three months’ notice (within the legal deadline). Nevertheless, Angolans still need to be registered to vote and there is no hint of when this will happen, along with other essential tasks to ensure a free and fair electoral process. These tactics could make it impossible for the opposition and public opinion to make any impression on the regime’s hold on power.

However, one fundamental question arises from this scenario of doubt and deceitfulness. What’s behind the regime’s postponement of elections for as long as it can? It has absolute control over the country’s riches, the media with a national outreach and the public administration. Furthermore, it uses the army and the national police as it pleases and as a means to achieve whatever ends it may pursue. It has support from the Western powerhouses in exchange for a large chunk of Angolan natural resources (oil and diamonds). There is also a Chinese bid for another slice of the country’s lucrative market with expensive loans, billions worth of construction contracts and so forth.

The factors mentioned above have been conspiring to eliminate the people as a fundamental factor for pressure and change. So the regime is afraid to hold elections because it is not sure whether it can control the emotions, anger and frustrations of the people. It is afraid of people’s reactions during an election campaign amid increased publicity.

Another element to take into account is the MPLA’s ideological problem or, more precisely, the lack of it. The end of socialism, or of the Marxism-Leninism it used to profess, led the MPLA to import, for its own survival, Western consumerism to provide a set of values required to regulate the dynamics of society.

Hence, the President’s appeal in his speech to patriotism is a mockery for he himself provides no example of it. Patriotism must be the sharing of a set of moral and national values which unite the citizens in the defence of their common interests, the country, and the dignity and the equality it reserves to each one of its children.

For its part, the government is hooked on corruption. It is unable to come up with a set of polices and the right course of action to effectively improve people’s lives and to develop the country. It is a regime with neither an ideology nor a nation-building project.

Corruption in Angola has taken on a life of its own. It serves the regime well to annihilate any signs of opposition, dissenting voices or alternative leaderships as well as to sabotage any action by the regime to deliver welfare to the people.

The absence of morals in the conduct of government officials and the gradual deletion of references to the people in public statements provides the necessary peace of mind for the very same government officials to pocket as they please the public funds assigned to them. The current Minister of Finances, Jose Pedro de Morais, and the Governor of the Central Bank, Amadeu Mauricio, are just the latest officials to present the country in recent months with financial scandals of an international dimension. The Brazilian daily O Globo (13.11.2005), in its coverage of a national corruption scandal (O Mensalao) that has shaken the presidency of Lula da Silva, exposed the Angolan connexion. A Brazilian businessman, Marcos V. de Souse, wire transferred around US$ 2.7 million to the personal bank accounts of the abovementioned Angolan officials. Days later, the newspaper, as a follow up to the same case, unearthed other remittances worth US$ 1,6 million to the personal account of the President of the Angolan Central Bank. In their defence, the Angolan ambassador to Brazil, Alberto Neto, told O Globo (21.11.2005), that “every man has a price, what matters is to know how much” The spokesperson for the Angolan Ministry of Finances stated that it was a duty for government officials to take 15% in commissions for the deals they close.

The Chinese Godfather

Once again the government, in its bid to re-legitimize itself, has turned abroad to seek credit and political protection. This time its port of call is China, after earlier docking at the White House (and its satellite Western allies) and, before that, mooring for a long time at the Kremlin and in Havana. In essence the government knows how to cuddle up to the permanent members of the UN Security Council, those with the power of veto.

The Dos Santos regime needs international legitimacy to keep in check its own people, its internal critics and its adversaries. The consequences of this extreme dependency upon foreign forces for the legitimization of power may be accounted for in terms of years of war, the slaughter of many Angolans and the never ending onslaught upon the country’s wealth. No less serious is the people’s feeling of a loss of dignity and self respect in its own household, humiliated and despised by the government’s friends of the hour. The example of the diamond rich territory of the Lundas is a point in case. The report ‘Lundas: The Stones of Death’ provides a detailed account of the complicity between the government, international diamond mining companies and dealers in spreading terror, destitution and misery in the region. The report is available at

For a long time shrewd foreigners have explored for their own benefit the political, economic, social and intellectual shortcomings of the ruling class and the vanity of its desire to mutate into an assimilated bourgeoisie – the elite. As a consequence, the MPLA is adrift. Its government has no influence over the Presidency. The President rules alone, under the influence of foreign interests. This tightens his grip on power, as well as being his major weakness, his Achilles, in his dealings with the society. Thus, in today’s Angola, the American lobbies, some Portuguese interests, the Chinese, and so on hold more true and meaningful power over the government than that collegial body holds itself, not to mention its forlorn individual members.

There is a power vacuum. The government, and especially the President, are held hostage by interests foreign to Angolan society. Individual members of the ruling class generally ponder that they are getting richer by the day and busy themselves with shopping sprees.

The Western government partners in these ransacking ventures settle their accounts among themselves. They only make a pretence of demanding some measure of respect for human rights, transparency and democracy whenever specific business projects with the government turn sour, or periodically, when their code of honour among thieves is violated. Only then do these Western governments choose to denounce the Angolan regime in international corridors as corrupt, incompetent and despicable. At the same time, their own countries welcome without any reservations the bank deposits, investments and profits from the looting of Angola.

The regime, represented by the MPLA, should reduce its propaganda efforts and goodwill-bolstering operations, like building dubious, cheap and short-lived housing projects. It must opt for a policy based on being near to the people and their problems. It must replace propaganda by respect for freedom of expression in the state media, which are the only ones with nationwide coverage. This would allow public debate to flourish and produce solutions as well as establishing a culture of checks and balances.

Freedom of expression and of the press is fundamental to curb corruption and create a public mindset to generate enough pressure on the government to punish corrupt officials. Corruption is the institution holding the government together. Reassuring initiatives to fight it might enable the authorities to postpone the holding of elections without causing public anger. By taking on corruption, President Dos Santos could find the peace and rest that he wants and the MPLA could find its way back to being a popular movement.

As for the patriotism called for by Dos Santos, his regime must be capable of defending Angolans from many an international partner which finds in Angola a land of promise in which to sow discord under official patronage and treat Angolans as replaceable, unserviceable, undignified and undeserving objects. The logic is simple: if the government does not treat its own citizens with respect and in a dignified way, who else will?

By preserving the interests, dignity and respect of the Angolan people, Angola could evolve towards an open market, a safe haven for foreign investment, a hospitable destiny for tourists from all over the world and a second home for those who may choose it in their quest for sun and prosperity. Otherwise, direct confrontation between the people and power (in the sense of a privileged minority aided and abetted by foreign interests) will only be a matter of time. In the showdown of what will be a class struggle between the very rich and the totally destitute, due to the lack of intermediate social structures, all will end up as losers. The MPLA’s battle cry used to be “Hail the People’s Power”. Many still recall this power and keep it inside themselves, for the benefit of the majority.

* Rafael Marques is an Angolan Human Rights Activist ([email protected])

* Please send comments to [email protected]

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