Asylum seekers and refugees in the Netherlands are increasingly facing "inhumane treatment", the Dutch Council of Churches warned. The Council expressed acute concern about putting asylum seekers with serious illnesses, including psychiatric patients, on the street, and the treatment of underage asylum seekers. Some of the children, the Council said, are locked up in deportation centres. There is also an increase in the number of children disappearing from asylum centres and reports of suicide.

Along with denunciations of the Lord's Resistance Army as "a barbaric cult," the United States Congress heard sharp criticisms last week of the Ugandan government's alleged failure to pursue peace negotiations with the LRA and to prevent the deaths of thousands of displaced civilians. Congressman Chris Smith, chairman of the US House of Representatives' Africa subcommittee, set the tone for the April 26 inquiry by suggesting that the government is "insufficiently committed to improving the situation in northern Uganda."

Refugees and internally displaced people are returning home in South Kivu Province of the Congo, but face enormous difficulties: basic assistance and services in their communities are minimal or nonexistent. Donors and humanitarian agencies must coordinate their interventions, especially to provide the seeds and tools essential for self-sufficiency, and increase community capacity to absorb returnees.

UNHCR has expressed alarm over growing insecurity along the Chad-Sudan border, where a raid on Monday by 150 armed men just a few kilometres from a refugee camp left four Chadian civilians dead and five others wounded. The Chadians were killed in an attack near the village of Dolola, in south-eastern Chad. Dolola is near UNHCR's refugee camp at Goz Amir, which currently shelters some 17,700 Sudanese refugees from Darfur.

For Burkina Faso, as with its neighbors in the region, migration has been a way of life for over 1,000 years as people followed livestock and crops on a seasonal basis. In the last 50 years, more traditional migration patterns have been reestablished, though these have retained important colonial characteristics. Overall, one Burkinabè in five now lives abroad. Yet, between 1990 and 2000, the percentage of people living in Burkina Faso who were born outside the country tripled, from 438,000 in 1990 to over a million a decade later, almost 10 percent of the population. Thus, while a net exporter of people, Burkina Faso itself is rapidly becoming a country of migrants.

At least 100 families have fled their homes in Katikomor, West Pokot District, following a disarmament exercise by military personnel. Three guns have been recovered in the operation dubbed Leta amani. Tension has been high in the district as residents continue to flee to Uganda to evade the crackdown on illegal arms. Local leaders have termed the operation "Government persecution" and an abuse of human rights. The disarmament exercise is one of the biggest in recent times.

The International Monetary Fund has cautioned Tanzania against creating "too many special economic zones." Hit by an unprecedented drought, the Tanzanian government will be walking a tightrope in coming months, having to increase revenues without raising taxes.

Observers fear the town of Gereida, which provides refuge to an estimated 90,000 displaced persons, might come under siege following a series of attacks on rebel-controlled villages in South Darfur. "We have received unconfirmed, unilateral reports that there might be an attack on Gereida town - meaning that the town could be under fire - if we do not take immediate steps," said the United Nations deputy humanitarian coordinator in Sudan.

Almost two dozen trucks left Uganda, carrying scores of Sudanese refugees home from settlements near the border with Sudan as their voluntary repatriation kicked off, according to the United Nations refugee agency (UNHCR). "Today [on Tuesday], we have facilitated the return of 160 refugees from Moyo District to their villages of Kangapo I and II," said the Kampala-based spokeswoman for UNHCR. "They were ferried to areas near their villages, and by the end of today, many will be in Kangapo [in southern Sudan]."

Are peace agreements negotiated more easily if they include references to human rights? If so, is peace more durable as a result? 'Negotiating justice?' examines eight recent peace agreements to assess how they addressed issues such as impunity and forcible displacement. It concludes that human rights can make practical and positive contributions to many areas of conflict resolution. Each chapter ends with recommendations and questions that can help negotiators, mediators and human rights advocates to address dilemmas that arise during the negotiation of peace agreements and when the latter are implemented.

Security conditions in Nigeria show no sign of improvement. A new militant group in the Niger Delta, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), is tallying up the number of successful attacks against government security forces and multinational oil companies. MEND is a shadowy organization that first came to prominence on January 11, 2006 when it kidnapped oil workers based at Royal Dutch Shell's offshore EA oil rig. While the workers were released, MEND has proven to be a capable, armed organization. For instance, since January, MEND has killed at least 24 soldiers and police, kidnapped 13 oil workers and caused severe damage to several critical oil pipelines.

Egypt's parliament agreed on Sunday (April 30) to a two-year extension of emergency law requested by the government while it prepares replacement anti-terrorism laws. The Muslim Brotherhood, the strongest opposition force, said there was no justification for extending the law, which President Hosni Mubarak last year promised to substitute with anti-terrorism legislation.

Twelve years ago on April 27, millions of South Africans flocked to the polls to take part in the first non-racial democratic election following the end of minority white rule. In the years since, and despite engaging in a truth and reconciliation process, South Africa has struggled with the legacy of the past and faces continued and in some cases widening racial divides. Piers Pigou reflects on the unfinished business of South Africa’s truth and reconciliation process.

A ten-year retrospective symposium on the legacy of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) convened in Cape Town last week by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) highlighted a number of uncomfortable issues and concerns, both for those intent on carrying on the work of the Commission, as well as those invested in the ‘business of forgetting’.

The symposium focused on the contentious issue of TRC related prosecutions, which have recently come into the spotlight following the introduction by the National Prosecuting Authority of prosecution ‘guidelines’ for dealing with offences that emanated from conflicts of the past and which were committed before 11 May 1994.

The guidelines allow for the National Director of Public Prosecutions to indemnify perpetrators who make a full disclosure regarding involvement in these crimes, and stipulate other criteria, some of which are strikingly similar to the TRC’s amnesty conditions (relating to issues of proportionality, political motives etc), as well as others (i.e. whether or not the victim desires prosecution) that arguably distort the parameters of prosecutorial discretion.

Critics argue that the guidelines, which were introduced without any public consultation, are not only unconstitutional but clearly send out the wrong message to perpetrators. They were after all given a very generous opportunity to apply for amnesty before the TRC, but chose to eschew this, showing contempt for the process and the new government.

Shifting the justice goalposts once again at the expense of victims’ rights and ongoing needs for accountability have raised a host of significant questions. How do you build respect for a struggling criminal justice system, by further indemnifications of perpetrators of gross human rights violations? How do you rationalize to the general populace the importance of prosecuting liberation movement leaders for contemporaneous (often, white collar) crimes, yet protect those who are responsible for heinous crimes from the pre-94 era? Should, indeed can, this past be so neatly ring-fenced from legal sanction?

There is, according to some critics of the policy, a far simpler and less contentious route to follow – and that is to allow perpetrators to plead guilty and to deal with indemnities through mitigation and sentencing process. Criminal records could be subsequently expunged through Presidential pardons. This approach would at least protect the integrity of the criminal justice system.

A small vocal minority, mainly it appears from within the white community, are cynical about continuing endeavours to secure accountability for past abuses, warning that the process must be ‘even-handed’, inferring that some sort of quantitative egalitarianism is the only acceptable route to follow. Dave Steward, the CEO of the De Klerk Foundation, and former DG of De Klerk’s Presidential office, begrudgingly agreed that there should be little sympathy for those who faced prosecutions, but raised broader concerns from “his constituency” about how these issues were being handled. He pointed to the way that the TRC amnesty process had been developed and implemented, asserting that National Party and Inkatha Freedom Party interests had not been taken into account and that there was a strong perception that the process was not partial.

This justification for hostility towards the TRC is not borne out empirically, as it is possible to demonstrate both strengths and drawbacks in investigations and research regarding all the main protagonists of past conflict. A qualitative and quantitative assessment of exactly what was undertaken has yet to be undertaken, but allegations of bias and its impact on the mythical ‘national reconciliation’ agenda is frequently wheeled out as an excuse for not engaging with the Commission’s work and findings, not to mention its unfinished business.

Of course, the issues under examination were always going to be sites of contested truth and deep-seated emotion. Many of the allegations made against the Commission regarding a partisan agenda are simply unsustainable. This was true, for example, of the IFP’s claims with regards to allegations about failures to investigate the murder of IFP leaders. In spite of the IFP’s failure to respond to appeals for assistance and further information, the TRC did conduct relatively detailed investigations and used these as a basis for making findings against the ANC.

It is perhaps not surprising that all three political parties were selective in the information they chose to disclose, and what they have chosen to refute. There is yet to be a systematic evaluation in this regard, but we should not be shocked that all the parties, with varying degrees, were economical with the truth. The ANC was clearly the most forthright, providing an unprecedented amount of information and detail in its submissions, and setting out its actual and possible responsibility for a multitude of armed actions. Approximately 900 of the 1500 individuals who came before the Amnesty Committee’s public hearings were ANC affiliated, and many came forward voluntarily. This was in stark contrast to the approximately 290 security force members who applied for amnesty, most of the basis that they were facing possible prosecution as a result of the State’s investigations. The IFP actively discouraged its supporters from applying for amnesty, with the result that only 100 of so applicants came forward.

The NP and IFP leadership refused to take responsibility for violations carried out by its supporters. The NP maintained the position that the security forces were an arm of government and would therefore be the only authority that could provide detail on individual acts and incidents. Its blanket denial of responsibility for political killings, assassinations and systematic repression rang hollow for many inside and outside the Commission, especially in light of the rapid fusion between politics and security that characterized much of apartheid governance, and evidence that senior Party representatives in the State Security Council had participated in discussions on the neutralization and elimination of enemy elements.

This culture of denial also characterized the IFP’s interaction with the Commission and, of all the parties, it was most active in its non-cooperation and attempts to vilify the process and TRC personnel. This destructive and distracting non-engagement, however, did not prevent the Commission from making a series of important findings about elements that were responsible for targeting IFP members and supporters, as the IFP had themselves alleged. The Commission finding of the IFP as the primary non-state actor responsible for violence remains contested, as it is widely acknowledged that the 21,000 statements made to the TRC represent an unknown proportion of the total number of violations.

Of course, it is also possible to show that the Commission itself was remiss in a number of ways. Its failure to subject the IFP’s leadership to further questioning, its scant attention to ANC abuses in the camps, and the failure to systematically interrogate the functioning and practices of the National Security Management System, amongst many other issues, is indicative of just how much unfinished business remains. Most of the 21,000 who submitted statements to the Commission did not receive any further details regarding their cases, despite pleas for more truth and understanding. Add to this the fact that tens of thousands of eligible South Africans did not engage the TRC for one reason or another, it is evident that there is much more work to be done if South Africans are to understand what transpired and in so doing come to terms with their past, as opposed to sweeping it under the proverbial carpet.

Prosecution provides but one, albeit important, component of a range of options that can facilitate further enquiry and exposure regarding past violations. Research and inquiry can take on many other forms, with and without official sanctions and powers; a variety of methodologies can be explored that work closely with communities, victims and their families, in an effort to develop understanding not only of what happened, but the limitations associated with developing this understanding.

The TRC has made a major contribution by naming and shaming, by exposing some of the worst aspects of what occurred, and by explicitly holding political leadership responsible for the actions of its membership and supporters. The Commission had limited tolerance for what others might have claimed under the rubric of plausible deniability. Such bold statements and findings, in the circumstances of South Africa’s conflict, were arguably necessary, particularly in a context where victims from all sides of the conflict remained fundamentally disempowered.

This imbalance has not been addressed by government’s lacklustre approach to domestic reparations, and its active opposition to efforts in the American courts to hold corporations to account for their complicity in supporting the repressive actions of the apartheid regime. The South African government has spent just over R500 million on individual reparations, considerably less than what has been spent on golden handshakes for apartheid bureaucrats, or special pensions to liberation movement members. Tutu and others continue to express their disappointment at the lack of generosity the government has shown, reiterating that what the TRC had suggested (a grant of up to R23,000 per annum for six years) was more realistic. In response to those who argue against this, that “we were not in the struggle for monetary gain” (a position articulated by senior ANC government figures), Tutu angrily retorted that “it’s an insult – they should shut up!”

The reactions of South Africa’s political leaders to the TRC’s findings and their selective engagement with ongoing issues of unfinished business tell us more about their own priorities, and clearly demonstrate that there is little or no desire to meaningfully engage with the specific needs of victims, survivors and their families and related opportunities to do so.

While there is currently political consensus about the need to develop and entrench an open and democratic society in South Africa, how this is done in relation to the plethora of unfinished business regarding past conflicts remains unresolved. Understandably, we are preoccupied with contemporary challenges, although it is important, especially for those who are the primary beneficiaries of the democratic dispensation, to appreciate that current realities for many remain profoundly informed by past experience and their continuing legacies, whether social and economic, civil and political. Dealing with one set of issues does not excuse not dealing with the other.

The failure of apartheid era politicians to grasp the opportunity and accept responsibility for the violations carried out by security force members was a major disappointment for many. A few former NP members at least admitted that they could have done more, but chose to turn away. In general, however, because of the example set by their political leadership, most white South Africans did not feel the need to engage with the Commission, or assist it to achieve its objectives. This has contributed significantly to the unfinished business of racial reconciliation in South Africa.

Tutu again raised these issues at the Symposium last week, pointing out that the white community had failed to respond to the enormous generosity of the black community. Not surprisingly, he has been subsequently lambasted and attacked for being a racist by elements within the white community and their representatives in the Democratic Alliance. Once again, many in the white community have chosen not to listen or seek to understand the situation and feelings of fellow South Africans whose continuing pain and needs are palpable. They chose not to acknowledge and accept that these circumstances have a correlation with past discrimination and repression, of which they were the primary beneficiaries.

A national survey conducted by the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in 2004 found that ten years into the new democracy one in five whites would rather go back to apartheid than live in the new South Africa; and in a similar poll, less than a third of former beneficiaries believed that they benefited from apartheid in the past or continue to benefit from it today. This evasion and denial of past responsibility has played itself out in resistance to any form of redress, whether it is individual reparations, affirmative action or the symbolic renaming of geographic locations. This is shocking and rightly condemned by Tutu and others, especially in a context where clearly more can be done.

The politics of South Africa’s truth and reconciliation process, as with the politics of transition, are characterized by compromise and limitations. The TRC provided an historic window of opportunity to all parties involved in the conflict to explain what had transpired from their various vantage points, in order to seek understanding, to take ownership and responsibility for what had gone wrong, and to understand the conditions and circumstances that allowed for this.

Each political party’s (and their respective constituencies) relationship with the TRC and the issues it was grappling with are inextricably linked to specific party political agendas. Differences of opinion regarding each party’s commitment to the goals of the TRC will continue to manifest, especially as the objectives of truth recovery and reconciliation inevitably extend beyond the time and spatial confines of an official commission. Despite the government’s protestations that it is addressing victims needs through its broader development agenda, other transformation processes and an increasing commitment to related heritage and memorialisation projects, the specific interests and concerns of victims as articulated through groupings such as the Khulumani Support Group continue to be largely ignored – especially with regards to further truth recovery and targeted reparations.

Political parties are keen to draw a veil over this period and further efforts to retrospectively examine the conflict. Little mention, if any is made of the huge volume of unfinished business and its implications for accountability and legitimacy. Instead, platitudes are offered in pursuit of an elite-led reconciliation agenda whose foundations appear to be perilously weak.

* Piers Pigou is Director of the South African History Archives. He was an investigator with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

* Please send comments to

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Three bombs spaced just minutes apart ripped through the crowded Egyptian beach resort of Dahab on Monday, killing at least 18 people and confirming the extent to which domestic terror groups have reestablished themselves after years of relative peace. It's the third time since October 2004 that Egypt's popular Sinai Peninsula beaches have been targeted. Prior to that first attack - three suicide bombs that killed 31 at Taba - Egypt had not experienced any terror attacks since 1997.

The number of people affected by prolonged droughts in nine countries in East Africa has doubled since January, despite a recent week of rain. Over 11 million people across Eritrea, Djibouti, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Somaliland, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi are now in need of assistance up from an estimated 5 million in January.

The constant refrain during Refugees International’s recent assessment to south Sudan was expressions of concern about UNHCR’s weak presence in the region. Plagued by a lack of strong leadership as well as by deep budget cuts, UNHCR has struggled to establish a strong field presence in south Sudan and can no longer blame a difficult logistical environment for its problems. An effective UNHCR is critical to the success of the entire operation in south Sudan because within the UN system the agency has the most in-house expertise on protecting refugees and internally displaced persons and managing large-scale returns.

"They have no voice, no jobs; poverty is excruciating, slavery is there -- because they work for others for nothing, like in only getting a plate of food or tombo (traditional beer). They are just suffering." This was the sobering assessment of Namibia's indigenous San community, delivered by Deputy Prime Minister Libertina Amathila last September after a visit to the north-eastern Otjozondjupa region where the majority of San live.

Zimbabwe State Security Minister Didymus Mutasa has reiterated threats that the government will use armed soldiers and police to crush mass protests planned by the opposition for the winter. Speaking to ZimOnline at the weekend, Mutasa said no one should expect the government to "keep its security organs in the camps" in the face of opposition-instigated protests meant to oust it.

At least 300 child soldiers in southern Sudan have handed in their guns and uniforms and will return to their families as part of an ongoing demobilisation exercise supported by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). The demobilisation at Khorfulus, near Malakal town in Upper Nile state, is considered the biggest of its kind since the signing in January 2005 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Sudanese government and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Under the agreement, both parties committed to releasing all child soldiers in their custody.