http://www.andycarvin.com/
http://www.wsis-wire.net/content/view/1171/
http://www.mraihi.com/blog
http://www.mraihi.com/blog
http://panos.blogs.com/iwitness
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=wsis&btnG=Google+Search
www.panos.org.uk/iwitness/
http://www.dailysummit.net/
http://www.highwayafrica.ru.ac.za/hana/
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/mena1105/

Since the earliest of times, Tunis has been an area of struggle, invaded by first the Phoenicians and later taken over by the Romans, who were in turn forced out by maurauding barbarian hordes that swept through Europe in the 5th century and were followed by Arab and Turkish empires.

Later, when the Allies under General Eisenhower landed in North Africa in November 1942, the Germans and Italians seized Tunis as an operations base for the forces of Rommel. The area was the scene of fierce fighting between the Germans and the Allies, until the Allied forces triumphed in 1943. Following the war, the struggle for independence from the French gained ground, leading to bloody clashes and the eventual declaration of a republic in 1957 with Habib Bourguiba as first president.

Zine El Abidine Ben Ali ousted Bourguiba in a bloodless coup on 7 November 1987, promising to lead the country toward democracy and releasing political prisoners. But after January 1992, President Ben Ali started using the civil war in neighbouring Algeria as an excuse to stifle basic rights, mainly freedom of expression, says the Tunisian Monitoring Group, a body of freedom of expression organisations set up to monitor the human rights situation in Tunisia in the lead up to the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). Opposition and independent papers were closed down and journalists and hundreds of political activists, most of them Islamists, were imprisoned following unfair trials, particularly in the early 1990s, says a TMG report.

Later, the Tunisian government used the attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, to further restrict freedom of association, movement, and expression. A new law criminalizing freedom of expression was passed at the end of 2003 allegedly to support “the international efforts in matters of the fight against terrorism and money laundering.” As reported by TMG, The Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) said after the promulgation of this law, “the year 2003 has been marked by the promulgation of laws of an unprecedented serious character in terms of their violation of the right to information.”

The Tunisian government could be able to monitor the activities and movements of each of the thousands of delegates to the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). That’s because the credit card-like registration badges that every delegate is issued with when registering for the summit contain a chip that has to be swiped when entering the summit facility - the Kram exhibition centre outside Tunis. Theoretically, this could enable the Tunisian authorities to store and access information about each delegate, but also to know which area of the summit venue each delegate is in and who else is in the same area.

The same system was used in Geneva and caused an uproar. “We don’t actually know, but I don’t think it tells anyone that I’m actually sitting in this room. There is less control,” said an internet policy expert, when questioned about the issue at a press conference.

Whether the Tunisian government is or isn’t using the technology to track the movements of delegates, its impossible not to feel watched in Tunis. High security at any major international summit has become the norm and Tunis is no exception.

Police gather on seemingly every street corner, while “men in suits” are everywhere, lining the highways and patrolling the corridors of the summit. At parallel civil society events that have addressed the issue of the human rights situation in Tunisia, security has been noticeably in attendance. When I tried to enter the venue for an event on Tuesday I was blocked by two security officials who told me that the venue was full. When I eventually got inside after one of the organizers intervened, there were plenty of seats available.

The entire area around the summit centre has been cleared of vegetation and roadblocks are common in the roads leading to the summit. Delegates are bussed into the exhibition centre from hotels and only authorized busses are allowed near the centre. Without an official badge or other forms of official authorization, it is impossible to enter the summit area.

In this context, its hard not to feel watched, and its hard not to feel that the summit is really a domain of the “haves” who have to be protected from the “have-nots”.

The marketing line of Skype, the internet telephony phenomenon, is “The whole world can talk for free”. That one line captures so much that is thrilling about the internet. Somehow the novelty of being able to cross boundaries, communicate and network in ways that weren’t possible before never seems to wear off, especially with new innovations popping up almost daily. Yet that one line dreamed up by the marketing experts also highlights the problem faced by the internet. This lies in the fact that unless you have a computer with broadband access you can’t talk to the world, or if you can - using traditional telephony - you certainly can’t do it for free. And because this goes for the majority of the world’s population, that means that those of us that do have access and can talk for free certainly aren’t talking to the world. We are in fact, talking to ourselves, at the expense of the world.

The theory goes like this: Providing information and communications technologies will enable people to access and create opportunities and is therefore key to development, although it’s a moot point as to whether development comes first and ICTs later. But this is why the digital divide – the gap between the information have’s and have-not’s - is such a disaster, because there are so many people without access that the development potential of the internet can never be truly realized. Only 1% of the world’s internet users are Africans, for example.

And to really drive the point home: Africa - the continent that everyone knows is the poorest in the world - has to pay seven times as much per kilobyte of data transferred via the internet than do the advanced capitalist countries.

It’s little surprise therefore, that the digital divide is one of the major themes of the WSIS process. This is not to say, though, that a solution is in hand, with historical differences of opinion over how to fund a closing of the gap leading to a lack of decisive action. Any previous suggestions for a global tax, for example, to fund the closing of the gap, has previously been opposed by those who state that that the market must take care of the problem, despite evidence that spending is down and that in the last two decades the gap has shown no signs of shrinking.

At the previous WSIS meeting in Geneva in 2003, a Digital Solidarity Fund was proposed as one way to bridge the digital divide. As a result the final Geneva summit declaration acknowledged that funding for investment in ICTs was an important issue, and requested the UN Secretary General to establish a Task Force to review the current availability of funding and report to the second part of the Summit, in Tunis. This Task Force on Financial Mechanisms for ICT for Development presented its report in December 2004. Although the idea of the Digital Solidarity Fund did not receive universal backing at WSIS, it continued to gather support, and the Fund was set up in March 2005, with a secretariat based in Geneva, but the challenge lay in collecting enough funds to make it viable. More information on this issue can be found by visiting www.panos.org.uk/iwitness/, where the information for this paragraph on the Fund was sourced from the Panos Media Toolkit No. 3 on ICT’s.

While how to finance the narrowing of the digital divide is a key component of the Tunis summit, who governs it was the topic of the moment in the lead up to the event. The key debates centre around a concern that if corporate interests gain control of the internet it will have serious implications for the extent to which access is made available to all. But calls for reform of internet governance – currently residing under the US-based Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (Icann) – have raised fears that some governments might seek to control the internet at the expense of freedom of expression.

There are therefore two main views on internet governance. Firstly, there are those that want to maintain the status quo, with some reforms. The other view wants to see the internet come under control of the international system as a way to ensure more transparency and accountability. Increasingly, there is also a feeling that the ultimate power of the US government over Icann, even if it is only potential and not actually used, is an obstacle to a fully international, open and equitable system. This information on Icann was sourced from the Panos Media Toolkit on ICTs, No1, available from the website www.panos.org.uk/iwitness/.

The US, however, is strongly opposed to reform and believes that the internet is best served by maintaining Icann as the current system. This deadlock has meant that predictions in the lead up to the summit were that it would pack up without concrete agreement. This has indeed been the case, with civil society generally disappointed with the outcomes of the summit and weak language expected from governments in the final summit statement – essentially language designed to cover up the failure of the summit.

* Please send comments to [email protected]

The IFEX Tunisia Monitoring Group (TMG) has launched a protest against Tunisia's hosting of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in the wake of attacks on journalists and human rights activists in Tunis in the past few days. They note a serious deterioration in conditions related to freedom of expression in Tunisia, particularly with respect to independent organisations , harassment of journalists and dissidents, independence of the judiciary, and the imprisonment of the human rights lawyer, Mohamed Abbou, for voicing his opinion in articles on the Internet. Cumulatively these changes lead us to conclude that the Tunisian government is seeking to further stifle dissent on the eve of the WSIS. "In such conditions," they said, "Tunisia is not a suitable place to hold a United Nations World Summit." The coalition has cancelled plans to hold a WSIS side events, saying a series of incidents, including the stabbing of a French reporter, show how unfit Tunisia is to host a conference on freedom of expression and the Internet.

Ten years ago on this day, Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine other members of the Ogoni community were hanged by the regime of General Sani Abacha. Maja Daruwala, Director of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative asks what progress there has been in institutionalizing human rights in the Commonwealth since his death. Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Malta between 25th and the 27th of November would do well to remember what Ken Saro-Wiwa stood for and prepare to turn their rhetoric into reality.

Today, November 10th, marks ten years since Ken Saro-Wiwa, writer and environmental activist, was killed on the order of General Sani Abacha, the then President of Nigeria. Despite international condemnation, collective hand wringing and the promise of change, ten years on, we still live in a Commonwealth that too readily tolerates human rights abuses from among its own.

In Auckland, in 1995, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting opened to the news that the Nigerian military regime had executed nine members of the Ogoni community, including Ken Saro-Wiwa. The Ogoni people are an ethnic minority living in Nigeria, whose lands have paid rich dividends from oil extraction since the 1950s. Saro-Wiwa had been involved in a non-violent campaign against environmental damage caused by multinational oil companies since, at 17 years old, he began writing letters to newspapers questioning the benefits that the discovery and extraction of oil would bring to the Ogoni people. Since that time, 900 million barrels of oil have been pumped from Ogoni lands and the Ogoni people remain poor and impoverished, even as oil flows through pipes strung across their farms and beside their homes.

In 1990, Saro-Wiwa founded the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). In 1994, following the death of four Ogoni elders who were believed to be sympathetic to the military, he was arrested, held without charge and eventually accused of incitement to murder. Saro-Wiwa denied the charges but was imprisoned for over a year before being found guilty and sentenced to death. His trial was held before a tribunal assembled by the military government, described by then Prime Minister of the UK, John Major, as a ‘fraudulent trial, a bad verdict and an unjust sentence’. In Auckland, the leaders of the Commonwealth condemned Saro-Wiwa’s trial and execution, suspended Nigeria from the Commonwealth, and set about putting into practice its core values of good governance, democracy and the protection of human rights, as contained in the 1991 Commonwealth Harare Declaration. The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, or CMAG, has sprung from this work, and is mandated to investigate serious or ongoing violations of the Harare Principles.

In the ten years since Saro-Wiwa’s death, and the development of this mechanism to monitor adherence to the principles of democracy and human rights in the Commonwealth, some good work has been done. Ministerial missions have, for instance, been sent to Fiji, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, the Solomon Islands and the Gambia. Fiji, the Solomon Islands and Pakistan have all been suspended from the Commonwealth after breaching basic standards of democracy and human rights. However, CMAG, and the Commonwealth, could have, can, and must do much more to protect democracy and human rights among its people. Slow, incremental and hesitant change is no answer for those people who are suffering and vulnerable, but is merely a euphemism for a lack of political will to call an immediate halt to human rights violations. The protection of democracy and human rights is at the heart of the Commonwealth. It is time that we remember this, shout it from our rooftops, and put it into action.

Every two years – in time for the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting – the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) produces a report on an issue of human rights concern common across the Commonwealth. This year, in its report entitled ‘Police Accountability: Too Important to Neglect, Too Urgent to Delay’, CHRI has asked governments to take practical steps toward ensuring that human and democratic rights are promoted through better and more accountable policing. Some of the best policing in the world exists in the Commonwealth, and also some of the worst. Too many police forces across the Commonwealth are too often cited for corruption, bias, and poor performance. Too many are cited for human rights violations ranging from excessive violence, abuse of power and discrimination to curbing democratic practices like freedom of speech.

This year, between the 25th and the 27th of November, the Commonwealth Heads of Government will once again meet to talk over the issues facing the Commonwealth, reach common ground, and form policy to direct its member states. Each Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting is an opportunity to go beyond rhetoric to reality. However, in the past, too many opportunities to make this happen have been squandered. Ten years on from Saro-Wiwa’s death, and ten years on from a renewed recognition of the importance of democracy and human rights to the countries and people of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth Heads of Government have an opportunity to turn their words into action. As the Commonwealth Heads of Government prepare to meet in Malta in 2005, and remember the events and words of Auckland a decade ago, they must not be content to take comfort in incremental and gradual change. This is the comfort of the privileged and the curse of the suffering.

Issues related to safety, security and policing are increasingly growing in importance for both governments and individuals, and pose some of the most significant human rights challenges in the Commonwealth. A recognition of this, and a push for police accountability, by the Commonwealth Heads of Government this year would honour the sentiments enshrined in the principles of the Commonwealth and expressed at Auckland in 1995 and would also be a fitting memorial to Ken Saro-Wiwa.

The tenth anniversary of Saro-Wiwa’s death will be marked with remembrances around the world. His final play, ‘On the Death of Ken Saro-Wiwa’, written a few days before his execution, will be read and performed across the globe. In Canada, there will be a celebration of music and readings by writers and musicians. In London the winner of the Living Memorial, an art competition launched to commemorate him, will be announced. It is crucial that as we remember Saro-Wiwa, we also look forward to the future of our Commonwealth, and resolve to work harder to protect democracy and human rights. Saro-Wiwa stood up for the values that, as a Commonwealth, we stand for. We must remember this. And as the Commonwealth Heads of Government prepare to meet in Malta in 2005, and remember the events and words of Auckland a decade ago, they must also remember this, and prepare to turn the rhetoric of ten years into reality.

* Maja Daruwala is the Director of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, an independent, international NGO working for the practical realisation of human rights in the countries of the Commonwealth. For more information or to download the Police Accountability report, please visit:

* Please send comments to [email protected]

* For another recent Pambazuka News article about Ken Saro-Wiwa, please visit:
http://www.remembersarowiwa.com/lifeksw.htm

“Saro-Wiwa was born in October 1941, the eldest son of a prominent family in Ogoni, which is today in Rivers State, Nigeria. After leaving university he initially pursued an academic career. During the Biafran war (1967-1970) he was a Civilian Administrator for the Port of Bonny, near Ogoni in the Niger Delta. He went on to be a businessman, novelist and television producer. His long-running satirical TV series ‘Basi & Co’ was purported to be the most watched soap opera in Africa.

Two of his best known works were drawn from his observations and experiences of the Biafran war. His most famous work, ‘Sozaboy: a Novel in Rotten English’, is a harrowing tale of a naive village boy recruited into the army. ‘On a Darkling Plain’, is a diary of his experiences during the war.

Ken Saro-Wiwa was consistently concerned about the treatment of Ogoni within the Nigerian Federation and in 1973 was dismissed from his post as Regional Commissioner for Education in the Rivers State cabinet, for advocating greater Ogoni autonomy. Throughout his work he often made references to the exploitation he saw around him as the oil and gas industry took riches from the beneath the feet of the poor Ogoni farmers, and in return left them polluted and disenfranchised.”

For his full life history, please visit http://www.remembersarowiwa.com/lifeksw.htm

WEBSITES DEDICATED TO SARO-WIWA

http://www.november10th.com/
http://www.kensarowiwa.com/
http://www.remembersarowiwa.com

WEBSITES WITH INFORMATION ABOUT SARO-WIWA
http://www.seen.org/pages/rights.shtml
http://www.mosop.org/
http://www.ifex.org/en/content/view/full/70334/
http://www.nu.ac.za/ccs/files/CCS_RREPORTS2_REPORT33.pdf

NEWS ABOUT SARO-WIWA
http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=255721&area=/insight/insight__africa/
http://www.commondreams.org/news2005/1107-15.htm
http://www.tribune.com.ng/051105/news05.htm

BLOGGERS ON SARO-WIWA

http://yawandmog.wordpress.com/2003/09/28/what-would-have-saved-ken-saro-wiwa/
http://xxcommunicator.blogspot.com/2005/11/ken-saro-wiwa-presente.html
http://okrasoup.typepad.com/black_looks/2005/11/remembering_ken.html

The right to education is an integral part of the new African Protocol on Women’s Rights, argues Roselynn Musa. Gender inequalities in education translate into larger socio-economic disparities, and affect not only individuals, but the social and economic development of communities and nations. The Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa offers a powerful tool for remedying these disparities, and addresses not only the grassroots level of the classroom, but also the political processes that grant women access to decision-making.

Everyone has a right to education states the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR, 1948), but today more than half a century after this historic text was adopted, the right to education remains an empty promise for millions of people all over the world, especially women and girls. During the last decade there have been improvements in basic education for women in many countries. A number of countries recorded increased growth in the number of enrolment of both girls and boys. At the same time many African countries have made progress in reducing illiteracy levels, particularly among women and girls. However, despite these improvements only 58% of children of school age are actually enrolled in school (World Conference on Education for All, UNESO, Paris, 2000). With few exceptions educational statistics show large gender disparities. Female-male school enrolment, retention and completion favour boys in a majority of countries. Moreover, African women have the highest illiteracy rate in the world, which in some countries is rising. In addition gender disparities in schooling undermine national efforts for human capital development, thereby slowing down the pace of social and economic development.

The right to education is a human right having major implications for both individuals as well as for social and economic development. Education of women in Africa is imperative given the inverse relationship between female education and other aspects of development.

The educational system in Africa generally reflects gender inequalities. Gender refers not just to women, but also to both men and women, and to the interaction between them. It is important to understand the differences between men and women that are externally influenced, as well as the conditions imposed on them that are based on naturally given biological differences. Gender analysis therefore has to do with both sexes in relation to each other, not in isolation. Furthermore, an understanding of gender does not imply that all women are alike. Race, ethnicity, class, nationality, age, etc, are other factors that may cause significant differences among women themselves and among men as well.

The purpose of looking at gender is not to divide men and women, causing conflict between them, rather it draws our attention to those issues that have brought about unequal relations, and allows us to address these issues with appropriate measures that will help reduce rather than perpetuate inequality. Thus the concept of gender helps focus on growth in terms of equitable distribution of benefits between women and men, equality and power relations between them and, most of all, partnership between them in all fields of development.

Gender equality is based on the premise that all human beings, women and men are free to develop their personal abilities and make choices without the limitations set by stereotypes, rigid gender roles and prejudices. Gender equality means that the different behaviour, aspirations and needs of women and men are considered, valued and favoured equally. It does not mean that women and men have become the same, but rather their rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they were born male or female.

The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa will come into force in November 2005. Article thirty-two of the protocol covers a broad range of human rights issues and advances the human rights for African women through creative, substantive and detailed language. Article 12 addresses the right to education and training.

One of the challenges to women’s educational empowerment in Africa is that decisions on what is to be learnt, at what level and by who are male dominated thus perpetuating gender-based stereotypes. This renders the curriculum inappropriate for the promotion and protection of women’s human rights. While the level of women’s participation is on the increase, certain socio-cultural constraints impede women’s access to vocational, scientific and technical education.

The Protocol obligates state parties to take positive actions to promote women’s education at all levels and in all disciplines. One of the measures that could be useful in addressing gender imbalances in education and training, is for countries to institute and strengthen affirmative action measures including scholarships at all levels for female students, distance and non-formal education and literacy programmes for women, innovative and aggressive strategies to redress the under-representation of women and girls in sciences, mathematics and technology-related disciplines and careers, including the promotion of science among children in general and young girls in particular. Women’s access to professional training should be strengthened.

Women need broad humanistic and scientific education for the same reasons men do, so they can understand and appreciate life, give intellectual and political leadership and make the greatest contribution of which they are capable. In addition to this, the main financial partners of Africa’s educational systems should show their firm commitment to the female population in their interventionist policies.

We must find ways to preserve what remains of our customs while at the same time refuse to accept those aspects of tradition that treat women and children as less than human. For example, the belief that investing in girls’ education is a waste of time and money. This has had and will continue to have devastating consequences on women unless something urgent is done.

Because most programmes for women’s economic development, educational and political equality bow to patriarchal culture and societal imposed stereotypes they are replete with fundamental conceptual flaws.

Approaches that focus on the law while ignoring culture are not likely to turn women’s situation around. We should strive for a condition in which women and men are equal both in laws and facts. If that happens to be the case then our problems will only be solved in fractions, even when we have fifty per cent female representation in positions of power, because these same women are the wives, sisters, daughters, etc of the men out there who the patriarchal system has placed above and therefore superior to women. This approach will be flawed because it refuses to address the cultural factors that impede women’s progress. Because of the current situation of inequality, gender equality cannot be achieved without the empowerment of women especially in the field of education.

Human rights education goes beyond cognitive learning and includes the social and emotional development of all those involved in the educational process. It should aim at developing a culture in which human rights are taught, practised and lived within the school community and spread through interaction with the wider community. Introducing human rights education therefore implies that the school becomes a model of human rights learning and practice. Teachers, as the main depositories of the curriculum, play a key role in reaching this goal.

Some of the factors militating against women’s educational empowerment include, but are not limited to: poverty; sexual abuse/ harassment and rape, which prevent some parents from sending their female children to school; child prostitution; insufficient infrastructure; gender-unfriendly school environment and curricula; gender stereotypes and preference in sending boys to school than girls; workload of the girl child; early marriages/pregnancies; high rate of drop out among girls, especially at secondary and tertiary institutions and lack of gender parity; and lack of policy and monitoring mechanisms. In consideration of some of these the protocol addresses the issue of sexual harassment and the need to introduce human rights education in schools and at the same time make counseling available to students.

The attacks or assaults on female education are manifestations of the same desire to mute the voice of women. The field of science and technology remains almost solely a man’s domain and the very few women that have ‘dared’ to venture there and have done well are seen as the exception rather than the rule. Gone are the days when women and girls are only trained in cooking, embroidery, home economics, etc

An educational system that is designed to subordinate and invalidate women’s experiences vis-à-vis the terrible illiteracy in which so many of our sisters are kept is not just the consequences of poverty, over- work and discrimination within the family, and by extension, the society, but it is also a social mechanism designed to ensure female acquiescence and deny women a public voice, or even a private one for that matter. Education is a powerful tool for empowerment and non-conformity, but ironically, the economic and social development of countries around the world is hampered by shortages of skilled men and women and confounded by widespread ignorance and indifference. If the capacity of people to shape and improve their own lives is the measure of development then educational empowerment of women is a necessary condition as well as a human right.

Achieving gender equality requires specific measures that go beyond the equal treatment of women and men. Such measures must address the politics, laws, procedures, norms, beliefs, practices and attitudes that maintain gender equality. Women must have the capacity to make informed choices about their lives. Efforts to achieve equality between women and men that use a ‘one size fits all’ approach may not take into account the discrimination existing in the past. Fathers, husbands and even brothers may also suppress the potentials of their daughters, wives and sisters because they do not wish them to have an independent identity. It will also be necessary to involve gender-sensitive men in the campaign in order to make a good headway.

Though there has been a great breakthrough in the matter of gender equality, a lot still needs to be done. Discrimination against women continues and practices subordinating women to men and considering girls lower to boys remain in force. The domestication of international, regional and national instruments on women and girls’ rights and the enforcement of existing legislation remain low. Women and girls’ access to justice systems is limited by legal illiteracy, lack of resources and gender insensitivity and bias of law enforcement agents. Violence against women and girls, including rape and domestic violence is rampant, particularly in conflict zones. Some traditional and cultural practices continue to inhibit progress in promoting women and girls’ human rights. In some countries, women are denied equal rights to inherit property, while in others several sources of laws continue to govern their lives and restrict the enjoyment of their rights.

The question to ask is, where are we going and how do we get there? It is an enormous task because when we zero in on women we are confronted by a plight so grim it can break our hearts. We should not be bought over by the gullibility of the larger society that thinks that if the government can just pass the right laws then women will become equal. It is not enough that the government passes a law that says all forms of discrimination against women should be eliminated [Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, Article 12(1a.)] and then women and men are automatically equal. It is naïve to think that just the passing of laws will help women. It has to be backed by action.

Deep and sustainable transformations require a strategic and political vision to the highest level and that is why the protocol has resolved to achieve necessary cultural and institutional transformation in the educational system. One of the initiatives to be taken on the part of the states is the introduction of human rights education in the educational curricula as stated in the protocol.

One of the measures that could be taken to address gender imbalances in education is for countries to institute and strengthen affirmative action measures including scholarships at all levels for female students, distance and non-formal education and literacy programmes for women and girls especially in the sciences and technically oriented disciplines.

Successful strategies for improving girls’ access to and retention in education should be scaled up. The content and culture of schooling should not discriminate against women and girls. One way to bring this about is curriculum reform, gender training for teachers and other people working in the field of curriculum development and for girls and boys generally. This should also include gender-focussed programmes for girls and boys.

A web does not move if you pull only one strand; that way all you do is break it. There is a need to adopt a participatory and multi-disciplinary approach to policy development by involving NGOs, teachers associations and unions, professional and research bodies, and other stakeholders in the preparation of educational policy texts, promoting a human rights based approach to school, governance, management, discipline procedures and other regulations and practices affecting the school culture and access to education.

Human rights education implies changes in the whole educational system. Policy statements and verbal commitments alone are not enough to ensure educational changes. Implementation of the policy should therefore not lie with the Ministries of Education alone, but should involve other stakeholders. There is a political will by government to get girls into schools and bursaries for girls, but more needs to be done in this direction.

In conclusion, some schools already have human rights based clubs; this should be encouraged, while schools that don’t have them should be encouraged to introduce them. In addition, increasing campaigns for girls’ enrolment for science based subjects, reviewing of the school curricular and text books to portray gender sensitive issues and language, providing adult education to older women, increasing the budget for education by government – these are all actions that would take things in the right direction. Human rights education should start at childhood.

* Roselynn Musa works for The African Women's Development and Communication Network (FEMNET) in Kenya and has been involved with the Solidarity on African Women’s Rights, a coalition of women’s organizations working to ratify and domesticate the Protocol on African Women’s Rights.

* Please send comments to [email protected]

Given the prevailing economic and social circumstances facing the African continent, exactly how can Africa begin to chart a path for the future? A conference due to be held this weekend in Durban, South Africa, brings academics together to discuss this question and decide exactly how Africa can reclaim the 21st century.

Introduction

The West tried for centuries to impose its models for development on Africa with limited success and without taking into account existing vast differences in culture and politics on the Continent. In this regard, most post-colonial African states adopted Western blueprints in the form of capitalism or socialism with limited trickling benefits to the general populace. It thus seems that Africa is in most cases worse off now than during colonialism despite billions of aid and investment being poured into the Continent. The continent has witnessed the controversy around which agency is more central in driving the development process between state and markets in an environment dominated by foreign actors, especially the Bretton Woods institutions, through their “one-size fit all” policies in addition to a host of imposed conditionalities. While this controversy continues, the socio-economic and political conditions in a number of States continues to deteriorate by the day.

Development paradigms and policies

Since the 1960s Africa has witnessed a contestation or confusion of development agendas, namely, the nationalist agenda of an autonomous development path anchored upon a derigiste economic nationalism in ideological terms on the one hand, and the Bretton Woods institutions propounding a neo-liberal economic adjustment programme premised upon free market enterprise in ideological terms on the other. The former has been and still is deliberately State-centric and encourages State interventionism in economic management. The latter has evolved as a market-driven development strategy and, as such, deliberately set out to roll back the State.

This ideological contestation has forced the Continent’s leadership to embrace several developmental paradigms and policies, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, in support of the two positions. The debate moved towards convergence in 1997 when the World Bank, through the question “Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?” accepted and appreciated the key role of the State in the socio-economic development of their respective countries. In response African leaders fashioned their own developmental paradigms such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) whose central thrust is collective responsibility towards improving the Continent, including getting directly involved in the search for long-term political stability and sustainable development. Assertive leadership of this responsibility is producing democratic fruits in former troubled nations and regions such as the Great Lakes region, where the return to democracy and constitutional route has resulted in positive socio-economic transformation.

Africa’s Challenges

Political conditions

Africa continues to face political challenges including many politically induced conflicts that have, and will, continue to destabilize both the respective member-State and/or the region. Scarce resources are allocated annually to defense, security and military ministerial portfolios in many African countries as a way of dealing with the prevailing conflicts and/or as a precaution to peace, security and humanitarian concerns, especially in those countries not directly involved in conflict. Post-colonial States have fallen prey to the ploy of destabilization, a factor that scares away both domestic and foreign investors. The prevailing socio-economic conditions have deteriorated in some countries to the point of contributing to the unfolding conflicts. As a result millions of people have been killed, displaced or forced into exile. This development also denies Africa access to its resource – human capital – which is now contributing to global capitalism without any compensation being paid to “our” Continent.

Socio-economic conditions

Africa continues to face unimpressive socio-economic conditions characterized by low economic growths; falling per capita income and life expectancy; rising inflation rates, interest rates and infant mortality rates; deteriorating external and domestic debt stocks; worsening poverty situations evidenced by food dependence, malnutrition and the fact that between 65% to 80% of the Continent’s population is living below the poverty datum line; and lack of access to basic social services (health, education, housing and water).

Macro-economic fundamentals

African countries are at different levels of economic development, depicting wide disparities in their macro-economic fundamentals. Such development impacts negatively on regional economic development strategies. In addition, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are yet to persuade member-States to move towards the convergence of their macro-economic fundamentals, which are explained by other factors. Of great concern at this juncture is also the duplicity of RECs which makes them both weak and vulnerable to external shocks and influence.

Production structure and trade

Production structure on the Continent has remained largely primary production-oriented, a trend that renders Africa the largest net importer of goods and services from the industrialized nations. This means that the Continent specializes in the production of raw materials, but has no input to global pricing. In addition, countries have, in most cases, competed seriously against each other since failure to diversify the economic base means the production and exportation of similar commodities. Africa’s contribution to global trade remains insignificant – just under 2%. This poses the question as to how long can Africa continue to remain in this position.

Access to international markets

Throughout the Continent market reforms have failed to develop the productive sectors. This has resulted in the underdevelopment of industrialization strategies. Even the religious adoption of Western driven economic reforms have failed to rejuvenate the industrial base of most countries on the Continent. The industrial base remains largely narrow and characterized by mono-commodities for export to the same market. This is more pronounced in Southern Africa where, for instance, Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Namibia produce and export diamonds to the same market. Other common export products include tobacco, copper, fish, tea, coffee, horticulture and cotton. This unfortunately generates less foreign currency necessary to meet national import requirements since the majority of member-States are net-importers. In the process this serves as a constraint to industrial development. At the same time debt service obligations means the availability of fewer resources to support the social sector; the very foundation for building a sound human resource base which is deemed critical for the Continent’s developmental needs.

The debt burden

At a time when the Continent is grappling with many challenges, member-States have accumulated large, but growing external debt which takes away a significant proportion of available resources for debt servicing. Industrial development requires foreign currency which is used to service debt, while sacrificing social service provisions in the process. In addition, no significant innovation is taking place to improve the future prospects of the Continent. A high debt overhang creates uncertainty for both domestic and foreign investors. It is a situation that adversely affects a country’s credit ratings and perception of risks. Furthermore, it limits potentially viable firms from accessing finance from the international capital markets. Moreover, the qualification of most countries to the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) initiative, has failed to extricate the Continent from this position. This means that the debt burden is not only retarding economic growth and development, but it has also become economically exhausting and unsustainable, politically destabilizing and ethically unacceptable.

Aid flows and donor-recipient relations

While industrialized economies pledge to increase aid flow to countries with sound socio-economic policies and democratic practices, in many cases this pledge has come with conditions and selective application. Inter-State relations has come to the fore, raising the question of whether aid is a developmental instrument or a vehicle to globalize capitalism, which is in search of markets. It appears that aid flows have gone beyond the realm of economic policies to include new conditionalities of good governance; respect for the rule of law and the environment; and observance of human rights. In addition, foreign direct investments (FDIs) tend to ignore certain regions. In particular sub-Saharan Africa has remained an unfavourable destination of this capital formation.

The current situation in Africa is not promising in terms of crafting sustainable endogenous policy directions, options and space. Despite decades of implementing developmental paradigms and policies on her own and/or in collaboration with global strategic partners, Africa has remained the poorest region in the world. Indeed, of the 53 countries on the Continent, only 7 countries have graduated onto the globally ranked middle income category (Countries include Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa [World Development Indicators database, World Bank, July 2005]).

The least developing countries (LDCs) category are of great concern which suffer from huge, but growing external debt overhang and limited capacity to industrialize and generate foreign currency necessary to meet national requirements. To date, Africa contributes less than 2% to the total global market, while it attracts only 2% of the FDIs inflows. In addition, the adoption of Western driven initiatives, presumed to offer lifelines to millions of poverty stricken people in the form of debt relief and free access to European markets under “everything else but arms (EBA)” initiatives, has failed to produce positive tangible results. Similarly, the adoption of neo-liberal policies has also failed to produce a success story to act as a model for policy options. Notable also is the failure of developmental State paradigms and policies to produce success stories. Indeed, Africa has remained stuck in the same predicament of an underdevelopment web characterized by unimpressive socio-economic indicators, unstable political environments and conflict situations, while countries in other Continents are making progress.

While Africa is preoccupied with identifying and correcting policy errors of the past, the formulation of its relations with developed regions is premised within the neo-liberal paradigm despite entrenching weak and vulnerable States towards the ambit of global institutions and agendas. A significant number of States have become increasingly vulnerable to the donor payroll, a development that weakens State capacity to offer alternative policy options, policy space and policy directions. This further exposes the same weak State to the dictates of donors, resulting in a vicious cycle of borrowing, harsh conditions, and unavoidable compromises in terms of a State’s responsibility to its citizens.

In this context, The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the African Futures Institute (AFI) are holding a two day conference focusing on the question: “Can Africa (re)claim the 21st Century?” In this spirit there are many questions regarding development that remains unanswered which the conference can raise and provide pointers on. A revisit to developmental paradigms and policies requires further interrogation by African scholars, given the prevailing socio-economic and political conditions prevailing on the Continent. Therefore the conference will bring together various scholars and policy makers from the Continent to discuss these issues.

Building sustainable strong state-citizens relationship offers unique opportunity to empower the organs of the states to become truly African with the “strong” belief that “Africa is for Africans”. This is imperative to mould the pillars of states to uniquely guide socio-economic and political transformation in a manner that facilitates development. In this respect, the conveners are expecting the debate to focus on how Africa should de-industrialize the donor sector and all its tentacles, which for long, has undermined the acceptance of “uhuru” developmental strategies and paradigms on the basis that Africans can not kick-start the developmental steps of their territories without externally driven resources and guidance, a development that demonizes the self-reliance concepts as baseless and unsustainable.

Indeed, as conveners, we will be happy to be associated with the creation of the right attitude in which Africans appreciate that poverty alleviation is in our own interest rather than the donor sector; that externalization of Africa’s resources is the main contributor to the growing external debt overhang; that domesticating Africa’s resources provides the basis for native industrialization strategies; that trade negotiations requires African resources to prepare in consultations of all the constituencies; and that demonisation of self-reliance principles is a “defeatist attitude” based on the “blame game” theory.

Africa has all the right signs for claiming the 21st Century. In this regard, it is imperative for her to exploit every opportunity that arises with positivist attitude. Indeed, the time to lament historical injustices and causal relationships for the present “status squo” is over. It’s high time that Africa realizes that globalization has no room for philanthropic and benevolent gestures, hence the expectation for the right attitude and a continent-orientated policy framework.

* Richard Kamidza is a Senior Researcher at The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), Durban, South Africa

* Please send comments to [email protected]

Exploring genocide in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (http://www.pambazuka.org/index.php?id=29835) and an examination of security and resource issues fuelling conflict in the Great Lakes region (http://www.pambazuka.org/index.php?id=30071) have been the subjects of two recent articles in Pambazuka News. In the third contribution to the discussion of the region, Ndung'u Wainaina examines the challenge of post-conflict reconstruction in the Great Lakes region: “Immediate concerns can be identified as ending existing ongoing conflicts, putting in place measures to prevent new ones, laying the ground for building sustainable peace and planning on post conflict reconstructions,” he writes.

Many people have argued that countries in the Great Lakes region are in perpetual conflict and disintegration by virtue of their ethnic composition. But in some cases, ethnic diversity is actually a blessing in disguise depending on the political ideology and level of societal socialisation, although this does not in any way mean that ethnicity has not caused havoc. Many countries in West Africa and the Great Lakes are however driven to war not due to their ethnic diversity. Other critical factors have contributed to the conflicts in the Great lakes region.

Conflict is inextricably related to poverty and human development. When a whole segment of society is excluded from socio-economic and political activities, there is every reason for that section to group and wage a war for recognition. Secondly, inequitable sharing of valuable natural resources fuels conflicts. It is self-evident that wherever in Africa there are minerals or such other lucrative resources, conflicts are ignited. Conflicts have turned into cover-ups for looting, corruption and supporting local dictatorships by both local and international actors.

Thirdly, a sustainable democracy is about functioning, independent and democratic institutions. People are able to vent their concerns through these institutions. Finally, as argued above ethnic diversity in itself provides little impetus to conflict. However, a polarized society based on other factors is more likely to break into a civil war. Such issues as historical discrimination and grievances, sharing of national wealth, social exclusion in decision-making processes, widespread atrocities against a group at the hands of another etc. can easily spark conflict.

In an attempt to address conflicts in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa, immediate concerns can be identified as ending existing ongoing conflicts, putting in place measures to prevent new ones, laying the ground for building sustainable peace and planning on post conflict reconstructions. Here the focus should take both national and sub-regional dimensions since as much as the conflict may be internal; it has tremendous cross border effects. Moreover, future political stability and democracy is achieveable via sustainable capacity building of personnel and leadership, institutional transformations, developing progressive post-conflict rehabilitation, a reconstruction and development agenda and the adoption of good governance practices.

A desire for justice and accountability is crucial for the processes of restoring peace, security and post conflict reconstruction in the Great Lakes. Civil society has a great role to play in this process. Addressing atrocities in a time of transition poses a fundamental challenge and yet it is extremely significant in avoiding future conflicts and autocratic dictatorships. Due to the cross border nature of some of the conflicts in this sub-region, the possibility of establishing accountability mechanisms that transcend borders may be an option in the future.

It is important for any justice and accountability mechanisms to be open and democratic through wide consultations with the relevant stakeholders and for decisions to be made in a transparent manner. Further these mechanisms have to be designed in a comprehensive and holistic way. These issues are crucial in avoiding discontent and thwarting any attempts to create an impunity gap. Civil society participation in the pre-transition consultations is fundamental in ensuring that final transitional decisions are not determined and conditioned by parties to the conflict.

Local and regional civil society initiatives in partnership with the international civil society community are very critical in providing technical assistance and expertise to countries emerging from such conflicts. One such role may involve bringing together stakeholders in each country, in consultation with neighbouring expertise for input, to develop an appropriate national strategy of pursuing justice and reconciliation policies as a way of cementing the move to democracy. However, such initiatives should be mutually reinforcing. For practical proposes such initiatives could explore mechanisms for establishing truth about the conflict in a non-judicial fora, crafting reparation policy for victims, transforming institutions, initiating vetting processes and formulating progressive socio-economic programs that guarantee equality and inclusion.

Collaboration initiatives in advancing post conflict accountability and securing lasting peace are an essential component in achieving the implementation of emerging international justice and accountability mechanisms as well as charting national policies and institutional responses. Further, signed peace agreement frameworks have created openings for further negotiations and consultations in stabilizing and institutionalizing the rule of law.

International intervention across the Great lakes region in post conflict situations is critical in providing basic information on experiences and lessons learned elsewhere; capacity building; technical expertise, especially in legal matters; information and database construction; and the mobilization of human and financial resources. In devising post conflict reconstruction programs, international obligations should be observed, particularly in relation to international human rights and humanitarian laws.

In order to avoid accusations that the international community captured the local initiatives, the intervention should be designed to strengthen local expertise and capabilities. The creation of a peace building commission and human rights council within the United Nations framework means more responsibility. For instance, the UN was requested to facilitate transitional mechanisms in the post conflict Burundi situation. As the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa region undergo transition, the civil society role in these areas is crucial, as issues of accountability and justice have become an integral part of the transition worldwide.

* Ndung'u Wainaina is a Transitional Justice Fellow and Co-founder of the International Center for Policy and Conflict, a Nairobi-based Transitional Justice Initiative.

* Please send comments to

A firebomb attack on a policeman last Friday was the latest in a series of six similar explosions targeting state institutions that have hit the tiny mountain kingdom of Swaziland in the last month. The attacks have been blamed by Africa’s last remaining ruling monarchy on banned political groups and come at a time when there is growing criticism of King Mswati III’s extravagant lifestyle in parallel with widespread impoverishment and the world's highest known rates of HIV/AIDS infection. Pambazuka News sent some questions on the situation in Swaziland to Bongani Masuku, Secretary General of the Swaziland Solidarity Network, an umbrella body of groups working for democracy in Swaziland. Zimbabwe is not the only problem country in the region, Masuku reveals.

PAMBAZUKA NEWS: What's the mood like in Swaziland these days with regards to electoral reform and democracy?

BONGANI MASUKU: A mood of both despair and anger is the only way I can try to intrepret the situation on the ground. The people feel a sense of despair, because they, for the meantime, are not able to stop the royal regime bulldozing and imposing its interests on the whole nation, knowing well that it has at its disposal all the instruments of force, whilst the progressive voices have no adequate support to mount a sustained offensive against this, at least for now. The international community is vocal elsewhere - where its own interests are at stake - and silent on Swaziland, where it is not interested or where its interests are best secured by the current regime, which is part of the double standards we see everyday in realpolitik.

The anger is informed by the fact that when all nations of the world are discussing serious ways to develop themselves and confront major issues like poverty, HIV and AIDS, unemployment, human security, sustainable livelihoods, participation of women and economic justice through redistribution, we have a situation in our country where the opposite is true. We are still rooted in backward and primitive ways that safeguard the selfish and greedy interests of a royal minority and their friends, all in the name of culture. We are still unable to enjoy even the most basic rights that other people elsewhere are beginning to take for granted as given and inevitable, such as the right to form and belong to an organisation of your choice, particularly on the basis of shared political opinion.

PAMBAZUKA NEWS: A post-9/11 anti-terrorism bill has been tabled again in the Swazi parliament in the wake of two recent fire bombings in the capital, Mbabane. Opposition groups are worried that King Mswati III might use the legislation to stifle dissent. Are there grounds for this concern?

BONGANI MASUKU: Concerns around the Anti-terrorism Bill relate to the fact that the definition of terrorism is not legitimate, neither is it broadly agreed to, but is rather an attempt to stain the legitimate activities of the progressive movement. PUDEMO, together with its youth wing, SWAYOCO, have been the main victims in the past of this label, for obvious reasons. In this regard, the regime is still looking for ways to legitimise its illegitimate attack on the activities of the progressive movement, which have become understood by every democracy-loving person all over the world. It is trying to secure a space in the global atmosphere characterised by insecurity, as a partner in the search for peace, but in the process it is also seeking to use that space to crush the democratic movement. It has used such acts for years, such as the definition of political activities as criminal activities or outlawed/illegal activities. These are the crude methods it has used to maintain itself in power, hence the obvious fact that this is not meant to target some terrorist somewhere, but the "terrorist", as defined by the royal regime.

PAMBAZUKA NEWS: The government branded the firebomb attacks as "terrorism". Where they?

BONGANI MASUKU: While we are not sure about the firebomb, we can only assume that these are the legitimate expressions of accumulated anger by the people and their response to the sustained wave of violence, state terror and naked brutality being meted out by the regime against the people. The people are not limited in the way they respond to state-enforced terror, they respond in the manner they deem appropriate to defend the cause they stand and believe in.

PAMBAZUKA NEWS: Swaziland's parliament consists of a 65-seat House of Assembly, 10 of whose members are appointed by the king, and a 30-seat Senate. All the senators are appointed, either by the House of Assembly or the king. In this context, there have been calls for electoral reform. What progress has or is being made in this area?

BONGANI MASUKU: With regard to the reformation of parliament and general electoral reform, what we have seen is attempts to subvert legitimate demands or calls for electoral reform through diversion, confusion and reconfiguration of the people's legitimate intentions to suit the purpose of the regime in seeking to maintain the fundamental bases of the system, but interfere with some of its manifestations in such a way that it appears that there has been a change in the way things are. In other words, the regime seeks to announce change, but resists change in actual fact. It changes the gowns of the rapists and not the character of the rapist, but parades the rapist as a new person. This includes the fact that multiparty democracy is still illegal, the media is still royal-controlled, the judiciary is still royal-stage-managed and all structures of society are still coerced, through overt and covert or subtle means.

PAMBAZUKA NEWS: The Central Bank of Swaziland reported in its annual review in September that the economic situation in the country had deteriorated over the last year. Swaziland is believed to have one of the worst rates of child poverty. Why is this?

BONGANI MASUKU: The issue of the deteriorating situation and poverty in the country is a hallmark of the system's generalised crisis levels. Many people have downplayed the extent of the crisis in Swaziland, but daily they are being forced to admit that the country is collapsing, and in the process shaming all those who had always claimed that all is well and that the only problem in the region is Zimbabwe. The royal family has caused so much economic bleeding that the country's economy can no longer take it anymore. The royal parasites are milking the cow to death, hence there is no way it can survive, however fat it is. The country's reserves shall be depleted sooner than many people think and soon, public servants will not be paid, as already many services, particularly public social services have totally collapsed, such as health, education, and basic community needs. The indicators to the extent of the poverty crisis are reflected in the fact of the following; HIV and AIDS levels at 38%, unemployment levels at 40%, high illiteracy levels, high child mortality rates, landlessness and the general state of social conditions of life, as well as the crisis of privatisation and retrenchments.

PAMBAZUKA NEWS: A flood of textile imports from China has hit Southern Africa hard. What has been the impact on the labour force in Swaziland?

BONGANI MASUKU: The flood of textile imports from China which has hit Southern Africa have had a dramatic impact on the labour force of Swaziland, hence the closure, if not increased rate of exploitation, in most textile companies. This is related to other matters such as the loss of preferential trade rates in the world market, which have threatened at one point to cost 15 000 jobs in such a small country and in one sector only. But it would be narrow minded to just isolate China, because the fluidity in the global market has imposed a particular amount of fragility, such that poor countries have been the ultimate losers. So it is a combination of factors, amongst others, the disinvestment by rich countries in productive sectors, as well as extreme and unregulated capital mobility, which, together impact negatively on the economic situation in the country.

PAMBAZUKA NEWS: What is the path forward suggested by the Swaziland Solidarity Network in terms of moving the country forward?

BONGANI MASUKU: The Swaziland Solidarity Network suggests a process that could move the country forward underpinned by the following factors (our perspectives are underpinned by the historic PUDEMO document, entitled ‘Way forward towards a Constituent Assembly through a negotiated settlement’). In summary they state that:

a) There must be a commitment by the monarchy to a genuine process of fundamental transformation in the form of a memorandum of intent; and to a process underwritten by a credible international organisation to safeguard against the tendency of the royal regime to renege on commitments;

b) This must be followed by a preliminary process, which shall be inclusive of all formations in the country, which is popularly known as the talks about talks on the critical issues facing our country. It is at this stage that there will be formal removal of all laws that militate against democratic progress and free political participation;

c) The next stage should be a negotiation stage, where the actual negotiations about the kind of society Swaziland should be must take place and all stakeholders must agree to a clearly defined process of transformation in political and constitutional terms. The outcome of this process shall include the draft constitution which shall guide the elections of a Constituent Assembly;

d) The Constituent Assembly is the democratically elected body of political representatives, mandated to formally write a constitution for the country;

In broad political terms, this is part of the critical process needed to drive forward the constitutional debate out of the current political quagmire and structural dilemma into which years of royal misrule has plunged our country. However, we also need a clear and workable alternative political process, which seeks to unite all the progressive organisations around a clear and viable framework for fundamental change in Swaziland.

This requires leadership of stature, advanced political and organisational foresight, mass mobilisation and a properly co-ordinated international solidarity movement, to support the genuine cause of the struggling people of Swaziland.

* Interview conducted by email. Please send comments to [email protected]

The Tanzanian National Electoral Commission (NEC) announced this week that general elections will take place on 14 December following the postponement of a 30 October poll due to the death of a presidential running mate. Elections did take place 30 October on Tanzania's semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar, with the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Party for the Revolution) winning the elections. The vote was marred by clashes between security forces and opposition supporters. Issa Shivj assesses the choices available for Tanzanian voters.

‘So my prayer to the socialist god is to get to have the American one-party system in Tanzania. ... So my hope is that you can have another party; you can have two parties in Tanzania, both believing in the essentials of the Arusha Declaration. Then try to see which is going to be more efficient in implementing it. But one socialist party, one capitalist party well, theoretically yes, but I don’t know how it can work.’

Julius Nyerere said this fifteen years ago when the debate on multi-party democracy had just begun and the Nyalali commission (The Justice Francis Nyalali Commission in the early 1990s found that only 20 per cent of Tanzanians wanted to revert to the multiparty political system) was making the rounds of the country to get people’s views. Nyerere went on to draw an analogy with the American system where, he said, there were two parties; ‘but they’re really one party!’ ‘Both parties agree on the basic national objectives. Internally, both of them are highly capitalist. Externally, both of them are imperialist.’ Elsewhere, Nyerere expressed the hope that the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) would split and that you would get two strong parties, both socialist and both nationalist.

The socialist god, fortunately for a few, unfortunately for the many, did not answer any of Nyerere’s prayers. Instead of the CCM splitting into two strong parties, it buried the Arusha Declaration itself, and with it both nationalism and socialism.

Today we have some 18 or so parties with perhaps two or three credible ones. But there is hardly any great difference in their vision, outlook or major policies. All are donor-dependent; all are driven by the neo-liberal policies of liberalisation, privatisation and the enrichment of the minority; the so-called “Washington consensus”; and none has a credible vision of constructing a national, democratic economy and polity in the interest of the large majority. So, when Tanzanians went to the polls in a third multi-party election last weekend, what was there to choose from? For the purposes of discussion we may cluster the choices into three types: the common sense, the pragmatic and the rational. Theoretically, there is also the fourth, the principled choice, based on principles and policies of a party. But this, as I said, was not available. The fourth choice did not exist.

The common sense choice dictates to err on the side of caution. This is best expressed in the old adage, ‘better the devil you know, than the devil you don’t know’. Common sense, however, is not always good sense. If you continue to strengthen the devil you know, there is a likelihood that he may be further emboldened to become even more devilish. These overwhelming electoral victories or what are called “ushindi wa kishindo”, or with an even more ominous connotation, “ushindi wa tsunami”, have their consequences. Few parties, and still fewer individuals, who have got into the political seat with 70-80 per cent vote, can resist the arrogance of power. Self-control in the exercise of power is a rare phenomenon.

The second type of choice is a pragmatic one. Here the voter is moved neither by instinct nor by principles and much less by reason. The motive force is either immediate self-interest - bribes and favours - or a racial, regional, religious or gender prejudice and bias. In our current political scenario, as a matter of fact, the pragmatic choice reigns supreme. We have already seen it in the internal nomination processes of the parties and should prepare ourselves to see more of it during the elections. Supposedly, there are watch dogs like the electoral commissions who are supposed to check such practices. But who watches the watch dogs?

Then there is the third set of choices, which we call a rational choice. In absence of the availability of a principled choice, the most rational choice would be for a political configuration which assures some stability, security, basic freedoms and checks on gross abuse and misuse of power. In our situation, theoretically, it means a union parliament which would have a strong presence of the opposition, over, say, 40 per cent of the seats. As for the presidency, ideally, the winning candidate should end up with slightly over 50 per cent of the votes. In other words, “ushindi wa kishindo: should disappear from our political scene.

Since we are a two-government union, the rational choice would be that different political parties are elected to run the two governments. The constant threat and fear whipped up by some ruling circles and their spokespersons that any party other than CCM forming the Zanzibar government would spell disaster for the union is a political scarecrow. No politician, even with a modicum of political sense, would advocate, and much less attempt, complete independence for Zanzibar. The union question is, in my view, not about secession; it is really about greater autonomy. And as I have always maintained, the union question should be contextualized, discussed and debated within the larger question of the grassroots democratisation of our politics. No people can have democracy for themselves if they are denying democracy to others.

The rational choice is not necessarily a principled choice. One only hopes, that the scenario painted here would create necessary conditions and open up space for the people to discuss and determine the vision and organise themselves to realise that vision. In other words, the rational choice would create an enabling environment for a principled choice.

But the rational choice pre-supposes certain pre-conditions. One is that the elections should be free and fair; free of corruption, rigging and other malpractices. On the part of the ruling party, it means “ushindi wa kishindo” should remain an aspiration. It should not become a coded message for “ushindi wa kishindo” by any means, fair or foul!

On the part of the opposition parties, it means not only to place on offer more democratic political governance, but also, a serious, critical and persuasive analysis of the promises and performance of the incumbent government over the last ten years. It is a telling comment on the opposition parties that so far they have not even been able to tell us what has happened to our society over the last ten years and yet, we feel it in our bones that this country has undergone fundamental changes, not only in its political and economic direction but in its social character. A good political leader is one who can explain systematically what people feel confusedly.

One cannot obviously expect such an analysis from the ruling party. Self-criticism is not, and has never been, a credo of bourgeois parties. They would only provide a score-board with ticks on achievements. It is the opposition which has the duty to raise, at least, question marks. If they fail to do so, then this time around, people would be justified in raising a big question mark against the very system of multi-party politics in Africa.

© Issa Shivji. Shivji is Professor of Law at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

* Please send comments to

We, the 42 members of 33 organizations participating in the Conference of African Freedom of Expression Organisations held in Accra, Ghana, from October 28 to 30, 2005, under the auspices of the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), Media Rights Agenda (MRA) and Journaliste en Danger (JED), with sponsorship from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisations (UNESCO);

Concerned by the continued violation of freedom of expression across Africa;

Concerned by the increasing enactment and abuse of repressive media laws in many parts of the continent;

Further concerned by the killings, imprisonments and arbitrary arrests and detentions of journalists and media workers, and the arbitrary suspension and closure of media outlets around the continent;

Gravely concerned by the lack of response of the African Union and the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to address these serious violations of freedom of expression;

Recalling the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in October 2002;

Recalling the Resolution on the Mandate and Designation of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression in Africa by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights adopted in December 2004;

Recalling the appeal to the African Union made by more than 100 media and freedom of expression organizations on the occasion of World Press Freedom Day 2005;

Welcoming the commitment and the Statement of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on World Press Freedom Day 2005 reiterating the importance of freedom of expression and the role of the media;

We call on the African Union to:

1. strengthen the existing mechanisms on freedom of expression in Africa;
2. ensure that the current Special Rapporteur Mechanism is fully independent and is provided with the necessary resources to efficiently execute the mandate;
3. take into account freedom of expression in the peer review mechanism process under the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD);
4. urge African Union members to respect freedom of expression and to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur to address the challenges of freedom of expression across Africa;
5. urge African governments to adopt a Treaty on Freedom of Expression in Africa;
6. urge the African Union to establish as a matter of urgency the African Court on Human Rights and make it operational.

We further call on the African Union to:

1. ensure the release of all arbitrarily detained Eritrean journalists and political prisoners held incommunicado since 2001;
2. ensure that an independent investigation is conducted to probe the murder of journalist Deyda Hydara in the Gambia;
3. closely monitor the situation of freedom of expression in Tunisia and ensure that freedom of expression advocates are protected and prisoners of conscience are freed;
4. take urgent measures to protect journalists and media practitioners in Somalia against the violent attacks and harassment by officials of local authorities and non-state actors.

Done this 30th of October 2005 in Accra

Attached is the list of organizations

* * * * *

Host Organisations

1. Journaliste en Danger (JED)
2. Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA)
3. Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA)
4. Media Rights Agenda (MRA)

Participating Organisations

African Organisations
5. AFMF: Africa Free Media Foundation (formerly NDIMA Network for the Defence of Independent Media in Africa)
6. AMDISS: Association for Media Development in Southern Sudan
7. CNLT: National Council for Liberties in Tunisia
8. CREDO: Centre for Research Education & Development of FoX & Associated Rights
9. EFJA: Ethiopian Free Press Journalists Association
10. FAMEDEV: Inter-Africa Network for Women, Media, Gender Equity & Development
11. FXI: Freedom of Expression Institute
12. HornAfrik Media
13. NGE: Nigerian Guild of Editors
14. OMAC: Organisation des Medias d’Afrique Centrale
15. OTM: Observatoire Togolas des Medias
16. PIWA: Panos Institute West Africa
17. SCFE: Somali Coalition for Free Expression
18. TAEF: All Africa Editors Forum
19. URATEL: Union des Radios & Televisions libres du Togo
20. WAJA/OJAO: West Africa Journalist Association/ Union des journalistes de l’Afrique de l’Ouest

Non-African Organisations
21. ARTICLE 19: Global Campaign for Free Expression
22. Free Voice
23. IFEX/AMARC: International Freedom of Expression eXchange/World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters
24. IFJ: International Federation of Journalists
25. IMS: International Media Support
26. Index on Censorship
27. OSI: Open Society Initiative - Network Media Program and Justice Initiative
28. CHRI: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative

Ghana Organisations
29. AI: Amnesty International, Ghana Chapter
30. GCRN: Ghana Community Radio Network
31. CHRAJ: Commission on Human Rights & Administrative Justice
32. Ghana Bar Association
33. Ghana Journalists Association

The implementation of the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa will inevitably involve legal strategies. Prior even to its legal implementation, however, is the requirement that the treaty be broadly known by all spheres of society.

In regards to legal strategies, one of the most primary conditions for its implementation will be the harmonisation of national legislation with the treaty. By signing on to the Protocol, countries are bound to the African Charter, and must adopt specific legal measures. The initiative to harmonize the protocol should come from the state, but in the case that the government is slow to respond, there is nothing stopping civil society organizations from taking the lead. While there is no single model for procedural steps to harmonization, a potentially useful tool would be the organization of a convention.

Calling together all those parties interested in the implementation – senior staff from appropriate ministries, magistrates, advocates, police staff, parliamentarians, professors, researchers, women’s rights activists and the media – the end goal could potentially be a draft implementation law. Not only could this involve the key players, but it could also act as a source of information dissemination if given adequate media coverage. Leading up to the ratification and consequent implementation, however, women’s rights activists in Africa should be prepared for close cooperation with the political and administrative structures concerned, and should also be familiar with the processes and methods by which their work is done.

Under the African Charter, there is a requirement for member states to present, every two years, to the African Commission on the status of implementation of newly ratified protocols. Reviews of these reports are carried out not only by the African Commission, but also by NGOs, specifically those that have observer status at the regional body. Areas of concern can be identified and recommendations can thus be made.

Litigation is perhaps the most delicate strategy in the implementation of the Protocol, as it has the capacity to work both for and against women’s rights, especially in the climate of the African Commission, which has, after sixteen years of existence, never examined a case relating to a women’s rights violation. “The effectiveness of women’s rights protection will pass by the establishment of strategic litigation but which require, at national level, that certain conditions be satisfied regarding environment and the attitude of the judge on the one hand, and, on the other hand, vigorous training of human rights activists (men and women) and of those responsible for human rights organisations on the issue.” Modules related to the training of magistrates and human rights activists will be necessary, as will the need to ensure the regular publication and popularization of the convention’s ratification.

The ratification of the Protocol is simply the first step in a difficult and lengthy process, and will mean nothing without its proper and prompt implementation. To quote the report’s conclusion at length: ““Do not ask me if the legislation of a given country is good. Rather ask me if the laws in force are applied”. This saying must be . . . the leitmotif of all those who fight for the effective respect of women’s rights in Africa. Now that we have at our disposal one of the most revolutionary treaties regarding the protection of women’s rights, our fight must be to do everything possible so that it may start being implemented in the states, which have ratified it. It is at that cost that human rights will be actually the rights of “human beings” that is, “those assumptions that every human being has the right to enjoy the fact of their humanity” and that they will contribute to creating a united, an integrated, a justice – oriented Africa, an Africa of peace, of political, economic, social and cultural integration, which gives back to Panafricanism its full meaning” and composed of “democratic states that are respectful of human rights and ones concerned by the building of balanced societies.””

* This is a summarised version of a paper presented at a conference on the Ratification and Domestication of The African Union Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on Rights of Women in Africa. The conference, held between 27-30 September in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was co-convened by the African Union Commission and the Solidarity for African Women’s Rights Coalition (SOAWR). The full length versions of all papers presented at the conference will be released in book form in January 2006.

* Summarized by Karoline Kemp, Commonwealth of Learning Young Professionals Intern, Fahamu

* Please send comments to [email protected]

Two weeks ago in an article for Pambazuka News, Carol Chehade explored the “seamless borders of genocide” in the Democratic Republic of Congo (http://www.pambazuka.org/index.php?id=29835). In this article Yav Katshung Joseph weighs into the discussion about the DRC with an exploration of the security and resource issues fuelling conflict in the Great Lakes Region. Internal normalisation, the establishment of the rule of law, reconciliation and reconstruction on a regional level are key to bringing peace and security to millions of citizens, he argues.

Several interconnected elements have shaped the conflict in the Great Lakes Region: neighbouring countries’ interests, economic resources, security concerns, ethnic division and so on. That is true for all core countries of the Great Lakes region (Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and Uganda) and it has been established by many observers and analysts that the root causes of the conflicts are insecurity, issues of identity, poor governance, political opportunism with its military options, and selfish economic interests (See J. Cartier-Bresson, Revue Tiers-Monde, n°174, Tome XLIV, avril–juin 2003).

In this regard, if realistic possibilities for conflict transformation are to be developed, the resources and security concerns will need to be addressed. Therefore, this article will focus only on these two issues: resources and security. I will offer my perspective on the how to transform conflicts by using resources and security as tools of reconciliation and reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region.

Security and Resources as sources of conflict in the Great Lakes Region

Security concerns

The question of security throughout the region has continued to be a major issue. The cycle of violence in the Great Lakes region began with the 1993 civil war in Burundi, which was followed by the 1994 Rwandan genocide targeting ethnic Tutsi and moderate Hutus. Both conflicts resulted in large numbers of refugee flows into neighbouring Zaire (now the DRC). The conflict then spread into Zaire, as both Tutsis and Hutus reside there in significant numbers.

Rwanda, citing the need not only to protect its own citizens from attacks by Hutus, but also to protect Tutsi-Congolese, launched incursions into eastern DRC in 1996.

In the beginning of the war in the DRC (1996), Rwanda and Uganda formed an alliance with the Congolese rebel movement led by Laurent Kabila. However, this “triple K” alliance (Kampala-Kinshasa-Kigali) fell apart in 1998, because of the number of security concerns cited by Uganda and Rwanda. Uganda maintained that it needed to stop insurgents (the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic Forces) from attacking Uganda through southern Sudan and eastern DRC. The Rwandan government invoked the right to “self-defence” against cross-border incursions into its territory by DRC-based Hutu militias. In reaction to the growing hostilities, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe justified their military intervention in the DRC by stating that they were seeking to preserve the unity of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) member state (Chad also provided a small number of troops at the DRC government’s request).

Political and security justifications for their intervention notwithstanding, the opportunity to exploit the DRC’s lucrative natural resources also provided an impetus for the military intervention of some states of the region. However, while the clamour for economic resources may well have proved to be an obstacle to peace in the DRC, the conflict has been triggered by the security concerns of neighbouring states such as Rwanda and Uganda, who argue that it is necessary to stop the incursions into their territories, of various armed groups based in the Congo.

Resource concerns

One of the most perplexing issues in the DRC conflict has been and remains that of the exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources. Illegal exploitation of the mineral resources of DRC has been a constant feature in the discussion about the war in DRC in general, and especially in the eastern part of the country. A main dividing line in different analysis has been between those highlighting the exploitation of mineral resources as a main aim for the foreign armed forces, and others seeing their use of existing resources mainly as a way of financing the war efforts. It has long been established that the exploitation of these resources, including coltan, gold, and diamonds in eastern Congo, and diamonds, copper, cobalt, and timber in central DRC, contributed to and exacerbated the conflict in the DRC. Concerned with reports of pillaging of resources by the foreign forces, the UN Security Council mandated an independent panel to investigate these allegations. The panel has produced a series of reports, detailing the circumstances of this exploitation.

Regional actors have been accused of aggression and “foreign adventurism” with regard to Congolese territory and natural resources. In other words, while parties to the conflict in the country may have been originally motivated by security concerns, their continued presence in the DRC is attributable to economic gains derived from the DRC. The report further stated that criminal groups linked to the armies of Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the Government of the DRC have benefited from such micro-conflicts. This has been the conflict, and by extension any envisaged conflict resolution mechanism, an intricate affair requiring a multifaceted and comprehensive approach. This is critical for the peace process, because, according to reports, these “groups will not disband voluntarily... They have built up a self-financing war economy centred on mineral exploitation” (See Final report by the UN Panel of Experts).

The rationale for intervention by the neighbouring states became self-enforcing and the localised conflicts became regional. As such, the conflicts within and between the countries of the Great Lakes require regionally based and targeted solutions, along with the cooperation of relevant neighbouring states.

Transforming Security and Resources as sources of conflict to options for reconciliation and reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region

Reconciliation and reconstruction are essential elements of peace building. The key to transforming conflicts is to build strong equitable relations where distrust and fear were once the norm (Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to Settlement. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 322-335).

In the Great Lakes Region as in many African countries, violent conflict has become the “normal” state of affairs. Control of economic resources has become an important factor in motivating and sustaining armed conflicts. Complex political economies, which often hide behind the outward symbols of statehood and national sovereignty, have grown up around conflict. The challenge therefore is to transform regional and national political economies that are served by violent conflict into healthy systems based on political participation, social and economic inclusion, and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Accordingly, attempting to transform conflicts for reconciliation and reconstruction in the Great Lakes Region, all countries should try to stimulate positive developments in the region that will enable them to conclude that their security and economic interests are better served through fostering stability at home and improving relations with their neighbours than by allowing their neighbours’ turmoil to deflect them from their chosen path of peace, reconciliation, democracy, and economic development.

Moreover, on security, ignoring the tensions and misunderstanding between Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and Uganda will have far reaching implications to the stability and social economic development of the Great Lakes Region with resources being diverted from human and economic development to warfare. For this reason it is important for them to work together for the restoration of peaceful dialogue and cordial relations between them. In this regard, allegations of hosting and/or training of rebel forces by neighbouring states for planned aggression must be investigated and stopped. Incursions of the forces of one state into another can lead to rising tensions and inter-state armed conflicts which if not promptly addressed will affect the well-being of the socio-economic development of the populations. If rebel groups in Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and Uganda are not neutralized, rebel incursions prevented, inter-state aggression arrested and territorial integrity secured, the result can be renewal of interstate conflicts and destabilization or even their disintegration.

Further, on the issue of resources, the Great Lakes Region is rich in natural resources, which are at stake for many actors in the conflict. However, resources are also a potential for post conflict rehabilitation and development. Therefore, reduction in the exploitation of mineral and other natural resources for the purposes of war, countries should work to examine ways of limiting the exploitation of such resources for the purpose of conflict. They should also seek to identify and promote the means by which such resources are safeguarded and managed in a way that reduces conflict and ensures that they benefit the population. Equally, there is a need to develop institutions and frameworks that both integrate/transform the informal to a formal economy, governed by a reasonable rule of law, transparency and efficiency, without marginalizing local and regional actors.

Concluding remarks

While the conflict dynamics in the Great Lakes region are complex and involve a multiplicity of interlocking regional and international actors, we should recognise that the region has made some progress in overcoming instability, but several threats remain.

In other words, each of the countries in the region has surely known and has pursued its own process of internal normalisation. Nevertheless, it is clear that the reconciliation process in one country is strongly linked to that of the others. Any viable solution must have a regional character. It is therefore important that the region’s constituent states understand that their security and economic interests are better served through fostering stability at home and improving relations with their neighbours than by allowing their neighbours’ turmoil to deflect them.

On the regional integration level, it is important to use a forum like the International Conference on the Great Lakes to speed up the normalisation process between all these states and to define strategies for political and economic integration of the region. The resumption of activities of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) would be a vital step. Other institutions of a social, cultural and scientific nature can also contribute to deepening the progress.

Moreover, countries in the GLR should work for the establishment of the rule of law. This implies the democratisation of power, good governance, respect for human rights and the end of impunity at every level through the creation of effective and independent courts and tribunals. Efforts can be made to set up functional Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (There are attempts in Burundi and in the DRC) and other traditional mechanisms such as Gacaca courts in Rwanda to address issues of accountability for atrocities and reconciliation.

Further, in order to build a sustainable peace, countries in the region should work on political cohabitation and border security. The security of borders must be guaranteed and checkpoints ensured in common. To reach these objectives, it is necessary to strengthen the capacities of real republican armies in every country in the region and to strengthen measures for checking small arms trafficking at the borders. It is also important for countries to strengthen peaceful coexistence between themselves by respecting the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of neighbouring countries.

In brief, and as one third of all ended civil wars in Africa restart, I would like to see post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation efforts in Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC satisfactorily completed. I would hope that peace and stability become realities for the millions of citizens in this region as we move from crises and conflicts to security and stability.

* Yav Katshung Joseph is a Lecturer in Law, at the Faculty of Law, University of Lubumbashi, Democratic Republic of Congo. He is also the Executive Director of CERDH (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherche en Droits de l’Homme, Democratie et Justice Transitionnelle/Centre for Human Rights, Democracy and Transitional Justice Studies), and Coordinator of the UNESCO Chair for Human Rights, Peace, Conflict resolution and Good Governance/University of Lubumbashi. He holds an LL.B and LL.M from the University of Lubumbashi; another LL.M from University of Pretoria, South Africa, and a Diploma in Transitional Justice from the Transitional Justice Fellowship Programme (ICTJ & IJR joint programme), South Africa. He is also an Advocate of the Court of Appeal of Lubumbashi. Mr. Yav Katshung Joseph has published numerous articles on human rights, law and transitional justice in scholarly journals. For contact: [email][email protected] or [email][email protected] Phone: +243 9 970 21 758

* Please send comments to [email protected]

Last week Pambuzuka News carried the story, Sudanese Refugees In Cairo: We'll Wait Here, We’ll Die Here’ (http://www.pambazuka.org/index.php?id=29957), describing a sit-in demonstration near the Cairo office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The refugees continue to reiterate their demands, and their numbers show no sign of decreasing. In fact, the sit-in has now been joined by a few Ethiopian refugees.

This week, we promised to include our interview with UNHCR’s Senior External Relations Officer, Leila Nassif, about the demonstration. Ms. Nassif was formerly a Protection Officer and has been with UNHCR for more than ten years with posts in Saudi Arabia, elsewhere in the Middle East, Timor, Rwanda and Sudan. She has been in Cairo for 16 months. She was cooperative in answering questions, but had concerns of bias in an article being published in two parts and not including UNHCR’s point of view first. Although she had not visited the sit-in, she speculated that many demonstrators may not even be refugees. Since no demonstrators have identified themselves to UNHCR, they cannot confirm that any is a refugee known to their office

Question: What is UNHCR’s policy of providing assistance to families and how many children are required in order to receive aid? Refugees have told us families of fewer than six are not considered.

Answer: UNHCR’s priority is to assist the most vulnerable among both refugees and asylum seekers (single heads of households—male and female, unaccompanied minors, the elderly, torture victims and the ill/sick). We assist over 7000 people through our partners and help over 5000 children to attend school. CARITAS provides medical treatment to approximately 150 persons daily. We want to help as many as possible in the best way possible. Our guidelines to assist recognized refugees are based on worldwide HCR guidelines for refugee assistance in urban areas

Question: Refugees accuse UNHCR of neglecting unaccompanied minors, the elderly, and handicapped. Do you feel this is justified?

Answer: This is a general question and allegation. If there is a particular neglected case, UNHCR has a stated method to address or appeal this situation and UNHCR's doors are always open to such recourse. We help the most vulnerable first. The rumors circulating about abuses may not even refer to refugees per se but other Sudanese living in Egypt.

Question: A number of the refugees say they reject “compulsory voluntary repatriation.” Could you comment on their obvious fears of involuntary repatriation?

Answer: This is a contradiction in terms. Voluntary means voluntary and we do not force any person to return against his or her will. Every refugee repatriating with UNHCR's help is requested to complete a voluntary return form and to sign it voluntarily in the presence of a UNHCR officer. Most refugees are from the South and the situation there appears to be changing. Repatriation is not compulsory, but earlier this year we began a dialogue and dissemination of information. Many are unhappy because of the implications of return for their expectations. UNHCR and others have increased their presence and programs in the South. Statistics indicate 750,000 have already returned between 2004 and July of this year with an estimated 1 million to return in 2006, mostly IDPs and others from Central African Republic, Ethiopia and the DRC. The process is voluntary and if a person has any fear he/ she is not forced to return. UNHCR is facilitating persons who wish to return with small funds and travel allowances as far as Khartoum.

Question: To what extent do you feel their fears are justified that the Four Freedoms legislation will undermine their status as refugees?

Answer: In my personal opinion, their fears have no basis whatsoever. Egypt and Sudan have a long history of open borders, and the Four Freedoms will help enhance the status of all Sudanese in Egypt.

Question: We realize that UNHCR has a real crisis in terms of funds to disperse for urban refugee subsistence in general. Do you think this demonstration will help UNHCR to convince donors of the need to provide more funds especially for new arrivals in Egypt?

Answer: UNHCR always needs/relies on donor funding and countries are tremendously generous. But in my personal opinion, this [Cairo] is not the biggest need. There is greater urgency elsewhere. Egypt has tried very hard to fulfill its role, but this may not be appreciated because of its lack of resources. Refugees have the same complaints as less fortunate Egyptians in many cases. With regards to funding for new arrivals in Egypt the answer is “no” because UNHCR does not recognize the demonstrators as refugees.

Question: We would also like to know if the demise of resettlement for the Sudanese is a result of a decision taken by the governments who have been resettling them (US, Australia, Canada, Finland), or a policy decision taken by UNHCR Geneva or Cairo?

Answer: There is no UNHCR policy decision. It is just a statement of fact that the number of people seeking resettlement will naturally diminish. We will continue to submit cases for resettlement as appropriate. I am not in a position to comment on immigration policies of governments.

Question: We are amazed Egyptian security officials and police have permitted the demonstration to go on. Has UNHCR interceded on their behalf?

Answer: They have shown remarkable restraint and should be commended. They have had no prompting from UNHCR.

Question: To your knowledge, outside of Central America, has there ever been such a well-organized demonstration for their rights by refugees?

Answer: I do not feel that it is appropriate for me to comment on this because I simply am not sure. I believe the organizers are to be commended for keeping peace.

Question: If there is anything else you consider pertinent, please comment. :

Answer: Leaving aside Darfur, the situation in the South is changing, going back to normal with control, order and rehabilitation. This will have implications for refugees and asylum seekers everywhere since reasons for flight may have ceased and there are international pledges to rebuild ($4.5 billion). In my personal opinion, the demonstration may reflect the changing situation. The decision to stop individual status determination interviews for the Sudanese was done to protect a larger number of Sudanese. It permits a larger number of yellow cards to be issued with the protections associated with yellow cards. We still do not have large numbers coming from Darfur.

There are 22 million refugees and others of concern around the world and resettlement cannot be a solution except for the few since the resettlement quota is a few thousand per year. Further the economic situation in countries hosting refugees often excludes the possibility of local integration on a large scale. This leaves voluntary repatriation as the main solution. UNHCR seeks resettlement as appropriate, but repatriation is most preferred. UN reports are circulated on a regular basis and information is continually updated. I personally observed tremendous hope for sustained peace and aspirations to rebuild from general population, government officials and returnees. Roads have reopened, an airport made functional, and schools and other services have begun again.

I believe the Sudanese in Egypt have an important role to play—none of it is easy, but it can be done. The number seeking resettlement will naturally diminish as fewer and fewer people will meet the requirements. It is only normal to express fears and anxieties, but it is also important to acknowledge the contribution they can make. Of course there will be distrust, but that doesn’t mean it isn’t valid to talk about the changes that are happening.

From my experience as a Protection Officer, Sudanese in Egypt do not face the sort of extreme treatment others experience elsewhere. Egypt tries hard, but of course more can be done in terms of receiving, registering and processing. UNHCR also works at building awareness especially among professionals working with refugees. We are building capacity with the government: over the past year UNHCR has conducted 12 workshops with police, one with members of the People’s Assembly, one with journalists, and one with diplomats. UNHCR has met with representatives from the protest who presented demands. UNHCR tried to explain its limitations and that some things were already at work—specifically the priority of vulnerable groups. (End of interview)

Resettlement from the Embassies’ Viewpoint

We also talked with two representatives of major resettlement countries. Gerard Cheyne, US Regional Refugee Coordinator for North Africa and the Middle East, said, “The US Government supports the goal of voluntary repatriation of the Sudanese who left their homes during the conflict in the south. We will work with UNHCR in Cairo and elsewhere in the region to encourage the Sudanese to return to Sudan. At the same time we will continue to consider for resettlement any Sudanese for whom repatriation is not possible and for whom resettlement is believed to be the best durable solution—as determined by the UNHCR.” Ross Wilkie, Principle Migration Officer for the Canadian Embassy in Cairo had a similar response, “Any decision by UNHCR is one for them to comment on. Our large refugee resettlement program in Africa—which includes significant numbers of Sudanese from Cairo… is continuing.”

UNHCR claims to have made no explicit policy decision on the issue of resettlement of the Sudanese. In Ms. Nassif’s words, it is “just a statement of fact…that the number of people seeking resettlement will naturally diminish.” This blatantly contradicts the aspiration of the protestors expressed in one banner at the sit-in, “Fix our problems or send us to another country.”

Change in the air?

Last week, UNHCR held a meeting with various NGOs concerned about the on-going demonstration. Overall, the general attitude appears to have been one of disapproval. Fears were expressed that the organizers of the demonstration are encouraging parents to take their children out of schools, but we saw only very young children and babies at the protest. Another rumour cited was that leaders were encouraging people to join the protest by telling them they will receive $25 from the UNHCR for their presence at the demonstration. Since UNHCR clearly has insufficient funds for subsistence for the most vulnerable, what refugee would believe such a rumour?

Nevertheless, there is an eminent crisis. The refugees are in the park in front of a popular mosque where very large numbers of people come to pray at Eid el-Fitr, the feast celebrating the end of Ramadan. The police guarding them assume that the demonstrators have to be out by then. On the other hand, the refugees feel some security because the police are themselves upper Egyptians and feel a closer cultural bond with the protestors and tend to be more sympathetic. But this may not save the protest if the government takes the position it is expected to take.

Early mornings at the site now find refugees huddled together under blankets. As the weather turns increasingly cold, perhaps the elements themselves may decide the fate of the demonstration.

* This article was compiled by Alex Gomez, Themba Lewis, Martin Rowe, Assad Khalid Salih, Leslie Sander, Stacy Schafer and Helen Smith. They are students at the Forced Migration and Refugee Studies Programme in Cairo, Egypt.

* Please send comments to

Every year, the World Bank releases its World Development Report, which is supposed to provide a guide to the economic, social and environmental state of the world. The 2006 version of the report represents a slight improvement on previous years, but still fails to impress Sanjay Reddy, who highlights data inadequacies, selective history and unhelpful prescriptions as its main weaknesses. It might be time for the World Bank to take its own medicine and open up the report to competition by allowing centres in developing countries to produce the report, he suggests.

A tempting first reaction to the World Development Report 2006 (henceforth WDR 2006), entitled ‘Equity and Development’, is that it represents a significant advance. Whereas previous WDRs (in particular WDR 1990 and 2000/01) had concerned themselves with the need to reduce the absolute disadvantages experienced by countries and by persons, WDR 2006 is the first WDR centrally to be concerned with relative inequalities between nations and between persons. Relative inequalities are viewed in WDR 2006 as concerns in themselves. The report defines equity as the requirement that “individuals should have equal opportunities to pursue a life of their choosing and be spared from extreme deprivations in outcomes” (p.2). It thus combines the emphasis of recent normative reasoning on ‘starting gate equality” with an insistence that outcomes that fall beneath a threshold of minimal adequacy must be deeply disvalued. This construction is rather clunky and appears to be the product of a political compromise rather than a foundational philosophical view, but is workable.

In many respects, WDR 2006 reflects the most progressive face of the World Bank (henceforth Bank). The report is concerned with absolute and relative disadvantages in their many dimensions (including health, education, political power, and real income). The report recognizes that disadvantages in these dimensions are often related. The report notes that self-perpetuating low level equilibrium traps are often associated with severe absolute deprivations or large relative inequalities and that there are often deep historical origins for these traps. The report also recognizes that inter-generational social mobility is often low and that specific policies are necessary to increase it. These features of the report are significant, and are worthy of praise. It can be argued that the report constitutes a landmark in terms of the breadth of its analysis and the choice of its theme.

However, from the standpoint of the developing countries, the report also possesses central inadequacies. Three of the classes into which inadequacies can be placed are the following:

1. Data and Inferential Inadequacies

The authors of the report cannot be blamed for making use of flawed data, as it may have been the best available to them. However, they can be blamed for failing to recognize the implications of the inadequacies in existing data for their ability to draw meaningful conclusions. For example, the choice of the specific PPPs for many countries (including large ones, such as such as India and China), used to compare real incomes across countries and to form global assessments, is highly questionable. Many countries have not recently, or in some instances ever, participated in benchmark surveys of the International Comparison Program, on the basis of which PPPs are identified. The implications of alternative choices of PPPs for assessments of global deprivations and inequalities are enormous, and must be centrally confronted [See e.g. Reddy and Minoiu (2005a, 2005b)]. Similarly, the report places great store in assessments that there have been reductions in global income poverty, deriving from the World Bank’s money-metric ($1 and $2 per day) approach to poverty assessment. These assessments are open to questioning on the basis both of their foundational assumptions and estimation techniques [See e.g. Reddy and Pogge (2003)].

2. Selective History and Analysis

The report recognizes the role of historical phenomena (for example, the imprint of slavery and colonialism) in shaping existing patterns of inequality and deprivation within and across countries. The report also recognizes that within-country inequalities have risen in many countries in the recent period. However, it fails to recognize that the policies recommended by the Bretton Woods Institutions may have been among the major reasons for the increases in relative inequality observed in these countries in recent years.

Structural adjustment policies and their successors may have among the central causes of widening relative income inequalities in many countries, contrary to what had been anticipated on the basis of simple trade models (and in particular the Stolper Samuelson theorem, which in its most simple variant predicts that trade liberalization in particular will lead to decreases in relative income inequality in developing countries). A considerable body of respectable technical literature (much of it focusing on Mexico’s experience in the aftermath of NAFTA) has in recent years concerned itself with explaining possible theoretical explanations for the apparent unexpected impact of trade liberalization in developing countries [See for example the work of Robert Feenstra, Gordon Hanson, Ann Harrison, James Galbraith, Zadia Feliciano, Pinelopi Goldberg, Nina Pavcnik and Ana Revenga, cited in the references]. This literature is not even mentioned in the WDR’s treatment of the effects of trade liberalization in Mexico (p.195).

Similarly, there is reason to think that financial liberalization and labor market liberalization may each have contributed to widening relative inequalities within countries. Arguments of this kind, which assert that at least some of the reason for widening inequalities within countries may be the implementation of policies recommended by the Bretton Woods institutions, do not appear adequately to be recognized and confronted. The role of policies eagerly promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions in the past (for example, the implementation of user fees in the health sector) respectively in increasing absolute disadvantages within nations and widening relative inequalities between nations (at least relative to the counterfactual in which these policies were not pursued), has not been forthrightly examined.

The report often relies on questionable indicators and analytical tools. For example, more secure property rights, as judged by foreign investors, are used as a proxy for the quality of institutions. A blithe footnote (p.108) avers without offering further evidence that “These data…are imperfect as a measure of the relevant institutions because they pertain to investments by foreigners only. Even so, they seem in practice to capture how stable property rights are in general”.

The report seeks too often to place the diverse phenomena that it confronts into an accustomed lens. For example, it describes domestic violence as an “inefficiency” (p.54). Although domestic violence is abominable, the reason that it is so is surely not that it constitutes an “inefficiency”. Language of this kind is indicative of the lack of commitment of the authors of the report to a conceptual framework in which human beings are foregrounded over abstract ends such as “efficiency” which are employed in an obscurantist manner.

3. Weak, Questionable or Unhelpful Prescriptions

It is perhaps not surprising, in view of the partial nature of the history provided and the analysis undertaken in the report that the recommendations for policies that may decrease absolute disadvantages and relative inequalities are also perhaps overly restrictive. There are some excellent innovative proposals in the report, some of which may be in the interests of developing countries (for example, the proposal to create a “generic drug region” in which “inventors in developed countries make legally binding commitments to their own governments not to enforce patent rights in certain pharmaceutical markets” (pp. 224-5)).

Similarly, the report correctly emphasizes the role of certain agricultural policies in developed countries (for instance, cotton subsidies) in depressing opportunities in poor countries. The report rightly takes note that aid should be targeted where it is most needed as well as where it is most effective. It recognizes that there has been an influential move to target aid toward countries that are perceived to possess “good policies” but is perhaps not adequately critical of the recent attempts within the Bretton Woods institutions to articulate this view, which have often taken a very narrow view of what constitute “good policies” and appeared to recommend that countries which do not possess such policies (which centrally emphasize liberalization and privatization) should not be beneficiaries of development aid at all. [See e.g. Burnside and Dollar (2000)].

The policies recommended in the report are more often than not accustomed policies which have been recommended in the past. It is a miracle that the same set of policies appears to be the prescription for all ills. For example, labor market deregulation (in particular reduction in the cost to employers of firing and hiring) is once again held up as being in general a highly desirable policy, and “overly generous unemployment benefit and social assistance systems, which discourage[s] job search” (p.192) are decried in blanket terms. Although there may occasionally be some merit in such recommendations, the reader is given the sense that alternative views have not been seriously considered.

Increased competition in domestic financial markets is similarly advocated as a general policy. The need to identify policies that specifically benefit the poor or relatively disadvantaged is too often glossed over in favor of broad prescriptions the primary effect of which may be to serve other interests entirely. For example, the epilogue to the report concludes that the “twin pillars” of a national development strategy aimed at increasing “equity” are a “better investment climate” and “empowerment”. It is stated that “for most people in the developing world, and certainly for the poor, it is not possible to have one without the other”. Many actual and potential conflicts of objectives are glossed over here; a better investment climate for the poor may not always be what makes for a better investment climate for relatively wealthy domestic or foreign investors, at least in the short run. The report notes, for example, that it is possible (p.228) that “the government…will not enforce tax collection, rather than build rural roads”, presumably because underlying conflicts of interests are resolved in favor of the relatively wealthy, whether at home or abroad. How potential conflict of this kind should be handled is not addressed.

In this and other respects, the report presents an account of political economy that is naïve. The general invocation of the need for a “better investment climate for all” without any effort to address such conflicts can have at most limited value in the formulation of policies that reduce absolute deprivations and relative inequalities. The treatment of property rights protections in the report is in this respect especially incoherent. Sound institutions are equated with those that protect property rights. However, land reforms including “expropriating with compensation” (p.167) are treated favourably, and the reader is told that (p.122) “The key to China’s equitable development was the combination of initial conditions and the economic reforms” without apparent recognition that China’s favourable “initial conditions” were the consequence of an earlier and comprehensive economic and social revolution, in which established property rights were overturned. One need not take a view on the merits of that revolution to recognize its historical importance.

Conclusion:

The WDR 2006 is a commendable effort in comparison to many of its predecessors. However, it is still dissatisfying. Its intellectual basis is often weak, its contents are not adequately complete and its prescriptions are often either questionable or of limited practical value.

A question that must be asked is: “Who does the WDR serve?” The substantial resources expended each year in the production of the WDR could perhaps better be used by supporting independent competitive research institutes (located in developing countries to the extent feasible) charged with the task of generating development research that is autonomous, intellectual rigorous and globally relevant. Competition can be beneficial in policy analysis, just as it is alleged to be beneficial in labor, capital and product markets. Perhaps this is the lesson that should be learned in this third decade of the WDR.

* Sanjay Reddy is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Barnard College, Columbia University.
([email protected]) This review was originally prepared for the Inter-Governmental Group of 24 on International Monetary Affairs and Development, a group of developing countries. This article first appeared in Economic and Political Weekly,
India,

* Please send comments to [email protected]

REFERENCES

Burnside, Craig and David Dollar (2000), “Aid, Policies and Growth”, American Eonomic Review, Vol. 90, No. 4.

Feliciano, Zadia. 1993. "Workers and Trade Liberalization: The Impact of Trade Reforms in Mexico on Wages and Employment." Mimeo, Harvard University.

Robert Feenstra & Gordon Hanson, 2001. "Global Production Sharing and Rising Inequality: A Survey of Trade and Wages," NBER Working Paper 8372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Feenstra, Robert C & Hanson, Gordon H, 1996. "Globalization, Outsourcing, and Wage Inequality" American Economic Review, vol. 86(2), pages 240-45.
James Galbraith and Vidal Garza Cantú, "Exporting Inequality? Recent Changes in industrial wage inequality in Canada, Mexico and the United States," Income and Productivity in North America, Commission on Labor Cooperation, Washington, 2001, 27-54.
Goldberg, P. and N. Pavcnik, “Trade, Inequality, and Poverty: What Do We Know? Evidence from Recent Trade Liberalization Episodes in Developing Countries”, Brookings Trade Forum, 2004.

Hanson, G. (2003). "What Has Happened to Wages in Mexico since NAFTA?" NBER Working Papers 9563, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Hanson, G. and A. Harrison (1999), “Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality in Mexico”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 52, No. 2.

Reddy, S. and C. Minoiu (2005a), “Has World Poverty Really Fallen?”, available on www.socialanlysis.org

Reddy, S. and C. Minoiu (2005b), “China’s Poverty Reduction Experience in the 1990s”, available on www.socialanalysis.org .

Reddy, S. and T. Pogge (2003), “How Not to Count the Poor”, available on www.socialanalysis.org

Revenga, Ana. (1997). “Employment and Wage Effects of Trade Liberalization: The Case of Mexican Manufacturing.” Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. S20-S43.

Human Rights. Accountability. Democratic values. These are not concepts that most people would match with their local police force. As a new report from the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) notes, Africa includes good cops and bad cops: good policing that upholds the human rights of the citizens; and bad policing where the police act as violent oppressors controlled by the political elite. The report ‘Police Accountability: Too Important to Neglect, Too Urgent to Delay’ provides an overview of accountability arrangements, highlights good practice, and gives recommendations for reform to assist governments, police officials, and civil society in developing and strengthening effective accountability regimes as part of the move towards truly democratic policing. Pambazuka News sent some questions to CHRI about the state of policing in Africa.

PAMBAZUKA NEWS: What are some of the policing problems related to human rights that are common to Africa?

CHRI: The violation of civil liberties by police, particularly rights of due process and disobedience to procedural law, is a glaring problem that seriously affects human rights and undermines the rule of law. This includes detaining people without reasonable cause, or for longer than permissible without bringing them before the appropriate authority, or carrying out arrests without warrants, illegal searches and seizures, or denying those arrested access to legal counsel.

Torture by police continues despite international and domestic laws and governments' promises, and hinges on impunity for those perpetuating it. Alarmingly, the demographic of people being tortured and/or illegally detained in Commonwealth countries, including Africa, by the police is very wide and speaks to governments' suppression of dissent as much as violation of law and human rights, as it can include suspected terrorists, but also armed insurgents, legitimate political opponents, government critics, suspected criminals, homosexuals, religious/racial minorities, suspected rebels/insurgents, human rights defenders, foreigners, to name a few.

Human rights are most seriously affected when the police act on illegitimate orders, or in some cases arbitrarily, to curb rights and freedoms.

PAMBAZUKA NEWS: What could be defined as effective and legitimate policing?

CHRI: CHRI is committed to promoting a model of democratic policing in which the police are:
- subject to the rule of law and responsible to protect human rights;
- accountable to a variety of institutions;
- transparent about policies, decisions and actions taken in most spheres of their work;
- responsive to the people they serve; and
- representative of the people they serve.

This is the model of effective and legitimate policing that democracy demands and governments are duty bound to provide.

PAMBAZUKA NEWS: What is the effect of bad policing on democratic governance?

CHRI: Bad policing means the public is not getting the service it deserves from a public agency, and the police are not doing their duty. More broadly, bad policing usually means the public does not trust its police, fueling a feeling of vulnerability and lawlessness. The effect of all this is that it moves people further away from their governments and makes governance less democratic.

Bad policing and impunity persist not by accident, but by design. If people do not feel assured of state protection from crime, if people are being tortured by the police for political ends, if the people feel the police, or even worse the entire criminal justice system, is controlled by government - these are sure signs that the system of checks and balances which is so critical to democratic governance is failing. Bad policing can also affect the functioning of the criminal justice system as a whole. If the police are not carrying out their investigative and law enforcement duties lawfully, this can influence the quality of evidence presented in court and have serious consequences in terms of "fair trial" guarantees.

PAMBAZUKA NEWS: What are the gender implications of bad policing?

CHRI: Crimes against women abound across the Commonwealth but are often met with a very poor response by the police, with stereotypes and traditionalist attitudes prejudicing the way a predominantly male bastion handles women's cases. Rape, domestic violence and trafficking are usually under-policed - this happens because of lack of domestic legal protection, stigma in reporting, but also because of the unsympathetic response of law enforcement agencies towards victims. Women may trust the police less than men, and in many Commonwealth countries, women fear the police. This is unjustifiable when seen against the volume of crimes committed against women all across the Commonwealth, and the special attention women need from the police.

PAMBAZUKA NEWS: What are some of the international laws and protocols signed up to by African countries that govern policing and to what extent do these govern policing and provide a mechanism for redress?

CHRI: This is discussed in more detail in chapter 3 of the report, but for a quick overview:

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the seminal human rights document that all Commonwealth countries have agreed to, enshrines fundamental human rights for all. Police organisations are expected to know and enforce the UDHR and uphold, defend and protect people's civil and political rights, as well as foster an environment that will promote their economic, social and cultural rights.

The human rights standards laid down in the UDHR have been refined and re-stated in legally binding treaties that guarantee civil and political rights, rights against racial discrimination, women's rights, children's rights, and rights against torture, among others.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) contain special provisions regarding policing, and together with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW), form the seven core UN human rights treaties.

Importantly, some of the treaty committees accept complaints from individuals whose rights have been violated which could lead to redress - these include the Human Rights Committee, the Committee against Torture, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.

The 1990 UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials and the 1979 UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials were both adopted by UN General Assembly resolutions, and do not have the same binding status of international conventions and treaties. Nevertheless, they are seminal for the police and are designed to guide domestic legal and policy formulation, with the Code of Conduct setting out basic standards for policing agencies, and the Basic Principles providing a series of human rights standards regarding the use of force and firearms by law enforcement officials.

In Africa specifically, The African Charter on Human and People's Rights or Banjul Charter was adopted by the members of the former Organisation of African Unity - OAU (now the African Union) in 1981. In the Commonwealth context, it is the youngest of the regional mechanisms and also the most widely accepted of the regional charters, with 53 ratifications or accessions. All African country members of the Commonwealth are part of the regional Charter. The African Commission on Human and People's Rights is the institution created under the Charter to promote and protect human rights in Africa and interpret the Banjul Charter when required by the states or institutions of the African Union. The Commission has procedures in place to receive complaints from states and individuals.

PAMBAZUKA NEWS: Briefly, what reforms are needed and what would be the key aspects of a democratic police organisation?

CHRI: Reforming police organisations across the Commonwealth requires changing and refining laws to reflect the rights-based approach, putting in place innovative institutional mechanisms that can ensure independent oversight of the police, and altering the culture within police organisations by properly implementing disciplinary and ethical standards. As well, the traditional oversight of the police by the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government must be strengthened.

Democratic policing is applicable to any context in the Commonwealth, rich or poor, large or small, diverse or homogenous. In a nutshell, a democratic police organisation is one that:
- Is accountable to the law, and not a law unto itself;
- Is accountable to democratic government structures and the community;
- Is transparent in its activities;
- Gives top operational priority to protecting the safety and rights of individuals;
- Protects human rights;
- Provides professional services;
- Is representative of the communities it serves.

A key feature of democratic policing is that the police are formally held to account, in a variety of ways, for their performance as much as for any wrongdoing. Police officers found guilty must be made to bear the consequences.

* These questions were answered by Devika Prasad, a Research Assistant to the Access to Justice Unit. The report and executive summary can be downloaded from the CHRI website:
www.humanrightsinitiative.org or the link could be viewed at http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/chogm/chogm_2005/defa…

* Please send comments to [email protected]

In the focus on Africa in 2005, it has often been hard to find African voices as opposed to European “experts”, while self-proclaimed saviours like Bob Geldof have been all to quick to declare, for example, that ‘a great justice has been done’ by the G8 meetings. A recent report by Ligali, an organisation that campaigns for social, economic and cultural equality on behalf of the African community in Britain, highlights these contradictions and concludes that the solutions to Africa’s problems do not reside in the corridors of Westminster or the White House but will come from African people themselves.

Africa is helpless. Africa is poor. Africa is, according to the song, a ‘world of dread and fear’ (Do They Know It’s Christmas? (Feed the World) written by Bob Geldof and Midge Ure)

These myths have pervaded the British psyche and its media for decades. The ignorance, racism and misinformation that inform these culturally and politically constructed illusions were particularly prevalent earlier this year preceding the G8 Summit at Gleneagles. The Summit and the subsequent rowdiness stirred by its supporters - the most boisterous and arrogant of who was the musician, Bob Geldof – ensured that people throughout the British Isles were forced to confront one of the greatest injustices perpetrated by humankind on their fellow human; the reality of how centuries of economic and human exploitation that has resulted in the people of the Continent of Africa facing poverty, malnutrition, disease and ultimately, cultural disempowerment.

Unfortunately, the opportunity to seriously and intelligently discuss the issues and solutions that relate to Africa’s development and empowerment was lost as an overtly racist motivation informed the media agenda and ensured that not only were the same old myths propagated about Africa but that new ones were added to the mix. In addition, the guilt complex that inhabits the British psyche was easily pacified by white wrist bands or, as in the case of many a right-wing newspaper editor, by attempting to dissolve any sense of responsibility that people in the West might feel for repairing the damage their politics and economies have inflicted on African countries.

As an organisation whose primary work currently involves monitoring the media for offensive representation and actively challenging the inaccuracies and inequality inherent in that representation, we have noted the flourishing trend of myth making and the equally prevalent tendency to actively silence informed African voices who talk about African affairs in favour of European experts who talk from a eurocentric perspective about African affairs, ultimately to the benefit of their respective nations. This becomes increasingly problematic when the solutions that the so-called European experts want to instigate are in direct contradiction with what African people themselves want and need.

Even as a media organisation, we have found it challenging to say the least, to find African voices in the mainstream media talking about African affairs. And so, the Making of an Impoverished History was written. Initially, it was to be a brief article summarising the media’s approach to Africa but we soon realised that ‘brief’ was perhaps not the way to go about this. We had to contextualise the matter, historically and globally, and so embarked on making this a more comprehensive but accessible report that provides a more joined up picture of the politics behind the G8 Summit, the Live 8 event and its figure head, Bob Geldof, and the British media debate about Africa.

In highlighting these issues, came the inevitability of dealing with the notion of giving charity versus the responsibility of encouraging justice and how the British media have fought against the latter with strategies of defence and denial. This gave rise to headlines including ‘Why I wont be squandering any more money on Africa' and documentaries such as Channel 4’s ‘Living with Aids’ which, along with a barrage of other media outputs reinforced the notion that Africa’s current situation is the fault of African people and therefore people of the West need not feel a sense of responsibility about African issues. Of course, when you look into the instances of corruption, fraud and commercial exploitation that occur on the Continent, a European, American and most recently Asian corporate or indeed governmental influence is not far behind. From the rampant practice of selling cheap and second-hand rifles to just about anyone who will pay the right price, to the contemptuous reluctance of Western banking institutions to relinquish the financial benefits they get from holding the accounts of a small number of corrupt African leaders, corruption and exploitative profit making has proved to be a very Western affair.

The Make Poverty History campaign, the Live 8 concert and the Geldof agenda also pervaded the media reporting. Here, the media found an apparently liberal guise behind which they could conceal their prejudices and racist presumptions. Bob Geldof, far from being the liberal saviour of Africa as many referred to him as, displayed his utter contempt for African opinion in the way he actively ignored it and ensured that his voice, his agenda and his vision of Africa was viewed as the definitive stopping point. At the time, this was hard enough for African people to bare but following the redundant exercise that was the G8 Summit and the way in which its seemingly laudable objectives have subsequently fallen, and some would say been pulled apart, Sir Bob’s announcement that ‘a great justice has been done’ is not only arrogant but disenfranchising and frustrating for the African people who know that his ridiculous assertion could not be further from the truth. Of course, now the media are suffering from Africa fatigue and therein sets the apathy.

In researching this report, it became obvious that for African people, the solutions to Africa’s issues are multifaceted and originate not in the corridors of Westminster or the White House but from African people themselves. The stories that we will rarely if ever hear about in the media are some of the success stories of African development, the workable solutions designed for and by us, examples of good governance and the revolution needed to overturn trading injustice. Some of these are addressed in our report but in truth, because of its specific remit, it is something that will have to be covered in depth at a later date. However, we have always been a solutions orientated organisation and therefore ended the report with ways in which we can continue to aid our own progress and the rebuilding of our great Continent. The British government clearly have responsibilities including the enforcing of anti-corruption legislation and stemming its drain of skilled African people from the Continent. However, we also focused on some of the ways in which the African Union, African governments and African people in Diaspora can develop Africa through self-determinate means.

* This is a summarised version of a report produced by Ligali (pronounced lee-ga-lee), entitled “The Making of an Impoverished History”. Ligali is the African British Equality Authority. African British is the term now used to describe the community previously mislabelled as Afro Caribbean, Black British, UK Black, Coloured and Black. It embraces all British nationals with antecedents originating directly from Africa or indirectly via African diasporic communities, such as those in the Caribbean and South America.
Ligali actively campaigns for social, economic and cultural equality on behalf of the African community. Ligali is a non profit voluntary organisation. Through investigation and monitoring, we aim to challenge, identify and recommend workable solutions to current social issues that refuse to recognise the equal and inalienable rights of African people in the UK. Our main objectives are to turn talk into action and apathy into productivity.

* Please send comments to [email protected]

The announcement that Senate elections would be held in Zimbabwe on November 26 has been interpreted as a move designed by President Robert Mugabe to contain fall out from his controversial appointment of Joyce Mujuru as vice president. It has also caused tension in the opposition Movement for Democratic Change over whether to contest the Senate polls. Writer Chenjerai Hove identifies a “Zimbabwean disease” which dictates that once an institution is formed it becomes a national cause to tear it apart.

The scene is a country called Zimbabwe, and the audience, thirteen million anxious Zimbabweans. The actors: Zanu PF and the MDC. The Stage Director, Robert Gabriel Mugabe. The title of the play: The Senate Bandwagon. The Zimbabwean political audience is once again faced with an ever more confused political situation. A few elections later, the people are rather puzzled as to what exactly is happening. President Robert Mugabe has dangled a new carrot, the Senate. And one already knows why this carrot is there, in front of the two political parties and their faithful. I always wondered why this causes confusion because the Senate is supposed to last only a short time. After all, it was abolished in 1987 on the pretext that it unnecessarily delayed urgent legislation which the government wanted passed the fast-track way. With the current series of endless crises, it would seem the need for urgent passing of legislation has not died. The land issue is still fresh and causing havoc to the economy, the economic mess fraught with so many other problems, the decline of services like health, education, transport. So many urgent issues! In the midst of all this, the president wants to introduce a Senate, an expensive undertaking which a shrinking economy can hardly afford.

It is well known now that Mugabe wouldn't care less if the country was broke or not, as long as he keeps power till he dies. So, in order to accommodate his 'fellows' who had fallen by the wayside, he decides to introduce a senate which practically serves no useful purpose except to give terminal benefits to his old and sickly friends he had forgotten to take along on his gravy train of economic plunder and electoral fraud. Then comes the side show: the MDC jumping onto this worthless project on the assumption that it might be possible to contain Zanu PF in its own game. To play or not to play the Zanu PF game? That was the question facing the national council of the MDC. Surprisingly, the outcome was half-half kusenga kwedhongi. The meaning of it all is that to play the game means the MDC accepts the rules and procedures which created the game. It also means an endorsement of the political manoeuvres which have created the senate, and also an acceptance of the recent constitutional amendments as valid. That is what President Mugabe wants to happen, realizing that he created this game in order to dangle a few crumps and left-overs in order cause a splits in the MDC and possibly civil society. Mugabe's project seems to be advancing without any hitches, so far.

As far as I can see, the problem of the MDC started when they participated in the parliamentary elections whose results were already predicted and known. Now, members of the opposition are in parliament, but not all who wanted to be there. Those who could not make it to parliament would argue that the current MDC members of the august house are enjoying the benefits of the gravy train while denying others the opportunity to do so in the new Senate. That is the problem facing the MDC. They have allowed themselves to taste of the niceties offered by the devil, and everyone wants their piece of the carrot. Exactly what Mugabe and Zanu PF wants, especially in these hard times of economic collapse and struggles for survival! Everyone wants to put bread and butter on the table, never mind the source! As far as I can see, wrapped inside the carrot, Mr Mugabe and his party gurus have thrown a live snake in the house of the opposition. Some from the opposition camp only see the skin of the carrot, while others have the vision to see the snake within. Thus, the opposition party begins its own demise fired by the energies and skills of Mr Mugabe's camp. The audience, we ordinary Zimbabweans, can only look and wonder whether the opposition is serious about participating in a Senate whose introduction it strongly opposed not so long ago.

Having participated in the formation and running of several national organisations, I have come to accept that the Zimbabwean disease is one and only one in terms of organisational management. Once an institution is formed, the next crucial task for some Zimbabweans is to find as many reasons and ways as possible to tear it apart. Some people call it factionalism. Others call it 'splinterism'. What I know is that both are usually not based on any basic principle or vision. They are usually based on some flimsy excuse and rampant opportunism, a national malaise in the affairs of our country. All the noble reasons underlying the formation of the organisation are soon forgotten. Every one for himself, and God for none of us! It is sad that the MDC is split and probably destroyed over a worthless carrot (Senate) dangled in front of them. Every citizen can see clearly that the Senate serves no useful purpose except to function as some kind of old-age pension and gratuity for Mugabe's loyalists and friends. Everyone knows who the new senators will be: old men and women discarded by either design or mistake by the Mugabe gravy train. Why anyone with a national vision and some kind of realization of where the country is going should join, I have no clue. In the end it also becomes a question of personal integrity and dignity. Zimbabweans are used to national abuse, especially by the ruining party, Zanu PF.

Sadly, it seems the MDC, having raised people's hopes, has also now embarked on this national malaise of thinking that they can earn good salaries from a national purse which does not exist. They can join the dance of Zanu PF pensioners and then wake up in the morning to call themselves the opposition. In Shona it is called 'kudziya moto wembavha'.(Warming themselves from the fireplace of a thief). As the Zimbabwean disease of splits and factions engulfs the political realm of the country, the decay continues, and more political parties will be formed in order to split again and again while Mugabe continues to destroy the country. The national vision dies, only to be replaced by financial greed and illusions of boundless power. In the end, national political fatigue creeps in, and no one wants to vote for anyone, knowing only too well that there is no Zimbabwean politician interested in shaping a genuine national vision devoid of greed for power and money.

* Chenjerai Hove is a leading Zimbabwean author and has several published books and poems including the aclaimed novel BONES. This article appeared on the www.newzimbabwe.com website and reproduced here with permission of the author.

* Please send comments to [email protected]

The Zimbabwean economy has contracted by 50% in the last five years, inflation stands at 255% and unemployment hovers at 75%, say economists. Recently, there was much controversy over a proposed $500m loan from South Africa to Zimbabwe in order to prevent Zimbabwe's suspension from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, South Africa made it clear that the loan was available only if Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe reformed economic policies and changed his politics. Patrick Bond critically examines the politics surrounding the proposed loan agreement and South African president Thabo Mbeki's vision that the IMF can be used as a tool for "normalisation" of Zimbabwean society.

Consider these wise words from a leading African National Congress politician: ‘As we speak, the neoliberal orthodoxy sits as a tyrant on the throne of political-economic policymaking. The dominant social and economic forces are doing their utmost to hegemonise the discourse - both materially and in respect of how developmental processes are to be institutionalised and theorised. Among other things, they use such transnational governmental organisations as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation to shape the discourse within which policies are defined, the terms and concepts that circumscribe what can be thought and done.’

This quote, from an April speech, is worth keeping in mind; its author (revealed at the end of this article) knows well of what he speaks. In between, though, we will consider the main way in which the region’s dominant social and economic forces intend to hegemonise political transition in Zimbabwe. The objective seems to be to bring the IMF back into play, for the first time since 1999.

It may surprise some readers, but a decade ago, Robert Mugabe’s regime was in fact a successful protégé of Washington financiers. In 1995, the World Bank gave his government the highest possible rating in its scorecard of neoliberal orthodoxy: ‘highly satisfactory’. This followed fifteen years of arm twisting by the Bank and IMF, leading to the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP).

Things began to go badly wrong for Harare’s elites soon thereafter. From 1996-2000, a series of overlapping worker/peasant/student/war veteran rebellions became a serious threat to Robert Mugabe and his ruling Zanu(PF) party. This in turn resulted in a zig-zag economic policy based on a mix of carrots and sticks, combining frontal attacks on poor and working-class urban Zimbabweans with fiery anti-imperialist rhetoric.

At the heart of Harare’s fiscal crisis are Mugabe’s expensive carrots to disgruntled sections of society: large new pensions for tens of thousands of Liberation War vets (previously ignored or repressed) from September 1997; periodic payolas of various kinds to the army and police, including license to loot the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the late 1990s civil war; on-again/off-again price controls from 1998, in order to prevent further ‘IMF Riots’ (which had broken out periodically during the 1990s); occasional gifts to key constituents during the early 2000s, such as very inexpensive rural electricity; and state-sponsored land invasions immediately following Mugabe’s defeat in a constitutional referendum in February 2000, as the opposition Movement for Democratic Change became a threatening electoral force.

The sticks we have learned much more about these past months. They don’t need recounting in detail, but include, in the words of South African Communist Party (SACP) general secretary Blade Nzimande, ‘the wanton destruction of homes and community facilities’ for more than a million of the urban poor, and ‘anti-democratic legislation, including legislation directed against the right to assembly and against media freedom’.

Durable nationalism

Mugabe’s alliances have generally been maintained the past five years, and both external and internecine rebellions have been crushed. Regular predictions that the ruling party will fragment - mainly due to ethnic factionalism - never reach fruition. After three decades of control over Zanu(PF) and six years’ experience harassing a strong opposition party, Mugabe has an even stronger grip on his politburo. Evidence of his dominance during this period includes the expulsion, demotion or jailing of figures with substantial regional or sectoral powerbases.

However, with Mugabe apparently now unable to raise basic hard currency for importing petrol, food and other vital necessities, the time is ripe for the next stage of what might be termed ‘exhausted nationalism’. When Simba Manyanya and I began using this phrase in 2002 as shorthand for Mugabe’s incapacity to deliver a higher standard of living, it was not clear that the nationalist project could be reinvigorated, at least in a manner the masses would find compelling.

We cited Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth: ‘A bourgeoisie that provides nationalism alone as food for the masses fails in its mission and gets caught up in a whole series of mishaps. But if nationalism is not made explicit, if it is not enriched and deepened by a very rapid transformation into a consciousness of social and political needs, in other words into humanism, it leads up a blind alley. The bourgeois leaders of underdeveloped countries imprison national consciousness in sterile formalism.’

The problem of ‘exhausted nationalism’ also applies to South Africa, where SACP deputy secretary Jeremy Cronin once translated it as the ‘Zanufication’ of the African National Congress (he was hurriedly forced to apologise). In turn, this is why the vigorous debate now underway on lending to Mugabe is so revealing. For it appears that Mbeki and the IMF have, to borrow the quote above, successfully shaped the discourse within which policies are defined, and indeed a proposed loan of $500 million from South Africa to Zimbabwe may circumscribe what can be thought and done.

There is no better example than Pretoria spokesperson Joel Netshitenzhe’s comment that the loan could ‘benefit Zimbabwean people as a whole, within the context of their program of economic recovery and political normalisation.’ Much of the debate in South Africa concerns whether Pretoria is putting sufficient – or indeed any – pressure on Harare to reform, as Netshitenzhe refuses to comment on speculation that both political and economic liberalisation are conditions for the proposed loan.

Mugabe spokesperson George Charamba revealed the process on August 14: ‘We never asked for any money from South Africa. It was the World Bank that approached Mbeki and said please help Zimbabwe. They then offered to help us.’ According to the World Bank’s own press service, a Pretoria-based Bank economist, Lollete Kritzinger-van Niekerk, confirmed that her institution ‘is not ready to thaw relations with the ostracised Harare’, hence Mbeki’s backchannel. A reported $160 million out of Pretoria’s proposed loan was meant to repay the IMF, with the rest earmarked for importing (from South Africa) agricultural inputs and petroleum.

But in Zimbabwe there is, in reality, no ‘normalisation’ under way, if by which is meant Mugabe’s agreement to hold serious democratisation talks with the Movement for Democratic Change, to run genuinely free and fair elections, to unban the media and revoke extremist laws, to recall fascistic security forces to the barracks, and to provide emergency food and shelter in a non-politicised manner to the millions who urgently require it.

In any case, Mbeki has repeatedly shown that these objectives are unimportant: by propping up Mugabe in the United Nations Human Rights Commission, by public commentary downplaying repression and vote theft, by silence at key junctures and by sending biased observation teams to monitor elections. Mugabe himself publicly rejected even the idea of negotiating with the MDC.

Setting the fake ‘reform’ rhetoric aside, what is instead revealed by the current crisis is another of Fanon’s insights, namely that Zanu(PF)’s sterile formalism now sharply contradicts further capital accumulation by Zimbabwe’s parasitical ruling class, a key faction of which desperately requires foreign exchange.

For the impoverished Zimbabwean masses, there is no economic bailout on the horizon, much less democratic leverage, only a choice of which financiers will worsen austerity in future years: the predictable money mandarins of Washington, or the new subimperialists of Pretoria, backed by a gullible media and superficially critical opposition parties, or both.

IMF squeeze on the Zimbabwean poor

Consider the first lot, the Bretton Woods Institutions. Beginning in September 1980, when Zimbabwe formally joined, the role of the IMF was never to benefit ‘Zimbabwean people as a whole’. As York University’s radical economist Colin Stoneman explained, ‘In encouraging borrowing, the IMF recognised that it had as yet no means of exerting leverage on Zimbabwean economic policy.’ What was that leverage? Five examples are illustrative:

- By early 1982, finance minister Bernard Chidzero – later to head the IMF/Bank Development Committee – denied that ‘the IMF would impose any conditions as Zimbabwe was already restructuring its economy.’ Though it was ‘a sensitive issue not for public debate,’ Chidzero made statements to Parliament claiming ‘devaluation of the dollar is not imminent and is not being contemplated.’ Less than three months later, Chidzero announced a 20% decline in the currency, admitting it ‘had been under consideration for some months.’

- In late 1982, interest rates were raised dramatically, a move Chidzero pointed out with pride to the World Bank in private correspondence.

- In March 1983, an editorial by the government-owned Herald observed that ‘Zimbabwe has a democratically elected people’s government and therefore, the people, its supporters have the right to know what the IMF asked of this country.’

- By 1984, Zimbabwe was paying vast proportions of export earnings to cover foreign loans, in part because of apartheid destabilisation of the region. As Stoneman put it, ‘there can be no doubt that Zimbabwe’s payments crisis was partly caused by South Africa, and that this was the means whereby the IMF gained a lever on Zimbabwean economic policy’.
- The IMF soon terminated its $315 million line of credit due to Harare’s budget overruns, forcing more painful austerity. By early 1985, Mugabe complained of ‘pressure from the IMF to cut government spending on education and defence but the government has a way of overcoming this pressure’. Yet within a few years, Zimbabwe’s vaunted education programme was indeed under threat as Bretton Woods cost-recovery policies gained momentum.

The Bretton Woods Institutions applied neoliberalism across a variety of sectors, and applied heavy pressure on Mugabe to continue his ineffectual ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ rural land policy. At last month’s land summit in South Africa, Mbeki told the audience that Zimbabwe’s failure to embark upon land redistribution prior to the chaotic takeovers of 4000 white-owned farms from February 2000, was because ‘They slowed down to get the negotiations in this country to succeed’ since South Africa’s white farmers would be ‘frightened’ about the transition to democracy.

In reality, Harare’s 1993 Land Designation Act was ‘shelved,’ as Zanu(PF) member of parliament Lazarus Nzarayebani complained in late 1994, because ‘it is not in conformity with the World Bank and IMF’ and instead served government only ‘to save its face’. In fact, South Africa’s first ANC land minister, Derek Hanekom, invited the same World Bank team that was preventing Zimbabwe’s land reform during the early 1990s, led by Robert Christenson, to guide post-apartheid policy. (That policy was also characterised by willing seller, willing buyer neoliberalism, and in August was publicly recognised as a failure at a major state-sponsored land summit.)

What of the last batch of IMF credits to Zimbabwe? Did these contribute to the welfare of all Zimbabweans, and promote peace and democracy? The opposite conclusion is more logical. The IMF’s $53 million loan in 1999 was meant to release another $800 million from other lenders. The IMF’s stated objectives were straightforward: reversal of both the luxury import tax and price controls on staple foods.

Details were confirmed in a March 1999 statement by leading IMF negotiator Michael Nowak, ‘There are two issues outstanding and these have stopped the IMF from making the standby credit available to the country. These issues are, one, we want the government to reduce the tariffs slapped on luxury goods last September, and secondly, we also want the government to give us a clear timetable as to when and how they will remove the price controls they have imposed on some goods.’

Five months later, the IMF agreed to increase the loan amount to $200 million, but two more conditions were reportedly added: access to classified Democratic Republic of Congo war information and a commitment to pay new war expenditure from the existing budget. According to an IMF official, ‘The Zimbabweans felt offended, shocked, but they all the same agreed to give us the information, we got all the clarification we wanted. They had no choice... We have had assurances [that] if there is budgetary overspending, there will be cuts in other budget sectors.’

In sum, the IMF gave permission to penalise health, education and other badly-defended sectors on behalf of Mugabe’s military adventures and business cronies, and also ordered Mugabe to immediately reverse the only redistributive policies he had adopted in a long time: a) a ban on holding foreign exchange accounts in local banks (which immediately halted the easiest form of capital flight by the country’s elites); b) a 100% customs tax on imported luxury goods; and c) price controls on staple foods in the wake of several urban riots.

That deal quickly fell apart, however, when fiscal targets were missed. Harare was, quite simply, broke. The previous year, Mugabe had spent an historically-unprecedented 38% of export earnings on servicing foreign loans, exceeded that year only by Brazil and Burundi. With foreign debt at $4.92 billion, fully $980 million was repaid to foreign creditors, while donor aid fell from its 1995 peak of $310 million to just $150 million. But due to compound interest rates, barely a dent was made in the total foreign debt outstanding.

The IMF continued giving advice to impose austerity, both from its Harare office and via periodic high-level missions from Washington. The 2000 mission called for ‘tight monetary and wage policies… privatisation, civil service reform and trade liberalisation,’ according to the Herald newspaper.

By mid-2001, finance minister Simba Makoni confessed to the Southern Africa regional session of the World Economic Forum in Durban, ‘We are committed to fulfilling these obligations, but it’s clear that our economy is in no state to generate sufficient funds to clear these arrears.’ As a result, by mid-2005, Mugabe had run up repayment arrears of $295 million to the IMF, and more than $1 billion to other lenders, including the World Bank and African Development Bank. The total foreign debt that is either in arrears or will come due in the next decade is $4.5 billion, far more than the national GDP in a given year.

Was Zimbabwe punished for failing to make most foreign debt payments since 1999? To almost everyone’s surprise, Mugabe was able to get away with the de facto default. No new long-term credit has been available, to be sure, but nor did the US Marines or other hostile military forces invade so to collect collateral, as was the practice a century earlier against defaulting Latin American countries.

Instead, once Zimbabwe fell into deep arrears to the IMF, a convoluted official procedure began, culminating a few months ago in the threat of expulsion. From 2001, the Zimbabwean finance ministry scrounged $1.4 million each quarter to make token payments on the debt, but from mid-2003 through 2004 found $16.5 million to send the IMF. This was also the point at which Zimbabwe ran out of petrol and many other essential imports.

Diplomatic scuffling

By August 2005, Mbeki assumed that his offer of a $500 million credit could influence the course of an elite transition, aiming at installing a neoliberal, low-intensity democracy regime. That model would slightly sideline Mugabe by 2008 at the latest; permit Zanu(PF) to retain power – possibly in a government of unity by coopting MDC leaders - with the friendlier face of a technocratic president (former neoliberal finance minister Simba Makoni is usually tipped for the job) even if Mugabe still controlled the ruling party itself; and then open the economic borders up much more to Johannesburg capital.

Mugabe didn’t play along. Showing an impressive resilience and desire to hold on to maximum power at all cost, he visited China in August and then snubbed Mbeki in a brutal diplomatic manner. At an African Union (AU) meeting in Addis Ababa, according to the Sunday Independent, Mugabe built an alliance of other leaders to ‘defeat a South African tactical move to win two permanent seats for Africa on the United Nations security council… Mugabe, Egypt and others spoke out against a compromise deal which South Africa had helped forge between the AU and the so-called G4, a coalition of four other nations seeking permanent seats on the security council - Germany, Japan, India and Brazil.’

‘Mbeki argued strongly at the AU summit in Addis Ababa in favour of the compromise as the only realistic way to get Africa permanent seats. But the Mugabe camp prevailed. The summit rejected the compromise deal that AU and G4 foreign ministers, including SA’s Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, agreed on at a meeting in London… Mugabe and others argued against this, saying the lack of a veto would relegate African permanent members to “second-class status”.’ Fortunately, the second-class citizenship he sought in the UN Security Council was not offered at the September heads of state summit. Hence a more serious fight can be waged at some stage, instead of legitimising a UN under Washington’s thumb.

This brings us back, though, to Mbeki’s vision that the IMF can be a vehicle for normalisation. As Nzimande reported to a Congress of SA Trade Unions central committee, the SACP was ‘extremely concerned about the danger of a loan amounting to little more than extending the crisis-ridden shelf-life of anti-worker, anti-poor authoritarian policies and practices. We call on our own government to show the maximum resolve in ensuring that there are very clear requirements attached to any loan. These requirements must include guarantees that the loan will not be squandered on elite consumption or repression. But the requirements must also embrace a much wider package of commitments with clear time-lines… These wider issues are, in fact, essential for resolving the present financial crisis.’

And then Mugabe pulled a card from his sleeve no one thought he had: in September he came up with $135 million from having scrounged all foreign currency available, and he paid the IMF a substantial downpayment, enough to earn a six-month reprieve on the expulsion threat. Mugabe promised $50 million more by March, and vowed to repay the full amount. (No one outside Pretoria really believes the IMF would expel Zimbabwe, given that China and many African regimes would oppose this in the IMF executive, where 15% of the vote would be enough to veto such a move.)

By all accounts, this was an insane gesture. Even the white business spokespeople who are most aggrieved by Mugabe’s dirigisme were opposed to the payment. The only explanation is Mugabe’s ego: it is so gargantuan that, under pressure from Pretoria, he ignored the extraordinary sacrifices being made by his citizens these past months, with every commodity in short supply, simply to massage his pride at repaying the IMF.

South African government officials were also surprised, and continue to maintain that negotiations for the additional $500 million are on track, merely delayed a bit. The Cabinet had made one other similar loan to a country so as to repay the IMF, three years earlier. It was Joseph Kabila’s unelected regime in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the $45 million loan by Pretoria allowed Kabila to clear enough of the old Mobutu arrears. Those debts should be declared ‘Odious’ in international law, but their payment by Pretoria gained Kabila a new IMF credit at the cost of renewed IMF control over the Congolese people.

The extent of Mbeki’s own commitment to getting the IMF back into Zimbabwe was revealed on October 15. Addressing a forum of African Editors, he explained, ‘We had indeed said that we were ready to assist, and the reason we wanted to assist was because we understood the implications of Zimbabwe's expulsion from the IMF. What it would mean, among other things, is that everybody who is owed something by Zimbabwe would demand immediately to be paid. You would even get to a situation where they would seize anything that was being exported out of Zimbabwe because of that debt.’ This is utter nonsense, as the IMF has never acquired much less used such power. Many creditors presently dealing with Zimbabwe have various forms of security, because the government’s likelihood of nonpayment has been demonstrated for six years already.
By the way, returning to our opening quote, it was Pretoria’s local government minister, Sidney Mufamadi, who in April this year warned that the IMF molds ‘the discourse within which policies are defined, the terms and concepts that circumscribe what can be thought and done.’ There is no better example of this than Pretoria’s latest subimperial gambit in Zimbabwe, combining high finance and venal politics.

But let’s also pause to consider Mufamadi’s own borrowing from the World Bank, in a loan that directly places Bretton Woods advisors in dozens of municipalities. The World Bank website gives away Mufamadi’s game: ‘The Municipal Financial Management Technical Assistance Project, totaling $15 million is the only active World Bank loan to South Africa. It supports the building of financial management capacity in more than 40 key municipalities around the country. The World Bank country office is also supporting the government in … [its] oversight role in municipal public/private partnerships.’

On the same site, the Bank brags about its ‘support to Johannesburg’s iGoli’ (the city’s privatisation policy), allegedly a ‘model’ for South Africa. In reality, Africa’s largest water corporatisation quickly became a world-renowned site of brutal disconnections, prepaid meters and substandard sanitation for low-income townships – as well as heroic resistance by the Anti-Privatisation Forum and Jubilee South Africa, which combined to protest Paul Wolfowitz’s Johannesburg visit in July.

In contrast to activists, the key politicians prefer to ‘talk left, walk right’. Once we dispense with the rhetoric, this surreal financial game of hide-and-seek from the IMF unveils imperial/subimperial/dictatorial power relations uniting Washington, Pretoria and Harare. It remains for critics of the regimes to pursue a democratic, anti-neoliberal strategy – and too, for international protest against the Bretton Woods Institutions to now intensify.

* Patrick Bond directs the University of KwaZulu-Natal Centre for Civil Society: he is author of ‘Uneven Zimbabwe: A Study of Finance, Development and Underdevelopment’ (1998) and coauthor of ‘Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice’ (2003). This article is excerpted from a longer version in the US journal ‘Against the Current’.

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